


3 1761 11764383 3







Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2022 with funding from  
University of Toronto

<https://archive.org/details/31761117643833>



Canadian  
Institute for  
International  
Peace and  
Security

360 Albert Street,  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1R 7X7

CAI  
IPS  
G71

# The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution



The Guide

15  
© 1990

Government  
Publications



CAI  
IPS  
-G71

**THE GUIDE  
TO CANADIAN POLICIES ON  
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT  
DEFENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION  
1990**

**WRITERS**

Marie-France Desjardins  
Johanne Di Donato  
Robin Hay

**EDITORS**

Roger Hill  
Ron Purver

**COPY EDITORS and  
PUBLICATION MANAGERS**

Veronica Baruffati  
Eva Bild

**ADMINISTRATIVE/  
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT**

Doina Cioiu

**TRANSLATION**

Anita Portier, Denis Bastien  
SOGESTRAN INC.

**October 1990  
ISBN 0-662-18122-0**



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### PREFACE

### INTRODUCTION

### SECTION I: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. Nuclear and Space Arms: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)	1
2. Nuclear and Space Arms: Defense and Space Arms Talks (DST)	9
3. Chemical and Biological Weapons	17
4. Canada and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones	33
5. Nuclear Testing	39
6. Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)	49
7. Open Skies	57
8. Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)	69
9. Nuclear Non-Proliferation	85
10. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space	95
11. Uranium and Tritium Exports	105
12. Verification	111
13. Arms Transfers	117

### SECTION II: DEFENCE

14. Arctic Sovereignty and Security	129
15. Cruise Missile Testing	147
16. North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)	155
17. Defence Planning and Procurement	163
18. The Defence Industry	175
19. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	179
20. Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF)	197
21. Peacekeeping and Observation	205



### **SECTION III: CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

22. Central America	223
23. The Middle East	247
24. Sub-Saharan Africa	269
25. Southern Asia	309
26. East Asia and the Pacific	323
27. International Terrorism	345

### **SECTION IV: SPECIAL TOPICS**

28. Central and Eastern Europe	355
29. Baltic States	393

### **APPENDICES**

1. Canadian Treaty Obligations	411
2. Canadian Armed Forces Order of Battle	415
3. Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping	421
4. Public Opinion	425
5. Strategic Nuclear Balance	429
6. Canada and Security at the United Nations	431



## PREFACE

*The Guide* reviews major developments in the field of international peace and security from July 1989 to June 1990, and surveys Canadian policy statements and Parliamentary debates. Concentrating on the areas specified in the Institute's mandate, it covers arms control and disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution.

I believe that *The Guide* is now recognized as a key resource for all Canadians who need to keep up with the critical changes in today's world and to reflect on their importance for this country. It is also intended as a reference volume for speakers, commentators and analysts who require ready, easily accessible information on recent Canadian contributions in the field of international affairs.

The last year has seen some massive changes on the international scene. Canada has responded to them, while at the same time pursuing such well-established goals as enhancing peace through the United Nations, seeking to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons, helping to resolve or at least contain the bitter conflicts ravaging many regions of the world, and countering international terrorism. Even prior to the tumultuous late summer of 1990 -- which will be covered in next year's *Guide* -- Canadians have had some particular national concerns, such as sovereignty and security in the Canadian Arctic, the aerospace surveillance of North America, and the management of re-equipment and policy review for national defence under conditions of rapid global change and budgetary austerity.

*The Guide* touches on last year's momentous developments in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe where they have affected the prospects for arms control and disarmament on such issues as the future of NATO and the question of modernizing short-range nuclear forces. There are special sections describing the principal events in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States and Canadian policies towards them. Critical events in Central America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific are also outlined, together with Canadian policy statements and Parliamentary comment on them. Since the period surveyed ends in June 1990, the section on the Middle East does not cover the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait or subsequent developments in the Gulf crisis.

Canada is affected by, and itself affects, the changes going on in this complex, rapidly evolving and sometimes dangerous world. Broad public interest in these questions has been heightened by the breakdown of the Cold War and the new challenges that have emerged. We all have to think about the policies that our country should pursue if it wants to contribute effectively to strengthening international peace and security. I hope that this fifth annual edition of *The Guide* will contribute by helping readers to trace recent trends in international affairs and to judge Canada's performance on the most critical issues before us today.



Bernard Wood  
Chief Executive Officer

## INTRODUCTION

*The Guide* is designed to provide Canadians with a readily accessible check list of issues in the field of peace and security. It seeks to identify the major policy issues to which Canada responded in the period between 1 July 1989 and 30 June 1990, to place them in context, and, where appropriate, to identify a range of Parliamentary comment on these issues.

In identifying official Canadian policies, we have relied entirely on public statements by Government leaders and responsible officials. The statements are either summarized or excerpted verbatim.

*The Guide* is not itself designed as a commentary, and contains no interpretative opinion, although the choice of excerpts and statements inevitably requires editorial discretion. Our purpose, therefore, is to assemble materials which will give to the interested reader a basic reference source on Canadian policies in the field of peace and security, and, at the same time, to indicate the scope for further enquiry.

In organizing the contents, we have chosen to follow the subject order identified in the mandate of the Institute, viz: arms control and disarmament, defence, and conflict resolution. The reader may wish to note that the last category -- conflict resolution -- has been defined for the present purposes as Canadian responses to major regional conflict issues.

Each entry is organized under five headings, as follows:

*BACKGROUND* provides an account of the basic issue. It seeks to avoid excessive detail, but to draw on recent material as appropriate in order to set the context of current policy issues. Where Canadian policy prior to 1989 was integral to the development of the issue itself, or where it is necessary for an understanding of the current Canadian position, it is included under this heading.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials, and identifies recent developments in Canadian policy.

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT* is intended primarily to capture the formal response of the opposition parties. For the most part it relies on statements and questions in the House of Commons by designated spokespersons on foreign and defence policy. Committee hearings have been used primarily in the Background section, and when appropriate, in describing the current Canadian position.

*CURRENT REFERENCES* is designed to indicate only some of the most recent materials relevant to the issue; the section is not intended to be an extensive reference list.

*FURTHER READING* contains a limited number of earlier references which the reader may wish to consult for more detailed background.

There have been a number of changes in this year's *Guide*, reflecting the ebb and flow of international events. Thus, in Section I, a new entry has been added on *Open Skies*. In Section II,

previous years' entries on *The Defence Budget* and *Major Equipment Acquisitions* have been combined into a single new entry entitled *Defence Planning and Procurement*, while an entirely new entry has been added on *Short-Range Nuclear Forces*. Two entries have been dropped from Section III: one on North Africa, given the dearth of developments and/or Canadian comment over the past year; and the other on Human Rights, in light of the establishment of a new Institute in this country devoted specifically to this subject.

In addition, an entirely new Section has been created entitled "Special Topics," meant to embrace subjects of particular interest during the past year which have not been covered in previous issues of *The Guide*. Two subjects have been chosen as "Special Topics" this year, based on their intrinsic international significance and the degree of attention paid to them by the Canadian public and policy-makers: the events in Central and Eastern Europe, and those in the Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union. Many momentous events have occurred too late for inclusion in this year's *Guide*, including the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait and the reunification of Germany. These, as well as other topics, will be given full consideration in next year's edition.

The bulk of the individual entries were researched and written by Marie-France Desjardins, Johanne Di Donato, and Robin Hay, all of the Institute's Research Division. Ms. Desjardins was responsible for entry numbers 3-5, 9-13, 15 and 27, as well as Appendices 4 and 6; Ms. Di Donato for entry numbers 21-26, as well as Appendix 3; and Mr. Hay for entry numbers 1-2, 6-8, 14, and 16-20, as well as Appendices 1-2 and 5. In addition, student intern Réjean Hallée of Carleton University and Research staff member Karen Ballentine collaborated to produce entry number 28 on *Central and Eastern Europe*, while John Wright of the Institute's Information Services Division contributed entry number 29 on *The Baltic States*.

Ron Purver, Senior Research Fellow, and Roger Hill, Research Director, have edited the volume, Mr. Purver being responsible primarily for those entries submitted in English (i.e., those by Ms. Di Donato and Messrs. Hay and Wright); and Mr. Hill for those submitted in French (i.e., those by Ms. Desjardins and Mr. Hallée).

As in past years, there are many people to thank for what has become an Institute-wide effort. Eva Bild and Veronica Baruffati of the Public Programmes Division copy-edited and managed the publication of *The Guide*, being assisted in the copy-editing by Hélène Samson, also of Public Programmes. Doina Cioiu, Administrator of the Research Division and "present at the creation" of *The Guide*, continued in her role as its "midwife," providing invaluable editorial and technical assistance. Thanks are also due to Anita Portier and Denis Bastien of Sogestran Inc., for both copy-editing and translation; the entire staff of the Institute Library, whose assistance was called upon throughout the year; and Sylvain Lemieux of Information Services, for his tireless work on the computers.

We welcome comments on *The Guide's* utility and format, as well as suggestions for improvement.

Ron Purver  
Co-editor

## SECTION I - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)	1
<i>Background</i>	1
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	6
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	7
2. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (DST)	9
<i>Background</i>	9
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	12
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	14
3. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	18
<i>Background</i>	18
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	25
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	28
4. CANADA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES	33
<i>Background</i>	33
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	34
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	35
5. NUCLEAR TESTING	39
<i>Background</i>	39
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	42
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	44
6. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS)	49
<i>Background</i>	49
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	54
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	55
7. OPEN SKIES	57
<i>Background</i>	57
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	61
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	66

8. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)	69
<i>Background</i>	69
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	79
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	81
9. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION	85
<i>Background</i>	85
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	88
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	90
10. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE	95
<i>Background</i>	95
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	97
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	100
11. URANIUM AND TRITIUM EXPORTS	105
<i>Background</i>	105
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	108
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	109
12. VERIFICATION	111
<i>Background</i>	111
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	114
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	115
13. ARMS TRANSFERS	117
<i>Background</i>	117
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	118
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	121



## SECTION I - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

### 1. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

#### BACKGROUND

On 8 January 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin negotiations "concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." Known as the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST), the discussions were divided into three distinct negotiations, involving: strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and defence and space weapons.

Significant progress was made in the NST with the signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Washington on 8 December 1987. The Treaty banned all US and Soviet land-based INF missiles (those with ranges of between 1,000 and 5,500 km). For the Soviet Union this meant the destruction of 1,846 missiles; for the United States, 847. Short-range INF, namely SS-12/22 and SS-12/23 missiles on the Soviet side and Pershing 1A missiles on the American, were to be destroyed within eighteen months of the ratification of the Treaty. Long-range INF, including SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 ballistic missiles and SSC-X-4 cruise missiles (stored, but never deployed) on the Soviet side and Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) on the American, were to be destroyed within three years of ratification. The instruments of ratification were exchanged by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Moscow Summit on 1 June 1988.

Both sides began inspecting each other's bases and factories to verify the information contained in the Treaty in July 1988. On 1 August, the Soviet Union destroyed the first of its missiles, four SS-12s, while the US began destruction of its Pershing IIs on 8 September. By early May 1990 the USSR had destroyed 1,615 missiles and the United States, 486. Generally speaking, both the US and the Soviet Union were satisfied with each other's record of compliance with the Agreement. However, American consternation was aroused when in March 1990, SS-23 missiles were discovered in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ronald Lehman said on 7 March that the United States was "working on the theory that it was just a mistake, that the Soviets just lost or forgot about those missiles."<sup>1</sup> The Soviets claimed that the missiles were transferred without authorization prior to the signing of the INF Treaty and that they bore non-nuclear warheads. In spite of the Soviet claim that the newly discovered SS-23s were not covered by the INF Treaty, arrangements were made to destroy them.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Arms Control Reporter* (1990), p. 403.B.745.

Success in the remaining two areas covered by the NST has been more difficult to achieve. No official name has been selected for the group dealing with strategic nuclear arms, though it is often referred to by the name of the earlier Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). START, which ended without agreement in December 1983, was preceded by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I (1969-1972) and II (1972-1979). Each of these negotiations dealt with intercontinental, strategic nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons are generally defined as those weapons capable of reaching the territory of one superpower from that of the other (specified in SALT II as those with a range in excess of 5,500 km).

At their November 1985 Summit in Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in principle to fifty percent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, together with effective measures of verification. Further details were agreed on at their December 1987 Washington Summit, including: a 6,000-warhead limit on no more than 1,600 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) and bombers; a sub-limit of 4,900 ICBM and SLBM warheads; a fifty percent cut in the number of Soviet "heavy" ICBMs to 154, with ten warheads each; a ceiling on the aggregate throw-weight of ICBMs and SLBMs at fifty percent of the Soviet level at the time; a separate ceiling (outside the 6,000 warhead limit) on long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs); and certain methods of verification of an accord. In addition, the two sides agreed on the "counting rules" for determining how many warheads would be assumed to be carried by each type of ballistic missile.

By the end of the eleventh round of START in August 1989, a number of critical issues remained in dispute, including:

- Soviet insistence that an agreement on START be linked to an agreement in the defence and space talks;
- counting rules for ALCMs, with the US proposing ten per bomber, regardless of the number an aircraft was capable of carrying, and the Soviets wanting to count the maximum number each type of bomber was equipped to carry. The two sides also disagreed on the range limitations for ALCMs, with the US wanting to include only those with ranges of over 1,500 km, while the Soviet Union wanted those with ranges over 600 km included;
- the US demand for a ban on mobile ICBMs, unless adequate ways of verifying their numbers could be found;
- the numerical limits on SLCMs, with the Soviets insisting on strict limits while the US wanted to exclude SLCM from START, since they felt there was no way to verify a ban on such missiles that did not compromise their policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons onboard ships;
- the question of warhead sublimits, with the US insisting on a sublimit of between 3,000 and 3,300 warheads on ICBMs and the Soviets declining to accept that figure unless a similar one was applied to SLBMs;

- the US insistence on a ban on heavy ICBM modernization; and
- the Soviet position that there be a ban on either country contributing to the modernization of a third country's nuclear systems; for the US this would preclude support for the nuclear deterrent force of Great Britain.

On 20 September 1989, US Secretary of State James Baker responded to Soviet criticism that the US was dragging its feet on arms control, by announcing that it would drop its demand for a ban on mobile ICBMs, provided that Congress approved financing for both the MX and Midgetman mobile missiles.

More significant progress related to the START talks was made during two days of discussion between Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on 22 and 23 September. During those meetings it was revealed that the Soviet Union had dropped its insistence that a START treaty be accompanied by an agreement on Defence and Space Arms that restricted the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviets did reserve the right, however, to abrogate a future START agreement if the US were to conduct SDI tests that violated the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Also at Jackson Hole, Baker and Shevardnadze agreed to conduct trial verification inspections of each other's nuclear arsenals prior to the signing of a START treaty, and to provide each other with at least two weeks' notification of one strategic exercise per year involving heavy nuclear-capable bombers. They announced as well that progress had been made on ways to monitor limits on mobile missiles, and to define ballistic missiles in terms of the missile and its associated launcher. Finally, in a significant move towards the US position, Shevardnadze suggested at Jackson Hole that SLCMs "could be limited outside of the text of a START treaty on the basis of reciprocal obligations."

At the Bush-Gorbachev Summit in Malta in early December, the two sides agreed to resolve the major disputes in START by June 1990 and to sign a treaty before the end of that year.

From 8 February to 10 February 1990 talks were held between Baker and Shevardnadze in Moscow. As a result, the two sides moved closer to resolving their differences over the counting of stored ballistic missiles, limits on SLCMs and ALCMs, and the issue of missile telemetry. They agreed to limit only those stored or undeployed missiles tested from mobile launchers. Regarding SLCMs, the US formally accepted the formula proposed by the USSR at Jackson Hole, namely that each side exchange binding declarations with the other side on the number of SLCMs deployed. These limits would be separate from, but remain in force for the duration of, a START treaty, with each side pledging not to exceed its declared number.

Differences remained over range specifications and whether or not to include non-nuclear SLCMs in the agreement, as desired by the Soviets.<sup>2</sup>

The USSR conceded to the US position regarding ALCMs after being reassured that the Americans would make a commitment that the actual number of ALCMs carried by a bomber would not exceed a certain unspecified number. The Soviet concession meant that in START, US strategic bombers capable of carrying up to twenty cruise missiles would be counted as carrying only ten, while Soviet bombers capable of carrying a dozen or more would be counted as carrying just eight. The Soviets would be allowed forty percent more ALCM-equipped bombers to offset the greater number of missiles permitted on each American bomber.<sup>3</sup> Differences over ALCM ranges were not solved, and the two sides still disagreed about how to ensure that conventionally armed cruise missiles would be exempt.

The two sides also agreed on the outline of a treaty provision specifying that missile telemetry would not be encoded, in order to allow for interception by the other side. However, the US insisted on preserving the right to omit key technical parameters, so that Moscow would remain in the dark about some of the data it intercepts. Moscow's preference was for all data to be transmitted in a clear and readily understood manner.

On 5 and 6 April 1990, Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze met in Washington in an effort to clear away the remaining obstacles to a START agreement, among other things. Other than the announcement that the US-Soviet Summit would take place from 30 May to 3 June, little headway was made. In fact, the Soviets seemed to go back on the SLCM agreement reached in February. Now they insisted that assurances on the size of the SLCM force of each side had to be codified in the treaty. Mr. Shevardnadze also asked the US to commit itself to follow-on strategic nuclear arms negotiations immediately upon completion of a START treaty, prior to Senate ratification. The Americans refused to make such a commitment pending the outcome of the ratification process and a discussion of what arms would be included in any "START II."<sup>4</sup>

Immediately after the Baker-Shevardnadze meetings it was revealed that the two sides had discussed a plan, secretly and informally put forward by the US the month before, for banning all land-based multiple-warhead missiles. Under the plan, a ban on *mobile* land-based missiles with more than one warhead would be included in an initial START agreement. In a follow-on agreement, to be negotiated after the current talks were completed, all land-based, multiple-warhead missiles would be eliminated. In a letter delivered to Bush from Gorbachev by Shevardnadze on 6 April the Soviet leader countered that any ban on multiple-warhead missiles

---

<sup>2</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "US and Soviets Appear to Agree on Main Elements of Arms Treaty," *New York Times*, 11 February 1990, pp. A1 and A20. *Arms Control Reporter* (1990), p. 611.B.613.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 611.B.614.

<sup>4</sup> Don Oberdorfer and R. Jeffrey Smith, "US-Soviet Summit Dates Advanced," *Washington Post*, 6 April 1990, p. A1.

should include sea-based missiles as well as those on land.<sup>5</sup> The majority of Soviet nuclear warheads are atop land-based ballistic missiles, while the majority of US nuclear warheads are based at sea.

In May, Mr. Baker flew to the Soviet Union armed with a host of new proposals intended to break the START logjam in order that a declaration on the main principles of an agreement could be announced at the US-Soviet summit in June. After four days of tense and often marathon-length negotiating sessions, US and Soviet officials reportedly "resolved all major obstacles to a strategic arms reduction treaty."<sup>6</sup> The "major obstacles" that were overcome involved the issues of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States conceded to the Soviet position that ALCMs with a range of 600 kilometres or more would be included in an agreement. In return the Soviets agreed to the US counting rules, and also to exempt conventionally-armed ALCMs that could be distinguished from nuclear versions. This included the Tacit Rainbow, an American conventional cruise missile designed to suppress enemy radar, which was in the testing phase. According to the agreed counting rule, "each current and future US heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs will count as 10 warheads and may actually be equipped for no more than 20 ALCMs.... [E]ach current and future Soviet heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs will count as 8 warheads and may actually be equipped for no more than 12 ALCMs."<sup>7</sup> It was agreed that the US could apply the counting rule to up to 150 heavy bombers and the Soviets to 210. Cruise missile-capable bombers in excess of those numbers would be counted as carrying the ALCMs for which they were equipped.<sup>8</sup>

The two sides agreed that SLCMs would not be constrained in a START treaty but instead would be included in a non-verifiable, politically binding -- but not legally binding -- declaration outside the treaty. Declarations would take place annually for the duration of a START treaty specifying the maximum number of SLCMs each side would have deployed "for each of the following five treaty years," with that number not to exceed 880.<sup>9</sup>

A number of issues remained in dispute, including numerical limits on mobile land-based missile warheads; restrictions on flight testing or modernization of existing heavy ballistic missiles, such as the Soviet SS-18; and the question of the Soviet Backfire bomber, which the Americans insisted posed an intercontinental threat, despite its limited range.

---

<sup>5</sup> See: R. Jeffrey Smith, "Gorbachev Cool to Bush's Missile Proposal." *Washington Post*, 9 April 1990, p. A10; and Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Rebuffed by Cheney on Plan Curbing Sea Arms." *New York Times*, 16 April 1990, pp. A1 and A8.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "US and Soviets Close to a Pact on 30% Cut in Nuclear Missiles; Agree on Chemical-Arms Curbs." *New York Times*, 20 May 1990, p. A1.

<sup>7</sup> USIS, *Wireless File*, EUR403, 5 July 1990, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

At the Washington Summit on 1 June 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev issued a joint statement outlining the text of a prospective START treaty and reaffirming "their determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year."<sup>10</sup> As expected, the outline stipulated that each side would be restricted to no more than 6,000 deployed warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (submarine-launched ballistic missiles and launchers, land-based ballistic missiles and launchers, and heavy bombers). No more than 4,900 of the warhead total could be deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs and no more than 1,540 on heavy ICBMs. The May agreement on cruise missiles was incorporated in the outline, and mobile missile warheads were limited to 1,100, though verification of their missiles was left unresolved. The treaty would have a duration of fifteen years unless superseded before that time by a subsequent agreement.

The counting rules for ALCMs and for heavy bombers not equipped to carry them but able to carry gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles, as well as the failure to include in the prospective agreement either non-deployed (reserve) missiles launched from silos, submarines and bombers or SLCMs, meant that the reduction in strategic warheads of the two signatories would be on the order of thirty to thirty-five percent, rather than the fifty percent agreed to in principle by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev at their November 1985 summit in Geneva. The June 1990 summit also failed to resolve the issues of the Backfire bomber and heavy ICBM modernization, or a new one concerning the "non-circumvention" clause. The US wanted to make sure that the latter would not interfere with its traditional assistance to the British strategic nuclear programme.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev signed a statement of goals for a follow-on START II accord in which they would "seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles as a whole, including measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs."<sup>12</sup>

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Reduction of the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals remains one of the Canadian Government's main arms control priorities. Speaking in Moscow in November 1989 Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

A pre-requisite to genuine peace is the reduction of conventional and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the correction of imbalances in these forces, as well as the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides to minimum levels consistent with basic security requirements.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> "Text of the Agreement on Long-Range Arms." *New York Times*, 2 June 1990, p. A8.

<sup>11</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Talks Fail to End Disputes on Long-Range Arms." *New York Times*, 2 June 1990, p. A4.

<sup>12</sup> "Bush-Gorbachev Summit: Agreeing to Agree." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 13 no. 24 (16 June 1990), p. 1200.

<sup>13</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, *Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney Prime Minister of Canada*, Moscow, 20 November 1989.

The joint Canadian-Soviet political declaration signed in Moscow declared that both sides favoured progress toward "the early conclusion of negotiations to reduce by 50 percent USA and USSR strategic offensive arms."<sup>14</sup>

Some aspects of the prospective START agreement worried Canadian officials, however. Ambassador for Disarmament Margaret Mason told a Commons committee in November 1989 that Canada had "signalled our concern over the setting aside of sea-launched cruise missiles [in START] and we would certainly hope that issue continues to be addressed."<sup>15</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In the House on 27 November 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie criticized the Prime Minister for failing to address the issue of SLCMs in his statement regarding the Moscow visit :

There is the whole question of naval arms control and the proliferation of submarine-launched cruise missiles. There was not a mention of it in the statement by the Prime Minister. This area of growing proliferation of nuclear weapons is of increasing concern.<sup>16</sup>

On 19 December 1989, in the House, Mr. Blaikie raised the issue of the MX Rail Garrison Program. He suggested that Canada protest the planned stationing of MX-equipped rail cars in Grand Forks, North Dakota, close to the Canadian border. Furthermore, he urged the government to speak now against this "inappropriate escalation of the arms race" and, failing the removal of the MX rail cars, to seek a guarantee that these trains would "never move in the direction of Canada."<sup>17</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Arbatov, Alexei G., "START: Good, Bad or Neutral?" *Survival*, vol. 31 no. 4 (July/August 1989), pp. 291-300.

Barral, Graham, *START, Stability and Arms Control*. Bradford, England: University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, *Peace Research Report* No. 25, June 1990 (89 pp.).

Boyer, Yves, "La conclusion prochaine des START: Triomphe de la raison, ou essoufflement des champions?" *Defense nationale* (Decembre 1989), pp. 11-19.

Cox, David, *A Review of the Geneva Negotiations: 1989-1990*. Ottawa: CIIPS, *Background Paper* No. 32, May 1990 (8 pp.).

Duquette, Christopher M., "Ban the SLCM." *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 116 no. 6 (June 1990), pp. 34-38.

---

<sup>14</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, *Press Release*, 22 November 1989.

<sup>15</sup> *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade*, No. 24 (7 November 1989), p. 23.

<sup>16</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6243.

<sup>17</sup> *Commons Debates*, 19 December 1989, p. 7192.

Isaacs, John, "START Makes Sense Despite Oversell." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 46 no. 5 (June 1990), p. 3.

Robinson, Bill, "Big Promises, Small Cuts: Nuclear and Conventional Arms Control." *Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 11 no. 1 (March 1990), pp. 3-5.

Yost, David, "The Most Difficult Question: Controlling Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles." *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 115 no. 9 (September 1989), pp. 61-70.

#### FURTHER READING

Barrett, John, "Arms Control and Canada's Security Policy." *International Journal*, vol. 42 no. 4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 731-768.

Boulden, Jane, *Cruise Missiles and Strategic Arms Control*. Ottawa: CIIPS, Background Paper No. 24, January 1989 (8 pp.).

Labrie, Roger P. (ed.), *SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues, 1972-1979*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979 (736 pp.).

Legget, Jeremy K., and Lewis, Patricia M., "Verifying a START Agreement." *Survival*, vol. 30 no. 4 (September/October 1988), pp. 409-428.

Smith, Gerard, *Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1980 (556 pp.).

Talbott, Strobe, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*. New York: Random House, 1985 (390 pp.).

Talbott, Strobe, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II*. New York: Harper's, 1980 (335 pp.).

Talbott, Strobe, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988 (416 pp.).

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Cruise Missile Testing

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Defence and Space Arms (DST)

## 2. NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (DST)

### *BACKGROUND*

The Defense and Space Arms Talks began in Geneva on 27 March 1985, as part of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) between the Soviet Union and the United States. The NST also deals with long-range strategic nuclear weapons control (see **NST:START**). The aim of the Defense and Space Arms Talks is to prevent an arms race in outer space and in strategic defences. This issue has drawn considerable attention since the announcement by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or, as it is often referred to, Star Wars).

SDI aims to provide defence against incoming ballistic missiles. At present, it calls for research, development and testing of new weapon technologies, many of which would be based in outer space. These weapons may include "exotic" technologies such as lasers and particle beams, as well as more conventional anti-satellite (ASAT) and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) weapons. Naturally, there is a close link between this project and the status and future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the United States in May 1972.

The ABM Treaty was the result of increased interest in anti-ballistic missile defence, on the part of both the US and USSR, throughout the 1960s. In the United States, the ABM issue sparked a prolonged public debate, centred on two main concerns: the ease with which the defences could be overcome by large numbers of cheaper offensive missiles, and the possibility that ABM deployments might destabilize deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction. This concept, which had become the basis of nuclear deterrence, requires that both sides remain vulnerable to attack, thereby preventing aggression by either one.

The ABM Treaty prohibits both sides from deploying a nation-wide ABM defence and limits each to two ABM deployment areas, later amended on 3 July 1974 to one area. Extensive verification measures are provided for in the Treaty, which also established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to deal with questions of interpretation and compliance. The United States Senate ratified the Treaty by a vote of eighty-eight to two.

During the 1970s both the United States and the Soviet Union continued research into ballistic missile defence. In 1976, the US dismantled the ABM system it had deployed at a missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Soviet Union has kept its ABM deployment around Moscow.

In his March 1983 announcement, President Reagan stated that the United States would pursue a new programme, SDI, aimed at providing a defence that would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." Although he initially stated that SDI was only a research programme and would be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty, the Administration adopted a "new" interpretation of the Treaty which would allow the US to carry out tests and development of systems previously considered prohibited by it.

The interpretation of the ABM Treaty has, therefore, become an issue of considerable debate, centring on how ABM systems based on new technologies are dealt with by the Treaty. The key to the debate lies in Article V of the Treaty which states that:

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

Proponents of the new or "broad" interpretation maintain that the systems and components referred to in Article V are defined by Article II. The use of the phrase "currently consisting of" as part of the definition of a system in Article II, according to this interpretation, means that only systems based on 1972 technology (current at the time the Treaty was signed) are banned. This would mean that systems based on new technology in the basing modes listed were not affected.

The traditional or "narrow" interpretation holds that Article V clearly bans all sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based systems and components, whether they are based on 1972 technology or not. According to this interpretation, the phrase "currently consisting of" was used in Article II only to demonstrate the functional nature of the definition, not to exclude future technologies.

The Soviet Union has stated that it believes the narrow interpretation to be the only valid interpretation of the Treaty. Indeed, until 1985 this was the only interpretation held by the United States. The Soviets have stood by this position at the Defense and Space Arms Talks, insisting that the testing of ABM systems and components must be restricted by the traditional interpretation. The United States at the Defense and Space Arms Talks has focussed on discussing the effects of the relationship between offence- and defence-based systems on the strategic balance; attempting to negotiate a smooth transition from an offense-dominated to a defence-dominated military structure; and raising concerns over possible Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, especially concerning the radar site at Krasnoyarsk, in central Siberia.

Both sides long used the 10 December 1987 Joint Statement from the Washington Summit as the basis for an agreement in negotiations that have taken place since. At Washington, they agreed to have their negotiators work out "an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time." Intensive discussions on strategic stability were to begin not later than three years before the end of the specified non-withdrawal period. Failing agreement in these discussions, each side would be free to pursue its own course of action once the non-withdrawal period was over. The general wording of the Joint Statement, however, left open the question of the narrow versus the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

On 15 January 1988, at the ninth round of the NST talks, the Soviets tabled a draft protocol to the proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty. During the ten-year non-withdrawal period suggested in the proposal, testing of ABM systems and components would be restricted by the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The United States rejected the

Soviet-proposed Protocol, arguing that a START Treaty should not be tied to restrictions on SDI. On 22 January 1988, the United States presented a draft treaty intended to provide a basis for a transition to a defence-oriented military structure by allowing for development, testing, and deployment of advanced missile defences.

On 22 April 1988, during a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow, the Soviets presented a new draft agreement. However, they have refused to develop a Joint Draft Treaty text, as proposed by the US.

From 24 to 31 August 1988 the third ABM Treaty Review Conference took place. Prior to the Conference, attention was focussed on whether or not the US would charge the Soviet Union with a "material breach" of the Treaty, as possible justification for an American withdrawal from it. Shortly before the beginning of the Conference, however, the United States announced it would postpone its decision until later. The Review Conference ended, unlike its two predecessors, without a joint statement reaffirming the Treaty's aims and purposes.

As a result of its strategic review in early 1989, the Bush Administration declared that it would take a somewhat different approach to the issue of SDI than did the Reagan Administration. This would involve a more limited view of what to expect from SDI and lower appropriations for research. For fiscal year 1990, requests for SDI funds were reduced from \$5.9 billion to \$4.9 billion;<sup>1</sup> funding requests for the next five years were reduced from \$41 billion to \$33 billion. Priority has shifted within the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) from developing a system of large satellites from which up to ten interceptor rockets each would be launched against incoming warheads, to a system called "Brilliant Pebbles," involving thousands of smaller space-based rockets. In July 1989, by a margin of 248 to 175, the US Congress voted to cut SDI funding for 1990 from the \$4.9 billion requested by President Bush to \$3.1 billion.

On 21 September, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivered a letter from Secretary General Gorbachev to President Bush detailing significant changes in the Soviet position on arms control. The contents of the letter were made public on 22 and 23 September during the Jackson Hole, Wyoming, meetings between Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker. Reversing its previous position on the issue, Gorbachev wrote that the Soviet Union would agree to a START treaty without first receiving assurances that the US would not deploy a space-based ABM system. However, Moscow reserved the right to abrogate any future START treaty in the event of a US move to deploy a strategic defence system that contravened the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. As part of this proposed "delinking" of START and SDI, the Soviets asked that both sides agree in writing to this abrogation clause.

Also at the Jackson Hole meetings, the Soviets announced that they had decided unconditionally to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar station. At the same time, they reiterated their concerns about US radar stations at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales Moor, in Great Britain. One month later, on 23 October, Shevardnadze, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet,

---

<sup>1</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Stars Wars' Fading as Major Element of US Strategy." *New York Times*, 28 September 1989, pp. A1 and A11.

admitted the Soviets had made a mistake in building the Krasnoyarsk radar. It had been built on the wrong site, he said, and constituted a violation of the ABM Treaty. On 28 May 1990 it was announced by US and Soviet officials that dismantlement of the thirty-story-high radar, which had cost the Soviets several hundred billion rubles to construct, had begun.<sup>2</sup>

At the conclusion of the Jackson Hole meetings, Secretary Baker had invited Soviet experts to visit SDI research facilities at Los Alamos and San Juan, Capistrano. The first visits by the Soviets to these stations took place on 15 December 1989 at San Juan and on 18 to 19 December 1989 at Los Alamos.

On 26 September 1989 the US Senate voted by a margin of sixty-six to thirty-four to cut \$800 million from the Administration's proposed budget for SDI. This compared to the \$1.8 billion cut proposed by Congress in July. Following the Senate vote, negotiators for both chambers set to work reconciling the different figures. In November, a compromise was announced that, for the first time, actually cut spending on SDI. By its terms, the Pentagon would be allowed to spend \$3.57 billion on SDI for fiscal year 1990. For 1991 the Bush Administration is asking for approximately US\$4.4 billion in SDI funds.<sup>3</sup>

The 12th round of the Defense and Space Arms Talks began on 29 September. On 3 October the chief US negotiator, Henry Cooper, stepped down. He was replaced in mid-October by David Smith. On 5 December, three days before the end of the round, the US tabled a new draft treaty text that did not, however, constitute a major change in the American position.

On 22 January 1990, Round 13 began. During the round, the Soviets backed off their insistence upon a written clause permitting withdrawal from START if the US deployed SDI.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In the past five years the Government of Canada has declared both that it is in favour of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and that it is not prepared to become involved in government-to-government participation in the SDI programme.

On 26 March 1985, Canada and the other NATO allies, as well as Australia, Japan and Israel, received a letter from US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, inviting them to participate in the SDI research programme. On 7 September 1985, after internal Government study and a set of public Parliamentary hearings, Canada refused the offer of government-to-government participation but left open the possibility that private companies could compete for

---

<sup>2</sup> Don Oberdorfer and Ann Devroy, "Soviets Dismantle Disputed Radar." *Washington Post*, 29 May 1990, p. A1.

<sup>3</sup> Peter Grier, "Star Wars Future May Rest on Test of New Rocket." *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 June 1990, p. 1.

SDI contracts. Of the allies contacted by the US, five nations--the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Israel, and Japan -- did sign Memoranda of Understanding to participate in SDI.

The Canadian Government has repeatedly expressed its belief that while it does not want to get involved directly in SDI research, it is only prudent to have some such research pursued in the West. This view was elaborated by External Affairs Minister Clark on 5 March 1987, following a meeting with Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to President Reagan on arms control issues. Having expressed Canadian support for continued US adherence to the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Mr. Clark stated:

Any move to a broader interpretation could have significant political and strategic ramifications for international stability and security....Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern.

He went on to say:

Canada has expressed its support for the Strategic Defence Initiative research program as a prudent measure in light of significant similar Soviet activity in the field of ballistic missile defence. We believe, however, that any transition to a greater dependence on strategic defences should be undertaken on a mutually agreed basis by both superpowers and should be combined with significant reductions in strategic offensive forces....[The] SDI program should continue to be pursued within the current restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

Assurances from Mr. Shultz that the US considered premature any decision to deploy a ballistic missile defence were welcomed by the Canadian Government.

In a speech before a meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Quebec City in May 1987, Prime Minister Mulroney stated that strategic defences must meet criteria that had been outlined previously by Mr. Nitze -- cost effectiveness, survivability, and affordability -- along with two other criteria: "extreme care must be taken to ensure that defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike" and "we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process...."<sup>5</sup>

According to a United States General Accounting Office report issued in February 1990, Canadian companies, as of 31 March 1989, had received four of the sixty-seven SDI contracts awarded to foreign firms.<sup>6</sup> The total value of the Canadian contracts was US\$1.9 million. In addition, Canadian firms had been awarded six SDI subcontracts worth US\$775,000.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Department of External Affairs *Statement* 87/14, 5 March 1987, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address before the North Atlantic Assembly," 23 May 1987, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> United States General Accounting Office, *Strategic Defense Initiative Program: Extent of Foreign Participation* (Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives), February 1990, p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no comment in the House of Commons on the issue of the Defense and Space Arms Talks during this reporting period. In past years, questions were raised in Parliament over Canadian Government involvement in SDI contracts to Canadian industry. In November 1987 the involvement of the Canadian Commercial Corporation as a prime contractor for an SDI contract was raised in the House. It was argued that the CCC, as a Crown Corporation, was an agent of the federal Government, and that its involvement therefore ran counter to the Government's commitment not to participate in SDI projects. The Government responded that the purpose of the CCC was to act as an agent for Canadian companies and that its involvement was limited to this purpose.<sup>8</sup>

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Bunn, Matthew, *Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security*. Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1990 (221 pp.).

Carter, Ashton B., "Testing Weapons in Space." *Scientific American*, vol. 261 no. 1 (July 1989), pp. 33-40.

Cooper, Henry F., "The Defence and Space Talks -- Small Steps Towards Agreement." *NATO Review*, vol. 37 no. 4 (August 1989), pp. 11-16.

Gardner, Anthony, "The Alliance and Missile Defence." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 16 no. 2 (Winter 1990), pp. 215-240.

Scheffer, David J., "Nouveau Law and Foreign Policy." *Foreign Policy* No. 76 (Fall 1989), pp. 44-65.

---

<sup>8</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 November 1987, p. 10829. See also Chapter 21, "Canada - US: Research on the Strategic Defence Initiative," in: David Cox and Mary Taylor (eds.), *A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution, 1986-87*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1987, esp. pp. 140-143.

### FURTHER READING

Croft, Stuart, *The Impact of Strategic Defences on European-American Relations in the 1990s*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Paper* No. 238, Spring 1989 (66 pp.).

Daggett, Stephen, and English, Robert D., "Assessing Soviet Strategic Defense." *Foreign Policy* No. 70 (Spring 1988), pp. 129-149.

Durch, William J., *The Future of the ABM Treaty*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Paper* No. 223, Summer 1987 (80 pp.).

Fainberg, Anthony, "Limited Missile Defenses -- What Can They Protect?" *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 3 (April 1989), pp.17-22.

Garthoff, Raymond L., *Policy vs. Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987 (117 pp.).

Lin, Herbert, *New Weapons Technologies and the ABM Treaty*. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Publishers Inc., 1988 (95 pp.).

Purver, Ronald, *Has the ABM Treaty a Future?* Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 18, February 1988 (7 pp.).

United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *SDI Technology Survivability and Software*. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, May 1988 (282 pp.).

Weston, William C., "L'importance stratégique de l'espace pour les besoins militaires futurs du Canada." *Études internationales*, vol. 19 no. 3 (September 1988), pp. 493-500.

### CROSS REFERENCES

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)  
North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)



### 3. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

#### *BACKGROUND*

The use of chemical weapons during the First World War led the international community to increase its efforts to eliminate them. Such efforts were also extended to the related problem posed by the prospect of biological agents being used as weapons of warfare. By 1925, these initiatives resulted in the signing of the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of "asphyxiating poisonous or other gases, analogous liquids, materials or devices as well as bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare."

The Protocol's failure to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, however, led to a growing recognition of the need for more comprehensive restrictions. This goal has been actively pursued in various United Nations disarmament bodies, particularly during the last twenty years.

By 1971, the difficulties of concluding a single agreement banning both chemical and biological weapons led to a decision in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to consider them separately. Progress in the area of biological weapons control soon followed, producing a convention signed in 1972 which came into force three years later. Considered the first international agreement requiring actual disarmament measures, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of bacteriological or toxin weapons, and calls for the destruction of existing stocks. As of 1 January 1990, the Convention had been signed by 137 states and ratified by 112 of them.

The BWC has been subject to two review conferences aimed at ensuring its effectiveness, in 1980 and 1986. Among the concerns addressed at both conferences were the ability of the Convention to cover potential weapons developments made possible by new technologies, such as recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA); the absence of provisions restricting research on biological and toxin agents, together with the possible weapons applications of such research; and problems of verifying compliance with the Convention.

Such issues were highlighted by a stream of allegations beginning in the mid-1970s concerning the development and use of biological and toxin weapons by the superpowers and their allies. Particularly noteworthy were charges that the Soviet Union and its allies had used toxin weapons in South East Asia (i.e., yellow rain), and the inability to establish facts conclusively.

In an attempt to strengthen the BWC further, the final declaration of the Second Review Conference included a new arrangement allowing any state to call a meeting of an advisory group of experts, if a problem arises concerning application of the Convention. It also requires the signatories to begin work on measures to prevent or reduce any "ambiguities, doubts and suspicions concerning bacteriological activities and to improve international cooperation on the peaceful uses of microbiology." Specific measures included the exchange of information

concerning research facilities, biological products and the occurrence of rare diseases. In order to elaborate precise procedures for such exchanges, an *ad hoc* Group of scientific and technical experts from the states parties, met in Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987. The first such exchange of information began in the fall of 1987 and has been repeated each year thereafter.

A ban on chemical weapons has been on the UN agenda since 1968. Yet progress has materialized only recently. In 1980, the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) established the *ad hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons. By 1983, this Group had developed a consensus document identifying elements of a comprehensive treaty, and had outlined areas of agreement and disagreement.

An important step in the CD negotiations on chemical weapons was taken by the United States in 1984 when it tabled a draft treaty providing for verification by challenge inspections (i.e., short-notice, mandatory inspections of plants suspected of cheating). That year also saw general agreement that the destruction of existing chemical weapon stockpiles should be subject to systematic international inspection, although disagreement persisted over the particular inspection procedures to be used.

Concern over chemical weapons has been fed by recent allegations of their use. Since 1980, the UN Secretary-General has conducted several inquiries to ascertain the truth of such charges. A series of UN reports, beginning in 1984, confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf War by Iraq against Iran. On 1 March 1988, Iraq was again reported to have used chemical weapons -- this time against its own Kurdish population. A UN investigation of the alleged attacks was undertaken between 17 March and 4 April 1988. On 26 April, the UN Secretary-General presented a report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war to the Security Council. Although the report indicated the use of both mustard and nerve gas in the conflict, it did not identify the countries responsible for such action.

In the meantime, after a hiatus of eighteen years, the United States renewed its production of chemical weapons in December 1987. Such plans gained momentum in the wake of US statements alleging continued Soviet production of chemical weapons. In the fall of 1987, for instance, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, chief US delegate to the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, cited US estimates indicating that there were fourteen to twenty chemical weapon-production sites on Soviet territory whose whereabouts Moscow refused to disclose.

At the same time, there is evidence of the development and production of chemical weapons in the Third World. On 25 October 1988, US Director of Central Intelligence William Webster announced that Libya was building a chemical warfare complex at Rabta, about eighty kilometres southwest of Tripoli. According to US State Department officials, the plant, once completed, would be capable of producing nerve gas as well as large quantities of mustard gas. While Libya denied the charges, and maintained that the facility was a pharmaceutical plant that it would "open to the world when completed," US accusations and presentation of evidence to the contrary mounted during subsequent months. Such evidence also indicated that the technology used in the development of the Libyan facility was acquired from companies in both West

Germany and Japan. West German, US and Indian companies were also linked to the development of a chemical weapons capability by Iran.

In Geneva, negotiations on a chemical weapons ban moved closer to agreement on the definition of chemical weapons and on procedures for their destruction. Detailed provisions have been elaborated on the verification of declarations of existing stocks and the closure and elimination of production facilities, while useful work has also been done on the guidelines for an international inspectorate. On 11 August 1987, the USSR tabled a proposal on compulsory on-site inspection which came close to that put forth by the United States in 1984. The Soviet proposal accepted the concept of challenge inspection of all chemical weapon facilities with no right of refusal. It also provided for the entry of inspection teams within forty-eight hours of a challenge (previously the Soviets had insisted on the right to veto requests for challenge inspection, and did not require that inspections be so timely).

Additional headway toward a chemical weapons ban was made in October 1987, when representatives of forty-five nations visited a Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany, on the Volga River south of Moscow. The foreign delegations were shown nineteen different types of chemical munitions and a mobile complex used for their destruction. Bilateral talks between the superpowers also resulted in visits by US officials to a Soviet facility for the destruction of chemical weapons at Chapayesk, and by Soviet officials to a US chemical weapon facility at Tooele, Utah, in November 1987. Moreover, in December 1987, the Soviet Union declared that its chemical weapons stockpile consisted of no more than 50,000 tons of poisonous agent, all located on Soviet territory.

From 7 to 11 January 1989, over 140 nations participated in a Conference on Chemical Weapons in Paris. The conference was intended to focus attention on the horrors associated with chemical weapons use, the dangers posed by their existence and proliferation, and the outstanding issues to be addressed in achieving a chemical weapons ban. During the five days of deliberations, the total number of states to have declared non-possession of chemical weapons increased to over sixty, eleven states added their signatures to the Geneva Protocol, and three additional states announced their intention to sign in the near future.

The Final Declaration of the Conference stressed four points: 1) the commitment of the participants not to use chemical weapons and to condemn their use (thus reaffirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol); 2) the necessity and urgency of concluding a chemical weapons ban, and for all states to accede to it upon its conclusion; 3) the need for states to exercise self-restraint and act responsibly until such time as a comprehensive ban entered into force; and 4) full support for the UN as a forum for exercising vigilance with regard to the prohibition on chemical weapons use and, in particular, for the role of the Secretary-General in investigating alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol.

Some participants at the Conference charged the Western nations with practising a double standard by trying to halt the proliferation of chemical weapons in the Third World while at the same time developing new generations of such weapons themselves. Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq and Libya demanded that the conferees recognize their right to possess weapons of this type

as long as Israel possessed a presumed nuclear capability. Both superpowers rejected such arguments.

During the past year, a number of events drew attention to the development and production of chemical and biological weapons in the Third World. For example, on 19 August 1989, the *New York Times* reported that Iran had tried to obtain toxins from Canada and the Netherlands, probably for a research programme on the production of biological weapons.<sup>1</sup> The newspaper went on to explain that in December 1988, an Iranian researcher had contacted Dr. Bruno Schiefer, Director of the University of Saskatchewan's Toxicology Research Laboratory, in order to negotiate the purchase of toxins which could be used to produce biological weapons. The *New York Times* reported that Dr. Schiefer informed the Canadian Government and rejected the transaction. Canada then alerted the members of the Australia Group (comprising nineteen countries manufacturing chemical products, including Canada, which are trying to impose tighter controls on the export of chemical agents which could be used to produce poisonous gas).

On 17 March 1990, the US Government again commented on the facility at Rabta, Libya. The White House spokesperson, Marlin Fitzwater, said: "There is evidence to suggest that Rabta is producing chemical weapons.... The facility is dangerous and becoming increasingly so." When questioned about the possibility of a military operation, Mr. Fitzwater simply stated: "We are not ruling anything out."<sup>2</sup> One week later, several sources reported that a fire had destroyed the Rabta facility, and Libya immediately accused the United States, Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany of being involved.<sup>3</sup> However, on 7 April, Washington said that it had satellite photos proving that the fire had been staged.<sup>4</sup> Just over one month later, the United States stated that activities had resumed at the chemical facility, which was suspected of being used to produce weapons.<sup>5</sup>

On 2 April 1990, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq acknowledged for the first time that his country possessed binary chemical weapons (composites which, when combined, become toxic). The Iraqi President added: "We shall ensure that fire ravages half of Israel if that country

---

<sup>1</sup> "Iran Is Said to Try to Obtain Toxins." *New York Times*, 13 August 1989, p. 11. See also "Harmful Fungi Requested by Iranian, Scientist Says." *Globe and Mail*, 14 August 1989, p. A1 and A2; and "Armes chimiques: l'Iran aurait tenté d'acheter des toxines au Canada." *Le Devoir*, 14 August 1989, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> "Washington et Bonn accusent la Libye de produire des armes chimiques." *La Presse*, 8 March 1990, p. B7.

<sup>3</sup> "L'usine de Rabta aurait été dévastée par un incendie." *Le Monde*, 16 March 1990, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *The Arms Control Reporter* (1990), pp. 704: E2.6. See also "L'usine chimique de Rabta à subi très peu de dégâts." *Le Monde*, 21 March 1990, p. 6; and "Damage in Libyan Fire Reassessed as U.S. Sees Possible Hoax." *The Washington Post*, 31 March 1990, p. A23.

<sup>5</sup> *The Arms Control Reporter* (1990), p. 704.E2.8.

tries anything against Iraq." He also stated: "Those who threaten us with atomic weapons shall be exterminated by us with chemical weapons."<sup>6</sup>

Recent progress at the CD has been evident in the near doubling of non-member participants involved in the chemical weapons negotiations, and in the submissions of reports by more than thirty states to date concerning inspections of their chemical industries (i.e., National Test Inspections). Nevertheless, several issues require further attention. These include: verification (and particularly the procedural details for instituting challenge inspection and *ad hoc* inspections), sanctions, assistance and the role of the Executive Council.

On 1 June 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union took an important step to facilitate the conclusion and implementation of a multilateral agreement banning chemical weapons. During their Washington Summit meeting, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a bilateral agreement on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the adoption of a multilateral convention banning such weapons.<sup>7</sup> In their statements of intentions, both parties expressed their determination to do their utmost to conclude and implement a multilateral convention on chemical weapons. Under the terms of the bilateral agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union undertake (once the agreement comes into effect) to stop all production of chemical weapons and to begin the destruction of their stockpiles prior to the end of 1992. The parties also undertake to destroy at least half of the stockpiles before the end of 1999, so that the maximum they will have as of 31 December 2002 will be 5,000 tons.

Among the measures taken to facilitate the conclusion of a multilateral convention, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to reduce and limit their chemical weapons so that at the latest, eight years after a multilateral convention has come into effect, the combined quantities of stocks possessed by both countries will not exceed 500 tons. Washington and Moscow also agreed to consult with other participants in the multilateral negotiations with a view to proposing that a special conference of parties to the convention be held eight years after it comes into effect. The purpose of such a conference would be to determine whether there was sufficient support for the multilateral convention to ensure the complete elimination in subsequent years of all stocks of remaining chemical weapons.

---

<sup>6</sup> "Israel s'inquiète des menaces de l'Irak." *Le Monde*, 4 April 1990, pp. 1 and 7. See also "Le président Hussein menace de mettre a feu la moitié d'Israël." *Le Monde*, 4 April 1990, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons," reproduced in *Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin* no. 8, (June 1989), pp. 19-22. See also "Agreed Statement in Connection with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons," reproduced in *Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin* no. 8 (June 1989), p. 22.

Canada has signed and ratified both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Since the conclusion of the BWC, Canada has shown great interest in the elaboration of verification measures to strengthen its enforcement. Canada was an active participant at the *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts held in Geneva in March and April 1987, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Declaration of the second review conference of the BWC. There, Canada contributed to a better understanding of the utility of adopting criteria relating to disease outbreaks, as well as containment standards for research facilities.<sup>8</sup>

Successive Canadian governments have also sought to help define and promote a chemical weapons convention, as well as to ensure its effective verification. Indeed, the conclusion of such a ban constitutes one of the six major goals in arms control and disarmament of the present Canadian Government. Prominent among Canada's initiatives has been its submission to the CD of various working papers relating to a chemical weapons ban.<sup>9</sup>

Canada has also produced a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, in 1985; sponsored three investigations of alleged Soviet use of toxin weapons in South East Asia;<sup>10</sup> and presented to the CD a series of compendia on chemical weapons negotiations comprising documents from its ongoing sessions. Finally, the Canadian Government has actively expressed its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, most recently in the Iran-Iraq War.<sup>11</sup>

More recently, Canada has helped work towards the conclusion of an international convention on chemical weapons by organizing or participating in a number of activities to promote its adoption. In October 1988, for example, Canada hosted a meeting at the University of Calgary of a small number of experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, West

---

<sup>8</sup> "Biological Weapons: Successful Conference Outcome." *The Disarmament Bulletin*, (Summer-Fall 1987), p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> See, for instance: Canada and Norway, *Proposal for an Annex to Article IX Concerning Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons*, CD/766 (2 July 1987); and Canada, *Factors Involved in Determining Verification Inspectorate Personnel and Resource Requirements*, CD/823 (31 March 1988).

<sup>10</sup> *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, November 1985; Butler, G.C., *Report on the Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia* (Memo to External Affairs), 2 December 1981; Shiefer, H.B., *Study of the Possible Use of Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia* (A Report to the Department of External Affairs), Ottawa, 1982; Norman, J. J., and Purdon, J. J., *Final Summary Report on the Investigation of Yellow Rain Samples from Southeast Asia*. Ottawa: Defence Research Establishment, February 1986; Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, *Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Working Papers, 1986 Session*, Ottawa, June 1987; and Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, *Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons-Final Records (PV), 1986 Session*, Ottawa, June 1987.

<sup>11</sup> Department of External Affairs, *Communiqué* No. 068, 25 March 1988.

Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada to consider what lessons could be learned from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard systems, in the context of verifying a ban on chemical weapons.<sup>12</sup>

From 7 to 11 January 1989, Canada actively participated in the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark took this important opportunity to call upon the conference to condemn the use of chemical weapons and reaffirm the Geneva Protocol. He also called on additional states to adhere to the Protocol, and for strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use.<sup>13</sup> The conference also gave Mr. Clark the opportunity to reiterate that Canada does not intend to develop, acquire or stockpile such weapons, unless they are used against the military forces or the civilian population of Canada or its allies. He stated that Canada was fulfilling its obligations under the Protocol to parties and non-parties alike, and had adopted a firm policy of non-production to help achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. The Minister added that Canada had already advised other nations of the destruction of the bulk of usable chemical warfare agents it had stockpiled during the Second World War. With regard to the BWC, Mr. Clark reiterated Canada's 1970 declaration that it had never had any biological or toxin weapons and did not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future.<sup>14</sup>

In order to enhance Canada's contribution to the discussions on a chemical weapons agreement, Ottawa announced on 9 January 1989 the appointment of a full-time Defence Science Counsellor for chemical arms control negotiations as part of Canada's Permanent Mission to the CD.<sup>15</sup>

In March 1989, Canada announced to the CD that it was preparing a working paper examining the cost implications of establishing an international inspectorate for a Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>16</sup>

In July 1989, Canada welcomed a delegation of ten Soviet scientists and military officers who visited the Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES). The purpose of the visit was to observe the technology and equipment used to destroy chemical agents, and to share

---

<sup>12</sup> "University of Calgary Workshop on Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention." *The Disarmament Bulletin*. (Fall-Winter 1988), p. 5. See also James Keeley, *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Occasional Papers* No. 1, September 1988.

<sup>13</sup> "Banning Chemical Weapons for All Time." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall-Winter 1988), p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>15</sup> Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 9 January 1989.

<sup>16</sup> Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva, "Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament," 7 March 1989, p. 8.

information about technical issues and environmental safety related to the destruction of those agents.<sup>17</sup>

Within Canada, serious concerns were raised in 1988 about the testing of chemical weapons (for more information, see **CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS** in the 1987-1988 and 1989 editions of *The Guide*). In June, it was revealed by a number of sources that the Department of National Defence had been testing nerve gas at the Canadian Forces Base Suffield, Alberta, since 1983. Although the Government stated that it had used only small quantities so as to find effective devices to protect Canadian troops against the possibility of such a threat (during peacekeeping operations, for example<sup>18</sup>), the fears concerning possible risk to neighbouring communities were not allayed. The Government subsequently asked Mr. William Barton, who was at the time Chairman of the Board of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, to prepare a report on research and training activities in the area of chemical and biological defence.

In December 1988, the Government published the results of Mr. Barton's study. The report, which was entitled *Research, Development and Training in Chemical Biological Defence Within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*, concluded that all research, development and training activities undertaken by the Department of National Defence were for purposes of self-defence, that this constituted the most prudent course for Canada, and that it was consistent with the international obligations undertaken by the Canadian Government. In addition, the study noted that all such activities were conducted in a professional manner, and posed no threat to public safety or to the environment. Nevertheless, it went on to list sixteen recommendations aimed at improving management, control and public understanding of the chemical and biological self-defence programme. These recommendations included: the tightening of safety procedures and physical security arrangements at the Defence Research Establishment, Suffield (DRES) and the Defence Research Establishment, Ottawa (DREO); reducing the number of outdoor tests at the Suffield base; and ensuring that all future testing procedures be conducted in accordance with the new *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*.<sup>19</sup> On 25 January 1989, Mr. Beatty, who was then minister of National Defence, announced the Government's response to the Barton Report. He stated that he had accepted all sixteen recommendations made in the report and had directed that they be implemented without delay.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, during the fall of 1988, there were a number of reports that chemical weapons had been tested on human subjects at Suffield during the 1960s (see **CHEMICAL AND**

---

<sup>17</sup> "Soviets Visit Defence Research Establishment Suffield." *The Disarmament Bulletin*, (Fall 1989), p. 6.

<sup>18</sup> *Commons Debates*, 24 August 1988, p. 18803.

<sup>19</sup> Department of National Defence, *Research, Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: A Review by William H. Barton*. Ottawa, 31 December 1988.

<sup>20</sup> Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 25 January 1989, p. 1.

**BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS** in the 1989 edition of *The Guide*). The Government ordered that a public enquiry be held to clarify the matter. It promised to conduct follow-up studies of those individuals identified as having participated in such tests, and gave assurances that additional efforts were being undertaken to identify and locate others who may have been involved.<sup>21</sup>

In December 1988, a retired Canadian army veteran indicated that in 1947 the Canadian Army had dumped shells containing mustard gas in the Pacific Ocean.<sup>22</sup> While Defence Minister Beatty and other DND officials had responded to such claims initially by stating that "no record of such an operation existed", additional evidence led to admissions by Colonel Conrad Mialkowski, Assistant Deputy General for Research and Development at National Defence Headquarters, that such dumping did in fact take place about 160 km off the coast of British Columbia.<sup>23</sup> (see **CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS** in the 1989 edition of *The Guide*).

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

From 18 to 22 September 1989, Canada participated in a conference in Canberra, Australia, on the proposed implementation of a convention on chemical weapons. The conference was attended by government officials from over sixty-five countries and chemical industry representatives from over thirty countries. Its purpose was to strengthen the government-industry bond and to draw attention to national and industrial responsibilities pending the conclusion and implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Canada took the opportunity to present a study prepared under the auspices of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs, entitled "Role and Function of a National Authority in the Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention."<sup>24</sup>

In an address to the First Committee of the United Nations on 20 October 1989, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Ms. Peggy Mason, referred to the progress achieved in chemical weapons negotiations:

Progress in the chemical weapons negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament has not been as dramatic as some may have hoped, given the expectations generated at the Paris Conference earlier this year. These expectations must be tempered, however, by recognition that questions of considerable complexity are now before the Ad Hoc Committee. The Working Groups established

---

<sup>21</sup> *Commons Debates*, 21 September 1988, pp. 19478-19479; 22 September 1988, p. 19530; and 23 September 1988, pp.19568 and 19572.

<sup>22</sup> "Army Dumped Chemical Arms: Report." *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 December 1988, p. C18.

<sup>23</sup> "Forces Admit Mustard Gas off B.C.'s Coast." *Vancouver Sun*, 14 December 1988.

<sup>24</sup> "Government and Industry Discuss CW Ban in Canberra." *The Disarmament Bulletin*, (Fall 1989), p. 22.

by this year's Chairman had many difficult technical and legal issues to consider, and they responded with extraordinary diligence and perseverance. We hope that a strengthened sense of purpose will be conveyed to the delegates in Geneva as a result of the highly successful Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons, recently concluded in Canberra, Australia.<sup>25</sup>

Ms. Mason went on to note the problem of adhesion to a Chemical Weapons Convention:

It has been suggested by some that convincing states to adhere to a chemical weapons convention, once concluded, might be a lengthy process. In fact, for many years, states have indicated in this Committee that they not only support a chemical weapons convention, but that they eagerly await its conclusion. Their votes in favour of resolutions calling for this agreement should be regarded as promises to be kept.<sup>26</sup>

On 15 December 1989, at the Forty-fourth Session of the UN General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored three resolutions on chemical and biological weapons. Resolution 44/115A urged that efforts be intensified and that increased time be devoted to the negotiation of a Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>27</sup> Resolution 44/115B called for strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol and a continuation of efforts by the Secretary-General, when a member state reports to him the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons or toxins, to conduct an investigation expeditiously in order to determine the facts. The resolution also noted the work done by the Group of Experts responsible for developing further guidelines and procedures for investigations into accusations of use.<sup>28</sup> Resolution 44/115C expressed satisfaction with the adoption of procedures for the exchange of information in accordance with the provisions of the Final Declaration of the second review conference of the BWC. The resolution also called upon member states to communicate such information annually and requested the Secretary-General to provide assistance where required to facilitate implementation of the relevant parts of the Final Declaration. The Resolution concluded by calling upon all states to ratify or sign the Convention if they had not yet done so.<sup>29</sup> All three resolutions were adopted by consensus.

On 24 April 1990, Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Gerald Shannon, made reference to the negotiation of a ban on chemical weapons at the CD. Ambassador Shannon pointed out that this issue was the most important one the CD faced during its 1990 session. He noted the threat posed by the existence of chemical weapons and reiterated the importance of achieving real

---

<sup>25</sup> "Mason Addresses First Committee." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall 1989), p.15.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>27</sup> UNGA Resolution 44/115(A), 15 December 1989.

<sup>28</sup> UNGA Resolution 44/115(B), 15 December 1989.

<sup>29</sup> UNGA Resolution 44/115(C), 15 December 1989.

progress. Ambassador Shannon indicated that success had been achieved in resolving a number of problems and he listed some of the areas where progress had been made.<sup>30</sup>

Ambassador Shannon said that Canada was particularly impressed by the progress made by the various working groups. He stated that the success of Working Group B on the crucial issue of the order of the destruction of chemical weapons may have been the most significant so far achieved. He described this problem as one of the most difficult issues facing the CD, and pointed out that although a solution was underway, there remained much work to be done in this area.

Referring to the progress of Working Group C in addressing the legal issues involved in the consideration of sanctions, amendments and settlement of disputes, Ambassador Shannon said that barely a year ago it might have seemed to a casual observer that these issues were intractable, but progress achieved had shown that solutions were possible.

Ambassador Shannon also noted the progress achieved by Working Group A concerning the work on the Protocol on Inspection Procedures, and particularly the issue of procedures for the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons. In this respect, Canada's representative noted the distribution of a report prepared by the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada entitled, "Verification Methods, Handling and Assessments of Unusual Events in Relation to Allegations on the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents." He also noted the work that Working Group A had recently begun on the question of Ad Hoc Verification. The Ambassador stated:

After careful consideration of the various approaches and proposals in this area, my government has come to the conclusion that the concept of Ad Hoc Verification must be an essential part of the structure that we are trying to develop to ensure the effective verification of the Convention. In our view, Ad Hoc Verification offers the most satisfactory means short of Challenge Inspection of ensuring that facilities relevant to the goal of the Convention are subject to appropriate verification.<sup>31</sup>

Ambassador Shannon concluded by stating:

In highlighting some of the achievements to date in the 1990 Session, I have been very conscious of the need to slight neither the other encouraging developments that have taken place nor the magnitude of the tasks that remain. My primary purpose in addressing these particular items has been to suggest that the momentum of 1989 is being continued and we are making considerable progress toward our ultimate goal.... I should, perhaps, not need to add that my Government is fully committed to doing all that it can to assist in realizing our final goal.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> "Statement by Ambassador Gerald D. Shannon before the Conference on Disarmament, 24 April 1990." Geneva: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

During his statement before the CD, Ambassador Shannon also tabled a paper describing Canada's first national Trial Inspection carried out in an organic synthesis laboratory at the Defence Research Establishment, Suffield. He expressed the hope that the results of the trial would prove to be a useful contribution to the work of the *ad hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons.<sup>33</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 4 April 1990, NDP Member Bill Blaikie questioned the Government about the proliferation and use of chemical weapons in the world:

My question...has to do with the heightened concern around the world about the spread and use of chemical weapons as a result of the Iraqi threat against Israel the other day and the well-known fact that these chemicals are being stockpiled in various places by various nations.

I want to ask the government whether it intends to show more leadership on this issue. Specifically, does it intend to use its seat on the Security Council of the United Nations to provoke new international momentum with respect to a total ban on chemical weapons and an international context in which nations which threaten not only to possess but to use these kinds of weapons are brought to heel?<sup>34</sup>

Mr. Patrick Boyer, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, replied:

The hon. member's question is extremely timely. The statement by President Hussein in relation to chemical weapons is one the Government of Canada condemns as being of an extremely bellicose nature in an area that is already tense and it in no way advances the cause of peace.

I would like to raise two points in answer to the hon. member's specific question. First, Canada as a nation does not export to Iraq any equipment, material, chemicals or substances that could be used in the development of chemical weapons.

Second, in relation to the question of the Security Council, this is a point that I will bring to the attention to the Secretary of State for External Affairs because I think the leadership role that Canada can play in this, as the hon. member suggests, is very timely and important and the Government of Canada would like to do that.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Commons Debates*, 4 April 1990, pp. 10181-10182.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10182.

The same day, NDP Member Jim Fulton questioned the Government about the development of biological and chemical weapons in Alberta:

The Department of National Defence developed and tested a number of chemical and biological weapons at Suffield, Alberta and other sites, including one in the province of Quebec.

Since some sites may still be contaminated with deadly agents such as anthrax, and since the Department of National Defence is known to cover up rather than clean up incidents such as this, will the Minister of the Environment undertake an immediate and complete search of all government records to determine and make public the location of such development and testing sites and test sites for contamination, particularly the anthrax site in the province of Quebec?<sup>36</sup>

The Honourable Mary Collins, Associate Minister of National Defence and Minister responsible for the Status of Women replied:

I wish to advise the hon. member that the Department of National Defence is hiring someone to go back over the records of the second world war to see if there is any further information or evidence which could confirm or deny whether field tests of anthrax, for example, took place at either Grosse Isle or at Suffield. We will certainly make whatever information that comes out of this review public.

As I am sure the member is aware, the Department of National Health and Welfare is undertaking investigations this summer in Grosse Isle to determine if there is any evidence of anthrax in that part of the country.<sup>37</sup>

On 5 April 1990, Liberal Member André Ouellet questioned the Secretary of State for External Affairs about the answer given on the previous day by his Parliamentary Secretary, regarding the role that Canada intended to play with respect to the development and use of chemical weapons in the world. Mr. Ouellet stated that Canada could not remain silent when

---

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

faced with the threat of the proliferation and use of this type of weapon in various parts of the world, and specifically the threats by Iraq against Israel.<sup>38</sup> External Affairs Minister Clark replied:

First, we believe that for the time being, it would be more effective for us to pursue the general question within the context of the Geneva talks on chemical weapons, which we are doing now.

I will continue to look at this question, and as soon as we can usefully raise the matter in the UN Security Council, we will do so.

Third, today I have given instructions that Canada's ambassador to Iraq be called to my department so that we can inform him of our concern about the statement by the President of Iraq.<sup>39</sup>

### CURRENT REFERENCES

Bailliu, J.J., *Canada and Chemical Warfare*, (Master's Thesis, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario), 3 May 1989 (200 pp.).

Canonne, Pierre, "La vérification du désarmement chimique et ses aspects techniques." *Ares*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1989), pp. 50-72.

Feinstein, Lee, "Is a Chemical Weapons Breakthrough Brewing?" *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 7 (September 1989), pp. 27-28.

Feinstein, Lee, "Mystery Surrounds 'Fire' at Libyan Chemical Plant." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 20 no. 3 (April 1989), pp. 26-27.

Feinstein, Lee, "Soviet Chemical Weapons Stockpile Reassessed." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 10 (December 1989-January 1990), p. 25.

Grenet, Yves, "Vers l'interdiction universelle des armes chimiques: après le succès de la Conférence de Paris." *La paix en mouvement, combat pour la paix* (February 1989), pp. 4-5.

Monier, Claude, "L'interdiction des armes biologiques et chimiques: une urgente nécessité, mais une longue démarche." *Défense nationale* (July 1989), pp. 168-170.

Morel, Pierre, "The Chemical Weapons Negotiation: Approaches and Political Stakes." *UNIDIR Newsletter* (March 1989), pp. 3-4.

---

<sup>38</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 April 1990, pp. 10228-10229.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10229.

## FURTHER READING

Barton, William H., *Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence Within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 31 December 1988 (54 pp.).

Boulden, Jane, *Towards a Chemical Weapons Convention: Proceedings of a Conference Entitled "Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention."* Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, *Aurora Paper* no. 9, January 1989 (60 pp.).

Bunn, Matthew, "U.S. Charges Libyan Plant Designed to Produce Chemical Weapons." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 1 (January-February 1989), pp. 28 and 31.

Canada, Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, *Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Working Papers (WP): 1988 Session*. Ottawa, February 1989.

Chown, Diana, "Suffield, Chemical, Biological Warfare and Canadian/U.S. Relations." *Peace Magazine*, vol. 5 no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 12-14.

Douglass, J.D., Jr., and Livingstone, N.C., *America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987 (204 pp.).

Gizewski, Peter, *Biological Weapons Control*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, *Issue Brief* no. 5, February 1987 (48 pp.).

Goldblat, Jozef, *Chemical Disarmament: From the Ban on Use to a Ban on Possession*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* no. 17, February 1988 (8 pp.).

Herby, Peter, "The Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons." *Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin* no. 3 (February 1989), pp. 12-13.

Keeley, James F., *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Arms Control and Disarmament Occasional Papers* no. 1, September 1988 (63 pp.).

Sims, Nicholas, *The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament*. London: St. Martin's Press, 1988 (371 pp.).

## CROSS REFERENCES

Nuclear Non-Proliferation  
Verification



#### 4. CANADA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

##### *BACKGROUND*

Nuclear Weapon-free Zones (NWFZs) consist of defined geographic areas in which the manufacture, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Various types of NWFZs exist and have been proposed since the 1950s. They have been supported as a means to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and provide a confidence-building measure (CBM) in the pursuit of regional security, as well as constituting steps in a progressive "denuclearization" of the planet.

The first NWFZ was proposed at the United Nations by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957. The Rapacki Plan would have prohibited the manufacturing, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany. While the Plan had Soviet support, it was opposed by NATO and subsequently dropped. The Plan did, however, succeed in generating widespread interest in the establishment of regional denuclearized zones.

Two NWFZs for populated areas have been established by international agreement: the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, establishing Latin America as the first such zone in the world; and the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985, establishing a South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone. The latter, negotiated by the thirteen members of the South Pacific Forum, bans the deployment, production, and testing of nuclear weapons in their area. The question of transit and visiting rights for ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in the zone has been left open for signatory nations to decide independently. The Treaty has encountered problems, since only two of the five nuclear weapons states, China and the Soviet Union, have signed the relevant Protocols. France, which maintains an active nuclear testing programme in the region, is opposed to the zone, as are the United States and the United Kingdom, which have both expressed reservations over the Treaty's symbolic importance as a precedent allegedly incongruent with their national interests.

Proposals have also been made to establish NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Balkan states, the South Atlantic, the Nordic states, the Mediterranean, and South East Asia. Most of these efforts have been made in the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, with interest in them varying over time. Two areas which have received considerable international attention recently include the Arctic--stimulated by the Soviet Union's October 1987 initiative (please see **ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY**, Chapter 14 of *The Guide*), and South East Asia--through the efforts of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). At their December 1987 summit meeting, ASEAN members agreed to intensify efforts for a Southeast Asia NWFZ given the example of New Zealand and improved US-USSR relations. The US has stated its strong opposition to the concept, however.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada supports the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones whenever they are considered feasible and likely to promote stability in an area. Although the creation of such a zone is not judged a satisfactory alternative to having the countries involved ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it can make a significant contribution to preventing the spread of nuclear arms and increasing regional security in the absence of NPT ratification. At the first two special sessions of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, in 1978 and 1982, Canada supported the final declarations encouraging the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones.

The Canadian Government's stance remains unchanged. It is prepared to study such proposals on a case-by-case basis but it believes that to be effective, any proposals must meet certain requirements: the zone must apply to a defined geographic area; it must be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most of the countries in the area concerned, including the principal military powers; it must not give an advantage to any state or group of states; it must contain adequate treaty assurances and the means to verify that countries abide by their commitments; and it must not permit the development of an independent nuclear explosive capability in the area.<sup>1</sup>

At the Forty-fourth Session of the UN General Assembly in 1989, Canada voted in support of related resolutions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in the Middle East (adopted without a vote), Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-free Zone in South Asia, and the Denuclearization of Africa (Part A--Implementation of the Declaration). Canada abstained on the Denuclearization of Africa (Part B--Nuclear Capability of South Africa), on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and on a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic.

As a result of Canada's NATO membership, it has always been opposed to the establishment of such zones in Central or Northern Europe or the Balkans. The Government believes that the establishment of zones in these areas would cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NATO deterrent and expose certain areas to the risk of Soviet attack, without making a genuine contribution to nuclear disarmament.

The Government does not support a declaration of nuclear weapon-free status for Canada. Although Canada does not possess nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons are not stationed on Canadian territory, Canada is a member of NATO which, as already indicated, relies on a nuclear deterrent. The declaration of a nuclear weapon-free zone, it is maintained, would be inconsistent with membership in that alliance.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, "Canada's Position on Nuclear Weapon-free Zones." *Disarmament Bulletin*, (Summer-Fall 1986), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

Despite this position the local authorities in approximately 170 municipalities across Canada have declared their areas nuclear-free. Manitoba, Ontario and the Northwest Territories have each declared themselves to be NWFZs. As a result of these declarations, approximately sixty percent of the Canadian population resides in locally declared NWFZs.

### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Proposals to make Canada a nuclear weapon-free zone have been put forward in the House of Commons on several occasions. The New Democratic Party (NDP) has been a strong supporter of bills declaring Canada a NWFZ. In the past it has put forward motions, for example, calling for a prohibition of "the deployment, testing, construction and transportation of nuclear weapons and associated equipment through and within Canada, [and] the export of goods and materials for use in the construction and deployment of nuclear arms," while calling on the Government to "encourage cities, provinces and states throughout the world to undertake similar action."<sup>3</sup>

On 19 February 1990, NDP Member Svend Robinson asked the Government to prohibit ships carrying nuclear weapons from using the port of Vancouver. Mr. Robinson stated:

... on April 19, 1983, Vancouver City Council representing the citizens of the city of Vancouver, declared the city to be a nuclear weapons free zone. Despite that fact, the Government of Canada continues to invite nuclear-armed U.S. ships into the harbour of Vancouver.

Recently, a group of courageous Greenpeace protesters were acquitted on mischief charges for having spray painted peace symbols and radio activity warnings on visiting U.S. warships in August of last year.

The learned trial judge, Wallace Craig, said he found it "remarkable that the government sees fit to invite this type of equipment into Vancouver in view of the serious concerns people have about it. It almost invites protest".

In June of last year the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in this House: "When there are nuclear weapons there are going to be accidents".

I call upon the Conservative government to respect the wishes of the people of Vancouver and to refuse to allow any more nuclear weapons equipped ships in our harbour, to take a strong stand for peace and a clean environment.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 August 1987, p. 8627.

<sup>4</sup> *Commons Debates*, 19 February 1990, p. 8495.

On 7 March 1990, NDP Member Robert E. Skelly tabled a petition before the House of Commons asking the government to set up a nuclear weapons-free zone in British Columbia. Mr. Skelly stated:

I have a ... petition that calls on the government to set up a nuclear free zone in British Columbia that would allow no ship carrying nuclear weapons to be given access to our ports and waterways, that the designation include passages through our waters en route to Nanoose Bay and in all the waters around the Canadian Forces maritime experimental and test ranges near Nanoose Bay, British Columbia, and that all governments be required to provide, in advance of their arrival, assurance that ships visiting our waters carry no nuclear weapons and have no nuclear reactors on board.<sup>5</sup>

The Liberal Party at its 1986 Convention declared itself in favour of the establishment of a NWFZ for Canada, but not at the expense of Canada's alliance obligations.

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Dufour, Jules, "Le réseau mondial des zones de sécurité." *Option Paix*, vol. 8 no. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 14-15.

Flacco, Nicholas L., "Whether to Confirm or Deny?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 116 no. 1043 (January 1990), pp. 52-56.

Pugh, M. C., "Nuclear Warship Visiting: Storms in Ports." *Naval Forces*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1990), pp. 26-30.

Thakur, Ramesh, "Creation of the Nuclear-free New Zealand Myth: Brinkmanship Without a Brink." *Asian Survey*, vol. 29 no. 10 (October 1989), pp. 919-939.

"Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)." New York: United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, *Disarmament Facts* 68, September 1989 (12 pp.).

Tsarevski, Nesho, "The Balkans - A Zone-free of Nuclear and Chemical Arms." *Peace and the Sciences* No. 1 (1989), pp. 61-67.

"Working for a Nuclear-free Zone in Africa." *APRI Newsletter*, vol. 4 no. 1 (January-February 1989), pp. 3-4.

---

<sup>5</sup> Commons Debates, 7 March 1990, p. 8932.

# FURTHER READING

Bennett, G. C., *The New Abolitionists: The Story of Nuclear-Free-Zones*. Elgin, Illinois: Brethren Press, 1987 (269 pp.).

Borawski, J. and Valetine, J., "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Nordic Case." *Naval Forces*, vol. 9 no. 3 (1988), pp. 66-71.

Broadhurst, A. I., *Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: A Comparative Analysis of Theory and Practice*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, *Aurora Papers* No. 5, June 1987 (53 pp.).

Hayward, Dan, "Gorbachev's Murmansk Initiative: New Prospects for Arms Control in the Arctic?" *Northern Perspectives*, vol. 16 no. 4 (August 1988), pp. 9-11.

*International Meeting for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A Documentary Account*. Berlin: Liaison Office of the International Meeting for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, 1988 (350 pp.).

*International Meeting for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Impressions of a World Forum of Peace*, [20-22 June 1988]. Dresden: Grafischer Grossbetrieb Volkerfreundschaft, 1988 (62 pp.).

Mogami, Toshiki, "The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone: A Fettered Leap Forward." *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 25 no. 4 (December 1988), pp. 411-430.

"Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones," in: *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 12*. New York: United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1988, pp. 196-219.

Purver, Ronald G., *Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Occasional Papers* No. 3, February 1988, (80 pp.).

Regehr, E. et al., *Making Canada a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone*. *Occasional Papers* No. 3, Waterloo: Project Ploughshares, *Working Paper* No. 1, April 1987 (8 pp.).

Selin, Shannon, *Canada as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: A Critical Analysis*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, *Issues Brief* No. 10, August 1988, (42 pp.).



## 5. NUCLEAR TESTING

### *BACKGROUND*

In the 1950s, the United States and Great Britain began negotiations with the Soviet Union to ban all forms of nuclear testing. While efforts to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) proved unsuccessful, the negotiations bore some fruit with the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The PTBT prohibits the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. As of January 1990, the Treaty had 119 states parties, although two nuclear weapons states -- France and China -- have yet to sign.

Further progress on the limitation of nuclear testing came when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) in 1976. The former limits underground nuclear testing to 150 kt, while the latter does the same for so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions." Neither the TTBT or the PNET has, however, been ratified by the US Senate.

Efforts to achieve more ambitious limitations on nuclear testing continued when the Carter Administration reopened trilateral negotiations on a CTBT in 1977. Although some headway was made in developing a draft treaty, strong domestic political opposition in the United States was one of the main factors ensuring that progress was limited. These negotiations ceased with the advent of the Reagan Administration.

On 6 August 1985, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, later extended three times. Yet the Soviet initiative failed to prompt the United States to take similar action, or to resume negotiations on a CTBT. Soviet testing resumed on 28 February 1987. The US Congress has put forth proposals seeking a moratorium on nuclear tests above one kiloton, but these have never been accepted by the Administration.

The Reagan Administration maintained that, although it regarded a total ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective, the need to ensure weapon reliability and national security required continued testing. In addition, the Administration contended that progress on a CTBT could be achieved only in stages: first, by securing more stringent monitoring provisions for the TTBT and the PNET; then, by negotiating intermediate limitations on testing; and finally by pursuing a total ban as part of a broad, effective disarmament process.

While the Soviets initially opposed the US government's approach to limits on nuclear testing -- favouring instead immediate negotiations on a total ban -- the prospects for accommodation began to brighten by the summer of 1986. One year later, the Soviets had largely acceded to the US position on how negotiations toward a CTBT should proceed.

On 17 September 1987, the two sides agreed to begin "full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing" before 1 December 1987. The negotiations would begin by searching for mutually agreeable procedures for verifying the TTBT and the PNET. On 9

December 1987, during the first round of talks, Robert Barker, head of the US negotiating team, announced plans to hold joint nuclear test explosions in order to calibrate equipment to help in verifying any future limits on testing. The Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) would also aid in settling differences between the superpowers regarding their preferred methods for monitoring the size of atomic tests. The Soviets prefer to rely on seismic devices, while the United States prefers the Corrtex system of hydrodynamic measurements. The Soviets have, however, agreed to negotiated on-site hydrodynamic methods as a step toward a CTBT.

At the Moscow Summit on 28 May to 1 June 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev noted that substantial progress had been made on a new protocol to the PNET. They instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously work on this Protocol, as well as to complete a protocol to the TTBT as soon as possible after the Joint Verification Experiment had been conducted and analyzed. In the meantime, US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze approved a schedule for the JVE and reached an agreement on its conduct, allowing each side to measure the yield of an explosion conducted at the other party's test site using both teleseismic and hydrodynamic yield measurement methods.<sup>1</sup> On 17 August 1988, stage one of the experiment was undertaken at the Nevada site. The experiment was concluded with the detonation of a nuclear device at Semipalatinsk on 14 September 1988. Both US and Soviet officials judged the tests to be successful.

After their two-day meeting at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in September 1989, Secretary of State James Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze announced that the verification protocol to the PNET had been accepted *ad referendum* by their negotiators. They also announced that discussions on the protocol to the TTBT were proceeding well and that agreement had been reached on three methods of verification: hydrodynamic methods, seismic methods and on-site inspections. They did not reveal from what yield level such recording methods might be authorized, but agreement was said to have been reached on that point.

On 22 January 1990, the Bush Administration announced that discussions on further limits on nuclear testing would not begin immediately following signature of the protocols to the PNET and TTBT, which was scheduled for June 1990 during the Bush-Gorbachev Summit in Washington. This decision was not well received by the US Congress as it contradicted the promise made by President Reagan in 1986 (which he reiterated to the Soviet Union in 1987) that the United States would continue stage-by-stage negotiations on further limits once the verification protocols to the TTBT and PNET were ratified. The Bush Administration explained its decision on the grounds that it was impossible to establish further limits without harming US national security. The US Administration stated that new complex verification techniques would be included in the protocol to the TTBT and that they wished to be able to analyze them for some time before determining further measures to be taken.

On 1 June 1990 in Washington, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the verification protocols to the TTBT and the PNET. Under the provisions of the PNET protocol, the parties are

---

<sup>1</sup> "U.S., Soviet Union Sign Joint Verification Experiment Agreement." *Department of State Bulletin* (August 1988), p. 67.

authorized to use three methods of verification: hydrodynamic methods for explosions with planned yields above 50 kt; on-site inspections for explosions with planned yields above 35 kt; and seismic methods for group explosions above 150 kt.

The verification protocols to the TTBT and the PNET are almost identical. The only significant difference concerns the use of seismic recording methods. In the case of the TTBT, these can be used in countries carrying out the explosion, but only from three designated off-site seismic stations. This method is authorized for tests with planned yields above 50 kt. Both protocols also contain a time schedule for notifying the other party of any explosion exceeding the agreed yield.

Additional efforts to limit nuclear testing have been made in multilateral forums. In 1983, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) established a CTBT working group. Now called the Ad Hoc Committee, the group has been unable to agree on a program of work and has not met since 1983.

Despite the inability of the CD to agree on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee, a special group of scientific experts associated with the CD has been working since 1976. The Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is charged with defining the technical specifications of a global system for the rapid and reliable exchange of data, which would be acceptable to all parties to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. In December 1988 the GSE began work on the second international seismic data exchange. A first experiment had been conducted in 1984.<sup>2</sup> The second phase of this second experiment, focussing on the weekly exchange and processing of data between the various seismological stations, began in January 1990.

Since 1985, resolutions in the UN General Assembly sponsored by the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) with the support of the Eastern bloc countries have called for converting the PTBT into a CTBT. On 5 August 1988, this initiative received added impetus when Mexico, Yugoslavia, Peru and Sri Lanka asked the PTBT's Depository States (United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) to convene an amending conference. Under Article II of the PTBT, the Depository States are required to call a conference if one-third of the Treaty's signatories so request.

By spring 1989 the proposal had received the requisite support, and a few months later the Depository States announced that the conference to amend the treaty would be held from 7 to 18 January 1991 in New York. From 29 May to 8 June 1990, over sixty signatory states attended a meeting in New York to organize the conference. Discussion focussed primarily on the organization and funding of the January conference. The United States and Great Britain opposed conversion of the PTBT into a CTBT.

---

<sup>2</sup> "The Group of Scientific Experts meets in Yellowknife." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall 1989), pp. 2-3.

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Further limitations on nuclear testing have been a priority item on the Canadian Government's agenda, a CTBT remaining one of its six major goals in arms control and disarmament during 1989 and 1990. Canada has contributed to this goal in various ways in the recent past.

Since 1976, Canada has participated in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), a CD body charged with examining the specifications of a global technical data system acceptable to all the parties to a comprehensive test ban. In 1985, the Federal Government awarded a grant to the University of Toronto for further research on the use of regional seismic data for verification of a CTBT. In 1986, the Government approved a sum of over \$3 million in order to upgrade a seismic array station in Yellowknife as a contribution towards test ban verification. In October 1986, Canada also hosted a technical workshop to support the GSE work on the international exchange of seismic data. Attended by forty-three representatives from seventeen countries, the workshop produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. The workshop's proceedings were tabled by Canada in the CD on 28 April 1987.<sup>3</sup>

From 11 to 14 September 1989, Canada hosted a workshop for about thirty members of the GSE in Yellowknife. The purpose of this technical workshop was to give participants the opportunity to evaluate the progress made on data exchange, to discuss outstanding problems and to prepare the second phase of the second international seismic data exchange, which began in January 1990 under the leadership of Peter Basham, a Canadian. The presence of some GSE members in Canada coincided with the opening of the modernized seismological array in Yellowknife.<sup>4</sup>

On 20 June 1989, Mr. Fred Bild, the Assistant Deputy Minister of External Affairs for Political and International Security Affairs, spoke at the CD on the attempt to convert the PTBT into a CTBT. Pointing out the possible implications of submitting a summary request for amendment to the PTBT's Depositary States, Mr. Bild stated that it was dangerous to force the parties to an arms control agreement to accept radical amendments to such agreements if there is no consensus.<sup>5</sup> He added:

The very future of the existing agreement may be placed in jeopardy. Even more disconcerting is the apparent readiness of at least some to tie this call for a PTBT amendment conference to the future continuation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Any such efforts should be firmly resisted. I cannot think of a better example of throwing the baby out with the bath-water. To

---

<sup>3</sup> CD/753, 28 April 1987.

<sup>4</sup> "Modernized Yellowknife Array Opened." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall 1989), pp. 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> "Crise de crédibilité," Statement by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs. *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Spring-Summer 1989), p. 30.

threaten to bring down the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the quest for an amendment which, however well intentioned, in reality gives no promise of producing a global, comprehensive and verifiable test ban is, quite simply, irresponsible.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Bild went on to say that it was, however, very important to continue to remain relentless and single-minded in preparing the ground for a comprehensive test ban. He also stated that we must prepare for the time when the nuclear powers realize that such a ban is in their security interests. Mr. Bild was convinced that circumstances will change in this regard and explained what we should do in the meantime:

The trepidation the nuclear powers and the rest of us will undoubtedly feel in taking tentative steps into the post-nuclear weapons era will largely be assuaged by assurances that no one is cheating. That is why improvement and refinement of our ability to monitor adequately such a ban should remain paramount on the multilateral disarmament agenda. We need to continue energetically experimentation with, and testing of, seismic data exchanges. Only by improving the expertise and coordination with which seismic events can be globally monitored will a level of verification be reached that is comforting and assuring to all. Let us not be caught in a position where the nuclear powers are ready to call a halt to their testing, but the required verification instruments are not yet in place.<sup>7</sup>

On 20 October 1989, in a statement to the UN First Committee, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Ms. Peggy Mason, explained the Canadian Government's position on efforts to convert the PTBT into a CTBT:

Because of its strong support for treaty-specific verification measures and in light of the procedures that regulate amendments to the PTBT, Canada did not view the initiative for an amending conference as likely to be either helpful or productive. However, now that the conference is to take place, we will, of course, participate constructively.<sup>8</sup>

The Forty-fourth Session of the UN General Assembly in December 1989 passed three resolutions concerning test bans. Resolution 44/105 called upon the CD to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a test ban, comprising two Working Groups -- one on compliance and verification and another on content and scope. The resolution was adopted by a vote of

---

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> "Statement by Ambassador Mason before the First Committee." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall 1989), p. 15.

136-3-13, with the United States, Britain and France voting against it, and Canada abstaining.<sup>9</sup> Resolution 44/106 called for the establishment of a preparatory committee to organize the Conference to convert the PTBT into a CTBT. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 127-2-22, with the United States and Britain voting against and Canada again abstaining.<sup>10</sup> France announced that it would not participate in the vote.

Finally, Canada co-sponsored Resolution 44/107, which called upon the CD to initiate substantive work and for the nuclear weapon states to agree to "appropriate verifiable interim measures on nuclear testing" so as to achieve a CTBT as quickly as possible. It also called on the CD to set up an international seismic monitoring network, and to investigate other measures to monitor and verify compliance with a CTBT. This Resolution was adopted by a vote of 145-2-6, with France and the United States in opposition.<sup>11</sup>

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 16 February 1990, the Honourable Warren Allmand presented a motion to the House asking the Canadian government to join the thirty-nine signatory states to the Partial Test Ban Treaty that had asked for a conference to convert it into a comprehensive test ban treaty. Mr. Allmand explained the background and importance of the PTBT as follows:

The partial test ban treaty was signed in 1963 by President John Kennedy and Secretary Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, and originally it was a treaty to deal with radioactive fallout. It was also seen as a means to stop the development of new nuclear weapons. According to the partial test ban treaty, the countries that signed the treaty pledged themselves not to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under the sea, or in outer space. This meant that the only place left for the testing of nuclear weapons was under ground.

That does not mean that testing has not taken place, as most of you know. As a matter of fact, there have been over 1,000 tests of nuclear weapons since 1963, all under ground. Unfortunately, these tests have led to the proliferation of new types of nuclear weapons ....

In 1963, with the partial test ban treaty testing was abolished in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. By leaving that particular avenue open, testing nuclear weapons underground, we have had a massive proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> UNGA Resolution 44/105, 15 December 1989.

<sup>10</sup> UNGA Resolution 44/106, 15 December 1989.

<sup>11</sup> UNGA Resolution 44/107, 15 December 1989.

<sup>12</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 February 1990, p. 8473.

Mr. Allmand went on to explain the importance of the motion he was proposing:

This is extremely important not only for the environmental consequences of testing but also to stop the development of new nuclear weapons. It is concluded by experts throughout the world that, if you could stop the testing of nuclear weapons, you could stop the development of nuclear weapons. This becomes an extremely important step in bringing about the end of nuclear weapons.<sup>13</sup>

On the same day, NDP Member Dan Heap also commented on the effort to convert the PTBT into a CTBT. He stated:

This move has the support of 116 countries, which is a good majority of the United Nations. Unfortunately, some of the heavyweights have not supported it. The point of such a conference as is being proposed is to bring the public opinion of the whole world, or of two-thirds of the world or more that are represented in these countries, to bear on the heavyweights that are resisting the idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

It has been the dream of hundreds of millions of people around the world that we would arrive at a reasonable decision to stop the use of nuclear weapons, to decide that we will never use them and, therefore, to decide that we will never produce them, to decide that we will never research their production, and to decide as a key decision, that we will never test the production of any new nuclear weapons.<sup>14</sup>

In reference to the question of completely stopping the testing of nuclear weapons, Progressive Conservative Member Bill Casey stated that the adoption of a CTBT had always been a fundamental objective for the Government. He noted that in 1985 the Prime Minister had stated that this was one of the six key objectives in the area of arms control and disarmament. Mr. Casey continued:

In addition, it must be borne in mind that no amendment to the partial test ban treaty can come into effect without the approval of the original depository states, and here there is clear opposition. Canada has long recognized the futility of holding a special conference or a negotiation on a CTBT in the absence of support of the parties most directly concerned.

Meaningful arms control, including the progress on the comprehensive test ban treaty, requires that issues be approached in a forthright manner. In this case, however, proponents of the comprehensive test ban treaty are taking advantage of a legal

---

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 February 1990, p. 8478.

loophole, the prescribed partial test ban treaty amendment procedure, to pursue an objective which they have been unable to achieve directly.

A partial test ban treaty amendment conference, instead of focusing on ongoing efforts where real prospects for real progress exists, runs the risk of wasting both time and resources. To some, it represents an irresponsible misuse of multilateral arms control and disarmament mechanisms. Its failure could undermine the confidence in the multilateral ACD process itself.<sup>15</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Barillot, Bruno, "Arrêt des essais nucléaires français: des résultats encourageants." *Damocles*, vol. 43 (April-May 1990), pp. 25-26.

Canada, Energy, Mines and Resources and External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Yellowknife Seismological Array: A Canadian Contribution to the Verification of Compliance with a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty*. Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1989 (14 pp.).

Epstein, William and Seaborg, Glenn T., "Non-nuclear States Move to End Testing." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 45 no. 5 (June 1989), pp. 36-37.

Lockwood, Dunbar, "Continued Testing 'Essential' DOE Tells Congress." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 20 no. 4 (May 1990), p. 29.

Robinson, C. Paul and Paldy, Les, "Substantial Progress in Nuclear Testing Talks: Verification Protocols Nearing Completion." *NATO Review*, vol. 38 no. 1, (February 1990), pp. 17-19.

#### FURTHER READING

Bugat, Alain, "Les essais nucléaires ont encore un avenir." *Defense nationale* (June 1988), pp. 143-144.

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Seismic Verification*. Ottawa: *Verification Brochure* No. 1, 1986 (53 pp.).

Epstein, William and Seaborg, Glenn, "Non-Nuclear States Move to End Testing." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 45 no. 5 (June 1989), pp. 36-37.

---

<sup>15</sup>

*Commons Debates*, 16 February 1990, p. 8477.

Evernden, Jack F. and Archambeau, Charles A., "Some Seismological Aspects of Monitoring a CTBT," in: K. Tsipis *et al.* (eds.), *Arms Control Verification: The Technologies that Make it Possible*. London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986, pp. 223-263.

Faille, Maxime, "Bold New Conference For Test Ban By Amending Existing Treaty." *Peace Magazine* (October 1988), pp. 16-17.

Fetter, Steve, "Stockpile Confidence Under a Nuclear Test Ban." *International Security* (Winter 1987-1988), pp. 132-167.

Fischer, Georges, "The Treaty of 1963: Retrospective and Perspective." *Disarmament*, vol. 12 no. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 96-108.

Goldblat, Jozef and Cox, David (eds.), *Nuclear Weapon Tests: Prohibition or Limitation?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1988 (423 pp.).

Robinson, C., "The Joint Verification Experiment: A Unique Approach to Developing Verification Agreements." *Disarmament*, vol. 12 no. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 90-95.

Stokes, Paul A., "Unattended In-country Stations for Seismic Verification," in: K. Tsipis *et al.* (eds.), *Arms Control Verification: The Technologies that Make it Possible*. London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986, pp. 264-274.

US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Nuclear Testing Limitations*. Washington, D.C.: ACDA Issues Brief, 2 October 1987.

Von Hippel, F., *et al.*, "A Low Threshold Nuclear Test Ban." *International Security* (Fall 1987), pp. 135-151.

## CROSS REFERENCES

Nuclear Non-Proliferation  
Verification



## 6. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (CSBM<sub>s</sub>)

### *BACKGROUND*

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM<sub>s</sub>) in the European security environment have been negotiated in three main fora: in Helsinki, through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); in Stockholm, through the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE); and currently in Vienna through the Negotiations on CSBM<sub>s</sub>.

The Helsinki Final Act was negotiated by the thirty-five-nation CSCE between 3 July 1973 and 1 August 1975. The thirty-five participating nations were roughly divided into three main groupings: the sixteen NATO members, the seven Warsaw Pact nations, and the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries.<sup>1</sup> The Final Act contained three "Baskets" of issues: Basket I: Questions relating to Security in Europe; Basket II: Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment; and Basket III: Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields.

In Basket I, the thirty-five participants agreed, among other things, to voluntary observance of limited confidence-building measures, designed to further such objectives as reducing the risks of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities. The measures agreed to were: prior notification of major or other military manoeuvres; exchange of observers; and prior notification of major military movements.

CSCE Follow-up meetings have been held in Belgrade (1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983), and Vienna (1986-1989). The Madrid Follow-up meeting established the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), also commonly referred to as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which began in Stockholm on 17 January 1984. The aim of this conference was to build upon the CBM process begun in Helsinki and "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations." These measures were to be applicable to "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space," to be militarily significant, politically binding, and adequately verifiable. As the type of CBMs to be negotiated were strengthened from those agreed to in Helsinki, the word "security" was added to describe them.

---

<sup>1</sup> The nations involved in the CSCE process were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.

On 22 September 1986, after almost three years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached in Stockholm. The terms of the Accord, effective 1 January 1987, included the following: notice of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks must be given forty-two days in advance; host states must extend invitations to foreign observers to attend manoeuvres exceeding 17,000 men; each state has the right to request a ground and/or aerial inspection of any military activity raising doubts about compliance with agreed CSBMs, although no state is required to submit to more than three such inspections per year; aircraft for aerial inspections will be chosen by the mutual consent of the parties involved, and inspectors will furnish the monitoring equipment and specify the flight path of the aircraft in the suspected area; and calendars outlining the schedule for military activities subject to prior notification in the following year are to be exchanged by 15 November. Notice for military activities involving over 40,000 or 75,000 troops must be given by 15 November, one and two years in advance, respectively. Finally, the signatories agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or political independence of other states in accordance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

Compliance with the Stockholm Agreement since its establishment has been considered satisfactory by all involved. For 1989, NATO forecast eleven exercises, of which seven were planned to be of observable size. The Warsaw Pact forecast seventeen exercises, with seven planned to be of observable size. The NNA forecast three exercises, of which two were planned to be observable. Also in 1989, the West conducted nine on-site challenge inspections and the East held seven. For 1990, notification has been given of twenty-one military activities -- seven by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), ten by NATO, and four by NNA countries. Of these twenty-one military activities, eleven qualify as observable (eight of NATO's and three of the WTO's).

The question of how to follow up the Stockholm Conference was on the agenda of the third CSCE Follow-up meeting in Vienna, which began on 19 November 1986. The working group on security discussed a proposal for two distinct negotiations on conventional arms control: one, expanding the CSBM regime agreed to in Stockholm; and the second, held within the CSCE framework but being autonomous and involving only the twenty-three nations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, to deal with enhancing security and stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional forces (see **NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)**, Chapter 8). The concept of having two distinct conventional security negotiations had been first outlined in the NATO Brussels Declaration of December 1986.

On 17 January 1989, the thirty-five nations involved agreed to establish follow-up talks to the Stockholm Conference. The new Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, related but not linked to the CFE negotiations, began on 9 March 1989. Prior to the

2

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Document of the Stockholm Conference On Confidence-and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 1986, pp. 1-20.

start of the negotiations, on 6 March, the Western nations issued their opening proposal. It included twelve specific measures under the following three broad headings:

- *Transparency about military organization:* three measures under this heading included the regular exchange of military information on forces on land in the negotiation zone and major weapons deployed in the zone. This information would be subject to random evaluation through unannounced visits by participating states.
- *Transparency and predictability of military activities:* the six measures under this heading basically extended those measures agreed to in Stockholm. They included enhanced information proposals for the annual calendars and notifications, improvements to observation guidelines (that is, more detailed briefings, better maps, etc.), lowering the observation threshold to activities involving 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, improvements to inspection guidelines by increasing the number of inspections allowed and shortening the period between inspection requests and access for the inspectors to the area, among other things, and lowering the thresholds for longer notice of large-scale activities to those involving 50,000 troops.
- *Contacts and Communication:* three measures under this heading included improved access to government officials for accredited personnel dealing with military matters, development of better communication links for transmitting information related to the Agreement, and encouragement of better treatment and access for media representatives.

In addition, NATO proposed an exchange of views on military policy, ideas, capabilities and doctrine.

The Warsaw Pact made a detailed proposal of thirty-six measures divided into five parts.

*Part One* contained five constraining measures, limiting exercises, redeployments, or concentration of armed forces to 40,000 troops; the number of troops engaged in a series of activities taking place in close proximity to 40,000; the number of notified exercises, involving a maximum of 40,000 troops, to be conducted simultaneously in one state, to three; the number of exercises with more than 25,000 troops to be conducted annually in any participating state, to two; and the duration of notifiable military activities to fifteen days.

*Part Two* contained sixteen measures addressing air and naval forces. It included, for example, limits on the number of ships involved in naval exercises and the duration of such exercises, as well as notification of naval redeployments of certain sizes (with similar measures applicable to air forces); notification of air exercises involving more than 150 aircraft or 500 sorties; and observation of naval exercises involving more than twenty-five ships or 100 aircraft.

*Part Three* included three measures to "develop and amplify" the measures agreed to in Stockholm. These involved lowering the thresholds for notifications and observations; improving observation conditions; and providing better information in the annual calendars.

*Part Four* proposed sub-regions in which specific CSBMs would apply.

Finally, *Part Five* proposed such measures as the establishment of a centre for the reduction of the danger of war and prevention of surprise attack, and the discussion of military doctrine.

Romania also put forward a set of proposals in the first round of talks.

Following the end of the first round, Western negotiators felt that some positive and common ground existed between the proposals. However, the West maintained its position that exercises involving naval or air forces alone should not be included in the talks, as they were not included in the mandate. The East's proposals for limiting the numbers and types of exercises were characterized as being unacceptable owing to the East's numerical and geographic advantages. NATO maintained that the large training exercises it conducted and the better training it provided for its troops helped to offset the numerical advantages of the Warsaw Pact. Constraints on this training, without corresponding reductions in force levels, would result in greater advantage to the Warsaw Pact.

Two Working Groups were formed in the second round: the first, to examine information, verification, communications and consultation; and the second, to consider constraining measures, notification, observation and calendar questions. Following a Western proposal, a third working group on developing an independent seminar on military policy and doctrine was established on 16 June 1989.

At the end of the third round, which was held from 8 September to 20 October 1989, the participants agreed on the dates and framework for a seminar on military doctrine. The latter took place from 16 January to 5 February 1990 and was attended by the top military officers of the thirty-five. Its purpose was "to allow for a discussion on military doctrine in relation to the posture, structure and activities of conventional forces in the zone. Likewise other connected issues of military doctrine bearing on military capabilities might be discussed."<sup>3</sup> Participants at the seminar, who included US General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Soviet General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, were careful to stress that the seminar was not a negotiating forum. The idea was "to try to begin to understand the motivations and intentions that lie behind military force structures and activities, an element that is obviously the key to mutual confidence."<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> *Arms Control Reporter* (1989), p. 402.B.242.

<sup>4</sup> John J. Maresca, "In Vienna, A Friendly Invasion." *Ottawa: United States Embassy Text* (15 January 1990).

The first week of discussion consisted of opening presentations by the military commanders. From 22 to 26 January, the delegates discussed the military posture of their various armed forces, including organization, command, structures, deployment, support systems personnel, armament, equipment, state of readiness and procurement plans. This was followed by a session on military activities and training and concluded with a session devoted to budgets and planning.

Of particular interest to the West was the Soviet elaboration of how they had reoriented their military posture to a defensive mode. General Moiseyev emphasized in his opening address that Moscow had adopted "a new defensive military doctrine" as a result of new political thinking.<sup>5</sup> He provided details of unilateral troop and arms reductions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to support this claim. Though the Americans welcomed the Soviet troop withdrawals they reacted cautiously given the fact that, according to intelligence reports, Soviet stockpiling of ammunition and fuel in Eastern Europe remained at pre-1989 levels.<sup>6</sup>

In March 1990, it was reported that diplomats in Vienna had reached a virtual consensus on the need to complete work on a CSBM treaty in time for signing at the CSCE summit to be held in late 1990.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, the fifth round ended on 23 February with a host of new initiatives. The delegations set up four treaty-drafting groups: one on information exchange and verification; one on communications, consultations, and contacts; one on observation and notification of exercises; and one on the annual calendar and constraints. A paper on options for a new communications system was introduced, co-sponsored by states from all three groups of CSCE participants. The NNAs submitted recommendations for conducting random evaluations to verify data furnished during the envisioned annual CSBM data exchanges. Finally, NATO formally submitted two proposals resulting from discussion at the military doctrine seminar. Under the first of these, each CSCE state would exchange annually with all others detailed data on its military budget for the forthcoming fiscal year. The other states could then submit questions about the data and expect answers. The second proposal was for states to hold annual five-day review meetings to discuss present and future implementation of CSBMs, as well as other military data exchanges.<sup>8</sup>

On 18 May 1990, Norway tabled on behalf of NATO a series of new CSBM proposals, including measures for: reducing the risk of, and reporting, hazardous incidents, including hazards to CDE observers and inspectors; a CSCE mechanism for the discussion of unusual military activities; visits to combat air bases to observe routine activities; and information exchange on

---

<sup>5</sup> Alan Riding, "Military Chiefs of East and West Meet to Discuss Europe's Security." *New York Times*, 17 January 1990, p. A8.

<sup>6</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Still Stocking Ammunition, US Says." *New York Times*, 11 January 1990, p. A15.

<sup>7</sup> "CSBM Talks 'Back on the Front Page'." *Defense and Disarmament Alternatives*, vol. 3 no. 3 (March 1990), p. 7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*.

infrastructure upgrading. NATO also tabled revisions to previous proposals that called for improved access to government officials for accredited personnel dealing with military matters and fewer restrictions on their activities in the CDE zone; improved military contacts; and development of new means of communication, including a telegram network, computer hookups, or existing commercial networks.<sup>9</sup>

Also in May, Hungary and Czechoslovakia tabled a proposal on bilateral CSBMs, including notification and observation of small-scale military activities, and bilateral commitments to refrain from military activities in border areas. The two countries envisioned that such bilateral CSBMs might eventually be incorporated into the multilateral CSBM regime. In June 1990, Sweden tabled a proposal on exchanging information about plans and programs for "developing" armed forces.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 19 October 1989, the government announced that Canadian military officials would visit the Soviet Union the next day, and stay until 26 October. The discussions that took place during that visit concerned military doctrine and arms control and disarmament issues, as well as a proposal for a two-year military exchange programme. Defence Minister Bill McKnight described the talks as "a historic first for Canada and...a testament to the new spirit of co-operation that exists between the East and the West."<sup>10</sup> Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Lt.-Gen. David Huddleston, who led the Canadian delegation, described the event as:

...a good first step in contributing to a common understanding of the Soviet and Canadian positions on defence matters...as well as a tried and true method of learning more of them and them of us in terms of military thinking.<sup>11</sup>

During the visit of Prime Minister Mulroney to Moscow in late November 1989, Canada and the Soviet Union signed an Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea. The agreement specifies the proper actions ships and aircraft from Canada and the Soviet Union must follow when they meet or operate in each other's vicinity.<sup>12</sup> On 31 May 1990, DND announced that ships of the Second Destroyer Squadron based in Esquimault, BC, would visit Vladivostok, USSR, from 3 June to 7 June 1990 to conduct training based on the new agreement. Defence Minister McKnight said: "The exercise of this agreement is tangible evidence of Canada's commitment to

---

<sup>9</sup> *Arms Control Reporter* (1990), p. 402.B.267.

<sup>10</sup> National Defence, *News Release* AFN 51/89 (19 October 1989).

<sup>11</sup> *The Wednesday Report*, 8 November 1989, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Government of Canada, "Canada and the USSR Sign an Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea." *News Release*, 20 November 1989.

promoting international stability and mutual confidence.... We are striving to establish a new pattern of relations between our two countries and to enhance our understanding of each other."<sup>13</sup>

Also during the Moscow visit, the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev signed an Agreement on a Program of Military Contacts, establishing the first Canada-USSR military exchange programme. The purpose of this agreement as described by the Canadian Government is to "nurture understanding between the defence forces between the two countries as a means of reducing tensions."<sup>14</sup>

In his address to the Seminar on Military Doctrine and Strategies in Vienna in January 1990, Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff General de Chastelain spoke of the value of the meeting, "which has opened lines of contact non-existent heretofore, and which has given us the opportunity for a balanced and transparent view and understanding of each others' military doctrines and strategies."<sup>15</sup>

Speaking before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs on 7 March 1990, Canada's Ambassador to the CSBM negotiations, David Peel, admitted that the talks had lost the leading edge in multilateral arms control to the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, simply because progress in CFE had been so fast and dramatic. Nevertheless, Ambassador Peel concluded, the CSBM negotiation by:

...its very existence is itself a confidence-building measure. The fact that there is a body where 35 countries come together to discuss the building of confidence at the military level among them, quite apart from whatever document it may produce, does itself produce an increase in confidence and one could argue an increase in security too.<sup>16</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The issue of confidence- and security-building measures was not raised in the House of Commons during this period.

---

<sup>13</sup> National Defence, "Canadian Ships to Visit Soviet Union." *News Release* AFN: 25/90 (31 May 1990), p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Government of Canada, "Canada and the USSR Sign an Agreement on a Program of Military Contacts." *News Release*, 20 November 1989.

<sup>15</sup> National Defence, "Address by General A.J.G.D de Chastelain Chief of the Defence Staff to The Seminar on Military Doctrine and Strategies, Vienna, Austria, 17 January 1990," p. 13.

<sup>16</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 19 (7 March 1990), p. 19:7.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Brown, Stuart, "CSBM -- The Other Negotiations." *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, vol. 34 no. 4 (August 1989), pp. 59-61.

"East, West and the Neutral and Non-aligned Countries of Europe Discuss Military Doctrine." *Disarmament Bulletin* No. 13 (Spring 1990), pp. 14-15.

Feinstein, Lee, "CSBM Talks Reconvene as Sides Differ on Air and Naval Activities." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 7 (September 1989), p. 31.

Holmes, Michael, *Compliance With Confidence-Building Measures: From Helsinki to Stockholm*. Ottawa: CIIPS, *Background Paper* No. 30, February 1990 (8 pp.).

Magill, W.K. and Rasiulus, Andrew P., "The Vienna Negotiations: Establishing a New Security Order for Europe." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 4 (February 1990), p. 34-38.

Maresca, John, "Ambassador John Maresca: Building Confidence in Europe" (Interview). *Arms Control Today*, vol. 20 no. 4 (May 1990), pp. 8-12.

## FURTHER READING

Ben-Horin, Y., et al., *Building Confidence and Security in Europe: The Potential Role of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures*. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1986 (91 pp.).

Borawski, John, "From Stockholm to Vienna: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 4 (May 1989), pp. 11-15.

Borawski, John, *From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988 (260 pp.).

Braun, Aurel, "Confidence Building Measures, Security and Disarmament," in: R. Spencer (ed.), *Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*. Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984, pp. 202-227.

Flanagan, S. J., and Hampson, F. O. (eds.), *Securing Europe's Future*. London: Croom Helm, 1986 (334 pp.).

Goetz, Col. B. A., "Verification of Confidence and Security Building Measures: Evolution and Future Prospects." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 18 no. 4 (February 1989), pp. 29-38.

Goodby, J., "To Reduce the Risk of War--The Stockholm Negotiation," in: R. B. Byers et al. (eds.), *Confidence-Building Measures and International Security*. New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, *East-West Monograph Series* No. 4, 1987, pp. 39-54.

Macintosh, James, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, *Arms Control and Disarmament Studies* No. 1, 1985 (148 pp.).

Namiesniowski, C. A., *The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence Building*. Ottawa: CIIPS, *Background Paper* No. 14, September 1987 (8 pp.).

Vick, A. J., "Building Confidence During Peace and War." *Defense Analysis*, vol. 5 no. 2 (June 1989), pp. 97-114.

## CROSS REFERENCES

Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

## BACKGROUND

On 12 May 1989, in a speech delivered at Texas A&M University, President Bush referred to a proposal made to the Soviets by President Eisenhower in 1955. Eisenhower's proposal, dubbed "Open Skies," had called for unarmed aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to fly over each other's territory, opening up each side's military activities to regular scrutiny. Noting that the Soviets had rejected the notion at that time, thus failing the test of "Soviet readiness to open their society," Bush suggested:

Now, let us again explore that proposal, but on a broader, more intrusive and radical basis, one which I hope would include allies on both sides. We suggest that those countries that wish to examine this proposal meet soon to work out the necessary operational details, separately from other arms control negotiations. Such surveillance flights, complementing satellites, would provide regular scrutiny for both sides. Such unprecedented territorial access would show the world the true meaning of the concept of openness.<sup>1</sup>

The motivation behind the proposals of Eisenhower and Bush were strikingly similar. For Eisenhower, to some degree, the Open Skies proposal was seen as a means of testing the seriousness of the Soviet Union on disarmament. The idea of mutual aerial inspection seemed to be "a good test to determine the willingness on the part of the USSR to accept intrusive inspection."<sup>2</sup> The Bush proposal was made partly to test the veracity of the Soviet statement, made by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the opening of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in March 1989, that there was no verification method the USSR would not accept, given reciprocity.

NATO endorsed the Open Skies concept at its Heads of State Summit in Brussels on 29 to 30 May 1989:

We consider as an important initiative President Bush's call for an "open skies" regime intended to improve confidence among states through reconnaissance flights, and to contribute to the transparency of military activity, to arms control and to public awareness. It will be the subject of careful study and wide-ranging consultations.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> George Bush, "Remarks at the Texas A&M University Commencement Ceremony College Station, Texas 12 May 1989," in: *Beyond Containment: Selected Speeches by President George Bush on Europe and East-West Relations 17 April-2 June 1989*. Ottawa: United States Information Agency (July 1989), pp. 10-11.

<sup>2</sup> External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Open Skies: Challenge for the 1990's." *Backgrounder*, 15 September 1990, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels* (M-1(89)21). Brussels: NATO Press Service, 30 May 1989, p. 5.

The initial Soviet reaction to President Bush's revival of the Open Skies concept was muted. But in September 1989, following the ministerial meeting between US Secretary of State James Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the Soviets "agreed in principle to the 'Open Skies' concept." Furthermore, both sides "noted their willingness to attend an international conference on the subject."<sup>4</sup> Canada immediately offered to host the conference. In November 1989, during his visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that invitations had been sent out to all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- and had been accepted by Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Baker -- to attend an Open Skies Conference of foreign ministers in Ottawa in February 1990.<sup>5</sup>

On 15 December 1989, NATO released a *Basic Elements* paper, outlining its negotiating position going into the conference.<sup>6</sup> This document stated that the Open Skies regime should be based on:

- overflights of a party's "entire national territory, in principle without other limitations than those imposed by flight safety or rules of international law;"
- the possibility for the participants to carry out observation flights on a national basis or jointly with their allies;
- the commitment of all parties to conduct and to receive such observation flights on the basis of national quotas; and
- the establishment of agreed procedures designed to ensure both transparency and flight safety.

Key aspects of the NATO position were:

- quotas for overflights based on the geographic size of the participating countries, with totals for both alliances being roughly equivalent;
- the use of unarmed, fixed-wing civilian or military aircraft;
- the prohibition of signals intelligence-gathering equipment, though a variety of other sensors would be allowed;

---

<sup>4</sup> United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Joint Statement of the Wyoming Ministerial." *Official Text*, 23 September 1989, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Government of Canada, "Canada Announces the International Conference on 'Open Skies'." *News Release*, 20 November 1989.

<sup>6</sup> *Open Skies Basic Elements* (Annex to M-2(89)46). Brussels: NATO Press Service, 15 December 1989.

- sixteen hours' notice of arrival at an entry point, after which a 24-hour pre-flight period would begin. During this pre-flight period the aircraft would be subjected to intrusive but non-destructive inspection for prohibited sensors and recorders; and
- the determination by each alliance of procedures for sharing the information gathered.

The Warsaw Pact tabled no comparable "basic elements" paper prior to the February conference. Still, it became apparent through press briefings and newspaper reports that the Soviet approach to Open Skies differed significantly from the approach of NATO. First, Moscow preferred a joint pool of aircraft equipped with standardized sensor equipment that would be shared by nations both East and West. Second, the Soviet Union argued that the information gathered from overflights should be made available to all the signatories, not exclusively to members of the alliance conducting the overflight. Finally, the Kremlin wanted the right to conduct overflights of NATO military bases located in third party countries.

The Open Skies Conference took place in Ottawa from 12 February to 27 February 1990, with NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) foreign ministers attending the first three days. On 12 February the WTO tabled its own "basic elements" paper. The document stated that "the regime parameters should ensure that the sides have equal entitlement to the information." It also proposed that "those participating countries with military bases abroad would enter into negotiations...with the aim of deciding whether the regime should extend to their military bases in third countries...with the agreement of those countries." Other elements in the WTO document included: a common fleet of surveillance aircraft that would use mixed crews and mixed groups of observers; uniform or agreed-upon surveillance equipment to be made available to all participants; access by all on an equal basis to the information resulting from the overflights; and the designation of "closed" areas, with special policies for those containing atomic power stations, large chemical plants and certain other structures.

In spite of these differences the negotiators were able to issue a communique on 13 February in which they agreed on four elements:

The "Open Skies" regime will be implemented on a reciprocal and equitable basis which will protect the interests of each participating state, and in accordance with which the participating states will be open to aerial observation. The regime will ensure the maximum possible openness and minimum restrictions for observation flights;

Each participating state will have the right to conduct, and the obligation to receive, observation flights on the basis of annual quotas which will be determined in negotiations so as to provide for equitable coverage;

The agreement will have provisions concerning the right to conduct observation flights using unarmed aircraft and equipment capable in all circumstances of fulfilling the goals of the regime; [and]

The participating states will favourably consider the possible participation in the regime of other countries, primarily the European countries.<sup>7</sup>

However, the initial optimism that the negotiation of an Open Skies agreement would be a relatively straightforward affair soon evaporated. The delegations divided into four working groups to meet daily to deal with the main issues in dispute. The first group focussed on what sensors would be permitted and what types of aircraft would be used. The second concerned itself with the number of overflights each country could conduct (active quotas), how many each would be subject to (passive quotas), and the geographic areas in each country that would be included (or not included) in the regime. A third group, "flight operations," looked at such issues as flight safety, the notice-time of overflights, and transit procedures at the point of entry. Finally, a fourth, legal working group dealt with the various legal issues that would be part of any regime.

The main stumbling block early on was the types of sensors to be permitted. The West, favouring sensors that would provide a twenty-four-hour, all-weather capability, envisaged a package including photo-reconnaissance, infrared detectors and synthetic aperture radar. The Soviets, though at one point seeming to agree to this package, backed off and insisted on optical and electro-optical sensors only (which do not have an all-weather, day-or-night capability), that would be used in common by all.

On other issues, the Soviets began to retreat from their insistence on a common pool of aircraft but suggested instead that Soviet aircraft and crews be used to carry foreign observers over Soviet territory. The Western position was that the country conducting the overflight would supply the aircraft and crews. There was also disagreement on the size of the quotas. While neither side had reached any final conclusions about the number of flights it would be allowed to conduct in a given year, the Soviets had in mind one-fifth the number that the West was considering. For example, the Soviets were suggesting receiving on the order of fifteen overflights for themselves and thirty for the Warsaw Pact as a whole, while Canada alone suggested it might want to conduct thirty overflights of the Soviet Union.

In addition, the Soviet Union, which was characterized by a Canadian official as being isolated in its positions, even from the other members of the WTO, wanted to impose strict territorial limits on Open Skies. This would include a minimum height of 10,000 feet for flights over nuclear power plants, chemical plants and populated areas such as Moscow. Viktor Karpov, the chief Soviet negotiator, argued that flights in those areas would be unduly hazardous, given the potentially catastrophic consequences should a plane crash.<sup>8</sup> NATO members felt that such restrictions would apply to too great an area of the Soviet Union and therefore were unreasonable. The Soviets also insisted on the need to extend Open Skies to military bases in third-party territories. The West argued that this could be done only in negotiation with those parties. Finally, the Soviets did not budge in their insistence that the data collected from any overflight be shared among all the members of the regime. The West felt that this would be too expensive, given the costs of information-processing, and maintained their position that data should be shared only among the allies as each member saw fit. By 27 February, when the Ottawa conference ended,

---

<sup>8</sup> Olivia Ward, "Superpowers Far Apart on Open Skies Treaty." *Toronto Star*, 28 February 1990, p. 3.

there had been little movement by either side on these issues. However, the meeting did produce a seventy-three-page composite Draft Treaty Text in which most of the language was agreed.

Most of the delegates to the first Open Skies conference registered disappointment at the outcome, though they seemed somewhat optimistic that agreement could be reached at a follow-on conference in Budapest, planned for the spring. Canadian delegate John Noble said: "We are not deadlocked here.... We have come as far as we can usefully come in Ottawa. This is an on-going negotiation."<sup>9</sup>

The Budapest conference began on 23 April 1990. In the intercessional period between the two meetings little or no progress had been made toward resolving any of the issues in dispute. At the start of the Budapest round, however, Mr. Karpov indicated that the Soviet Union would be willing to add radar to the list of permitted sensors, thereby acceding to the West's demand for a 24-hour, all-weather capability. There was still some debate over how sophisticated these radars could be.<sup>10</sup> For its part, NATO indicated that it would consider lifting COCOM (Coordination Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) restrictions to allow the export of commercial sensors to all participating countries. However, the chances of a successful conclusion to the round were diminished when after only two days of talks Mr. Karpov flew home to the Soviet Union. On 4 May the negotiators in Budapest abandoned their target of signing an Open Skies treaty by the end of the conference on 12 May, the first anniversary of President Bush's proposal. Instead, the conference adjourned two days early. One participant acknowledged that "we have not succeeded in the ambitious task we set for ourselves in Ottawa."<sup>11</sup> However, there was optimism that a third round would take place at an unspecified date.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In spring 1989 Canadian officials became aware that the Bush administration was giving at least cursory consideration to re-introducing Eisenhower's 1955 Open Skies proposal. Like the Eisenhower approach, the Bush proposal for Open Skies was intended to limit overflights of unarmed reconnaissance aircraft to the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States. However, because of their research into space-based satellite monitoring, it was obvious to Canadian officials that the middle and lesser powers stood to gain the most from aircraft monitoring, because:

...as long as surveillance aircraft belonging to each alliance are excluded from the other's airspace, the smaller members of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have to rely on the sophisticated spying abilities of their respective superpowers for much of the

<sup>9</sup> "Open Skies Doesn't Fly." *Ottawa Sun*, 28 February 1990, p. 16.

<sup>10</sup> Celestine Bohlen, "'Open Skies' Talks Hit Snag, Cutting Chances of Pact in May." *New York Times*, 26 April 1990, p. A14.

<sup>11</sup> John Noble, "Remarks to Closing Plenary," 10 May 1990.

information they receive about their potential adversaries. Proponents of open skies argue that lesser powers would be better off gathering their own information from independent overflights.<sup>12</sup>

In short, satellite monitoring was too expensive for the middle and lesser powers; aircraft monitoring, on the other hand, was affordable to all. In April 1989 Mr. Mulroney wrote President Bush urging him to support Open Skies, offering Canada's help and asking that it be put on the agenda for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington the following month.<sup>13</sup> During his visit, Mr. Mulroney explained Canada's view "that while this would be an excellent initiative, even in a bilateral context, it would have greater value if it included the territory of all nations in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and if all these nations could participate in the programme of overflights."<sup>14</sup> On 11 May, the day before he made his announcement, President Bush informed Prime Minister Mulroney that he intended to proceed with the initiative according to the broader definition of open skies suggested by Canada. The Canadian intervention was apparently an important factor in the President's decision to proceed.<sup>15</sup>

Canada was among the first nations in NATO to applaud the Bush proposal and immediately announced that it would be willing to participate in an Open Skies arrangement. As Prime Minister Mulroney explained in a press release welcoming the US announcement:

This concept was raised during our meetings with the President and Secretary of State James Baker and we suggested that Mr. Bush consider it as an initiative for the NATO Alliance.<sup>16</sup>

On 5 June 1989, in an op-ed article written for the *New York Times*, External Affairs Minister Clark outlined the reasons why Canada supported Open Skies. First, he listed the advantages of aircraft surveillance over satellite surveillance:

Aircraft can see more than satellites can. They fly lower. They can get around or below clouds and observe from different angles. Satellites pass in fixed orbits, at predictable times, so suspect activity can be thoroughly hidden; short-notice overflights would complicate this kind of masking significantly, and could make it impossible. Should a satellite see something significant, its ability to take another look is constrained by its orbit time. Open skies could allow an early second look from aircraft.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Marc Clark and Ian Mather, "Opening the Skies." *Maclean's*, 12 February 1990, p. 19.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>14</sup> External Affairs, *Factsheet*, May 1989, p. 8.

<sup>15</sup> Clark and Mather, *supra* note 15, p. 19.

<sup>16</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, *Press Release*, 12 May 1989, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Joe Clark, "Don't Dismiss Open Skies." *New York Times*, 5 June 1989, p. 17.

He then listed some of the less technical reasons why Open Skies should be considered seriously. Clark said that Open Skies would build confidence by opening a nation's activities to detailed, intrusive monitoring: "A clear unequivocal gesture that a nation's intentions are not aggressive"; open skies could contribute to the verification of prospective arms control treaties, specifically a CFE agreement, allowing "all parties to the agreement...to assure their publics, on the basis of their own judgements, that these agreements are being adhered to, and that their security is intact"; the public availability of aircraft surveillance photos could not but enhance the public discussion of the Warsaw Pact's military activity and of arms control compliance; and, finally, overhead monitoring would become more reliable since it would not be subject to the vagaries of satellite failure.

Following the Wyoming ministerial in September 1989, Canada offered to host the first international Open Skies conference. Mr. Clark welcomed the Soviet agreement to attend, observing: "It's a very firm commitment from the Soviet Union not only to participate but to encourage the participation of others."<sup>18</sup>

During his visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Mulroney reiterated Canada's belief that "an 'Open Skies' regime would contribute significantly to East/West confidence-building," adding: "the utility of such overflights would be enhanced if these aircraft were unrestricted as to where they could fly, subject only to basic air safety regulations as applicable to civilian passenger aircraft."<sup>19</sup>

Prior to the February conference, and in an effort to clarify some of the issues pertinent to an Open Skies regime, External Affairs and International Trade Canada sponsored a workshop in Ottawa from 21 to 24 November 1989. The meeting, which included some forty participants from Canada, the United States and Europe, dealt with the technical, organizational, operational, legal, and political aspects of the subject. In the foreword to the book that resulted from the workshop, External Affairs Minister Clark wrote:

Canada believes that Open Skies is the most effective way to translate the current atmosphere of goodwill which prevails in international relations into something practical and concrete. The initiative will give President Gorbachev the opportunity to act upon his commitment to openness in a simple and yet dramatic fashion.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> Southam News, "Soviets Endorse Canada's Plan for Open Skies Treaty." *Montreal Gazette*, 28 September 1989, p. A13.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>20</sup> Joe Clark, "Open Skies" (Foreword), in: Michael Slack and Heather Chestnutt (eds.), *Open Skies: Technical Organizational Operational Legal and Political Aspects*. North York, Ontario: York University, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, February 1990, p. vii.

Mr. Clark noted that Canada supported the Open Skies concept because it would "enable the two North American members of the NATO Alliance to demonstrate to their European partners their willingness to shoulder some of the obligations of the upcoming era of greater openness in international relations." Specifically, he wrote: "Since CFE provisions will not apply to North America, Open Skies will demonstrate our willingness to bear a comparable responsibility in the interest of improved international relations." He was alluding to the fact that the North American partners in NATO were sometimes criticized by the European Allies for calling for onerous verification provisions in arms control agreements without themselves being subject to such provisions. By extending aerial overflights to North America, Open Skies would subject Canadian and American territory to surveillance as well. Mr. Clark was careful to point out that Open Skies was not a verification technique *per se*, though it would contribute to the verification of arms control agreements.

On 3 January 1990, Canada announced that it would conduct a trial overflight of Hungary on 6 January, "to test the administrative and operational procedures that are expected to be necessary for an Open Skies agreement."<sup>21</sup> At a press conference following the flight, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division at External Affairs, Ralph Lysyshyn, noted that the fact that Canada conducted the overflight reflected "the role we have played in moving forward the Open Skies process."

Optimism on the part of some Canadian officials that the Open Skies conference was "doomed to succeed," remained undimmed by the fact that East and West had opposing visions of the prospective regime. Mr. Clark explained that it was only natural for countries to enter the meeting with differing positions.<sup>22</sup> At the opening plenary on 12 February Mr. Mulroney said:

An agreement on Open Skies is in concert with the times... An Open Skies agreement will be a statement of enlightened political will, capitalizing on the current climate of achievement and building on a record of recent success.<sup>23</sup>

Then, turning to the business of the conference, the Prime Minister said:

This meeting in Ottawa has two main tasks. First, to concentrate diligently on the work at hand so that an agreement on Open Skies will be achieved when delegations reassemble in Budapest. And, more generally, to seize this unprecedented moment in recent history to replace the Cold War and its incalculable costs in economic wealth, misspent human genius and wasted social opportunity with a new ethic of cooperation based on peace, prosperity and common purpose.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Government of Canada, "Canada to Conduct Trial Open Skies Overflight of Hungary." *News Release No. 001*, 3 January 1990.

<sup>22</sup> Tim Harper, "Soviet Sincerity on 'Open Skies' is Challenged by US Official." *Toronto Star*, 8 February 1990, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Brian Mulroney, "Notes for an Address [at the] Open Skies Conference," 12 February 1990, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*.

In his opening remarks to the conference the following day Mr. Clark placed the Open Skies concept within the context of the historical changes taking place in Europe:

Let us make Open Skies our first step onto the uncharted ground of our future security in Europe. We face an enormous challenge, but also unprecedented opportunity. By putting our political will into practice we, together, can make the term "East-West" synonymous not with confrontation and rivalry, as it has been for the last forty years, but with good will and cooperation.<sup>25</sup>

With the announcement of the two-plus-four formula for German unification and the agreement on US-Soviet troop reductions during the first days of the conference, Mr. Clark indicated that his wishes had been fulfilled: "There is no question we have contributed to historic processes in Europe," he said.<sup>26</sup> The Prime Minister said the agreements were evidence of "the kinds of timely and appropriate initiatives that a country like Canada can take."<sup>27</sup>

The initial euphoria engendered by these accomplishments quickly dissipated as the negotiators in the Ottawa conference found themselves stalemated. In the intercessional Mr. Clark expressed the view that an agreement on Open Skies, which at first seemed inevitable, might not be signed by the end of the second round in Budapest. Blaming the Soviet side for the lack of progress in Ottawa, Mr. Clark speculated that conservative forces in the USSR might be stalling the pace of reform, or that the Soviets might simply be preoccupied with other problems.<sup>28</sup>

Optimism again reasserted itself as the Budapest round got under way. John Noble said that the talks began "in a good atmosphere.... an agreement is not beyond the bounds of possibility." He continued: "We are here to negotiate. The big question is whether the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate also. They have shown some signs of flexibility."<sup>29</sup> At the end of the Budapest round on 10 May, Mr. Noble stated:

We have been limited in our potential at this session by continuing fundamental political differences on certain key issues. Once those political differences become unstuck, as I remain confident that they will, the technical solutions will follow very quickly.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> "Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark," Open Skies Conference Doc ICO-CS-031, 13 February 1990, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Paul Mooney, "Conference a Triumph for Canada." *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 February 1990, p. A4.

<sup>27</sup> Philip Jalsevac, "PM: Success of Meeting Shows Canada has Role in Solving Global Issues." *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 February 1990, p. A4.

<sup>28</sup> Charlotte Montgomery, "Clark Pessimistic on Slow Progress of Open Skies Pact." *Globe and Mail*, 12 April 1990, p. A5.

<sup>29</sup> Alan Ferguson, "Canada to Offer Compromise in 'Open Skies' Row." *Toronto Star*, 24 April 1990, p. 3.

<sup>30</sup> John J. Noble, "Remarks to Closing Plenary," 10 May 1990.

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Much of the discussion of Open Skies in the House concerned the relationship between the Ottawa conference and the monumental changes sweeping Europe. A few days prior to the beginning of the conference, Conservative MP Arnold Malone declared:

...the events of recent days in the Soviet Union have been extraordinary. Mikhail Gorbachev has shown courageous leadership in moving his country toward democracy and economic renewal.... By taking these steps, Mr. Gorbachev has also given a challenge to all other countries. The challenge is to dare to undertake those procedures which will build a mutual environment of confidence.

He then said:

Next week, in Ottawa, Canada will have the opportunity to play a leading role in advancing the confidence-building measures. The Open Skies Conference is a unique occasion for Canada to make a substantive contribution to verification and confidence-building. This statement is shared by all members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.<sup>31</sup>

Again, as the conference opened, Conservative MP Pauline Browes placed Open Skies solidly within the context of the changes that took place in Europe in 1989-1990:

Today in Ottawa an historic chapter in that process is unfolding. Representatives from 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact nations have gathered in Canada to negotiate a treaty which will permit unarmed surveillance flights over each other's territory. An open skies treaty will help foster peaceful understanding and co-operation and lead to more stable relations between all nations. Canadians can be proud of the role that our country is playing in helping to put an end to the cold war once and for all.<sup>32</sup>

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Boulden, Jane, "1990 Open Skies Conference in Canada." *Peace&Security*, vol. 4 no. 4 (Winter 1989-1990), p. 13.

Canada, External Affairs and International Trade, "Open Skies: Opportunity for the 1990s." *Backgrounder* No. 2, January 1990 (22 pp.).

Florini, Ann M., "Come Spy the Friendly Skies." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 46 no. 2 (March 1990), p. 13.

---

<sup>31</sup> *Commons Debates*, 8 February 1990, p. 8057.

<sup>32</sup> *Commons Debates*, 12 February 1990, pp. 8176-8177.

Hawes, John H., "Open Skies: From Idea to Negotiation." *NATO Review* No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 6-9.

"An Open Skies Chronicle." *Disarmament Bulletin* No. 12 (Winter 1989-1990), pp. 3-4.

"Open Skies -- or Pie in the Skies?" *International Perspectives*, vol. 19 no. 3 (March 1990), p. 30.

Shevardnadze, Eduard, "Open Thinking Opens the Skies." *Vestnik* (April 1990), pp. 60-61.

Slack, Michael and Chestnutt, Heather (eds.), *Open Skies: Technical, Organizational, Operational, Legal and Political Aspects*. North York, Ontario: York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies, February 1990 (168 pp.).

Spencer, Metta, "Opening the Sky." *Peace Magazine*, vol. 6 no. 1 (February/March 1990), p. 26.

#### *FURTHER READING*

Rostow, W.S., *Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982 (224 pp.).



## 8. NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

### *BACKGROUND*

Negotiations between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe have been conducted in two main fora: the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna; and the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna.

The MBFR talks began in 1973. The aim of the talks was to reduce the level of conventional forces in a Central European zone covering the territories of West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Direct participants included the eleven NATO and Warsaw Pact nations with troops stationed in these countries -- the above seven, plus the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Eight nations, known as "flank states", were indirect participants in the talks. These consisted of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Italy, and Turkey from NATO; and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania from the Warsaw Pact.

The MBFR talks showed some progress through the 1970s, including an agreement in principle in 1977 to reduce each side's forces in the region to 900,000 air and ground personnel with a 700,000 sub-ceiling for ground forces alone. Between 1977 and the conclusion of the talks on 2 February 1989, however, the talks were stalemated largely over the issues of the number of troops each side had stationed in the area (with the West counting 230,000 more Warsaw Pact troops than officially declared by the East) and the methods that would be used for verifying any troop reductions.

Throughout the negotiations, NATO's positions centred on achieving parity with the Warsaw Pact in military manpower; agreeing on effective verification measures to ensure Treaty compliance; allowing for geographical asymmetries, given the greater distance to the central front from North America and the UK; and requiring collectivity in force reductions -- enabling deployments of troops from one nation to substitute for those of another while remaining under the overall manpower ceiling. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, opposed collectivity and pushed for national sub-ceilings on force levels; equipment, in addition to manpower reductions; and verification measures less intrusive than those proposed by the West.

In April 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to expand the "zone of reductions" to the "entire territory of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals." Two months later, the Warsaw Pact suggested troop cuts of 100,000 to 150,000 over the next two years, with ultimate reductions of 500,000 on each side by the early 1990s. The Soviets suggested that negotiations on these proposals could take place in an expanded MBFR forum (including countries not already involved), a forum related to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) (see **NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES**, Chapter 6), or a new forum altogether. In May 1986,

NATO formed a High Level Task Force (HLTF) as a steering body for the review and development of Western positions on conventional arms control.

In September 1986, the first stage of the CCSBMDE concluded with an agreement signed in Stockholm. There was hope that the success of these talks in creating a more open and predictable security regime in Europe would carry over to the MBFR negotiations.

In December 1986, the North Atlantic Council issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control. It recommended two distinct negotiations: the first, to expand upon the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures; and the second, to establish conventional stability at lower levels from the Atlantic to the Urals. The former would be for all CSCE participants while the latter would be restricted to the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In February 1987, the Conventional Mandate Talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO began with the aim of drafting a mandate for new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. At the time, these negotiations were referred to as the Conventional Stability Talks (CST). On 10 January 1989, agreement was reached on the mandate for the new talks, at which point their formal title became Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

The mandate stated the following as the objectives of the talks:

...to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

It stated that these objectives would be achieved through such militarily significant measures as reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions and equal ceilings. Measures would be pursued step by step and for the whole area of application, from the Atlantic to the Urals, allowing for regional differentiation to redress disparities, if necessary.<sup>1</sup>

Following the decision to open the first round of the new negotiations in March, the participants decided to conclude the MBFR talks. On 2 February 1989, the forty-seventh and final round of the latter ended without agreement.

Prior to the agreement on the CFE mandate, a series of significant events established the groundwork upon which the talks began. On 25 November 1989, NATO released a report entitled *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*. The document summarized the conventional forces

---

<sup>1</sup> United States, Department of State, *To Strengthen Stability and Security: CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*. Washington: United States Information Agency, March 1989, pp. 4-5.

balance in Europe, demonstrating a Warsaw Pact numerical advantage in each of the categories listed, including: main battle tanks (51,500 vs. 16,424); armoured infantry fighting vehicles (22,400 vs. 4,153); artillery (43,400 vs. 14,458); other armoured vehicles (71,000 vs. 35,351); anti-tank weapons (44,200 vs. 18,240); air defence systems (22,400 vs. 10,309); helicopters (3,700 vs. 2,419); combat aircraft (8,250 vs. 3,977); armoured vehicle launched bridges (2,550 vs. 454); and personnel (3,090,000 vs. 2,213,593). These figures excluded stored equipment.

On 8 December 1988, at the United Nations, General Secretary Gorbachev announced unilateral cuts in the Soviet armed forces of 500,000 troops, 8,500 artillery pieces, 800 aircraft, and 10,000 tanks within two years. Fifty thousand troops and 5,000 tanks would come out of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany by 1991. Six tank divisions in these countries would be disbanded. Mr. Gorbachev also stated that the remaining forces in Eastern Europe and the Western portion of the Soviet Union would be reorganized into defensive formations.

The following day, NATO issued a proposal for negotiated arms reductions. The tank holdings of each alliance would be limited to 20,000, with no one nation allowed more than 12,000. Equal limits were also proposed on all other weapon categories, at levels slightly below those assessed for Western forces in NATO's November 1988 report. As with tanks, no single country would be permitted more than thirty percent of the total holdings of both alliances in any category of weapons systems. Other elements of the proposal included specific limits on stationed forces, and sub-limits within particular zones to avoid a concentration of forces.

In the two months following Mr. Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral reductions, a number of other Warsaw Pact nations made similar moves. East Germany announced cuts of 10,000 troops, including six armoured regiments, 600 tanks, and fifty fighter planes to take place by the end of 1990. Czechoslovakia stated that over the next two years it would reduce army combat units by 12,000 troops, while phasing out 850 tanks, 165 other armoured vehicles, and fifty-one combat aircraft. Poland, which stated that it had cut two motorized rifle divisions totalling 15,000 troops in the past two years, announced that it would further reduce its forces by 40,000 troops, 850 tanks, 900 artillery pieces, 700 armoured vehicles, and eighty combat aircraft. Hungary planned to cut its forces by 9,300 troops, 251 tanks, thirty armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 430 artillery pieces, six missile-launching pads, and nine interceptor aircraft. Finally, Bulgaria announced that by the end of 1990 it would reduce its forces by 10,000 troops, 200 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, twenty planes, and five ships.

On 30 January 1989 the Warsaw Pact, for the first time ever, released its own assessment of the European military balance. NATO was estimated to have a higher total troop strength than the Warsaw Pact (3,660,200 vs. 3,573,100) and more combat helicopters (5,270 vs. 2,785), anti-tank missile launchers (18,070 vs. 11,465), and large surface ships (499 vs. 102). The Warsaw Pact was credited with more tactical combat aircraft (7,876 vs. 7,130); tactical missile launch systems (1,608 vs. 136); tanks (59,470 vs. 30,690); infantry fighting vehicles (70,330 vs. 46,900); artillery pieces (71,560 vs. 57,060); and submarines (228 vs. 200). Different counting rules and definitions were responsible for most of the discrepancies between the two alliances' assessments. For example, NATO figures did not include ship-borne naval aircraft, ships, naval personnel, or stored materiel.

On 6 March, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze set out the Warsaw Pact's negotiating proposal, consisting of three stages. In the first stage, lasting two to three years, each alliance was to reduce its personnel and conventional arms -- including tactical fighter aircraft, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, combat helicopters, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars -- by ten to fifteen percent below the lowest levels currently held by either side. The second stage, again lasting two to three years, would involve further reductions of twenty-five percent in these categories, as well as cuts in battlefield nuclear arms. In the final stage, each side's forces would be given a strictly defensive character and agreements would be reached limiting all other categories of arms.

Also on 6 March 1989, British Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe presented the West's proposal, adding detail to the plan outlined in December. As noted above, each side would be allowed 20,000 tanks with no single nation having more than 12,000. Ceilings of 16,500 artillery pieces and 28,000 APCs were proposed. Each side could station no more than 3,200 tanks, 1,700 artillery pieces, and 6,000 armoured personnel carriers outside national territory in active units. For example, tank deployments in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland, would be restricted to 8,000 by regional sub-limits.

In sum, key areas of agreement between the two sides included the setting of equal limits on critical weapons (tanks, APCs, and artillery), the general size of reductions envisaged, and the need for stringent verification measures. Important differences also existed, however. These included the Soviet proposals for partially demilitarized zones along the East-West border and limits on aircraft; their specification of follow-up reductions in arms and troops; and their view of the relationship of naval forces to the negotiations.

On 25 May, during the second round of talks, the Warsaw Pact, in a major shift, accepted the NATO principles of ceilings on any one country's forces, on foreign deployment, and within three sub-zones. Specifically, the Warsaw Pact proposed reductions in each alliance to 20,000 tanks, 28,000 APCs, 24,000 artillery pieces, and 1,350,000 troops. Strike aircraft would be limited to 1,500, and helicopters to 1,700. Reductions to these levels would occur over six years, from 1991 to 1997, after which the alliances would begin a twenty-five percent reduction in remaining forces.

At the NATO Summit on 29 May, President Bush outlined a new four-point proposal: first, agreement on the ceilings already proposed in Vienna on tanks, APCs, and artillery, with all withdrawn equipment to be destroyed (recognizing that questions of definition remained to be solved); second, fifteen-percent reductions in helicopters and land-based combat aircraft in the Atlantic-to-Urals zone, with withdrawn equipment again being destroyed; third, a twenty-percent cut in combat manpower in US stationed forces and a ceiling on US and Soviet air force and ground personnel stationed outside national territory within the zone of approximately 275,000, with all withdrawn forces being demobilized; and fourth, negotiation of such an agreement in six to twelve months, aiming to accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993. Most important was the Western acceptance of reductions in air forces and troop strength. At the

NATO Summit it was agreed that a draft agreement based on this proposal would be tabled by the third round of the talks, scheduled to begin 7 September. The Warsaw Pact characterized the Bush proposal as positive, and agreed that a treaty was possible as early as 1990.

On 12 July, ahead of schedule, NATO announced further details of the Bush proposals dealing with aircraft. These included limiting each side to 5,700 combat aircraft and 1,900 combat helicopters. The former category would include those designed primarily for air-to-ground bombing and air-to-air fighting operations. NATO indicated it had about 6,700 such aircraft while the Warsaw Pact possessed approximately 9,600. Major differences between the two alliances on defining the types of aircraft to be included in any agreement remained, however.

In August 1989, the US House Armed Services Committee visited Soviet Military Headquarters in East Germany. During a meeting with Lieutenant-General Valery I. Fursin, the Chief of Staff for Soviet Forces in East Germany, committee members learned that not all the elements of six tank divisions would be withdrawn from Eastern Europe under the plan announced by General Secretary Gorbachev at the UN in December 1988. Instead, weapons used for air-defence and artillery would remain, Fursin explained, to be added to "new non-offensive motorized rifle divisions" in East Germany. Still, the American visitors concluded that the unilateral reductions in tanks alone would effectively and measurably reduce the Soviet military threat to NATO.

The opening session of the third round of CFE talks began as scheduled on 7 September 1989. At that session the Soviet Union declared that it accepted the Western challenge to sign a treaty in 1990 reducing conventional arms. Two weeks later, NATO tabled proposals on information exchange, "stabilization" measures, and verification provisions. The proposed information exchange measure stipulated that each alliance would provide information on the structure of its land, air and air-defence forces down to the level of battalion (land forces) and squadron (air and air-defence forces). This would include detailed information on the organization and location of these units and itemization of their holdings of treaty-limited equipment and non-treaty-limited equipment, such as main battle tanks, that could have a potential for treaty circumvention.

The verification proposal included measures pertaining to the validation of baseline data, monitoring of reductions and confirmation of compliance with force limits. It included stipulations for short-notice inspections of declared sites and the right to request inspection of undeclared sites. It also contained provisions for the monitoring of stabilization measures and for aerial inspections.

NATO also tabled proposals on stabilization measures that included: at least forty-two days' notice of troop movements or the call-up of 40,000 or more reservists; monitored storage sites and monitored low-strength units; and restrictions on the size of military activities to 40,000 troops and 800 MBTs, this level to be exceeded only once every two years, with at least twelve months' notice.

On 28 September 1989, the Soviets presented a revised position on aircraft limitations. Like NATO, the Warsaw Pact now suggested an overall limit of 4,700 on each side. Included in this limit would be some types of interceptor fighters, reconnaissance planes and electronic warfare aircraft. Still excluded were training aircraft, the Backfire bomber and approximately 1,800 fighters that the Soviets said were designated for defence against strategic air attack. In addition, the Soviets proposed that limits on the numbers of helicopters possessed by each side be set at 1,900 (the same number proposed by NATO).

Round three of the CFE concluded on 19 October with the tabling by the Warsaw Pact of counterproposals to NATO's proposals on stabilization measures, information exchange and verification. Concerning verification, the East proposed the establishment of entry/exit points in the area of application at railway junctions, ports, air bases and airfields. In its information-exchange package the Pact asked for data down to the level of regiment rather than battalion or squadron. The stabilization measures proposed by the Pact included limiting exercises of more than 40,000 troops to once every three years and exercises of more than 25,000 troops to only twice a year.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies declared in October 1989 that the unilateral reductions announced by Gorbachev in 1988 would, once completed, virtually eliminate the surprise attack threat that had so long concerned NATO. The IISS estimated that after the cuts it would take the Soviets one to two weeks to marshall their forces for an attack. This assessment complemented a new American intelligence estimate, made public in November 1989, that the United States was now likely to have one to three months' warning of a Soviet conventional forces attack in Europe (compared to recent previous Pentagon estimates of just fourteen days). This calculation of extended warning time was based on increased Soviet openness, better American intelligence capabilities and Soviet cuts in conventional forces.

In the fall of 1989, some Warsaw Pact countries began to reduce their conventional defence structures. At the end of November 1989, Czechoslovakia announced that it would begin immediately to eliminate the fortifications along its 240-mile border with Austria. The following month Prague told of similar intentions to dismantle the defences along its 150-mile border with West Germany. The Czech Government stated also its intention to shorten compulsory military service to eighteen months from two years and to reduce the number of active reserves from 290,000 to nearly 200,000. The Czechoslovak initiative followed a similar one made by Hungary in September 1989 to pull back and reduce defences along its borders with Austria and Yugoslavia.

Prior to the summit meeting between President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev on 2 and 3 December at Malta, America's European Allies expressed concern over the possibility of a unilateral American initiative on troop cuts greater than those proposed by President Bush in May 1989. On 4 December, President Bush met with his Alliance counterparts and reassured them that he and General Secretary Gorbachev had discussed only their broad aspirations for arms control, without getting into specifics. Furthermore, the President emphasized in a press conference following the NATO meeting that his interest was in getting a CFE treaty signed, rather than to begin thinking about any follow-on conventional arms reductions or CFE II.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact exchanged draft treaty texts on 14 December 1989. The two sides appeared close to agreement on reductions in three types of armament: main battle tanks, armoured troop carriers and helicopters. East and West agreed that limits should be placed on these types of equipment at 20,000, 28,000 and 1,900 respectively.

Regarding limits on other types of equipment the two texts differed, though seldom drastically. Perhaps the widest difference in numbers was in the proposed limits on artillery, with NATO's suggested ceiling of 16,500 versus the Pact's suggested ceiling of 24,000. However, the two sides had at least agreed upon a definition in this category. In addition, NATO continued to propose a limit of 5,700 aircraft compared to the Pact's suggested limit of 4,700.

Finally, while NATO's draft embodied its call for a ceiling of 275,000 on US and Soviet stationed manpower, the Warsaw Pact draft restricted each alliance to a total of 1.35 million troops, with a sublimit of 350,000 stationed forces for each country.

Both drafts included proposals on "sufficiency" limits (the maximum percentage of manpower and equipment that could be held by any one country) as well as verification and stabilization measures. Differences in definitions of equipment remained. The East continued to insist that certain types of aircraft -- air-defence interceptors, land-based naval aviation and trainers -- be excluded. NATO insisted on including all combat-capable aircraft. NATO defined a main battle tank as a tracked vehicle weighing twenty tons or more with a 75-mm barrel. The Pact set the weight limit at ten tons.

The CFE process was influenced by the dramatic changes that took place in Europe this past year. Most significant were the demands by several East European countries for the negotiated withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces from their territory. The Soviets agreed on 10 March 1990 to remove their contingent of 50,000 to 60,000 troops from Hungary by 30 June 1991. In Czechoslovakia, withdrawal of the approximately 75,000 Soviet troops began on 26 February 1990 and was scheduled to be completed by 1 July 1991. The Kremlin expressed a willingness to remove its 40,000 troops from Poland but had not received a formal request from Warsaw to do so.

In January 1990, there were murmurings of more far-reaching troop-cut proposals from East and West. On 1 January it was reported that Sam Nunn, the Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, had suggested that the United States reduce its troop presence in Europe from 305,000 Army and Air Force personnel to as low as 200,000, on the grounds that the NATO manpower proposal tabled at the CFE in December had been overtaken by events.

On 5 January, it was reported that chief Soviet negotiator Oleg Grinevsky had informally submitted a plan during the fourth round of the talks calling for an overall limit of 600,000 troops (foreign and indigenous) for each side in Central Europe. The sublimit for Soviet and American stationed forces under this proposal was set at 275,000, corresponding to NATO's proposal in this respect.

At the talks on 26 January, West Germany, France and Italy called for accelerating their pace to take into consideration the political changes in Eastern Europe. With an eye to these changes the Soviet Union announced on 11 February 1990 that it was ready to reduce its troop strength in Europe prior to the signing of a CFE agreement. The Soviets maintained that their forces stationed in East Germany would have to be dealt with separately, however.

Finally, in his 31 January 1990 State of the Union Address, President Bush proposed reductions in Soviet and American stationed forces in Central Europe to 195,000,<sup>2</sup> with a provision for 30,000 American forces stationed outside the central zone. Initially the Soviets balked at this proposal, primarily because of the latter provision which would have granted the US superiority in stationed forces in Europe as a whole. At the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa on 14 February, however, the Soviets relented and agreed to the proposal on the condition that the separate troop levels for the Americans constitute individual ceilings: US troop levels could not be increased beyond the ceiling in either zone, nor could troops be transferred from one zone to the other.

In February 1990, NATO agreed to allow each side to keep up to 500 air-defence interceptors over and above the ceiling on combat aircraft. NATO also agreed to exclude approximately 2,000 "primary" trainer aircraft (those without weapons) from that ceiling, which it lowered to 4,700. The revised NATO position on aircraft was prompted by a Pact promise to allow on-site inspection and its willingness to limit air-defence interceptors under a separate ceiling. At the same time, NATO lowered to thirteen tons its previous weight stipulation for defining an MBT.

NATO was surprised when, on 23 February 1990, Moscow and East Germany proposed limits on alliance-wide troop holdings of East and West of between 700,000 and 750,000 troops each. NATO had assumed that Soviet agreement to the Bush proposal meant that the East had yielded in its attempt to impose troop limitations on overall holdings. Because of Hungarian opposition to the Soviet-East German proposal, however, it was not formally tabled.

On 24 February, it was reported that the Soviet Union had carried out nearly half of the unilateral force cuts announced by Mr. Gorbachev in December 1988. Intelligence sources revealed that nearly 5,000 Soviet tanks and 800 aircraft had been removed. They also said that half the promised cuts in manpower and artillery had been made, although this was difficult to estimate.<sup>3</sup>

Prior to the convening of the sixth round of the CFE in March, NATO agreed on verification proposals that were less strict than those tabled in the past. Previously, at US insistence, NATO verification plans for a CFE accord would have required monitoring of key

---

<sup>2</sup> R. W. Apple, "Bush Calls on Soviets to Join in Deep Troop Cuts for Europe as Germans See Path to Unity." *New York Times*, 1 February 1990, p. A1.

<sup>3</sup> J.A.C. Lewis, "Soviets on Target with Force Cuts." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 13 no. 8 (24 February 1990), p. 322.

weapons production plants and of shipments of restricted equipment into or out of the region covered by an agreement. Now, the Allies agreed to forego strict monitoring of some shipments and production, relying in some instances on private notification. Parties to an agreement would still be required to allow on-site inspection of key storage sites and weapons destruction.<sup>4</sup>

On 15 March 1990, when the sixth round began, NATO tabled destruction protocols stipulating that all equipment in excess of the residual levels would have to be destroyed, with destruction taking place over a period of three years. With the tabling of these protocols NATO had virtually completed its draft treaty.<sup>5</sup>

The promise of a quick and easy CFE agreement, ready for signing at the June 1990 Bush-Gorbachev summit or even by the end of the year, began to fade during the sixth round as the Soviets became preoccupied with events at home and with the future status of a united Germany. On the opening day of the round, Mr. Grinevsky called for cuts in the armed forces of a united Germany as part of any agreement on German unification. He indicated that such cuts should be related in some way to the CFE talks.<sup>6</sup> As a result, the talks bogged down over such issues as height requirements for fences at depot facilities and whether a tank's weight should include fuel and other items.<sup>7</sup>

Still, the major hurdle to overcome, about which there was little or no movement in round six, involved aircraft. At the Washington meeting on 5 and 6 April between Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister presented a proposal limiting to 500 each the number of American and Soviet aircraft stationed in central Europe. The Americans immediately rejected the proposal, primarily because it did not cover Soviet aircraft at home, within easy reach of central Europe. On 26 April, Hungary tabled a compromise aircraft proposal limiting air-defence interceptors to 800 and combat aircraft and trainers to 5,600, making a combined ceiling of 6,400. A no-increase limit would be placed on land-based naval aviation.<sup>8</sup> The aircraft issue had proven so intractable that, on a number of occasions, US and Soviet officials had suggested deferring it to future negotiations, but agreement could not be reached to do so.

Other areas where major disagreement remained included "sufficiency" rules, with NATO proposing that no country should have more than thirty percent of the total equipment in each category (sixty percent of each alliance total) and the WTO suggesting a thirty-five to forty

---

<sup>4</sup> R. Jeffrey Smith, "US, Allies Ease Terms on Arms Verification." *Washington Post*, 14 March 1990, p. A24.

<sup>5</sup> Andrew Slade, "Europe's Troubles Stall Vienna Talks." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 13 No. 13 (31 March 1990), p. 580.

<sup>6</sup> *Arms Control Reporter* (1990), p.407.B.341.

<sup>7</sup> British American Security Information Council, *BASIC Reports From Vienna* No. 7 (11 April 1990), p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies, *Vienna Fax* No. 19 (29 May 1990), p. 2.

percent rule (seventy to eighty percent of each alliance total); and verification, with the main issue in dispute being how to calculate the number of inspections each country would have to host. NATO favoured a formula based on the number of treaty-limited items in each country and its geographic size. The East objected that such a formula would subject them to 900 inspections compared to just 400 for NATO. The WTO wanted to determine quotas based on the number of each country's military units, storage sites, and training camps.<sup>9</sup>

At a ministerial meeting in Moscow between Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze from 16 to 19 May 1990, the US presented new ideas to break the CFE logjam, including higher limits on tactical aircraft and a willingness to explore a compromise over sufficiency rules. The American aircraft proposal, revealed in a letter to NATO foreign ministers the day Mr. Baker arrived in Moscow, suggested that the US was prepared to discuss a limit in the 6,000 range.<sup>10</sup> It also included greater flexibility on the mix of combat aircraft, trainers and air-defence interceptors. However, no compromise was reached on these issues as a result of the meeting.

The failure by Baker and Shevardnadze to reach a compromise dimmed the prospects of any major announcements on CFE at the June Washington Summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. The Soviets were cautious about moving ahead with CFE until they had been assured at the "two-plus-four" German unification talks (talks between the two Germanies and the four-powers with post-war rights in Germany -- US, USSR, UK, and France) that the size of a united German Army would be limited. NATO argued that the subject of German troop levels should be discussed exclusively at the CFE, that this should take place only after an initial conventional forces treaty had been signed, and that it should avoid singling out Germany for reductions.

At the 30 May to 3 June Summit in Washington, Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to conclude a CFE agreement by the end of 1990.<sup>11</sup> A week later, the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Turnberry, Scotland instructed their negotiators in Vienna "to pursue new approaches to mutually acceptable solutions, in particular on aircraft, armour and verification." These new approaches were to be based on the proposals made by Baker to Shevardnadze in May.<sup>12</sup>

In late June, in an effort to move the talks forward, NATO began to consider offering Moscow a commitment to limit the size of the future German Army in connection with a CFE

---

<sup>9</sup> Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, *Vienna Fax* No. 17 (26 April 1990), pp. 1 and 2.

<sup>10</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Baker Has New Arms Deal for Moscow, Officials Say." *New York Times*, 18 May 1990, p. A6.

<sup>11</sup> White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Joint Statement on CFE." *Factsheet*, 1 June 1990.

<sup>12</sup> Theresa Hitchens, "NATO Gives Negotiators Improved Flexibility." *Defense News*, 11 June 1990, p. 3 and 29.

treaty. Specific numbers, however, would be left to a CFE-II negotiation.<sup>13</sup> On 23 June, Mr. Shevardnadze proposed at the two-plus-four talks that "an international endorsement of German unity include provisions for a staged withdrawal of all foreign troops from a united Germany and strict limits on its military."<sup>14</sup> The proposal was immediately rejected by the other participants as an unwarranted restriction on the sovereignty of a future Germany.

On 27 June 1990, the WTO and NATO agreed to definitions for, and reductions of, tanks and armoured combat vehicles. According to this compromise agreement, first tabled on 14 June by France and Poland, tanks would be defined as tracked or wheeled armoured vehicles weighing 16.5 tonnes or greater (unladen) and with a main gun of 75 mm or larger. There would be three categories of armoured combat vehicles: armoured personnel carriers (APCs) -- tracked or wheeled armoured vehicles designed to transport combat troops; armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) -- APCs with a gun of 20 mm or larger; and heavy armament combat vehicles (HACVs) -- tracked or wheeled armoured vehicles weighing between 6 and 16.5 tonnes (unladen) with a gun of 75 mm or bigger.<sup>15</sup>

The agreed limit on tanks would be 20,000 for each alliance. The limit on ACVs was set at 30,000 with a combined sublimit on AIFVs and HACVs of 18,000, of which no more than 1,500 could be HACVs. Under this plan the WTO would be forced to reduce its inventory of tanks by 35,000, compared to a reduction of 4,000 by NATO.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

The Government of Canada, with its NATO Allies, supports the goal of conventional force reduction to the lowest levels commensurate with security and stability. Addressing a dinner crowd in Moscow on 20 November 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney described as "a pre-requisite to genuine peace, the reduction of conventional and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the correction of imbalances in these forces."<sup>16</sup>

At first, Canadian officials remained cautious about the degree to which developments in Europe had reduced the Soviet threat. Testifying before the Standing Committee on External

---

<sup>13</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO May Offer Moscow Specific Limit for Future German Army." *New York Times*, 23 June 1990, p. A4.

<sup>14</sup> Serge Schmemann, "Shevardnadze Seeks Curbs on Forces in New Germany." *New York Times*, 23 June 1990, p. A4.

<sup>15</sup> *Arms Control Reporter* (1990), p. 407.B.376.

<sup>16</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, Moscow, 20 November 1989," p. 4.

Affairs and International Trade on 12 December 1989, John Noble, Director-General of the International Security and Arms Control Bureau at External Affairs, said:

Despite the political developments covered daily by the western media, there do remain at the present time, in terms of Soviet capabilities, asymmetries which favour the East in critical conventional weapons categories and which give the Warsaw Treaty Organization a capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. I am talking about a capability; I am not talking about an intent.... So it is important that the CFE proceed to deal with the cuts bringing down the Soviet forces to parity at NATO at 15% less than that.<sup>17</sup>

There was some confusion on the part of government officials as to whether Canada would make troop cuts as a result of a CFE agreement. On 27 November 1989, the Prime Minister expressed the hope that any NATO agreement to cut troops in Europe would include Canadian forces based in West Germany. On 5 December, following a visit to Washington, the Prime Minister qualified his remark, saying that Canada *eventually* would like to pull some of its armed forces out of Europe: "But we are going to maintain our full complement [now about 7,500] until such time as the [Western] alliance decides that a reduction is in order."<sup>18</sup>

Canada wholeheartedly endorsed the NATO draft treaty text tabled at the CFE in December. Perhaps referring to the difficulty NATO had experienced in formulating a common position, Canadian officials called the draft an important agreement and a major achievement.

On 17 January 1990, at a Seminar on Military Doctrine and Strategy attended by virtually all of the military leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain reaffirmed Canada's commitment to the achievement of a "military balance between East and West at the lowest possible level of the two forces."<sup>19</sup>

In a speech delivered at McGill University on 5 February 1990, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark firmly rejected unilateralism and emphasized Canada's commitment to negotiated reductions in national military capabilities. At the same time he warned that the negotiations "must keep pace with the political will, and grasp the opportunity now before us to increase security at vastly lower levels of armaments."<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* [Hereafter: SCEAIT *Proceedings*], Issue No. 32, (12 December 1989), p. 25.

<sup>18</sup> Edison Stewart, *Toronto Star*, 5 December 1989, p. 14.

<sup>19</sup> Address by General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain Chief of the Defence Staff to The Seminar on Military Doctrine and Strategies, Vienna, Austria, 17 January 1990, p. 10.

<sup>20</sup> "Notes for a Speech by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, at McGill University Department of Political Science and Economics," Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 90/09 (5 February 1990). p. 5.

In announcing the US-Soviet agreement at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa on 13 February, Mr. Clark added: "The agreement on manpower overcomes one of the most significant obstacles to a CFE treaty and provides additional impetus to reaching an agreement this year."<sup>21</sup> Later, he was cited as indicating that "the ongoing game of troop reductions could eventually affect the more than 7,000 Canadians stationed in West Germany."<sup>22</sup>

Following the agreement on tanks and ACVs announced on 27 June 1990, Canadian Ambassador to the CFE David Peel declared: "This is really an important step in terms of the negotiations and it's been holding up some of the other work.... Along with artillery, the tanks and armored combat vehicles are the main components, so we can now go on to other areas."<sup>23</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Prime Minister Mulroney touched on the CFE in his report to the House on 27 November 1989 regarding his visit to Moscow. He maintained that even in the context of momentous change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the latter still retained enormous conventional forces and that therefore NATO remained relevant as the locus for discussion of the Western response to the political changes in the East and for coordinating positions in the conventional arms reduction discussions in Vienna.<sup>24</sup>

Responding to the Prime Minister's statement, NDP Member Bill Blaikie suggested "that Canada should seek within the context of the mutual balance force reduction negotiations (sic) to bring Canadian troops home from Europe." He stressed, however, that this should be done in the context of negotiated reductions.<sup>25</sup>

On 1 February 1990, the Prime Minister replied to a question by Liberal Member William Rompkey on the troop reduction initiative announced by President Bush the night before. Mr Mulroney said that Canada had been consulted on the President's decision and had congratulated him prior to his announcement. Alluding to the possibility of removing Canadian troops from Europe, the Prime Minister indicated that Canada's intention was to act only in concert with its Allies.

---

<sup>21</sup> R. Jeffrey Smith, "US, Soviets Reach Troop-Cut Accord." *Washington Post*, 14 February 1990, p. A23.

<sup>22</sup> Tim Harper, " 'Common Sense' Led to Deal, Soviet Says." *Toronto Star*, 15 February 1990, p. A13.

<sup>23</sup> "Negotiators Fix Curbs on Armies." *New York Times*, 28 June 1990, p. A8.

<sup>24</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6237.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6244.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Chalmers, Malcolm, "Beyond CFE: Cutting Conventional Procurement." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 20 no. 5 (June 1990), pp. 5-6.

Darilek, Richard, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe: The Role of Non-reduction Measures." Ottawa: Carleton University, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, *Proceedings of the International Security Seminar Series*, vol. 2 no. 4, 22 November 1989 (4 pp.).

Dean, Jonathan, "Negotiated Force Cuts in Europe: Overtaken by Events?" *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 10 (December 1989/January 1990), pp. 12-16.

Freedman, Lawrence, "The Politics of Conventional Arms Control." *Survival*, vol. 21 no. 5 (September/October 1989), pp. 387-396.

Ghebali, Victor-Yves, "La Négociation sur les Forces Conventionnelles en Europe." *Défense nationale* (April 1990), pp. 89-100.

Hamlin, Doug, *Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament in Europe: Canadian Objectives*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Working Paper No. 20*, January 1990 (52 pp.).

Hamm, Manfred R. and Pohlman, Hartmut, "Military Strategy and Doctrine: Why They Matter to Conventional Arms Control." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13 no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 185-198.

Legge, Michael, "NATO Defence Planning After CFE." *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, vol. 35 no. 3 (June 1990), pp. 31-35.

Magill, W.K. and Rasiulus, Andrew P., "The Vienna Negotiations: Establishing a New Security Order for Europe." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 4 (February 1990), pp. 34-38.

Mason, R. A., "Airpower in Conventional Arms Control." *Survival*, vol. 21 no. 5 (September/October 1989), pp. 397-414.

Warnke, Paul C., "Arms Control in a New Age." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 10 (December 1989/January 1990), pp. 3-5.

## FURTHER READING

Blechman, Barry, *et al.*, *Regaining the High Ground: NATO's Stake in the New Talks on Conventional Forces in Europe*. Washington: Defense Forecasts Inc., April 1989 (328 pp.).

Dean, Jonathan, "Defining Long-term Western Objectives in CFE." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13 no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 169-184.

Dean, Jonathan, *Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987 (286 pp.).

Hill, Roger, *Are Major Conventional Force-Reductions in Europe Possible?* Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control And Disarmament, *Aurora Paper No. 7*, 1988 (47 pp.).

Keliher, J. G., *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe*. New York: Pergamon, 1980 (204 pp.).

Krakau, Anton and Diehl, Ole, "The Unilateral Reduction in Conventional Arms by the USSR." *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 40 no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1989), pp. 119-128.

Krepon, Michael, "Verification of Conventional Arms Control." *Survival*, vol. 30 no. 6 (November/December 1988), pp. 544-556.

Nerlich, Uwe, and Thomson, James A. (eds.), *Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988 (251 pp.).

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)



## 9. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

### *BACKGROUND*

Since the discovery of nuclear fission in 1939, the problem of nuclear proliferation has been a major concern. Following World War II, the United States, Britain and Canada (the three allied governments involved in the Manhattan project to build the first nuclear bomb) decided to continue the policy of atomic secrecy, that had been adopted during the War, until an effective international monitoring system could be established to control this new energy. A few months later, in June 1946, the United States proposed the creation of an international authority to monitor all existing nuclear raw materials in the world and all nuclear activities considered potentially dangerous. This initiative, better known as the Baruch Plan, was rejected by the Soviets in 1949 on the grounds that it did not require the prior destruction of US nuclear weapons.

Following the explosion of the first Soviet and British nuclear devices in 1949 and 1952 respectively, the United States began to perceive the problem of nuclear proliferation in a new light. In December 1953, President Eisenhower presented to the United Nations the "Atoms for Peace" programme, under which countries could be helped to exploit the potential of nuclear energy, provided that they were willing to undertake to use such technology solely for peaceful purposes and to accept the application of safeguards to ensure compliance with such a commitment. This concept was finally endorsed in 1956, when over fifty states approved the creation and Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The primary function of the IAEA, which was established in Vienna in 1956, is to "enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity" and to ensure that all assistance provided by it or under its control "is not used to further any military purpose." The IAEA has contributed to this goal through the application of safeguards (such as keeping records of stocks of nuclear materials and conducting on-site inspections) to all projects it supervises, to all voluntary offers and to all requests made to the Agency as a result of bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements.

Although the creation of the Agency in Vienna, and the acceptance of the principle of verification and on-site inspections have all made a significant contribution to preventing nuclear energy from being used to manufacture weapons, the implementation of a more global non-proliferation system was achieved only in 1968 with the conclusion of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The express purpose of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states.

In accordance with the provisions of the NPT, which came into force in 1970, each nuclear weapon state (NWS) party to the treaty "undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ... and not in any way assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

For non-nuclear weapon states, acceding to the Treaty means agreeing not to receive and not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosives or other nuclear explosive devices, and to agree to accept full IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. Nuclear weapon states parties agree to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of information and assistance to their non-nuclear counterparts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, all states parties undertake not to provide fissile material, or equipment used for processing or producing it, unless under IAEA safeguards.

In addition to non-proliferation, the Treaty also seeks to promote nuclear disarmament. The Preamble, for example, recalls that the parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (the PTBT) had expressed their determination to bring test explosions of nuclear weapons to a complete halt. Also, under Article VI, every nuclear weapon state party to the NPT agrees to undertake to pursue negotiations "on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date."

The Treaty also seeks to promote access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Article IV stipulates that: "All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."

Although viewed by some as an agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, only three of the states possessing these weapons -- the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union

-- have actually signed the NPT. France and China -- as well as states suspected of having or wishing to acquire nuclear weapons such as India, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa -- have all yet to accede to the Treaty. However, it is rumoured that Pretoria might soon sign the Treaty.

One obstacle to further accession to the NPT has been the long-held view among some states that it is discriminatory in that it allows a very small number of countries to maintain their nuclear weapons whereas the majority must renounce them. Furthermore, non-nuclear weapon states are the only ones which are required, under the Treaty, to open their facilities to the IAEA. Nevertheless, as of early 1990, 141 states were party to the Treaty. By the end of the 1988, the IAEA had concluded some 168 safeguard agreements with ninety-nine states.<sup>1</sup>

Under Article VIII of the NPT, parties may convene conferences every five years to ensure that the provisions and purposes of the agreement are being realized. To date, three review conferences have been held on the operation of the NPT.

---

<sup>1</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, *The Annual Report for 1988*, Vienna, July 1989. It should be noted that the safeguard agreements negotiated under the NPT are not the only agreements the Agency has negotiated.

At the First Review Conference, in 1975, expressions of concern were voiced by the neutral and non-aligned nations regarding the failure of the NWS to halt the arms race. These states called for an end to underground nuclear testing, large reductions in nuclear arsenals, and a pledge by nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against their non-nuclear counterparts. Agreement by the NWS to make a greater effort to address these concerns was reflected in the Final Document.

The Second Review Conference in 1980 was less successful than its predecessor. This was in large part due to the fact that since 1975 none of the demands of the neutral and non-aligned states had been met, and no consensus could be reached on bringing a halt to the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals. In fact, no final declaration, nor any reaffirmation of support for the Treaty, was issued from the review's proceedings.

Although no major arms control measure of any kind was achieved between 1980 and 1985, the issue was again the subject of considerable debate at the Third Review Conference in 1985. However, a Final Declaration reaffirming the participants' support for the Treaty was adopted by consensus. The Declaration also expressed the deep regret of all but some participants (i.e., the United States and Britain) over the failure to conclude a comprehensive test ban, and called on nuclear weapon states parties to resume trilateral negotiations, as well as to participate actively in the CD, to achieve it.

A Fourth Review Conference on the operation of the NPT is to be held in Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. This review will be the last of its kind before the parties meet again in 1995 to decide whether the Treaty "shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." Under Article X of the NPT, the Treaty is in force for an initial period of twenty-five years, and any decision on extending it beyond that period must be taken at a new meeting by a majority of the parties to the Treaty.

A first meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the Fourth Review Conference was held in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989. The Committee chose Oswaldo de Rivero from Peru to chair the Fourth Conference.<sup>2</sup> At the Second Meeting of the Preparatory Committee, held in Geneva from 11 to 18 September 1989, discussion focussed on administrative questions relating to the Conference and examination of the working papers on disarmament.<sup>3</sup> The third and last meeting of the Preparatory Committee prior to the Review Conference was held in Geneva from 21 April to 2 May 1990. There were discussions on a number of issues, including the possible accession of South Africa to the NPT and steps to ensure universal acceptance of the Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> See *The Arms Control Reporter* (June 1989), p. 602.B.164.

<sup>3</sup> See "NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee Meets." *Disarmament Bulletin*, vol. 11 (Fall 1989), p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> See *The Arms Control Reporter* (May 1990), p. 602.B 174-176.

Canada has always played a leading role in the quest for strict non-proliferation measures. While Canada assisted the US in the development of the world's first nuclear weapons during World War II, it was also the first nation to forego the option of developing them despite possession of the capacity to do so. As an active participant in negotiations on the creation of the IAEA and one of the first countries to accede to the NPT, Canada has always articulated the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime as one of its six specific arms control goals.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Present Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation is based on changes introduced by Ottawa in the mid-1970s as a result of the testing of a nuclear explosive device by India in 1974. Although India, which is not a signatory to the NPT, stated at the time that its explosion was "peaceful" (i.e., for peaceful purposes), the Canadian Government has never recognized any distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. The announcement that the Indian explosion had been achieved with plutonium produced in a reactor supplied by Canada in the 1950s also contributed to Ottawa's decision to revise its non-proliferation policy and to impose tighter controls over nuclear exports.

Since 1974, Canada has allowed the export of nuclear materials only to those states (both nuclear and non-nuclear) which have undertaken to accept, in a formal agreement, a number of additional requirements designed to minimize proliferation risks. Such states must assure that Canadian-supplied nuclear items (e.g., nuclear materials, heavy water, nuclear equipment and technology) will not be used in connection with the production of nuclear explosive devices. In addition, they must be willing to accept fallback safeguards in the event that a situation arises where the IAEA is unable to continue to perform its safeguard functions. The Canadian Government also reserves the right to retain control over the re-transfer of Canadian-supplied nuclear items and the reprocessing of spent fuel of Canadian origin. Since 1976, any new nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states is authorized only if such states accede to the NPT or make equivalent undertakings with respect to the Treaty, and thus accept the application of IAEA safeguards.<sup>5</sup> Since 1976, these requirements have been negotiated with the United States, Euratom, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

In the mid-1970s, Canada established an extensive programme aimed at developing and improving the verification mechanisms of the NPT. This initiative, known as the Canadian Safeguards Research and Development Programme, was designed to assist the IAEA in the development of safeguards systems for CANDU reactors. Since 1983, work under this programme has extended to other facilities such as plutonium reprocessing plants.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Department of External Affairs, *Canada's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy*. Ottawa, 1985, p. 13.

<sup>6</sup> Department of External Affairs, *Canada and International Safeguards: Verification of Nuclear Proliferation*. Ottawa, January 1990, p. 46.

In September and October 1989, a number of sources indicated that the Crown Corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), had held discussions with Hungary,<sup>7</sup> Israel<sup>8</sup> and South Korea,<sup>9</sup> concerning the sale of Canadian CANDU nuclear reactors. While some senior officials subsequently denied rumours of upcoming cooperation with Hungary<sup>10</sup> and Israel,<sup>11</sup> the possibility of an agreement with South Korea was said to be merely premature.<sup>12</sup>

In early 1990, Romania was accused by many sources of using conscripts and forced labour on the CANDU reactor construction site at Cernavoda.<sup>13</sup> On 14 March 1990, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., which had sold the reactor to Romania, stated that it was aware that the army provided some manual labour to the reactor construction project, but it was not aware of forced labour being used on the site.<sup>14</sup>

In May 1990, Romania's nuclear project was in the news again, following allegations concerning the illegal diversion of heavy water from Norway. The Norwegian heavy water was to have been used in Canadian-designed Romanian reactors but, according to the new Romanian government, the heavy water in question was diverted to India in 1986 under the previous regime of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. An AECL spokesperson stated that the diversion of Norwegian heavy water did not constitute a violation of the nuclear agreement between Canada and Romania.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> "Un réacteur Candu en Hongrie?" *Le Droit*, 27 September 1989, p. 20.

<sup>8</sup> "Israel Keen to Buy Candu from AECL, Official Says." *Globe and Mail*, 27 October 1989, pp. A1-A2.

<sup>9</sup> "Un autre CANDU pour la Corée." *La Presse*, 22 September 1989, p. A11.

<sup>10</sup> "Centrale Candu: pas d'accord entre EAC et la Hongrie." *La Presse*, 30 September 1989, p. A-7.

<sup>11</sup> "Israel Keen to Buy Candu from AECL, Official Says." *Globe and Mail*, 27 October 1989, pp. A1-A2.

<sup>12</sup> "News of AECL Candu Sale to South Korea Premature." *Globe and Mail*, 21 September 1989, p. B12.

<sup>13</sup> See William Walker, "Candu Overseer Dismisses Reports of Forced Labor." *Toronto Star*, 3 January 1990, p. A17. See also "Energie atomique nie que des Roumains aient été envoyés de force sur le chantier Candu." *La Presse*, 4 January 1990, p. B10.

<sup>14</sup> *Commons Debates*, 14 March 1990, pp. 9285-9286.

<sup>15</sup> "Canadian Reactor Used in Illegal Sale." *Toronto Star*, 1 May 1990, p. 4.

Later in May, the Romanian government asked Canada for financial assistance to complete the Cernavoda nuclear complex.<sup>16</sup> In January 1990 Bucharest had suspended construction of the project in order to assess safety problems which had been indicated by a number of people involved in the project.<sup>17</sup>

On 5 March 1990, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Joe Clark, clearly reiterated Canada's support for the NPT. Recalling that the date in question marked the twentieth anniversary of the coming into force of the Treaty, Mr. Clark stated:

The NPT's continuing major importance has been that it provides for legally binding commitments to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitates international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Another key element is that it sets out a guiding framework for the negotiated reduction of nuclear arsenals.<sup>18</sup>

Noting that Canada had been among the earliest adherents to the Treaty, Mr. Clark urged all states which had not yet done so, to officially ratify the agreement. Mr. Clark also pointed out that the US/USSR negotiations on nuclear arms control and disarmament were progressing in conformity with the objectives of the provisions of the NPT and he expressed the hope that further progress would be made before the Fourth Review Conference. After noting the contribution made by the NPT to non-proliferation, Mr. Clark stressed that the Treaty would remain a key factor in strengthening international cooperation and security, particularly in view of the significant changes taking place in the world at the present time.<sup>19</sup>

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

On 27 October 1989, NDP Member Ron Fisher made a statement to the House regarding the possible sale of CANDU reactors to Israel. He said:

[I]t is said that Atomic Energy of Canada Limited wishes to sell a nuclear reactor to Israel. Given that Israel is widely reported to have a covert nuclear bomb assembly capability, I call on the Government of Canada to block the sale. Given that the Israelis are not signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, they cannot be considered to be purely peaceful consumers of nuclear power.

---

<sup>16</sup> "Romania to Seek \$300 - Million to Complete Candu Complex." *Globe and Mail*, 14 May 1990, pp. A1-A2.

<sup>17</sup> "Romania Halts Candu Construction; Official Promises to Make Changes." *Toronto Star*, 25 January 1990, p. 16.

<sup>18</sup> Department of External Affairs, "Canada Supports Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." *News Release No. 44*, 5 March 1990.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*.

It should be remembered that in 1974 the Indian government detonated a nuclear bomb based largely on Candu technology and nuclear materials. We do not need this dangerously dirty technology and the balance of power in the middle east does not need another nuclear plant with all the possibilities of diverting nuclear materials to nuclear weapons production that such a CANDU plant would imply.<sup>20</sup>

Further to questions asked by Liberal Member Charles Caccia regarding the sale of Candu reactors to other countries, Minister for Energy, Mines and Resources Jake Epp tabled the answers of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited before the House on 14 March 1990. In answer to the question whether AECL was negotiating the sale of CANDU reactor technology to other countries, the Crown Corporation gave the following answer:

AECL is not currently negotiating the sale of CANDU reactor technology to other countries. However, in late January 1990, AECL received from South Korea an Invitation to Bid on engineering services for the construction of a second CANDU reactor in that country, that could eventually involve the sale of CANDU reactor technology. Negotiations for this unit are expected to begin later this year.<sup>21</sup>

On 28 May 1990, Liberal Member David Walker asked the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources whether he could assure the House that if an agreement with Bucharest on the Cernavoda nuclear project was concluded, such an agreement would take into account all conditions related to safety and to the workforce, as well as questions of human rights, and that the agreement would be tabled in the House for discussion by all parties. Mr. Epp answered:

[W]ith respect to safety, that is the reason why I and others have been insisting that if there is any work resumption at Cernavoda we need control of it and that the safety aspects relative to AECL requirements, our signatories with the non-proliferation treaty, as well as our membership with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna are met.<sup>22</sup>

For further Parliamentary comment on this issue, see the section on *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT: Romania*, in chapter No. 28, *CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE*.

---

<sup>20</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 October 1989, p. 5222.

<sup>21</sup> *Commons Debates*, 14 March 1990, p. 9286.

<sup>22</sup> *Commons Debates*, 28 May 1990, p. 11933.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Bailey, Kathleen C., "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons." *Review of International Affairs*, 20 January 1990, pp. 12-14.

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Canada and International Safeguards: Verifying Nuclear Non-Proliferation*. Ottawa: *Verification Brochure* no. 5, January 1990 (60 pp.).

Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, "Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)." Ottawa: *Fact Sheet* no. 10, October 1989, (2 pp.).

Delobbeau, Francis and de Lastours, Sophie, "Evolution de la prolifération nucléaire dans le monde." *Stratégie*, vol. 3 (1989), pp. 69-92.

Desjardins, Marie-France, "The Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *Peace&Security*, vol. 5 no. 2 (Summer 1990), p. 14.

Goldblat, Jozef, *Twenty Years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Implementation and Prospects*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), 1990 (162 pp.).

Lysyshyn, Ralph J., "The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: Today and Into the 1990s," in: Morrison, Alex (ed.), *Nuclear Strategy in the Nineties: Deterrence, Defence and Disarmament*. Toronto: Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1989, pp. 55-61.

Muller, Harald and Kokoski, Richard, *The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Political and Technological Prospects and Dangers in 1990*. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 1990 (138 pp.).

## FURTHER READING

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Canadian Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy*. Ottawa, 1985 (27 pp.).

Goldblat, Jozef, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Status and Prospects." Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* no. 29, June 1989 (8 pp.).

Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, *Newsbrief*, (several issues), Centre for International Policy Studies, Department of Politics, University of Southampton.

Rauf, Tariq and Desjardins, Marie-France, "Canada's Nuclear Submarine Program: A New Proliferation Concern." *Arms Control Today* (December 1988), pp. 13-18.

Scheinman, Lawrence, *The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order*. Washington: Resources for the Future Inc., 1987, (320 pp.).

Spector, Leonard, "Non-Proliferation - After the Bomb Has Spread." *Arms Control Today* (December 1988), pp. 8-12.

Spector, Leonard, *The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1987-1988*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988 (499 pp.).

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Nuclear Testing

Uranium and Tritium Exports

Canada and Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones



## 10. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

### BACKGROUND

In 1961, a resolution passed by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore. In 1963, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. Over 119 countries have now signed the Treaty.

In December 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this Treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all. It bans the stationing of any weapons of mass destruction in space, and also prohibits military bases, installations or fortifications; weapons testing of any kind; and military manoeuvres on the moon and other celestial bodies. The use of the moon for solely peaceful purposes was reaffirmed in July 1984, with the coming into force of the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radars. Under Article V of the Treaty, the parties also undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air based, *space based*, or mobile-land based" [emphasis added]. The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race in outer space.

The Final Document of the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 urged that further agreements be developed to reserve outer space for solely peaceful purposes.

In June 1979, bilateral superpower talks on anti-satellite (ASAT) activities were suspended after a year of inconclusive discussions. There was disagreement concerning the capabilities of each side in this area, as well as the possible defensive or offensive nature of ASAT weapons. Repeated calls by the Soviet Union for a renewal of negotiations proved unsuccessful. Then, in 1983, the Soviet Union announced that it was unilaterally halting all ASAT testing. Two years later, the US Congress imposed a moratorium on tests in space of the F-15 ASAT, and in late 1987, funding for the weapon was cancelled by the US Air Force, in large part due to its high costs and limited capability. In 1988, an effort to impose a more permanent ban on ASAT testing was launched by some members of Congress. Congressional supporters of ASAT succeeded not only in blocking a ban, but also in ending the moratorium imposed in 1985. Recent budget statements by the Pentagon call for increases in spending on ASAT research and development for

FY 1991, and each of the armed services is currently considering different systems developed under the Strategic Defense Initiative.

"Prevention of an arms race in outer space" has also been on the agenda of the multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. It was not until 1985, however, that the forty nations represented on the Conference were able to reach a consensus on a mandate for an *ad hoc* Committee on the subject. It was agreed that, in addition to studying the issues involved in such a ban, the Committee should also study existing treaties and international law relating to outer space along with any proposals concerning the issue. During 1986 the CD re-established the *ad hoc* Committee to continue its examination of issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The 1986 mandate has been continually re-established ever since.

In April 1988 the Ad Hoc Committee presented a special report to the CD, concluding that "the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space." The report also recognized the need to consolidate and reinforce the legal regime in order to enhance its effectiveness. Finally, it called for strict compliance with existing multilateral and bilateral agreements.<sup>1</sup>

In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau outlined Canada's official stand on the increasing militarization of outer space. He pointed out the "highly destabilizing" loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty, particularly those regarding "anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems":

I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in space.<sup>2</sup>

In 1982, as a contribution to the necessary preparation for substantive negotiations, Canada tabled a working paper in the CD outlining the factors of stable and unstable deterrence, desirable objectives for arms control, the increasing importance of space for military purposes and the present state of arms control in space. The paper also illustrated the relationship of anti-satellite systems to ballistic missile defence.<sup>3</sup> The following year, Canada initiated a national research programme on the problems for verification which were likely to arise from the possible dual nature of many space systems.

---

<sup>1</sup> Special Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, CD/833, 25 April 1988.

<sup>2</sup> Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau, "Technological Momentum the Fuel That Feeds the Nuclear Arms Race: An Address...to the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, New York, 18 June 1982." Department of External Affairs *Statements and Speeches* No. 82/10, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> CD/320, 26 August 1982.

In 1985, the Canadian delegation at the CD tabled a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space at the CD."<sup>4</sup> This review of existing relevant agreements was considered essential to ensure that the CD worked in conformity with existing treaties and international law.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, Canada has been conducting a research project on verification called "PAXSAT A", studying the feasibility of developing a system of satellites capable of verifying arms control agreements in outer space. "PAXSAT A" involves space-to-space remote sensing, with satellites used to identify the purpose and function of other space objects. A second project, "PAXSAT B", is a feasibility study of the use of satellites for space-to-ground remote sensing to verify agreements on conventional forces. Canada presented its analysis of PAXSAT to the CD in April 1987.

In 1988, Canada presented three working papers at the CD dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The papers dealt with terminology; a proposal for the strengthening of state practice under the 1975 UN Registration Convention (which requires, among other things, that parties to it furnish information to the Secretary General concerning the general function of space objects launched); and a retrospective view of recent significant political, technical and military developments in outer space.<sup>5</sup>

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 20 June 1989, Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs at the Department of External Affairs, addressed the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Noting that the number of activities taking place in space is constantly increasing, Mr. Bild stated that it is important to reassure the public about them, and particularly to explain that they do not detract from, but rather contribute to, international security. Mr. Bild pointed out, however, that before a start can be made in that regard:

[We] must know what international security means as it relates to the uses of space. International security ... implies not only the absence of weapons as such in outer space, it entails the responsibility of the two major space powers to maintain a stable, controlled relationship between themselves on space issues. This means that all efforts to consider the relationship between international security and outer space are predicated on the

---

<sup>4</sup> CD/618, CD/OS/WP.6, 23 July 1985.

<sup>5</sup> See Canada, *Working Paper on the Use of Certain Terms Relating to Arms Control and Outer Space*, CD/OS/WP.27 (8 August 1988); Australia and Canada, *Strengthening State Practice Under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, to provide more timely and specific information concerning the function of satellites, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission*, CD/OS/WP.25 (18 August 1988); and Canada, *Arms Control and Outer Space: A Retrospective Review: 1982-1987*, CD/OS/WP.26 (8 August 1988).

enhancement of stability. It is our job to identify measures concerning the use of outer space that can be taken on a multilateral basis and through consensus, and that will enhance stability, admittedly a daunting task. That is all the more reason to ensure that the first step provides a strong building block from which further proposals can proceed.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Bild went on to state:

Much more attention has to be given to the basic framework involved in the use of space. The current regime on outer space, comprising a number of international agreements and treaties, can be strengthened: we can search for agreement on the definition of key terms, clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. We could make a start, for example, in applying principles of transparency to activities in space by urging more States to sign the Registration Convention and by persuading the parties to the Registration Convention to agree to provide more timely and specific information on the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.<sup>7</sup>

In October 1989, Canada held a workshop at the McGill Centre for Research of Air and Space Law in Montreal. A cooperative effort between the Centre and the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, the workshop represented a further step in the progressive study toward the continuing use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Over one hundred academics and outer space specialists, representing twenty-four countries, attended the workshop. The Symposium focussed on the militarization of space in its various forms.<sup>8</sup>

On 20 October 1989, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Ms. Peggy Mason, addressed the First Committee of the Forty-fourth United Nations General Assembly. Ambassador Mason discussed Canada's policy on preventing an arms race in outer space:

As we enter the final decade of the century, the relative prominence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the two major powers in space is lessening. More and more states are developing the capability to conduct space research and to use outer space for legitimate commercial purposes. Such developments are welcome, as long as they do not contribute in any way to the development of an arms race in outer space .... It is Canada's strong conviction that outer space is an area of legitimate multilateral concern, and that the question of whether additional legal measures may be required in this area is of broad international interest.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> "Crise de crédibilité," Statement by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs. *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Spring-Summer 1989), p. 31.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>8</sup> "Symposium on Space Without Weapons." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Winter 1989-90), p. 18.

<sup>9</sup> "Mason Addresses First Committee." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall 1989), p. 15.

On 15 December 1989, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 44/112, calling on the CD to give priority to the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and to re-establish, with the appropriate terms of reference, the Ad Hoc Committee on this question. It also called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to intensify their negotiations on this issue. The Resolution passed by a vote of 153-1-0, with Canada voting in favour of the motion and only the US opposed.<sup>10</sup>

In January 1990, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs released its latest compendium of final records and working papers from the CD. The volume includes all such materials on the outer space question for the sessions of the CD held in 1989.<sup>11</sup>

Ambassador Gerald G. Shannon discussed the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the CD on 24 April 1990. Noting that Canada had been entrusted with the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space, Ambassador Shannon added:

On outer space there is both very little and a great deal to say. I say "very little" because, as we all know, we have spent the past three months trying first to establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and then to find agreement on a programme and organization of work. Thus we have not been able to begin substantive work until now. On the other hand, there is nonetheless a great deal to say, in the sense that the Committee has much valuable work to do in furtherance of its goal of preventing an arms race in outer space.<sup>12</sup>

Since 1988 Canada, along with Japan and the European Space Agency (ESA), has participated in the US space station project. Deployment of the station, which was initially scheduled for 1995, has been postponed until 1999. Canada's contribution to the station includes a mobile servicing centre to cost an estimated \$1.2 billion. The "Intergovernmental Agreement" signed in 1988 between Canada, Japan, the United States and certain ESA members, gives each member state the right to decide on the military uses of its own contribution to the station.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> UNGA Resolution 44/112, 15 December 1989.

<sup>11</sup> *Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space - Final Records and Working Papers 1989*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, January 1990.

<sup>12</sup> Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in Geneva, "Statement by Ambassador Gerald G. Shannon before the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 24 April 1990."

<sup>13</sup> "Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station," in: Canada, Ministry of State for Science and Technology, *Space Station Documents*, 29 September 1988.

Bill C-16, an Act to establish the Canadian Space Agency, was given royal assent on 10 May 1990. The Act describes the objects and functions of the Agency as follows:

The objects of the Agency are to promote the peaceful use and development of space, to advance the knowledge of space through science and to ensure that space, science and technology provide social and economic benefits for Canadians.<sup>14</sup>

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

In a statement to the House on 6 October 1989, NDP Member Lyle Dean MacWilliam questioned the government about the establishment of the Canadian Space Agency. Referring to the mandate of the new Agency, Mr. MacWilliam stated:

[W]hile Canadians largely support this government's venture into space science research through the development of a Canadian space agency, there is legitimate concern that such a venture be used for non-military and peaceful purposes only.

The Minister of State has recently acknowledged that the bill to establish the space agency, Bill C-16, does not preclude its involvement in military pursuits. The term "peaceful purposes" may well be interpreted as non-aggressive military use such as satellite surveillance or the development and testing of space-based weapons systems.<sup>15</sup>

On 3 November 1989, Mr. MacWilliam proposed a motion to amend Bill C-16. In presenting it to the House, the NDP Member explained that the purpose of the motion was to ensure that the Act would clearly preclude the use of the Agency for military purposes. Mr. MacWilliam stated:

The current bill before the House outlines that the proposed space agency shall promote "the peaceful use and development of space."

It was argued in committee, and I think the argument is valid, that although the term "peaceful use and development of space" indicates that we will be seeking to use the mandate of the agency for non-aggressive military purposes, the argument can be made that the term "peaceful use" does not preclude the use of this agency for non-aggressive military purposes.

---

<sup>14</sup> Section 4, Bill C-16, an Act to establish the Canadian Space Agency and to provide for other matters in relation to space, assented to 10 May 1990, Statutes of Canada 1990, Second session, Thirty-fourth Parliament.

<sup>15</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 October 1990, pp. 4418-4419.

During committee stage the minister acknowledged that the agency could actually become involved in a type of non-aggressive military action. The minister gave the indication, by way of example, of the launching and maintenance of surveillance satellite systems.

The crux of the argument lies in what can be construed by the term "non-aggressive military use." Such a definition in the past has been used, for example, to qualify the low altitude testing of cruise missiles in Canadian air space. It is non-aggressive, but ultimately the testing of those cruise missiles has forwarded the whole problem of the use of nuclear military weaponry.

Therefore, because the current legislation does not specifically preclude military actions under the mandate of the space agency, it leaves the door open for Canada to enter into the exploration of space as a military frontier.<sup>16</sup>

On the same day Ms. Suzanne Duplessis, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of State for Science and Technology, outlined the position of the government:

The government cannot accept the motion because the Agency's objects are stated clearly in clause 4 of the Bill. They consist in promoting the peaceful use and development of space ....

The terms "for peaceful purposes" are entirely appropriate, since those are the terms used in treaties on outer space.

I would therefore like to remind the Hon. Member ... that according to the Canadian government's policy, also stated in clause 4 of the Bill which provides for promoting the peaceful use and development of space, Canada is a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty which requires space to be used for "exclusively peaceful" purposes.

The terms "peaceful purposes" can apply to certain non-aggressive activities such as monitoring compliance with arms control treaties, telecommunications and search and rescue operations. It is clear the terms "peaceful purposes" do not apply to aggressive activities such as the "militarization" of space.<sup>17</sup>

Mr. MacWilliam's motion on the mandate of the Canadian Space Agency was rejected by the House on 6 November 1989. Bill C-16, an Act to establish the Canadian Space Agency and to provide for other matters in relation to space, was passed on 15 December 1989.

---

<sup>16</sup> *Commons Debates*, 3 November 1989, p. 5513.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5519.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Coulon, Jocelyn, "In Search of a Space Policy for Canada." *Peace&Security*, vol. 3 no. 3 (Autumn 1989), pp. 8-9.

O'Lone, Richard G., "Scientists Call for Policy on Space Nuclear Reactors." *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, vol. 130 no. 4 (23 January 1989), p. 23.

Rodionov, Stanislav, "State of Research on Disarmament and International Security Questions related to Outer Space." *UNIDIR Newsletter*, vol. 2 no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 7-9.

Stibrany, Peter, "Militarization and Outer Space." *Pugwash Papers*, vol. 2 no. 3 (Spring 1989), p. 12.

## FURTHER READING

Beesley, J. Alan *et al.*, "L'apport du Canada au droit spatial et au contrôle des armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique." *Etudes internationales*, vol. 19 no. 3 (September 1988), pp. 501-517.

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *PAXSAT Concept: The Application of Space-Based Remote Sensing for Arms Control Verification*. Ottawa: *Verification Brochure No. 2*, December 1986, (48 pp.).

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space - Final Records and Working Papers 1988*. Ottawa, January 1989.

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space*. UN Document CD/OS/WO.6, 23 July 1985 (41 pp.).

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, "Canadian Space Policy: An Arms Control Perspective." *Arms Control Communiqué No. 35*, 7 April 1987.

Carter, Ashton, "Testing Weapons in Space." *Scientific American*, vol. 261 no. 1 (July 1989), pp. 33-41.

Harkin, Sen. Tom, "Star Wars: A Trojan Horse for ASAT Weapons." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 2 (March 1989), pp. 3-9.

Horgan, John, "Ivan's Eyes: A Ban Ends, and Antisatellite Weapons Make a Comeback." *Scientific American*, vol. 20 no. 6 (June 1989), pp. 19-22.

Kirby, S., and Robson, G. (eds.), *The Militarization of Space*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987 (255 pp.).

Kirton, John, "Une coquille vide: le Canada, puissance spatiale internationale, 1945-1988." *Etudes internationales*, vol. 19 no. 3 (September 1988), pp. 477-491.

Lindsey, George, "L'espace: rôle auxiliaire ou quatrième armée." *Etudes internationales*, vol. 19 no. 3 (September 1988), pp. 451-466.

McGill University Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, *Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification: Options (Proceedings of the Symposium held on October 21-23, 1987)*.

Weston, William C., "L'importance stratégique de l'espace pour les besoins militaires futures du Canada." *Etudes internationales*, vol. 19 no. 3 (September 1988), pp. 493-499.

*CROSS REFERENCES*

Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: Defence and Space Talks (DST)  
Verification



## 11. URANIUM AND TRITIUM EXPORTS

### *BACKGROUND*

Canada is one of the world's largest suppliers of uranium. During World War II it was involved in the research and development of the atomic bomb, and supplied uranium for atomic weapons. Canada continued to provide uranium for the nuclear weapons programmes of the United States and Britain for twenty years, although it renounced any intention of developing its own atomic weapons. In 1965, Canada's uranium export policy was altered when Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson announced that, henceforth, Canadian uranium exports would be used for peaceful purposes only.

By acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970, Canada agreed to place greater restrictions on the use of its nuclear materials. Under the provisions of the NPT, every state party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide raw materials or special fissile products, to be used for peaceful purposes, to a non-nuclear weapon state unless such products are subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Non-nuclear weapon states must also undertake not to acquire such weapons and must agree, for verification purposes, to submit their civilian nuclear programme to IAEA safeguards.

In 1974 India, which had not signed the NPT, exploded its "peaceful nuclear device" (i.e., one used for peaceful purposes). This event led Canada to conduct a thorough reassessment of its nuclear non-proliferation policy. Canada never recognized any distinction between nuclear explosive devices and nuclear weapons, and the announcement that the Indian explosion had been produced with plutonium produced in a reactor provided by Canada in the 1950s caused Canada to suspend all nuclear cooperation with New Delhi and to impose more stringent safeguards on its nuclear exports.

Since 1974 the Canadian Government has reserved the right to control the retransfer and reprocessing of any nuclear item directly provided or derived from products supplied by Canada. Furthermore, since 1976 any new cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states is subject to the countries in question acceding to the NPT or making equivalent commitments with respect to the Treaty, and accepting the application of IAEA safeguards to their nuclear activities.

Canada is now the world's largest producer and exporter of natural uranium. However, Canadian uranium cannot be used directly to manufacture nuclear weapons. A blend of uranium 235 (U235) and uranium 238 (U238), natural uranium contains less than one percent U235, and a far higher concentration of this fissile isotope would be needed to make nuclear weapons. In international usage, when the U235 concentration reaches twenty percent (through a process known as uranium enrichment), it is then designated as highly enriched uranium, even though an enrichment level of eighty or ninety percent is probably needed to manufacture weapons.

Canada has never considered that it might be necessary to enrich uranium in Canada itself. Not only does Canada not have a nuclear weapons programme, but the Canadian-designed

CANDU reactor (abbreviation of CANada, Deuterium and Uranium) uses only natural uranium. However, with the exception of the CANDU reactor, most existing nuclear reactors are light-water reactors requiring uranium with a three percent concentration of U235, and the natural uranium must be enriched to this level by increasing the percentage of U235 isotope. Elaborate and expensive, the enrichment process was, until recently, confined to those countries possessing nuclear weapons programmes, as only they could afford the cost of such large operations.

Approximately fifty percent of the uranium exported from Canada goes to the United States, Great Britain and France. There it is enriched for use in light-water nuclear reactors. The Canada-United States Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1955 and most recently renewed in 1980, stipulates that uranium of Canadian origin cannot be used for military purposes. Similar conditions govern uranium exports to Britain and France under the Canada-Euratom Agreement (1978).

Since enrichment plants of nuclear weapon countries have both civilian and military uses, the separation of materials for either application occurs only as a bookkeeping procedure. Imported uranium effectively goes into a large "pot" and is not kept separate according to the country of origin or its intended use. In a letter to NDP leader Ed Broadbent in October 1985, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stated:

It is impossible to trace precisely each and every molecule of Canadian uranium through these complex enrichment plants.... However, for each ounce of Canadian uranium fed into the enrichment plant, the same amount, in both enriched and depleted forms as appropriate, is subject to the Canada-USA nuclear co-operation agreement and to the non-explosive use and non-military use commitments contained therein. This is an example of the application of the internationally accepted notion of fungibility.<sup>1</sup>

After the uranium is enriched to the required three per cent concentration of U235, the remaining uranium (which still contains small amounts of U235) is stored. This uranium, which is called depleted uranium because its U235 concentration is lower than that of natural uranium, can be used in military reactors to breed plutonium -- a substance which itself can be used to make nuclear weapons. Depleted uranium also constitutes an important element of hydrogen bombs, providing fifty percent of their explosive power.

Following the policy changes announced in 1974, Canada had to halt uranium shipments to both the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan in January 1977, after two years of negotiations failed to produce their agreement to the Canadian stipulations. Although Japan consented to abide by the clause soon afterwards, the EEC remained intransigent. It was not until 1980 that an agreement was signed allowing sales to the EEC, with consultation on a case-by-case basis.

---

<sup>1</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, Letter to the Hon. Edward Broadbent, 3 October 1985.

Western European countries purchasing uranium from Canada occasionally have arranged for both its enrichment, and its subsequent retransfer to one of Canada's nuclear partners, by the Soviet Union. This practice has been taking place for several years with the complete knowledge and prior consent of the Canadian Government, which has judged it to be fully consistent with Canadian nuclear export and non-proliferation policy.

Greater formalization of this agreement was established with the signing of the Canada-USSR Agreement Concerning the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy on 14 October 1988. The Agreement stipulates that Canadian uranium shipped to the USSR "... shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device or other military purpose."<sup>2</sup> It also provides for the direct exchange of information between the parties on the transfer of Canadian uranium into and out of the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, constitutes another key component of nuclear weapons. It is generally found as tritiated water. Its importance is based on its high rate of fusion with deuterium and the large quantity of high-energy neutrons released as a result. The fusion of the two elements produces ten times as many neutrons as fission for the same amount of energy released. Tritium is thus crucial for boosting the energy released in nuclear explosions, allowing designers to build smaller and lighter weapons. In fact, because of its boosting characteristics, tritium is now considered an essential aspect of most US nuclear weapons.

Each year, approximately 0.5 kg of tritium is used for civilian purposes such as phosphorescent lights and fusion experiments, while approximately eleven kg are used for military purposes. Tritium decays at a rate of about 5.5 percent per year. In the case of nuclear weapons, this requires that their tritium supply be replaced from time to time.

Continued production of the tritium required for the US nuclear stockpile, however, has become an issue of increasing concern. In August 1988, the sole tritium-producing facility in the US -- the thirty-eight-year-old Savannah River Plant in South Carolina -- was closed due to safety and management problems. The costs associated with repairing the facility are estimated at close to \$1 billion over a ten-year period. Even if repaired, however, the plant is not expected to operate with the power required to produce the tritium necessary for US needs.

More tritium is produced as a by-product by the CANDU reactors than by any other type of reactor. The heavy water -- containing deuterium -- captures neutrons from the main reactor chamber, converting deuterium to tritium. As the Canadian reactors are designed to minimize the risk of heavy water leaks, they are very effective for containing tritium.

For health and safety reasons, the tritium by-products of CANDU reactors require removal. In October 1988 Ontario Hydro constructed a tritium recovery facility at Darlington,

---

<sup>2</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 223 (14 October 1988).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*.

Ontario. This facility is capable of producing an estimated 2.5 kg of tritium per year. However, technical problems have precluded regular operation of the facility, and the plant was shut down for repair in late February 1989. Operations were resumed in June 1990.

Ontario Hydro has for a long time considered whether to market the tritium recovered at the Darlington facility. Tritium sells for approximately \$15 million per kilogram on the international market. As transportation of tritium can be dangerous and is not subject to IAEA international safeguards since it is not classified as a nuclear material (although it is an important element in the manufacturing of certain atomic weapons), the possibility of Ontario Hydro marketing the material has sparked considerable concern from both peace activists and environmentalists.

On 30 August 1989, the Government of Ontario announced its decision. The Minister of Energy, Ms Lyn McLeod, stated:

Hydro will be permitted to sell tritium only for the manufacture in Canada of self-powered tritium lights, for medical research, and for government-sponsored research into the fusion process.<sup>4</sup>

The Minister added that these limited sales will be subject to the strictest interpretation of federal government controls, in accordance with Canada's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Tritium will be used only for peaceful purposes.

The announcement by Ontario Hydro that it would authorize the sale of tritium did not meet with unanimous approval. Some observers doubted the ability of the government to verify whether the tritium was being used for peaceful purposes after it left Canada.<sup>5</sup> Other critics urged the government to support and promote the idea of a universal ban on the production of tritium.<sup>6</sup>

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada continues to require that its uranium exports be used for non-explosive purposes, pursuant to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, and in keeping with its nuclear non-proliferation commitments.

Canada's policy on the sale of tritium and tritium-related technology is governed by a set of guidelines issued on 14 March 1986. The guidelines reflect Canada's policy that tritium

---

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Energy, Government of Ontario, *News Release* (30 August 1989), p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> "Hydro Ontario pourrait vendre du tritium." *La Presse*, 31 August 1989, p. A10.

<sup>6</sup> "Mulroney Asked to Push Ban on World Production of Tritium." *Sunday Star*, 8 October 1989, p. A26.

exports "not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."<sup>7</sup> Tritium exports are permitted only to states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or to states which have undertaken equivalent non-proliferation obligations acceptable to Canada and for the specified end-uses elaborated in Canada's guidelines.<sup>8</sup>

In December 1989, at the UN General Assembly, Canada once again introduced a resolution (44/116H) entitled "Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes." The Resolution noted that such a prohibition would be an important step in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, as well as halting and reversing the arms race. It therefore requested that the CD pursue its consideration of the question of an adequately verifiable cessation and prohibition, and that it keep the General Assembly informed of that consideration. The Resolution passed by a vote of 147-1-6, with only France in opposition.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Neither the issue of uranium exports nor that of the export of tritium has been raised in the Commons this year.

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Kock, Irene *et al.*, "Tritium." *Peace Magazine*, vol. 5 no. 3 (June-July 1989), pp. 20-21.

Martin, Dave, "Tritium Sales Approved: Commercial Use Pushed." *Anti-Nuclear Review* (Summer-Fall 1989), pp. 1-2.

*Nuclear Facts: Seeking to Generate a Better Understanding* (several issues). Toronto: The Canadian Nuclear Association.

#### FURTHER READING

For a good review of what happens to Canadian uranium in the United States, see the testimony of Mark Moher, Director of the Nuclear Energy Division at External Affairs, in the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Proceedings*, 1 October 1985, pp. 24-27.

Aubin, N., "Le Tritium: questions et réponses." *Option Paix*, vol. 4 no. 3 (1986), pp. 16-18.

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Canadian Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy*. Ottawa, 1985 (27 pp.).

---

<sup>7</sup> "Tritium-Related Exports." Ottawa: Atomic Energy Control Board, *Notice* 86-5 (14 March 1986), p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*.

Cochran, Thomas B., "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Production: An Overview." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 44 no. 1 (January-February 1988), pp. 12-16.

Edwards, Gordon, "Fuelling the Arms Race: Canada's Nuclear Trade." *Ploughshares Monitor* (June 1985), pp. 16-22.

Kock, Irene, *et al.*, "Tritium." *Peace Magazine*, vol. 5 no. 3 (June 1989), pp. 20-21.

Project Ploughshares, "Uranium Exports." *Ploughshares Monitor* (June 1976), p. 15.

Rubin, Norman, "Tritium: Canadian Content for the Bomb," in J. Alton *et al.*, *The Name of the Chamber Was Peace*. Toronto: Samuel Stevens and Co. for Science for Peace, 1988, pp. 40-44.

*The Tritium Factor: Tritium's Impact on Nuclear Arms Reductions*. Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Control Institute and the National Academy of Sciences, 1989 (180 pp.).

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

### *BACKGROUND*

Verification is now recognized as a key factor in all areas of disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the negotiations on nuclear missiles, arms in outer space, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. The issue of compliance often generates controversy and makes it difficult to reach agreements in any of these sectors. However, two important developments have occurred since the end of summer 1987: talks have resumed on verification of nuclear testing after an eight-year hiatus, and the Soviet Union and the United States have signed an agreement to eliminate ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF). The INF Treaty contains certain innovative provisions on verification that could set a precedent for future disarmament and arms control agreements.

Over the years, Canada has acquired solid expertise in verification, in the recognition that an arms control and disarmament agreement must be accompanied by provisions designed to ensure compliance and build confidence. Following the United Nations' First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, which stressed the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in disarmament agreements, the Canadian Government announced in 1983 the launching of an Arms Control Research Programme, which now has an annual budget of \$1 million. This Department of External Affairs programme involves the Government, the academic community and the commercial sector and includes such projects as studies of problems that arise in international negotiations, creation of specialized technical training programmes and organization of international symposia of experts.

The Arms Control Research Programme, which is managed by the Verification and Research Section of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs, focusses on certain Canadian arms control priorities: the achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons; negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space; and the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.

The Government's activities include a \$3.2 million upgrading of the seismic array station in Yellowknife, which was officially opened on 11 September 1989; two studies given to the UN Secretary-General on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons abuses, and working papers on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the verification of a future Convention on Chemical Weapons. Canada has also considered the possibility of using space-based remote sensing for the verification of multilateral arms control agreements, known as PAXSAT. PAXSAT 'A' investigated the use of space-based remote sensing for arms control in outer space, while PAXSAT 'B' was concerned with verifying conventional arms control agreements.

In 1985, at the Fortieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada's UN delegation initiated and sponsored Resolution 40/152 "on all aspects of verification," which was passed by consensus. The Resolution called on member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation

and disarmament measures," and urged them "to communicate to the Secretary General ... their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques ... and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The Resolution was called "a historic breakthrough," since previous resolutions on this issue had failed to proceed beyond the negotiating stage.<sup>1</sup>

Carrying out the requirements of this Resolution, in April 1986, the Canadian Government submitted to the Secretary-General, and subsequently published, *A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification*. This publication, in addition to describing the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification, also foresees an important role for the United Nations in the application and interpretation of arms controls agreements, despite the fact that bilateral negotiations between the superpowers will likely continue to be of paramount importance in this context.

In 1987 and 1988, Canada chaired the UN Disarmament Commission's Verification Working Group. The Group completed its work in May 1988, approving a consensus document listing sixteen principles on verification. The Group also held discussions on procedures and techniques and on the role the United Nations might play in verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. The latter was described on 12 May 1988 by Mr. Douglas Roche, who was at that time Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, as follows:

- development of internationally recognized standards on arms control and disarmament verification;
- creation of a verification data base, especially to assist negotiators;
- provision of assistance, advice and technical expertise to regional arms control negotiators, on request;
- research into structures, procedures and techniques for verification; and
- on a responsive basis and with the consent of the parties to an arms control or disarmament negotiation or agreement, potential involvement in the formulation and execution of verification provisions of specific agreements.<sup>2</sup>

At the United Nations' Third Special Session on Disarmament in June 1988, Canada and the Netherlands submitted a paper on the role the United Nations might play in verification. The two countries proposed in particular that a UN Group of Experts conduct a thorough study of this subject, to serve as a key international document on future UN activities in this field.

---

<sup>1</sup> Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, *News Release* No. 62, 22 November 1985.

<sup>2</sup> "Intervention on the Role of the United Nations in Verification by Canadian Representative at UNDC Verification Working Group," United Nations, 12 May 1988.

In December 1988, a Department of External Affairs briefing note addressed the Canadian Government's position regarding the notion of an international verification organization (IVO) and the link between such a body and the UN. It stated:

Canada advocates a realistic and step-by-step approach to the establishment of IVOs, including those that would employ the UN. Costly schemes to create verification bodies with all-encompassing responsibilities, some of which go beyond the limited function of verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, are inappropriate. Verification should be primarily a treaty-specific activity. While useful work may be done to study verification as a general process and to discuss general principles, the implementation of verification is fundamentally dependent on the specifics of a treaty context. For the foreseeable future, the most effective way of organizing the specialized expertise necessary for verification will be through treaty-specific organizations. Under current international conditions an IVO with responsibilities for several ACD agreements is unlikely to [be] a realistic possibility.<sup>3</sup>

At the Forty-third Session of the UN General Assembly in 1988, Canada co-sponsored Resolution 43/81B calling upon the UN Secretary-General to initiate a Group of Experts study on the role of the United Nations in verification. The study would identify and review existing activities of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament; assess the need for improvements in existing activities; explore and identify other possible activities; and provide specific recommendations for future actions by the United Nations in this regard.<sup>4</sup> The Resolution passed by a vote of 150-1-0, with the United States opposing the motion.

The opening session of the Group of Experts study on the role of the United Nations in verification was held in February 1989. Composed of authorities from over twenty countries, including Canada, the Group dedicated its first session primarily to organizational matters and the preparation of a draft outline of the Group's report. Fred Bild, Canada's Assistant Deputy Minister of External Affairs for Political and International Security Affairs, was elected chairman.<sup>5</sup> The second and third meetings of the Group of Experts were held in July 1989 and January 1990 respectively. They focussed on developing the final report to be submitted at the Forty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly in 1990. A final meeting of the Group is scheduled for July 1990.

---

<sup>3</sup> "Establishment of a UN Verification Organization." Department of External Affairs *Briefing Note*, 22 December 1988, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> UNGA Resolution 43/81B, 7 December 1988.

<sup>5</sup> "Work Begins on S.G. Studies." *Disarmament Times* (April 1989), p. 1.

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

On 24 and 25 July 1989 the Group of Experts studying the role of the United Nations in the field of verification held a workshop in Montreal. The workshop was organized by McGill University's Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, at the request of the Department of External Affairs, and its purpose was to provide the Group with an opportunity to discuss the results of Canadian verification research and to explore the technical and legal issues relating to verification.<sup>6</sup>

From 11 to 15 September 1989 Canada hosted a workshop of the Group of Scientific Experts examining international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic activities. This Group of Experts is associated with the Conference on Disarmament and has participants from twenty-seven countries; it met in Edmonton and Yellowknife to discuss technical questions related to the detection of seismic activities, data communication by satellite, and facilities for managing and processing data bases.<sup>7</sup>

In an address to the First Committee of the United Nations on 20 October 1989, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Ms. Peggy Mason, stressed the importance of verification in the context of Canada's arms control policy:

The verification of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements continues to be a major focus of Canada's efforts in the multilateral field. Without provision for assurances that parties will abide by their treaty obligations, countries will be hesitant to sign arms control and disarmament agreements. Verification is the essential means by which confidence in compliance is created.<sup>8</sup>

Ambassador Mason also pointed out the strong support given to the verification resolution proposed by Canada the preceding year. She added that, so as to avoid prejudging the Experts' report on this subject, Canada would not propose a resolution on verification during the Forty-fourth Session of the UN General Assembly.<sup>9</sup>

As part of its Verification Research Programme, the Verification Research Unit (Department of External Affairs) devoted its Sixth Annual Symposium to the subject of "Open Skies". The Symposium, which was organized by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies, was attended by approximately forty people, including civilian and military

---

<sup>6</sup> "Canada Hosts Workshop of UN Verification Experts." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall 1989), p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> "Group of Scientific Experts Meets in Yellowknife." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall 1989), pp. 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> "Ambassador Mason Addresses First Committee." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Fall 1989), p. 14.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*.

officials from Canada, the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands and Hungary. The Symposium, held in Ottawa from 21 to 24 November 1989, gave participants the opportunity to examine technical, organizational, legal and political issues relating to overflights.<sup>10</sup> (See Chapter **OPEN SKIES**).

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The subject of verification was not raised in the Commons this year.

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Canada, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada and International Safeguards: Verifying Nuclear Non-Proliferation*. Ottawa: *Verification Brochure* No. 5, 1990 (60 pp.).

"Canada's Verification Programme." *Disarmament Bulletin*, vol. 11 (Fall 1989), p.4.

Dorn, Walter, "Technologies for Peace: Canada Proceeds Cautiously." *Science for Peace Bulletin*, vol. 10 no. 1 (March 1990), pp. 20-21.

Watt, Fergus, "Experts Study U.N. Verification Role." *Links* (Spring 1989), p.6.

#### FURTHER READING

Buckingham, R., *Satellite Surveillance and Canadian Capabilities*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 7, September 1986 (10 pp.).

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Verification Research: Canadian Verification Research Program*. Ottawa: *Verification Brochure*, No. 3, 1987 (48 pp.).

Cleminson, Ronald, "United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification: Principles of Verification: the Multilateral Context." *Disarmament* (Summer 1988), pp. 20-29.

Cleminson, F.R. and Gilman, E., *A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification*, Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Arms Control Verification Series* No. 1, January 1986 (30 pp.).

*Compendium of Verbatim Statements on Verification*. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, May 1988 (529 pp.).

Graybeal, Sidney and McFate, Patricia, "Criteria for Verification: In the Eyes of the Beholder." *Harvard International Review*, vol. 10 no. 6 (August-September 1988), pp. 4-80.

---

<sup>10</sup> "Verification Symposium Examines Open Skies Issues." *The Disarmament Bulletin* (Winter 1989-1990), p. 5.

Hansen, Lynn M., "United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification: Is There a Gap Between Advances in Technology and the Ability to Verify?" *Disarmament* (Summer 1988), pp.45-53.

Keeley, James F., *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention.* Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Arms Control and Disarmament Occasional Papers* No. 1, September 1988 (63 pp.).

Remacle, Eric, "L'inspection sur place et la transparence des relations internationales." *Études internationales* (December 1988), pp.693-702.

Sanders, Ben, "United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification: Some Practical Aspects of Arms Control Verification." *Disarmament* (Summer 1988), pp. 30-39.

Scott, Douglas S. and Dorn, Walter A., "Making Arms Control Treaties Stronger." *International Perspectives* (January-February 1989), pp. 13-17.

Scribner, Richard, "In the Future of Verification." *Harvard International Review*, vol. 10 no. 6 (August-September 1988), pp. 27-31 and 48.

Tsipis K., et al. (eds.), *Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Make It Possible.* London: Pergamon-Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986 (419 pp.).

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Chemical and Biological Weapons  
Nuclear Testing  
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space  
Open Skies

## BACKGROUND

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the global trade in major weapons in 1989 was valued at approximately US \$31.8 billion (all figures are in 1985 US dollars),<sup>1</sup> down from US \$33.6 billion in 1988 and US \$38.8 billion in 1987, which was the highest year on record for arms sales.<sup>2</sup>

The Institute noted a relative drop in the value of arms sales to Third World countries: the value of weapons sold to these countries in 1988 was US \$19.3 billion. By comparison, in 1989 the value of such sales dropped to US \$16.4 billion, which was the lowest level since 1976.<sup>3</sup> SIPRI attributed this downward trend to a number of factors, including the economic difficulties being experienced by many developing countries and the cessation of major conflicts, such as the war between Iran and Iraq.

For the first time in twenty years, the Middle East was not the leading importer of weapons in the world. In 1989, the largest importer of major weapons in the Third World was South Asia, with transfers for that year estimated at US \$6.9 billion. It was followed by the Far East (US \$3.279 billion), the Middle East (US \$3.27 billion), North Africa (US \$1.2 billion), South America (US \$963 million), Sub-Saharan Africa (US \$397 million), Central America (US \$300 million) and South Africa (US \$3 million).<sup>4</sup> India ranked as the world's leading individual arms importer in 1989 with purchases estimated at US \$3.8 billion. It was followed by Afghanistan, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, South Korea and Libya.<sup>5</sup> The largest exporters of major weapons to developing countries were the USSR (US \$8.5 billion), the USA (US \$2.5 billion), France (US \$1.5 billion), the UK (US \$993 million) and China (US \$718 million).<sup>6</sup>

While arms purchases by Third World countries have declined, those of industrialized countries have been steadily increasing since 1985. The share of the world market held by industrialized countries rose from thirty-three to forty-two percent between 1987 and 1988, and to almost fifty percent in 1989.<sup>7</sup> According to SIPRI, this increase was due to measures taken by certain NATO countries (such as major modernization programmes carried out by Greece, Turkey and Spain) and also to decisions by the Japanese authorities. Among the industrialized

---

<sup>1</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1990*. London: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 219.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 228.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 219.

countries, Japan was the leading importer of arms in 1989, with purchases estimated at US \$3.1 billion. Japan was followed by Greece and Turkey, with imports of US \$1.8 billion and US \$1.1 billion respectively.<sup>8</sup>

The Soviet Union (US \$11.7 billion), the USA (US \$10.8 billion) and three NATO countries -- France (US \$2.7 billion), the UK (US \$1.6 billion) and West Germany (US \$780 million) -- were the world's top exporters of major weapons to all countries.<sup>9</sup> China followed West Germany with 1989 transfers valued at US \$779 million. However, China's sales were made almost exclusively to the Third World. The Soviet Union continued to lead as the main exporter of major arms to the Third World, while US arms transfers were divided between the developing countries (US \$2.5 billion) and the industrialized world (US \$8.2 billion).<sup>10</sup> In 1989, the US ranked first among exporters of major weapons to industrialized countries.<sup>11</sup>

Arms transfer controls by exporters, whether through regulation, creation of a world arms register, or any other means, have often been considered but never effectively enacted by members of the United Nations. In 1977, US President Carter imposed unilateral restrictions on American arms exports. This action was followed by the Conventional Arms Transfers (CAT) talks with the Soviet Union. These talks, however, soon broke down.<sup>12</sup>

#### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada continues to be a minor player in the global conventional arms market. In 1989, Canada ranked fourteenth as a major weapons exporter with global deliveries valued at US \$37 million.<sup>13</sup>

In the same year, Canada imported weapons from industrialized countries to the amount of US \$444 million.<sup>14</sup>

Canadian military exports are primarily in the electronics and aerospace sectors. Since Canadian firms manufacture few complete weapons systems, most exports consist of components, despite Ottawa's continued efforts to develop a more broadly-based domestic defence industry. Canada's policy on military exports has not changed since Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced revised guidelines on 10 September 1986, aimed at regulating Canadian

---

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 228.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 220

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>12</sup> Keith Krause, *The International Trade in Arms*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 28 (March 1988), pp. 7-8.

<sup>13</sup> SIPRI, *supra* note 1, p. 221.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229.

exports.<sup>15</sup> This policy prohibits military exports to countries that seriously or persistently violate human rights, "unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population"; to countries under UN Security Council sanctions; and to countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities. Restrictions also apply to exports of civilian strategic equipment to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and countries where there is a risk the goods will be re-routed to these destinations.

The biggest recipient of Canadian defence and defence-related goods is the United States, with whom Canada has had a Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) since 1959 that gives Canadian firms privileged access to the US military market.<sup>16</sup> [Canada and the US also have a Defence Development Sharing Agreement (DDSA)]. However, protectionists in the US Congress have tabled trade bills in the Senate and House of Representatives that would place restrictions on purchases of foreign defence goods in order to promote US products. Despite the Free Trade Agreement, these measures may well affect existing Canada-US agreements on military trade, such as the DPSA and the DDSA.

The idea of developing an international arms sale register under the auspices of the United Nations surfaced once again in the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Foreign Relations (the Simard-Hockin Report) of June 1986. The Report recommended that Canada should strive to convince other nations to support the proposals for an international system to register exports and imports of weapons and munitions.<sup>17</sup> On 21 October 1987, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs James Taylor told a conference in Hull that Canada supported the idea of an arms register. His address included the following statement:

It is perhaps instructive in this regard to note that despite repeated UN resolutions, scarcely more than twenty states register with the UN their levels of military expenditure. Canada is one of the few countries that does so.<sup>18</sup>

Mr. Taylor also listed the current obstacles to such a measure, especially the type of information to be provided and the range of goods to be declared. He pointed out that some countries might refuse to be included on such a register for security reasons, since this register would contain virtually all information about a country's military strength, and might be used by a potential enemy. Finally, he explained that the problem of the arms trade could not be solved

---

<sup>15</sup> For a full overview of the new policy, see: "Export Controls Policy." Department of External Affairs *Communiqué* No. 155 (10 September 1986).

<sup>16</sup> Krause, *supra* note 12, pp. 6-7.

<sup>17</sup> Tom Hockin (MP) and Senator Jean-Maurice Simard, *Independence and Internationalism: Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations*, June 1986, p. 145.

<sup>18</sup> Department of External Affairs, *Canadian Policy on Arms Control and Disarmament - Excerpts from Official Statements and Communication*. Ottawa, August 1988, p. 1.

until the insecurity of some countries, often the result of flawed international security mechanisms, had been addressed.<sup>19</sup>

In 1988 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of governmental experts, a study on ways of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional weapons on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. The group of governmental experts held its first meeting in New York from 22 to 26 January 1990, where they focussed on the scope of the study and the definition of key terms such as "arms" and "transfers". The Group comprises experts from nineteen countries, including Canada. It will submit the results of its study to the General Assembly in the fall of 1991.<sup>20</sup>

Begun in 1983, the biennial Armed Forces Training Technology Exhibition (ARMX) held its 1989 exhibition in Ottawa in May. The exhibition featured the latest military technology products of approximately 450 corporations from sixteen countries, including Canada. The sponsor of the event was the Toronto-based Baxter Publishing Co., publisher of the *Canadian Defence Quarterly*.

On 19 May 1989, Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins explained the role of ARMX-1989 to the House of Commons as follows:

The primary purpose of ARMX is to provide a forum in which training and technology needs of the Department of National Defence can be offered and shown.... The Government of Canada has identified its equipment needs from trucks to communications equipment, and ARMX provides the various companies with an opportunity to show their products and share their ideas.... ARMX gives Canadian companies...the opportunity to show what they have to offer to both exhibitors and the Canadian Government.... Visitors from NATO countries are encouraged to look at Canadian capabilities to help them meet their NATO commitments.... We all know that the defence industry is a relatively small part of our national economy.... However, it certainly represents some of the most technologically sophisticated industries that we have. The high-tech industry is one of the ways for Canada to maintain a competitive position internationally.... The defence business is important to the economic viability of many of our high-tech communities.<sup>21</sup>

About 2,000 demonstrators protested outside the grounds where ARMX-1989 was being held. A total of 145 people were arrested and charged with mischief when they staged a sit-

---

<sup>19</sup> Keith Krause, *The International Trade in Arms: Problems and Prospects*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Conference Report No. 6* (October 1987), pp. 28-29.

<sup>20</sup> "Arms Transfer Experts Group Meets." *Disarmament Bulletin* No. 13 (Spring 1990), p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> *Commons Debates*, 19 May 1989, pp. 1981-1982.

down strike in an attempt to prevent the exhibition from opening. Ottawa's City Council voted to stop renting any municipally owned property for future ARMX shows.

In February 1990, an ARMX spokesperson stated that a new private facility was being built in the Ottawa region to house the military exhibition.<sup>22</sup> A few months earlier, in October 1989, a study prepared on behalf of Baxter Publications reported that ten percent of the products presented in ARMX-89 could be classed as weapons. The study, conducted by John Walsh of Guelph University, stated that over eighty percent of the ARMX exhibitors were manufacturers of non-lethal products, such as protective clothing, infographic equipment, machine parts, medical equipment used for training purposes and components required for information services.<sup>23</sup>

Canadian Government regulations require an export permit for the sale of military commodities to any country other than the United States. However, this permit does not cover subsequent sales or inclusion of the commodity in another product sold to a third party. There is no official Government reporting of either direct or indirect military commodity sales. However, it was alleged in the December 1989 issue of *The Ploughshares Monitor* that Canadian military commodities, or products that have military application, find their way each year into the hands of governments who are at war or who are severe human rights violators.<sup>24</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 29 September 1989, Liberal Member Stan Keyes presented to the House a petition signed by some twenty-five members of local churches in the riding of Hamilton West. Mr Keyes stated:

They call upon the government to provide full disclosure of all Canadian military exports, including the type, producers, vendors, purchasers, transporters, as well as the immediate and final destinations of military exports to be printed in register form and available to the Canadian public upon request.<sup>25</sup>

On 25 January 1990, NDP Member Bill Blaikie spoke on Bill C-25, an Act to amend the Geneva Conventions Act. Mr Blaikie referred to the December edition of *The Ploughshares Monitor* which gave a list of those countries reported to have received Canadian military

---

<sup>22</sup> "ARMX Trade Show's Back - Permanently." *Ottawa Sun*, 20 February 1990, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> "Report Finds Defence Show a Boon to Ottawa Industry." *Toronto Star*, 24 October 1989, p. F7.

<sup>24</sup> "Armed Conflicts in the World 1989." *Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 10 no. 4 (December 1989), pp. 14-15. See also "Indirect Military Sales to the Third World: Hidden Road to the Arms Market." *Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 9 no. 4 (December 1988), pp. 13-15.

<sup>25</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1989, p. 4110. See also *Commons Debates*, 4 October 1989, p. 4312.

equipment directly and indirectly. The NDP Member pointed out that the publication listed a number of documented cases of such sales:

Let me mention the ones in which there are documented direct arms sales. In Colombia there is a record of documented indirect Canadian arms sales. There is documentation of Canadian arms sales in Peru, in Israel, in Northern Ireland and Turkey. There is documentation of indirect arms sales in Western Sahara, Sudan, Chad, Uganda and Angola.

There is a record of indirect Canadian arms sales in the Iraq-Iranian conflict. In India where there is conflict between the government and separatist ethnic and religious rebels, there is direct Canadian arms sales; in Somalia, indirect Canadian arms sales; in Mozambique, direct Canadian arms sales; in Sri Lanka, direct Canadian arms sales; in Indonesia, direct Canadian arms sales; in Malaysia, direct Canadian arms sales; in the Philippines, indirect Canadian arms sales.

Finally, in the conflict between the Chinese and Vietnamese governments since 1979, there is record of Canadian arms sales.<sup>26</sup>

Mr Blaikie went on to state:

Unfortunately, as far as we are concerned, the Canadian government's record in that respect is not one that Canadians should be as proud of as they sometimes are. There is no question that the average Canadian feels good about Canada's role in the world, and so they should in many respects. They need to be reminded, not just from time to time, but consistently that our hands are indeed dirty with respect to a lot of these armed conflicts that are happening around the world.<sup>27</sup>

On 9 February 1990, NDP Member Stan J. Hovdebo also spoke on Bill C-25, an Act to amend the Geneva Conventions Act. He stated:

There should be stronger restrictions so that, minimally, military and military-related products do not go to human rights violators. The end use of any component should be part of the exporting requirements and should be firmly controlled.

Better still, we should stop making and selling armaments completely. Canadians could also make an effort, both nationally and internationally, to reduce the flow of weapons on the international market. As a place to start we could make requirements which would force suppliers to recognize when they are contributing to world armament.

---

<sup>26</sup> *Commons Debates*, 25 January 1990, pp. 7482-7483.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7483.

We could appeal to places such as Indo-China, the Horn of Africa, South Africa, Central America, the Middle East and other places where there is widespread killing, devastation and injustice. We could deal with them and start a movement toward the elimination of armaments.

Even as we make rules for war we should be doing much more to ensure that war becomes less likely in the world.<sup>28</sup>

On 30 April 1990, NDP Member Ian Waddell questioned the Government about arms sales to Nicaragua. Mr. Waddell said:

Three years ago I raised in this House of Commons actually four times, the question of arms sales by Canadian companies to the Nicaragua contras.

Yesterday *The Toronto Star* reports that arms dealer Arif Durrani has seen the shipments first-hand, and is testifying that documents were falsified.

In light of the new, direct evidence of illegal activity of Canadian companies, will the minister make public the RCMP report, which I do not believe has ever been made public, and can we expect charges against these companies in Canada? <sup>29</sup>

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark replied:

The hon. member is correct. He raised the matter four times and I think that on each occasion I gave him the assurance that the Canadian government was not involved in and had no knowledge of a transaction to supply arms.

He quotes Mr. Arif Durrani. He does not give his full credential. He is a convicted arms dealer in prison in Oregon. He is the source of the latest round of concerns that have been expressed in *The Toronto Star*.

The hon. member knows as well as anyone in the House that there is a practical rule against releasing RCMP reports. I trust him and take him as a man of his word. If he is prepared to accept the normal confidentiality that would apply, I will be sure that there is a complete briefing given to him on a confidential basis as to the circumstances. Then he can base his questions on the facts, not on allegations that come from persons occupying cells in Oregon.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> *Commons Debates*, 9 February 1990, p. 8105.

<sup>29</sup> *Commons Debates*, 30 April 1990, p. 10790.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Adam, Bernard, "La production d'armements en Belgique." *Dossier "notes et documents"*, GRIP, vol. 135, November 1989, (45 pp.).

Anthony, Ian and Wulf, Herbert, "The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons," in: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1990*, London: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 219-316.

Ball, Nicole, "Report on Working Group 5: The Arms Trade and Regional Conflicts." *Pugwash Newsletter*, vol. 27. no. 2 (October 1989), pp. 86-92.

Barillo, Bruno, "Le complexe militaro-industriel en chiffres." *Damocles*, vol. 41 (November-December 1989), pp. 12-15.

Husbands, Jo L., "A Buyer's Market for Arms." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 46 no. 4, (May 1990), pp. 14-19.

Johnston, Russel, "Curbing the Arms Trade." *Council for Arms Control Bulletin*, vol. 48 (February 1990), pp. 1-2.

Lyons, Peter, *et al.* "Militarizing the Third World." *Nuclear Times*, vol. 8 no. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 27-29.

Morring, Frank, "Canada's Role in International Defense Market is in Flux." *Defense News*, vol. 4 no. 26 (26 June 1989), p. 16.

Neuman, Stephanie G., "The Arms Market: Who's on Top?" *Orbis*, vol. 33 no. 4 (Fall 1989), pp. 509-529.

Regehr, Ernie, "Arms Bazaars in the Age of Restraint." *Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 10, no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 59-60 and 62.

Regehr, Ernie, "Declaring War on the Traffic in Arms." *Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 11, no. 1, (March 1990), pp. 9-10.

Rosh, Robert M., "Third World Arms Production and the Evolving Interstate System." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 34 no. 1 (March 1990), pp. 57-73.

Starr, Barbara, "Foreign Military Sales." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 13 no. 6 (Fall 1990), pp. 249 *et seq.*

"U.S. Military Equipment Surplus Grows as Worldwide Weapons Market Shrinks." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, vol. 133 no. 2 (9 July 1990), pp. 52-53.

"World Weapons Sales Top \$1 Trillion, Paced by South Asia Market." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, vol. 131 no. 9 (28 August 1989), pp. 34-36.

# FURTHER READING

Acuthan, Nisha Sahai, "Soviet Arms Transfer Policy in South Asia." *IDSA Journal*, vol. 19 no. 3 (January-March 1987), pp. 409-588.

"Canada's Military Exports Policy: A Response to the New Guidelines." *Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 8 no. 2 (June 1987), pp. 9-10.

Catrina, Christian, *Arms Transfers and Dependence*. New York: Taylor & Francis for United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1988 (409 pp.).

Daguzan, J.F., "Les politiques industrielles de défense de l'Europe du Sud." *Défense nationale* (December 1988), pp. 101-113.

Dussauge, Pierre, "La baisse des exportations françaises d'armement et ses répercussions industrielles." *Défense nationale* (January 1988), pp. 77-93.

Gallik, Daniel (ed.), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1988 (147 pp.).

Hooper, Larry, "Canadian Defense Industry Focuses on Export Market." *Defense Electronics*, vol. 18 no. 10 (October 1986), pp. 175-188.

Klare, Michael T., "Deadly Convergence: The Perils of the Arms Trade." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 6 no. 1 (Winter 1988-1989), pp. 141-168.

Klare, Michael T., "The State of the Trade: Global Arms Transfer Patterns in the 1980s." *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 40 no. 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 1-21.

Neuman, Stephanie G., "Arms Aid and the Superpowers." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 66 no. 5 (Summer 1988), pp. 1044-1066.

Ohlson, Thomas (ed.), *Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security*. New York: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1988 (260 pp.).

Pearson, Frederick S., et al., "Arms Transfers Effects on American Interstate Wars and Intervention." *Conflict Quarterly*, vol. 9 no. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 36-62.

Regehr, Ernie, *Arms Canada*. Toronto: Lorimer, 1987 (273 pp.).

Segal, Gerald, and Gilks, Anne, "China and the Arms Trade." *Arms Control*, vol. 6 no. 3 (December 1988), pp. 256-281.

Sivard, Ruth L., *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989*. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1989 (60 pp.).<sup>11</sup>



## SECTION II - DEFENCE

14. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY	129
<i>Background</i>	129
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	133
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	137
15. CRUISE MISSILE TESTING	147
<i>Background</i>	147
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	150
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	151
16. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE COMMAND (NORAD)	155
<i>Background</i>	155
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	158
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	160
17. DEFENCE PLANNING AND PROCUREMENT	163
<i>Background</i>	163
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	164
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	170
18. THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY	175
<i>Background</i>	175
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	176
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	178
19. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)	179
<i>Background</i>	179
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	185
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	189
20. SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF)	197
<i>Background</i>	197
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	201
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	202
21. PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION	205
<i>Background</i>	205
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	209
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	216



## II - DEFENCE

### 14. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

#### BACKGROUND

Successive Canadian Governments have attributed great economic and political value to the Arctic and its resources. Active involvement in the High Arctic began in the 1890s in the form of exploration and patrol expeditions. During World War II, the Canadian Arctic took on a new strategic significance when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of weather stations and airfields in the Arctic in order to deliver military aircraft to the Soviet Union.

In 1955, Canada and the United States signed an agreement to build the Distant Early Warning (DEW) system, a line of early-warning radar stations stretched across the Canadian North. The main purpose of the system was to provide warning of a Soviet bomber attack across the North Pole against the continental United States.

While this increased activity in the Arctic was initiated primarily by the United States, cooperative agreements satisfied Canadian Government concern about the protection of sovereignty. This situation changed when a privately owned oil tanker, the *Manhattan*, attempted to cross the Northwest Passage without seeking the permission of the Canadian Government. Concerned with the threat to sovereignty and a possible increase in commercial shipping, the Canadian Government passed the *Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act*, 1970, which established Canadian environmental jurisdiction for up to 100 miles off the Arctic coasts. As late as 1969 considerable confusion seemed to characterize the Canadian Government's position on the precise nature of Canadian claims to the Arctic waters. After 1973, however, Canadian Governments were consistently claiming the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as internal, with no right of innocent passage through them.

At the Quebec Summit, in March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on developing the North Warning System (NWS), a line of modern long- and short-range radars to replace the DEW Line. Unlike the earlier system, which was largely manned and operated by US personnel, the NWS will be manned and controlled entirely by Canadians. (For more information, see the NORAD entry in *The Guide*.)

Although the first nuclear-powered submarine operated under the Arctic icecap for an extended period of time as early as 1958, it is comparatively recently that both superpowers are believed to have initiated regular submarine patrols under the ice. This development has raised the prospect of the Arctic becoming an area of growing strategic importance to the superpowers, and has created dilemmas for the Canadian Government. As nuclear-powered submarines are particularly difficult to detect and monitor effectively under the ice, their operation in the Arctic poses a new challenge to the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the region.

In August 1985, a more visible threat to Canadian sovereignty presented itself with the voyage of the US Coast Guard vessel, the *Polar Sea*, through the Northwest Passage. The declared purpose of the voyage was to shorten the sailing time to Alaska. The US Government failed, however, to request the Canadian Government's permission to make the voyage. Although the US Government made it clear that it did not agree with Canada's position on the status of the Arctic waters, it nevertheless proposed that the voyage be made on a cooperative basis. To this end, the US Coast Guard provided information to its Canadian counterpart and took Canadian observers on board the vessel. Moreover, the US Government stated that the voyage did not prejudice the legal position of either government with regard to the waters.<sup>1</sup>

The Canadian Government responded to the *Polar Sea* incident with a firm assertion of Canada's sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago. On 10 September 1985, in a statement before the House of Commons, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said:

Only with full sovereignty can we protect the entire range of Canadian interests. Full sovereignty is vital to Canada's security. It is vital to the Inuit people. And it is vital to Canada's national identity. The policy of this Government is to exercise full sovereignty in and on the waters of the Arctic archipelago and this applies to the airspace above as well. We will accept no substitutes.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Clark announced several measures to better ensure the protection of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. These included: an Order in Council establishing straight baselines (enclosing Canada's internal waters) around the outer perimeter of the Archipelago; the introduction of measures to extend the application of Canadian civil and criminal law to all offshore zones, including the Arctic (Bill C-104); an increase in the number of surveillance flights and in the level of naval activity in eastern Arctic waters; and the construction of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. The Government also indicated its willingness to have the sovereignty question referred to the World Court, by withdrawing its earlier reservations in this regard. Finally, it called for immediate discussions with the United States on all means of cooperation in Arctic waters on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty. Negotiations between Canada and the United States began soon afterwards.

In June 1987, Canada's Defence White Paper listed a number of additional sovereignty-related defence initiatives that the Government planned to undertake. These included: the ongoing modernization of the DEW Line radars; the upgrading of five northern airfields to accommodate fighter interceptors; an increase in the number of Aurora Long-range Patrol Aircraft; the modernization of the Tracker medium-range aircraft; an expansion of the Canadian Ranger force; the establishment of a Northern Training Centre for the Canadian Forces; and the planned deployment of fixed sonar systems for submarine detection in the Arctic passages. In addition,

---

<sup>1</sup> This was made clear in a State Department Press Guidance released on 14 June 1985, the day after the Canadian public was made aware of the impending transit.

<sup>2</sup> *Commons Debates*, 10 September 1985, p. 6463.

recognizing the Archipelago's potential as a viable passageway for submarines between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, the White Paper announced the Government's decision to acquire ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines of its own, partly because of their under-ice capability.

In a speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic become a zone of peace. Specifically, the Soviet leader called for negotiations aimed at scaling down militarization and naval activity in the Baltic, Northern, Greenland and Norwegian Seas (later extended to include the Barents Sea as well). Limitations on anti-submarine weapons, advance notification of major military exercises, and the banning of naval activity in international straits and shipping lanes were all proposed. President Gorbachev also called for multilateral cooperation in the development of Arctic resources, in scientific research, and in environmental protection. Finally, he raised the possibility of the Soviet Union opening to other nations the Northern Sea Route from Europe to the Far East.

On 9 December 1987, at a Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues in Tromsø, Norway, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark indicated the Government's desire to develop a comprehensive Northern foreign policy. He stated the elements of this policy as follows: 1) affirming Canadian sovereignty; 2) modernizing Canada's northern defences; 3) preparing for commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and 4) promoting enhanced circumpolar cooperation. Enhanced security in the Arctic, according to Mr. Clark, would come from a step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament. Finally, he noted that Canada's Arctic security was a direct function of Alliance solidarity and cohesion, the climate of East-West relations, and progress toward balanced reductions of nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup>

In this speech Mr. Clark also elucidated Canada's response to Mr. Gorbachev's Murmansk Initiative, outlining what he termed "serious reservations about these proposals." First, Mr. Clark said that proposals to declare the North a nuclear weapon-free zone or to restrict naval movements in areas like the Norwegian Sea ignored the fact that the nuclear weapon threat was global, not regional. Such proposals, he said, would therefore do nothing to reduce the threat from these weapons. Second, Mr. Clark criticized Mr. Gorbachev for not providing any detail as to how a ban on naval activity would be verified. Finally, the External Affairs Minister observed that it was the Soviet Union, not Canada or the other Nordic countries, that had an enormous concentration of military forces and weapons in the Arctic.

On 11 January 1988, after two years of discussion, Canada and the United States signed a Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement (the "Icebreaker" Agreement). This Agreement seeks to facilitate navigation by the icebreakers of the two nations, and to develop cooperative procedures for this purpose. Under its terms, the United States pledges that all navigation by US icebreakers in waters claimed by Canada to be internal, will be undertaken with

---

<sup>3</sup> "Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark to the Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues, Tromsø, Norway, December 9, 1987." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 87/72.

the consent of the Canadian Government.<sup>4</sup> It goes on to state that nothing in the Agreement nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the two governments on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas, or their positions regarding third parties.<sup>5</sup> Describing the Agreement as "an important step for Canada in the North," Prime Minister Brian Mulroney stated:

While we and the United States have not changed our legal positions we have come to a practical agreement that is fully consistent with the requirements of Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic. It is an improvement over the situation which prevailed previously. What we have now significantly advances Canadian interests.<sup>6</sup>

The first "test" of the new agreement came in October 1988, when External Affairs Minister Clark announced that the Canadian Government had given its consent to a US request for the US Coast Guard icebreaker *Polar Star* to transit the Northwest Passage.

The release of a new budget by the Government in late April 1989 brought with it the cancellation or curtailment of a number of programmes envisaged in the Defence White Paper as contributing to sovereignty protection in the Arctic. Cancelled were: 1) plans to acquire ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines; 2) the purchase of six additional Aurora long-range patrol aircraft; 3) plans to modernize two squadrons of older Tracker patrol planes; and 4) the purchase of thirteen to twenty-eight CF-18 jet fighters. In addition, the planned purchase of 820 all-terrain vehicles designed to operate in the Arctic was cut by over fifty percent (to 400), and was expected to be delayed until at least 1995-1996.

In an interview on 27 April 1989, Defence Minister Bill McKnight remarked that, as a result of the budget cuts, Canada might in future be forced to place greater reliance on cooperation with its allies (i.e., the United States and Britain) for the protection of sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic.<sup>7</sup> Commenting that "(t)here are better ways of defending northern sovereignty," the Minister added: "unfortunately we cannot afford those ways."<sup>8</sup>

On 30 June 1989, Defence Minister McKnight announced the purchase of three Arctic and Maritime Surveillance Aircraft for the Canadian Forces. To be called the Arcturus, the aircraft will be used primarily for military, environmental, maritime and Arctic surveillance, as

---

<sup>4</sup> "Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation." Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 010 (11 January 1988).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Koring, "Defence of Arctic Left to Allies by Budget Cuts," *Globe and Mail*, 28 April 1989, p. A2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*.

well as for fisheries patrols.<sup>9</sup> In addition, they will serve as a back-up for search and rescue. The aircraft are to be built to Canadian military specifications and share the same airframe and engines as the Aurora aircraft (although, unlike the Aurora, they will not be equipped with submarine-detection equipment), thus allowing significant savings in maintenance and training costs for both. Mr. McKnight described the purchase as "a cost-effective measure to address the need to effectively patrol Canada's coastline and enforce Canadian sovereignty."<sup>10</sup>

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In July 1989, the United States, for the second time under the terms of the Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement, requested and received permission from the Canadian government to allow navigation through the Northwest Passage of the *Polar Star* icebreaker. Mr. Clark, who announced the voyage, said that the *Polar Star* would be accompanied by a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker and that there would be a Canadian Coast Guard agent aboard the American vessel.<sup>11</sup>

In September 1989, there were reports that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev would ask Prime Minister Mulroney to cooperate in demilitarizing the Arctic when the Prime Minister visited the Soviet Union in November 1989.<sup>12</sup> The following month, the issue of Arctic demilitarization drew closer scrutiny with the publication by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament of a panel report on Arctic arms control. The panel, consisting of professors, international relations experts and representatives of native groups, made eight recommendations in response to Mr. Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk initiative, including: establishment of a central Arctic demilitarized zone; an Arctic Open Skies arrangement; aerial confidence-building measures pertaining to military aircraft; sea-launched cruise missile limits and naval arms control; a Conference on Arctic Security and Cooperation; the appointment by Canada of an Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs; and two unilateral initiatives by the USSR, namely a halt to its nuclear testing on the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya and a declaration that its submarines would not transit Canadian Arctic waters.<sup>13</sup>

At a Conference on Canadian-Soviet Arctic Cooperation to which the Panel report was presented, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky urged Canada to join the Soviet Union in attempts to demilitarize the Arctic. Specifically, Mr. Petrovsky suggested there should

---

<sup>9</sup> Department of National Defence, *News Release*, 30 June 1989, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> "Ottawa autorise le Polar Star à naviguer dans le Passage du Nord-Ouest," *La Presse*, 29 July 1989, p. A10.

<sup>12</sup> Olivia Ward, "Soviets 'ready' to disarm Arctic official says," *Toronto Star*, 18 September 1989, p. A3.

<sup>13</sup> See: David Cox and Tariq Rauf, *Security Co-operation in the Arctic: A Canadian Response to Gorbachev's Murmansk Initiative*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 24 October 1989, pp. vi-vii.

be limits on vessels bearing nuclear weapons in the northern seas. Petrovsky told the conference: "We propose all interested states begin negotiations aimed at limiting the scale of their military activity in the North, both in the eastern and western hemispheres."<sup>14</sup>

The response of the Canadian Government to the report of the panel on Arctic arms control was less than enthusiastic. Speaking to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on 7 November 1989, Canada's new Ambassador for Disarmament Margaret Mason explained that Canada viewed the threat to Canadian security in the Arctic in the context of East-West relations. That threat, she said, was being addressed through those forums that deal with such issues. She continued:

The only nuclear weapons that are present in the Arctic are of course on the Soviet Kola Peninsula. It is a base for the submarines that carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Those weapons are being addressed...by the START negotiation. If there is a 50% reduction, at least some of the reduction will touch the missiles that are located in the Soviet Arctic.

Likewise the conventional negotiation in Europe, dealing with the East-West threat...again is dealing with the question of Arctic security. I think that is the way Canada has been approaching this.<sup>15</sup>

Ambassador Mason maintained that the level of armaments located in the central Arctic was too low to warrant it being established as a zone of peace. She did concede, however, that confidence-building measures could be examined for that area. She also suggested in her testimony that the government was looking closely at the recommendation for a conference on Arctic cooperation to discuss a broad range of issues affecting the region. She remained adamant, though, that "the government's approach at this time is to argue, as I said, that the threat to the Arctic is not emanating from the Arctic *per se*. It is a broader issue."<sup>16</sup> Finally, the Ambassador maintained that "no proposal put forward by the Soviets goes anywhere near affecting the Kola Peninsula."<sup>17</sup> This point was echoed by External Affairs Minister Clark who was quoted later in the month describing Mr. Gorbachev's "zone of peace" as unacceptable to Canada because it excluded the heavily militarized Kola Peninsula.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> William Walker, "Soviet urges Canada to work toward limiting nuclear arms in North," *Toronto Star*, 24 October 1989, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade*, Issue no. 24, 7 November 1989, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>18</sup> "Hands Across the Pole," *Macleans*, 102:48, 27 November 1989, p. 25.

While in the Soviet Union in November 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney delivered a speech on Arctic issues to the Arctic and Antarctic Institute in Leningrad and signed the Canada-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North. In his speech, which dealt mainly with the responsibility of Canada and the USSR to protect the Arctic environment, Mr. Mulroney said that he agreed "entirely with President Gorbachev on the call he made at the United Nations for definitions of national security to be broadened to include the environmental threat to all nations."<sup>19</sup> The "Arctic Cooperation Agreement," signed by Prime Minister Mulroney and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, is intended to enhance exchanges and broaden bilateral cooperation in many areas of Arctic development including scientific, technical and economic cooperation and cooperation on social and cultural questions. The agreement provides for the establishment of a Canada-USSR ministerial level mixed commission to oversee its implementation.

Also announced by Mr. Mulroney during his visit to Moscow was the creation of a Canadian Polar Commission, to monitor the development in Canada and elsewhere of polar knowledge and provide information about polar research matters for Canadians and Canadian institutions. Bill C-72, an act to establish the Commission, was first introduced in the House by Indian Affairs and Northern Development Minister Thomas Siddon on 25 May 1990.<sup>20</sup>

On the final day of the visit to Moscow it was revealed that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had told Mr. Clark privately that the Soviet Union would not send its submarines into Canadian Arctic waters.<sup>21</sup> Mr. Shevardnadze made that commitment public in an interview with the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* when he said:

The Soviet Union is consistently working towards making the Arctic a zone of peace, free from nuclear weapons, and scaling down military activity in that region....even now we can announce that Soviet submarines do not enter the waters of the Canadian Archipelago.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, *Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney Prime Minister of Canada*, delivered at the Arctic and Antarctic Institute, Leningrad, 24 November 1989, p. 4.

<sup>20</sup> *Commons Debates*, 25 May 1990, p. 11903.

<sup>21</sup> Jeff Sallot, "Soviet subs entered Arctic, Clark says." *Globe and Mail*, 25 November 1989, p. A4.

<sup>22</sup> USSR Embassy, "Common Concerns -- Close Partnership" (Interview with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in *Izvestia*, 23 November 1989), Ottawa: Press Office of the USSR Embassy in Canada, *News Release* No. 90, 30 November 1989.

Mr. Clark responded cautiously to the Soviet pledge. He said that he believed Soviet submarines had in the past invaded Canadian Arctic waters though he had no indications of recent incursions.<sup>23</sup>

When he returned home the Prime Minister was widely criticized for having failed to use the opportunity of his Soviet visit to launch a Canadian initiative on Arctic arms control. He did tell the House of Commons upon his return that he had raised the issue of the Murmansk proposals with President Gorbachev, reminded him of Mr. Clark's initial reactions, and stated "that we were quite prepared to discuss with the Soviets any refinements they might have to their original ideas." He also informed the Soviet president of his belief that "the best avenues for making progress on these issues" were the "current ongoing arms control negotiations between the two superpowers and the two alliances." According to the prime minister, President Gorbachev "understands fully our position and agreed that further review of this issue should be pursued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Clark) and Mr. Shevardnadze."<sup>24</sup>

Later in the day's debate, External Affairs Minister Clark referred to President Gorbachev's desire to have "the matter...be under more regular review between myself as Canadian foreign minister and Mr. Shevardnadze." Describing this as "one of the significant developments of the discussions in Moscow," Mr. Clark went on: "We agreed to that immediately because we think that will provide us with the opportunity to make proposals and provide an occasion for them to be looked at on a very high level."<sup>25</sup>

Just prior to visiting Canada in February 1990, Mr. Shevardnadze said that Canada would figure prominently in helping to demilitarize the Arctic. He insisted that the Soviet Union was already meeting doubts raised by Canada and other countries about Moscow's commitment to demilitarizing the region. He pointed out, for example, that more than 20,000 soldiers and sailors would be withdrawn during 1990 from the Leningrad Military District and the strategic Northern Fleet. He added that the US-Soviet treaty cutting strategic nuclear arsenals (START) would also affect the polar region.<sup>26</sup>

Also during February 1990, the Canadian Government announced, as part of its deficit reduction effort, the cancellation of the Polar 8 icebreaker project. During his budget speech on 20 February, Finance Minister Michael Wilson explained: "The government will not proceed with the Polar 8 icebreaker project, due to significant increases in the estimated costs, delays which

---

<sup>23</sup> Jeff Sallot, "Soviet subs entered Arctic, Clark says," *Globe and Mail*, 25 November 1989, p. A4.

<sup>24</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6237.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6261.

<sup>26</sup> Stephen Handelman, "Let's build 'peaceful Arctic roof' soviet urges," *Toronto Star*, 3 February 1990, p. A20.

have contributed to these increases, and changes in the international environment."<sup>27</sup> The budget document itself added:

The decision to construct the Polar 8 was taken in a significantly different international context. In 1988, the government signed the Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agreement. Under this proven and workable agreement, the United States has agreed to provide advance notice and seek prior consent of Canada for all US icebreaker voyages in Canadian Arctic waters.<sup>28</sup>

The document also pointed out that the current estimated cost of the Polar 8 project was in excess of \$680 million, twenty per cent higher than the original estimate of \$565 million. It calculated that the decision to axe the project would generate direct fiscal savings of \$84 million in 1990-91 and \$62 million in 1991-92.<sup>29</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The question of Arctic arms control was the subject of considerable discussion in the House. On 24 October 1989, Liberal MP Joseph Volpe referred to the Arms Control Centre's panel report in criticizing the government for what he called its lack of an Arctic policy. Specifically, he chastised the Government for pouring cold water on the recommendations of the report and for failing to respond to Soviet invitations for discussion and reciprocal cooperation in the region. Mr Volpe then said:

I call on the government to examine thoroughly, thoughtfully, and with openness, the recommendations made by the panel on Arctic arms control and then to respond positively to invitations for peace.<sup>30</sup>

NDP Member Simon de Jong made a similar statement in the House on 31 October 1989, criticizing the government for its negative response to the Murmansk initiative. He then urged that:

At a minimum the government should accept two of the Arms Control Centre's recommendations. It should create an ambassador for circumpolar affairs, and it should extend the open-sky proposals to include the Arctic ocean region.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Department of Finance Canada, *The Budget*, 20 February 1990, p. 12.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>29</sup> Department of Finance Canada, *The Budget*, 20 February 1990, p.82.

<sup>30</sup> *Commons Debates*, 24 October 1989, p. 5046.

<sup>31</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 October 1989, p. 5353.

Prior to the Prime Minister's departure for the Soviet Union in November 1989, NDP leader Ed Broadbent asked him if he would seriously respond, during his visit, to a repeated Soviet proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Arctic.<sup>32</sup> The Prime Minister replied:

I propose to review with the President of the Soviet Union all avenues of co-operation and to explore with him and his colleagues all reasonable opportunities for progress and for a greater degree of stability.<sup>33</sup>

Liberal Leader John Turner took up this theme upon the Prime Minister's return from Moscow. Referring to Mr. Mulroney's visit, Mr. Turner remarked:

The joint statement by the two governments contain many generalities but no proposals, no initiatives, no studies of any indication of interest in developing Canadian perspectives on arms limitation. Joint approaches to Arctic security shone by their absence. There was no response to Mr. Gorbachev's proposal regarding a peace zone in the Arctic.<sup>34</sup>

Mr. Turner continued, suggesting to the Prime Minister specific proposals he might have pursued:

The Prime Minister should have put forward serious proposals in several areas. First, Arctic security. In February, 1988, I called for the creation of a new international regime in the Arctic, in particular the promotion of arms control alternatives. This government has refused to consider such initiatives.

The second area is Arctic sovereignty. We need a joint declaration with the Soviet Union in which they explicitly recognize our sovereignty over Canadian-claimed Arctic waters. The Soviet foreign minister's statement on Soviet submarines hinted at their willingness to support such a declaration.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, Mr. Turner asked the government to appoint an ambassador for circumpolar affairs whose job it would be to co-ordinate Canada's Arctic policy.

NDP Member Bill Blaikie also criticized the government for failing to come up with any ideas with respect to peace in the Arctic:

What is the response of the government to the proposal that there be an Arctic open skies Policy? What is the response of the government to the suggestion that we seek -- and this is a suggestion that has been made not only by the Soviet Union, but by various Canadian groups and political parties -- a demilitarized zone in the Arctic or a nuclear free zone in the Arctic?<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> *Commons Debates*, 30 October 1989, p. 5292.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>34</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6240.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6241.

<sup>36</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6243.

Mr. Blaikie complained that it was a mistake to confine matters pertaining to the Arctic to the context of superpower negotiations. On the contrary, he said, Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic was no more respected by the US than by the USSR. He suggested, therefore, that the Government seek a replacement for NORAD that would enable Canada to respond to initiatives that were made by the Soviet Union with respect to peace and security in the Arctic.<sup>37</sup>

Again, on 27 November, Mr. Volpe asked if the government would, like the Soviet Union, give a positive response to recommendations of the Panel on Arctic Arms Control. Mr. Clark responded:

I have asked my office to arrange a meeting between myself and the chairman of the agency which organized that panel. We intend to take a very careful look at all of its recommendations.<sup>38</sup>

Mr. Clark then reiterated his feeling, which he said was shared by the Soviet Union, that any discussion of such questions would proceed "always on the understanding that any negotiations would occur on an alliance basis because that is the way that negotiations lead to real reduction in weapons."<sup>39</sup> However, he added:

Having those questions negotiated on an alliance to alliance basis obviously does not preclude them being discussed between countries that have a particular interest, as Canada and the Soviet Union do.<sup>40</sup>

Given the strength of the Government's past commitment to building the Polar 8 icebreaker and its economic importance to B.C., where it was to be built, it is not surprising that the decision to cancel the project caused a flurry of discussion in the House. On 13 March 1990, NDP Member John Brewin asked the government to revoke its decision:

Will the Prime Minister assure the House, given his personal commitment, that he will in fact direct a reconsideration of this decision, or will he stand in this House and explain to the people of Canada what alternative the government has in mind to protect our sovereignty in the Arctic, to open the north and to ensure that the people of British Columbia get their fair share of jobs in the shipbuilding industry?<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6244.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6264.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>41</sup> *Commons Debates*, 13 March 1990, p. 9157.

External Affairs Minister Clark replied that the decision to cancel the icebreaker had been an agonizing one for the government. But he said it was justified for reasons of escalating cost, the fact that the US had agreed to seek the prior consent of Canada before traversing the Northwest Passage, and the fact that "there are a range of other devices available to us in our north that can help us assert and assume Canadian sovereignty."<sup>42</sup>

Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy persisted along the same line as Mr. Brewin, asking the government if it was no longer interested in exercising Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. Mr. Clark reiterated that the agreement with the United States had assured Canadian sovereignty there:

Mr. Speaker, as I have indicated, what we have done is first, our actions with regard to the International Court; second, with regard to the establishment of base lines; third with regard to the establishment in the north of aircraft and other surveillance features; fourth by the conclusion of an agreement with the United States by which for the first time in history the Americans agree that they must....seek the prior consent of this sovereign country before their nation traverses the Northwest Passage.<sup>43</sup>

A few days later Liberal MP Bob Kaplan attacked this latter argument:

I want to ask [Mr. Clark] about the delusions of grandeur he has about this Northwest Passage Agreement with the Americans. The minister said in the House last week three times that Canada's consent was required for all US vessels to pass, that is false. The consent required is limited to ice-breakers. His agreement means, in effect, that other US vessels like submarines and oil tankers can pass without seeking consent.

Is his agreement not a step backward from the long progress to have the Americans recognize our sovereignty?<sup>44</sup>

Mr. Clark responded that he would let the people of Canada decide what was a step backward. He pointed out that when Mr. Kaplan's party was the government there was no understanding between Canada and the US with regard to the passage of icebreakers. This had precipitated the controversy over the Northwest Passage that Mr. Clark's government had sought to end by concluding the agreement.

In a statement made in the House on 5 March 1990, Ms. Dawn Black, NDP Member for New-Westminster -- Burnaby, BC, described the cancellation of the Polar 8 project as indicative of "how much the finance minister cares about British Columbia." First, she said, the government

---

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9157-9158.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9158.

<sup>44</sup> *Commons Debates*, 19 March 1990, p. 9460.

had snubbed that province entirely when it came time to award contracts for the Navy frigates, which had created a furore. Ms. Black continued:

Somehow, surprised at the furore that this snub created in my province, the Tories did what they always do. They scrambled about and they made yet another of their "sacred trust" promises. They said: No, of course we did not forget about British Columbia. We will give your shipyards the Polar 8 contract. Now, just a short time later, we see those words were just so much hot air. The budget wiped out this promise to B.C..<sup>45</sup>

Referring to the Government's action, Ms. Black charged: "They make one promise to get elected and rescind that commitment when the whim suits them."<sup>46</sup>

From 20 April to 5 May 1990, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade visited the Soviet Union and East and West Germany. While in Leningrad the Committee learned that Moscow would soon transfer all its nuclear testing from Kazakhstan to the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya. On 24 May, External Affairs Minister Clark appeared before the Committee and was told by NDP Member Bill Blaikie:

The fact that [testing] is now going to be happening in our neighbourhood, in the Arctic, it seems to me, should be of renewed concern to both west and east and grounds, I would hope, for the government to change its position, to give new impetus to the government to really get about the business of seeking a comprehensive test ban....<sup>47</sup>

Mr. Clark replied:

On the Arctic, we are worried about that change in the venue of testing. We certainly are going to be discussing it with the Soviets when they are here, particularly with regard, in the short term, to whatever guarantees they can give us, whatever safeguards can be established regarding environmental implications for Canada. As you know, there are particularly acute problems because of the fragility and the carrying capacity of the atmosphere in the far north. We are going to have to take a look at whether or not under some of the agreements we have signed with the Soviets on northern co-operation there is particular leverage or a particular opportunity for us to deal with the question.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 March 1990, p. 8824.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>47</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 51 (24 May 1990), p. 51:11.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51:13.

Progressive Conservative MP Walter MacLean suggested that the Minister explore the possibility of "having an Arctic parliamentary initiative to look at the environment and security issues in this area, particularly in light of the testing issues that Mr. Blaikie was raising."<sup>49</sup> Mr. Clark replied:

I think the idea of an Arctic parliamentary initiative is interesting. If you want to flesh that out, I think that would be a useful thing to be launched between Soviet and Canadian parliamentarians for a variety of reasons. The focus on the Arctic, I think, would be quite helpful.<sup>50</sup>

In June, the Standing Committee issued a report of its visit to the Soviet Union and the two Germanies recommending the "need to develop and act upon a circumpolar political agenda by creating a Conference on Arctic Security and Cooperation, in effect an Arctic equivalent of the CSCE."<sup>51</sup> They advised that such a forum would continually address several "baskets" of issues, including security and arms control issues, the indigenous peoples, scientific cooperation, the environment and economic and cultural development. To begin the process the report recommended that the Canadian Parliament propose and prepare to organize a Circumpolar Parliamentary Conference with the aim of setting up a permanent Arctic Conference.<sup>52</sup>

On 31 May 1990, Liberal MP André Ouellet moved that the Chamber call upon the government through open parliamentary consultations to develop independent, effective policy initiatives in foreign policy and trade in line with changed international conditions. In considering that motion, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy said that one of the most critical areas of concern was the Arctic. He chastized the government for not taking advantage of Mr. Gorbachev's visit the day before by responding to his earlier suggestions for a treaty for the Arctic: "Goodness knows that our security interests are directly in the Arctic. That is where US and Russian submarines are playing tag all the time and where we need some kind of arrangement."<sup>53</sup>

On 5 June, New Democratic Party leader Audrey McLaughlin told the House that there could be no greater threat to the environment than continued nuclear testing. She then asked the External Affairs Minister what had been conveyed by Canada to Mr. Gorbachev about the Arctic during his visit. Mr. Clark replied:

I raised the question with Mr. Shevardnadze with respect to the shifting of the emphasis of Soviet testing to the Arctic and expressed Canada's concern about the environmental consequences of that testing. I indicated to him that we were particularly aware

---

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51:20.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51:21.

<sup>51</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Report on the Committee's Visit to the Soviet Union and the Germanies*, (June 1990), p. 16.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1990, p. 12126

of the fragility of the ecology there and wanted to ensure that the co-operation established between Canada and the Soviet Union on Arctic matters could apply to co-operation with respect to testing.<sup>54</sup>

On 15 June 1990, a second reading was given in the House to Bill C-72, an act to establish the Canadian Polar Commission. In the debate that followed, Conservative MP Shirley Martin said that the Commission would foster the promotion and development of knowledge about the polar region. "Furthermore," she said:

An increase in the field of polar knowledge will in accordance with Canada's foreign policy enhance Canada's international profile as a circumpolar nation by fostering international co-operation and by increasing international attention to Canada's polar regions by addressing such issues as resource development, legal or jurisdictional questions, security concerns, and global environmental problems including the greenhouse effect, the ozone layer, and water and airborne contaminants.<sup>55</sup>

There was virtually unanimous support in the House for the establishment of the Commission. Liberal MP Jack Iyerak Anawak said that he supported the bill in principle "because it is a good initiative and is long overdue."<sup>56</sup> New Democratic Party Member Nelson Riis echoed Mr. Anawak:

This particular piece of legislation to create an arctic commission is long overdue. If my memory serves me, I believe that we are the only polar nation that does not have a commission in place. I must say that, on behalf of the New Democrats in the House, we are pleased with this initiative...<sup>57</sup>

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Cox, David and Rauf, Tariq, *Security Co-operation in the Arctic: A Canadian Response to Murmansk (Report of the Panel on Arctic Arms Control)*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 24 October 1989, (28 pp.).

Dosman, Edgar (ed.), *Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic*. London: Routledge, 1989 (234 pp.).

Grant, Sheilagh D., *Sovereignty or Security?: Government Policy in the Canadian North*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988 (385 pp.).

Jockel, Joseph T., "The US Navy, Maritime Command and the Arctic." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 3 (December 1989), pp. 23-27 and 30-32.

---

<sup>54</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 June 1990, p. 12286.

<sup>55</sup> *Commons Debates*, 15 June 1990, p. 12836.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12837.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12840.

Lindsey, George, *Strategic Stability in the Arctic*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 241, Summer 1990.

McMahon, Kevin, *Arctic Twilight*. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1988 (259 pp.).

Monier, Claude, "La Défense du Grand Nord Canadien." *Défense nationale* (Juillet 1990), pp. 181-184.

Osherenko, Gail, "Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: Will the Soviets Participate?" *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, vol. 12 no. 3 (1989), pp. 133-143.

Purver, Ron, "The North in Canada's International Relations," in: Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson (eds.), *Canada Among Nations, 1989: The Challenge of Change*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1990, pp. 105-118.

Rauf, Tariq, "Arms Control in the Arctic: The Time is Ripe." *Barometer* (Arms Control Centre), (Winter 1989/1990) pp. 1-3.

#### FURTHER READING

Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *The North and Canada's International Relations: The Report of a Working Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs*. Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, March 1988 (67 pp.).

Frédérick, Michel, "La politique arctique des États-Unis et le cas de la souveraineté du Canada dans le Nord." *Études internationales*, vol. 19 no. 4 (December 1988), pp. 673-691.

Griffiths, Franklyn (ed.), *The Politics of the Northwest Passage*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987 (313 pp.).

Halstead, John, "L'importance politique et stratégique de l'Arctique: une perspective canadienne." *Études internationales*, vol. 20 no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 27-44.

Hannigan, John, *New Dimensions in Soviet-Canada Arctic Relations*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Points of View* no. 6, November 1988 (8 pp.).

Purver, Ronald G., "Aspects of Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic," in: Donald McRae and Gordon Munro (eds.), *Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989, pp. 165-188.

Haydon, Cdr. Peter T., "The Strategic Importance of the Arctic: Understanding the Military Issues." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 17 no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 27-34.

Honderich, John, *Arctic Imperative: Is Canada Losing the North?* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987 (258 pp.).

Mottola, Kari (ed.), *The Arctic Challenge: Nordic and Canadian Approaches to Security and Cooperation in an Emerging International Region*. Boulder: Westview, 1988 (335 pp.).

Pharand, Donat, *Canada's Arctic Waters in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (288 pp.).

Pharand, Donat, "Les problèmes de droit international de l'Arctique." *Études internationales*, vol. 20 no. 1 (March 1988), pp. 131-164.

*Polar Opposites: Ensuring Peace in the Arctic*. Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, *Working Paper* 89-1, April 1989 (16 pp.).

Purver, Ronald, "Arctic Security: The Murmansk Initiative and Its Impact." *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, vol. 9 no. 4 (1988), pp. 147-158.

Purver, Ronald G. *Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Occasional Papers No. 3, February 1988 (80 pp.).

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Defence Planning and Procurement  
North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)



## 15. CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

### BACKGROUND

On 10 February 1983, Canada and the United States signed an agreement establishing a procedure for the testing of US defense systems in Canada. Known as the "Canada-U.S. Test and Evaluation Programme," the agreement was initially valid for five years, and was renewed for another five years in 1988.

The agreement is not reciprocal, covering only the testing of U.S. defence systems in Canada. According to its terms, the United States can request testing of various systems, including artillery equipment, helicopters, surveillance and identification systems and the guidance system for unarmed cruise missiles. Canada may, however, refuse any testing project, and no biological, chemical or nuclear weapons may be brought into the country. Furthermore, the agreement can be terminated on twelve months' notice.<sup>1</sup>

Two groups were formed within the Department of National Defence (DND) to oversee the programme. A steering group, charged with exercising authority over the programme itself, makes recommendations concerning which projects are acceptable to Canada. In addition, a coordinating group reviews the feasibility of the projects and administers the programme. At the beginning of each year, the United States submits a thirty-month forecast to DND, outlining the projects it wishes to undertake in Canada. After review, and once ministerial approval is granted, the Government of Canada informs the US of its approval-in-principle. The Americans then submit a project proposal to DND, where it is examined and approved by authorities. Once this approval is obtained, a project arrangement is jointly developed by the two parties. For some projects, however, Cabinet approval may be required.

On 15 July 1983, the Government of Canada announced that it had agreed to allow tests of the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) over Canadian territory. The cruise missile is an unmanned airborne craft, propelled by a jet engine that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads. It can be launched from the ground, sea and air.

The Government's rationale for agreeing to the US request was that testing of the cruise missile and guidance system was, in its view, directly linked to Canada's security, as a member of NATO and NORAD, and that it was in keeping with Canada's policy on arms control and disarmament. Canadian territory is particularly suitable for this type of testing as it offers vast expanses of uninhabited cold-weather terrain similar to that of attack routes into the Soviet Union. The tests generally take place in the first three months of the year to take advantage of the desired weather conditions. The government has made clear, however, that its agreement to allow such testing in no way changes Canada's own decision to renounce the use of nuclear weapons for its own armed forces.

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of External Affairs, *Testing of Defence Systems in Canada, Background Notes*. Ottawa, 1983.

The extension of cruise missile testing for another five years beyond the initial five-year period specified in the 1983 umbrella agreement was confirmed in 1987, after the Government did not give the required twelve months' notice of its intention to withdraw. The renewal of the agreement, and the terms surrounding it, were clearly expressed in a statement by the Associate Minister of National Defence to the House of Commons on 6 March 1987:

The agreement has always been and still is, liable to termination at any time by either party giving 12 months' notice.... Either party can terminate a specific arrangement under the agreement -- for example, cruise missile testing -- at any time on one day's notice should imperative circumstances so warrant.... We have repeatedly stated our intention to carry on, and will do so, but this in no way precludes second thoughts should circumstances change.<sup>2</sup>

The first term of the umbrella testing agreement officially ended on 28 February 1988. The renewal extends the agreement to 1993.

On 17 January 1989, Canada received an official request from US authorities to amend the 1983 umbrella agreement to allow testing of a more sophisticated version of the cruise missile in Canada. This Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), a "Stealth" missile known as the AGM-129A, is faster and has a longer range than the previous model tested in Canada. It is also more difficult to track via radar and seeks its targets with more precision.

The new American request provoked an outcry among arms control experts, as well as peace and disarmament groups, who pointed to the new missile's potential use as a first-strike nuclear weapon. These critics argued that agreement to allow its testing by Canada would mean a "dangerous escalation of the arms race."<sup>3</sup>

On 1 February 1989, Minister of National Defence Bill McKnight, announced that Canada would allow the United States to test the unarmed Advanced Cruise Missile over Canadian territory. The Minister said that cruise missile testing "is an important Canadian contribution to the effectiveness of NATO's strategic deterrent."<sup>4</sup> Observing that Canada supported the pursuit of mutual arms reduction, Mr. McKnight went on to say that this process could only move ahead effectively if both sides were dealing from equivalent positions. He added that the Warsaw Pact already had a significant and impressive cruise missile capability, and that both superpowers were agreed that under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), advanced cruise missiles would continue to form part of their future strategic arsenals.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 March 1987, p. 3918.

<sup>3</sup> Tim Harper, "New Cruise Missile Tests Fuel the Arms Race." *Toronto Star*, 2 February 1989, p. A2.

<sup>4</sup> Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. 6 (1 February 1989), p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

Echoing Mr. McKnight's remarks, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark added that cruise missile testing would contribute to a climate "that will lead to balanced arms control."<sup>6</sup> He also denied allegations that the Stealth cruise missile constituted a first-strike weapon capable of being used in a sudden attack on the Soviet Union. In this regard, Mr. Clark noted that the advanced cruise would require "something like six hours to reach Moscow from North America," and that it "would be visible" on Soviet radar screens.<sup>7</sup>

That same day, a document issued by the Department of External Affairs stated that substantial improvements were taking place in Soviet cruise missile capabilities. Noting that many of these developments were "revolutionary", the document asserted that the Soviets had begun testing a number of supersonic (Mach 3) cruise missiles which were larger than currently existing US and Soviet ALCMs.<sup>8</sup> The document also observed that the Soviet AS-19 cruise missile currently in production was supersonic and equipped with state-of-the-art Stealth technology.<sup>9</sup>

The first test of the advanced missile over Canadian territory took place on 2 March 1989. In a "captive carry" test flight, the missile remained attached to a US B-52 bomber on a return flight from the United States without any stop in Canada. The testing of the ACM prompted considerable criticism in Canada. Following the first ACM test, demonstrations against cruise missile testing were held across the country.

To date, sixteen cruise missile tests have taken place over Canadian territory: one in 1984, three in 1985, two in 1986, three in 1987, two in 1988, two in 1989 (including one of the advanced AGM-129A missile), and three in 1990.

The agreement on cruise missile testing sparked a vigorous national debate. For some Canadians, the testing compromised their country's position on nuclear arms and contributed to the arms race. Others raised concerns over the potential risks to Canadians and the environment in case of an accident during the tests. The government responded by assuring Canadians that test missiles would never come within less than eight kilometers of populated areas.

In mid-March 1989, documents were released under the Access to Information Act revealing that the Canadian Government had accepted liability ranging from twenty-five to 100 percent for accidents resulting from cruise missile tests in Canada as part of the 1983 umbrella testing agreement. According to the standard NATO arrangement outlined in the documents, Canada was to pay twenty-five percent of damages if the US was to blame for an accident, while

---

<sup>6</sup> Harper, *supra* note 3.

<sup>7</sup> Iain Hunter, "Disarmament Groups Condemn 'Stealth' Cruise Missile Testing," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 February 1989.

<sup>8</sup> "Canada, Security Policy and Cruise Missile Testing." Ottawa: Department of External Affairs *Background* (1 February 1989), p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

damage costs would be split fifty-fifty if Canada shared some responsibility. In addition, Canada could claim damages against the US for damage of Canadian military property and, in the event that other federal property was damaged, Canada would be required to agree with the US on an outside arbiter to assess damage costs.<sup>10</sup> The documents also revealed that officials from at least four Department of National Defence directorates (finance, legal, air plans and military plans coordination) strongly opposed adoption of the liability arrangements.<sup>11</sup>

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In a news release issued on 21 January 1990, the Minister of National Defence explained the reasons for Canada's authorization of cruise missile testing over its territory as follows:

Participation in the testing of the air-launched cruise missile is an acceptance of Canada's obligations and responsibilities within the NATO alliance, and contributing to maintaining a balance of strategic forces which will effectively deter any aggression and thus preserve the peace.<sup>12</sup>

The first cruise missile test over Canadian territory in 1990 was conducted on 23 January, when an AGM-86B missile was tested in free flight. An identical test was planned for 26 January but poor weather and technical "glitches" on one of the aircraft that was to track down and intercept the missile forced a delay until 29 January. Although the test of the missile was executed according to plan, the simulated detection exercise had to be cancelled following the crash of one of the four participating tracker aircraft. The CF-18 crashed a few seconds after takeoff from the airport in Inuvik, Northwest Territories.<sup>13</sup>

The last test during 1990, of an AGM-129A advanced cruise missile, took place on 24 March. The missile remained attached to an American B-52 bomber throughout the flight which, according to reliable sources, lasted a little more than four hours.<sup>14</sup> According to information made available before the test, the B-52 was to fly over the Beaufort Sea and the Mackenzie River Valley, heading east near the intersection of the borders of the Northwest Territories, Alberta and British Columbia, where it was to veer south to the Primrose Lake weapons testing range, near the Canadian Forces Base at Cold Lake (Alberta) before returning to the United

---

<sup>10</sup> See Peter Calamai, "Canada Liable If Cruise Crashes." *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 March 1989, p. A1.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. A2.

<sup>12</sup> Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. 5 (21 January 1990), p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> "Un CF-18 s'écrase au cours d'un essai du missile de croisière." *La Presse*, 30 janvier 1990, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> "Final 1990 Cruise Test Runs Smoothly." *Toronto Star*, 25 March 1990, p. A2.

States.<sup>15</sup> This was the second test of an advanced cruise missile over Canadian territory since 1984; both tests were "captive carry" flights.

A Gallup poll of 1,003 Canadians conducted between 7 and 10 February 1990 found fifty-seven percent of respondents opposed to continuing cruise missile testing in Canada, while thirty-five percent were in favor of it and eight percent had no opinion.<sup>16</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 22 January 1990, New Democratic Party MP Derek Blackburn asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs about cruise missile testing in Canada:

As he (Secretary of State for External Affairs) knows, and as the whole world knows, for the last many months we have been witnessing the grinding down of the cold war in central and eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union.... Therefore, why is it that he, his department and this government insist upon clinging on to that old relic of the cold war, cruise missile testing here in Canada?<sup>17</sup>

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark replied as follows:

There have been dramatic developments in East-West relations. There have been dramatic changes which are evident and, to some degree, surprising to all of us in their extent in Eastern Europe. There is no doubt that there were several causes of that. One of them, of course, was the reform initiative undertaken by Mr. Gorbachev. But, there is also no doubt that one of the reasons for those changes was that at times when parties like his were suggesting that the West should take positions that were divided, governments like ours decided that it was in our interest to maintain the solidarity of the western alliance. This solidarity led, in the first instance, to the reduction of a classification of nuclear weapons. We believe it had contributed substantially to the dramatically new atmosphere that now exists in East-West relations. We have followed the practice in the past of taking major decisions of this kind in consultation with our allies. Often we propose things, as we have done with the "Open Skies" Conference, which became the policy of the alliance as a whole. But we do not propose to act unilaterally, because that would neutralize one of the forces that has brought the progress that we celebrate in this House today.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. 16 (22 March 1990), p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> "Cruise Tests Opposed by 57%, Gallup Says." *Toronto Star*, 26 February 1990, p. A18.

<sup>17</sup> *Commons Debates*, 22 January 1990, p. 7314.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7314-7315.

In a press release issued on 23 January 1990, the Opposition Associate Critic for Arms Control and Disarmament, Mr. Joseph Volpe, asked the government to reconsider its decision to allow testing of Stealth cruise missiles in Canada.<sup>19</sup> The Liberal MP went on to say:

The Canadian government must realize that strategic cruise missiles represent a direct and increasing threat to Canadian security and that Canada has a right to forcefully present its concerns to the Americans and Soviets.<sup>20</sup>

According to Mr. Volpe, a halt to cruise missile testing over Canadian territory would enable Canada to indicate clearly to the superpowers that the Geneva strategic arms talks on the control and reduction of cruise missiles must move forward. The Liberal MP said:

The reluctance of the Conservative government to act on cruise missile testing reflects the government's preference to allow other nations to decide Canada's fate in the realm of arms control and foreign policy, even when these decisions are of immediate concern to Canada's national security and sovereignty.<sup>21</sup>

On 29 January 1990, following the crash of the CF-18 during a cruise missile test over Canadian territory, Liberal MP Jack Iyerak Anawak asked the Minister of National Defence, Bill McKnight, if he would reconsider his authorization allowing such tests over Canadian territory.<sup>22</sup>

The Minister of National Defence replied as follows:

The agreement under which Canada allows for the testing of the AGM-86B is an agreement that was signed and supported by the previous administration - and he is a member of that party at this time - and supported by this administration. I believe it is an important part of the defence of North America. We are part of an alliance.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Joseph Volpe, Member of Parliament for Eglinton-Lawrence, Opposition Associate Critic for Arms Control and Disarmament, *News Release* (23 January 1990), p. 1.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 January 1990, pp. 7544-7545.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7545.

Ms. Audrey McLaughlin, Leader of the New Democratic Party, said that lives should not be endangered simply in order to test cruise missiles. In her statement to the media on 30 January 1990, Ms. McLaughlin maintained that changes taking place in the world had rendered testing of such offensive weapons unnecessary.<sup>24</sup>

On 26 March 1990, Liberal MP Stan Keyes raised the cruise missile testing issue in the House of Commons:

The Hamilton, Ontario chapter of Science for Peace, along with many other Canadians, oppose the continued support by the Conservative government for cruise missile testing over Canadian soil. The over 300 scientists and other members of Science for Peace say to the government that cruise missile testing completely negates any efforts Canada may be making in the cause for global peace and security. While other countries in the world are sheathing their swords, Canada is keeping remnants of the cold war alive by participating in the testing of these destructive weapons. As Science for Peace members correctly pointed out in their second letter of protest to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, there are many ways in which Canada can honour commitments to NATO, instead of participating in cruise missile testing. Canada can start by distancing itself from such destabilizing activities and by promoting its traditional role as the honest broker in peacekeeping. Science for Peace and all Canadians, including the Liberal party, call upon the Conservative government to discontinue testing of the cruise missile over Canadian soil.<sup>25</sup>

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Fieldhouse, Richard, "Cruise Missile Compromise Surfacing," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 46 no. 5 (June 1990), pp. 21-24.

Mann, Paul, "Cruise Missile Accord Advances START Treaty." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, vol. 132 no. 22 (28 May 1990), pp. 18-19.

Mann, Paul, "Soviets Ready to Resolve START Pace Despite Clash Over Cruise Missiles." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, vol. 132 no. 16 (26 April 1990), pp. 66-67.

Rosenblum, Simon, and Robinson, Bill, "Modernizing the Cruise." *International Perspectives*, vol. 18 no. 4 (July-August 1989), pp. 13-15.

Sorenson, David S., "Stealth Bombers, Advanced Cruise Missiles and Superpower Deterrence Stability." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 16 no. 3 (Spring 1990), pp. 405-420.

Welch, Jasper, "Assessing the Value of Stealthy Aircraft and Cruise Missiles." *International Security*, vol. 14 no. 2 (Autumn 1989), pp. 47-63.

---

<sup>24</sup> Miro Cernetig, "CF-18 Explodes on Arctic Flight for Cruise Test." *Globe and Mail*, 30 January 1990, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> *Commons Debates*, 26 March 1990, pp. 9744-9745.

### FURTHER READING

Arkin, William, "Stealth Cruise Sneaks Into Canada." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 45 no. 4 (May 1989), pp. 6-7.

Betts, Richard K., *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics*. Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1981 (612 pp.).

Boulden, Jane, *Cruise Missiles and Strategic Arms Control*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 24, January 1989 (8 pp.).

Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Cruise Missiles: Background, Technology and Verification*, Ottawa: *Verification Brochure* No. 4, December 1988 (64 pp.).

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, "Testing the Advanced Cruise Missile: Starting on a Slippery Slope." *Arms Control Communique* No. 60, 2 February 1989 (2 pp.).

Cox, David, "Testing the Advanced Cruise Missile." *Peace&Security*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989), p. 16.

"The Cruise Missile and Cruise Missile Testing in Canada." Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Factsheet* No. 3, September 1988 (2 pp.).

Regehr, Ernie, "Canada and the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal," in: Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum (eds.), *Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race*. Toronto: Lorimer and Co., 1983, pp. 101-121.

Rosenblum, Simon, *Misguided Missiles*. Toronto: Lorimer and Co., 1985 (234 pp.).

"The Stealth Cruise Missile: Unsafe at any Speed." *Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 10, no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 1-4.

## 16. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE COMMAND (NORAD)

### *BACKGROUND*

On 7 August 1957 the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed on an interim basis between Canada and the United States. It began operations on 12 September 1957, and was established formally by the two governments on 12 May 1958.

NORAD was the result of many years of continental defence cooperation between Canada and the United States, following the Second World War. Its purpose was to defend against air attack on North America, particularly by the Soviet bomber force. For Canada, a major concern from NORAD's conception was the effect it would have on Canadian sovereignty. NORAD's commander is an American, while a Canadian officer holds the Deputy Commander position.

The NORAD Agreement, initially to last ten years, established an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over the forces of both nations and dedicated to continental defence. At the outset, the Command included both active and passive defence systems, with a joint fighter-interceptor force and a series of radar nets across the continent. These nets included the Pinetree Line, built in 1951, at 50° North latitude; the Mid-Canada Line, completed in 1954, at 55° North latitude; and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, completed in 1957, at 70° North latitude.

As the assessment of the threat evolved, NORAD's resources also changed. The development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in particular, lessened the need for bomber defence. By 1965, the ninety-eight detection stations of the Mid-Canada Line--the only system built, designed and financed solely by Canada--were deactivated. The number of DEW Line and Pinetree Line installations was reduced from seventy-eight to thirty-one and from thirty-nine to fifteen, respectively. From its height between 1958 and 1962 of nearly 250,000 (including 17,000 Canadians), the manpower available to NORAD had decreased to approximately 64,000 (including 6700 Canadians) in 1985. Canadian financial contributions have traditionally been about ten percent of the annual total of \$6.8 billion (in 1985 dollars).

The NORAD Agreement was first renewed in May 1968 for a period of five years. The renewed agreement included two changes: first, clarification that either party could nullify the agreement after review and one year's notice; and second, the insertion of a clause stating that the NORAD agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." The 1973 renewal of the agreement was for two years only, to allow for re-evaluation of the strategic situation, in light of Soviet ICBM developments and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I).

The 1975 renewal recognized the changed strategic circumstances, namely a higher degree of mutual and stable deterrence and a less significant long-range bomber threat. The bomber early-warning function, together with some limited defence, nonetheless remained. In addition, to reflect the increased emphasis on ICBMs, NORAD was charged with providing space

surveillance, as well as warning and assessment of ballistic missile attack, to ensure an effective response, should deterrence fail. These new tasks involved the development and maintenance of new surveillance systems, including the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS), although Canada's involvement was quite minimal.

As a result of a continuing debate in Canada on NORAD and an impending election, the 1980 renewal was for a single year. In March 1981 the Agreement was renewed for five years with two important changes for Canada. First, in recognition of the changing nature of the arrangement and the threat it was meant to answer, the title was changed to North American Aerospace Defence Command (emphasis added). Second, the 1981 Agreement also removed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) clause which had been inserted in 1968. Officials attributed this change to the fact that the United States did not have an ABM system at the time, as well as to the desire to avoid any suggestion that either Canada or the United States would breach the ABM Treaty. Some analysts have argued that the change was made so as not to preclude any future ABM possibilities.

In August 1984, with the coming into operation of two Canadian Region Operations Control Centres (ROCCs) at North Bay, Ontario, Canada took over full command and control of NORAD operations within its own airspace. Previously, a significant amount of Canadian airspace had been under the command and control of US facilities.

At the Quebec City Summit on 18 March 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on an extensive modernization of NORAD's assets, known as the North American Air Defence Modernization (NAADM) Project.

This includes the following:

- a system of four very-long-range Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars (one in Alaska and three in the continental United States) to monitor the eastern, western and southern approaches to North America;
- a North Warning System (NWS), consisting of thirteen long-range (eleven in Canada) and thirty-nine short-range (thirty-six in Canada) radars located along the northern periphery of the continent, to replace the DEW Line;
- use of USAF Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to supplement the NWS at times of alert;
- upgrading of forward operating locations (FOLs) and dispersed operating bases (DOBs) to accommodate fighter and AWACS aircraft; and
- improvements to the command, control and communications (C3) elements of the system.

The modernization programme will cost over \$7 billion, of which Canada will contribute \$1.2 billion.

The NWS is expected to be completed by 1993. The Canadian commitment to the programme includes: meeting all the communication needs of the North Warning System; the integration of the radars with the ROCCs in North Bay, Ontario; the design and building of any new facilities required by the NWS in Canada; forty percent financing of the \$1.3 billion NWS system (a sixty/forty cost-sharing ratio also applies to its operational and maintenance costs); managing the final stages of the programme after 1989; and complete operational control of the NWS in Canada upon its completion. Canada will also be involved, to a limited extent, in the manning of the OTH-B radars and the AWACS aircraft.

On 19 March 1986, Canada and the United States renewed the NORAD Agreement for a further five years, without any changes.

In March 1987, Canada announced five forward operating locations for NORAD fighter-interceptors: Rankin Inlet, Inuvik, Yellowknife, and Iqaluit in the Northwest Territories, and Kuujuaq in Quebec. Canada and the US will share, equally, the cost of developing these sites, which will be fully operational by the end of 1993.

The first five long-range radars of the NWS, the westernmost of the Canadian-based ones, became operational in November 1987. Construction of the remaining six Canadian NWS long-range radars in the Eastern Arctic, Labrador and Baffin Island, was completed in November 1988. The first OTH-B radar, on the east coast of the United States, began to be tested in mid-1988 and is due to be fully operational by the end of 1990. On 24 April 1990 it was delivered to the US Air Force in Maine.<sup>1</sup> The west coast site was still under construction but was ninety percent complete in April and expected to be at least partially operational by the end of 1990.<sup>2</sup> Planning and design continues on the mid-west and northern sites. Design of the thirty-nine short-range NWS radars of Phase II of the NWS is complete, and construction of this system is scheduled to begin in 1990. Installation of the first radar is to take place in 1991, with the entire system to be completed a year later than planned, by late 1993.

As revealed in the 1987 Defence White Paper, Canada has also agreed to participate in the United States' Air Defense Initiative (ADI). This is currently a relatively small programme (US\$250 million spent from 1987 to 1989) concentrating on research into air defence technologies that offer the promise of reliable detection, tracking, and engagement of bombers and cruise missiles, particularly in light of the development of Stealth characteristics. Initiation of the ADI was followed by five years of debate over the role that the elements of surveillance, engagement and battle management should play in the programme. The resultant confusion prompted Congress to slash \$100 million from the US Department of Defense's (DoD) request of \$253 million for ADI in 1990. DoD appeared to have resolved the issue with its decision to focus on

---

<sup>1</sup> "New Radar Peers Over the Horizon." *New York Times*, 26 April 1990, p. A24.

<sup>2</sup> See: *Ibid.*; and National Defence, 1990-91 Estimates -- Part III Expenditure Plan, p. 47.

airborne surveillance within ADI, leaving issues of engagement to be pursued by the Air Force Tactical Air Command and other military divisions.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the Bush Administration sought to increase funding for ADI to \$246.9 million for fiscal year 1991.<sup>4</sup>

Canada is also pursuing a \$50-million research and development programme of its own on space-based surveillance systems for the future. This project began in 1987 and will run for approximately seven years. Current studies aim at determining the feasibility of space-based radar with "look-down" capability for detecting low-flying objects. Canada and the United States are also negotiating an agreement for project definition of a cooperative, space-based surveillance system.

Finally, Canada is going ahead with development of a Canadian Coastal Radar (CCR) system -- three radars on the east coast and one on the west coast -- to complement the NWS and to fill in the gaps in these regions that the OTH-B radars cannot cover. Deployment of this system will probably begin in the early 1990s.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

The Government remains fully committed to its membership in, and support for, NORAD. On 29 September 1989, Canada accepted full responsibility for the NWS at an official signing ceremony held at Hall Beach in the Northwest Territories.<sup>5</sup> The ceremony marked the handing over to Canada from the United States of the last of eight former DEW line sites, which had been upgraded to NWS configuration. Operation and maintenance (O&M) responsibility for the sites was also transferred from US O&M contractor, FELEC Services Inc., to Canadian O&M contractor, FRONTEC Logistics Corporation.

On 26 January 1990, a Soviet Ilyushin Il-20 reconnaissance and electronic intelligence-gathering aircraft was intercepted by Canadian aircraft under the operational control of NORAD when it entered the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone over the Beaufort Sea.<sup>6</sup> At no time did the aircraft enter Canadian air space. In March 1990, two pairs of Soviet aircraft, two Bear "D"s and two Soviet Bear "F"s, were intercepted.

---

<sup>3</sup> Barbara Amouyal, "Air Defense Initiative Survives Congressional, Industry Debate." *Defense News* (29 January 1990), p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, vol. 132 no. 12 (19 March 1990), p.25.

<sup>5</sup> "Canada takes over northern alert system." *Sunday Star*, 1 October 1989, p. A20.

<sup>6</sup> "Soviet Aircraft Intercepted in the Beaufort Sea Area." *National Defence News Release* AFN: 06/90, 26 January 1990.

In a paper delivered on 31 May 1990, the Commander, Fighter Group Canadian NORAD Region, Major General J. D. O'Brien remarked:

As part of Mr. Gorbachev's new policy, Soviet military activity off our coasts was significantly reduced during 1989. A total of only 21 Soviet military aircraft were detected in all three areas last year. It is important to note, however, that this does not mean that Soviet cruise missile carriers are not continuing to maintain a high state of readiness through regular training.<sup>7</sup>

Major General O'Brien provided figures that showed a total of 68 Soviet military aircraft detected in 1988 and 66 detected in 1987. He explained:

One can speculate that these numerous Soviet military forays were a political embarrassment to Mr. Gorbachev and were curtailed because they undermined his attempts to create a non-aggressive military image in the west.<sup>8</sup>

But O'Brien warned:

Despite the fact that one is encouraged by the reduction of such aggressive activity, there is a real risk that this could be misinterpreted by some who are perhaps overly eager to believe that the Soviets have reduced their capabilities for strategic attack on North America when, in fact, the opposite is the case.<sup>9</sup>

On 26 March 1990, a building permit was issued for work to begin on site preparation for the Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Yellowknife, Northwest Territories. It was expected that an appeal would be launched by local Dene and Metis Indians, who had been pressuring the Government of the Northwest Territories to reject DND's environmental protection plan for the site on the grounds that it was inadequate. In the end an appeal was launched by Chris O'Brien, a pacifist. It was rejected and five days later DND issued a \$4.5 million contract to Robinson Trucking for site preparation work.

In May 1990, native leaders were surprised to learn that the military was considering low-level flight training at the Yellowknife FOL. They said that such training had not been mentioned in DND's original environmental assessment of the FOL and that as recently as 28 December 1989 they had been assured by Mr. McKnight that low-level flight training would not take place there. On the basis of the new information, the natives asked DND to outline all specific activities planned for the air base. They complained that the original environmental impact assessment had

---

<sup>7</sup> Major General J. D. O'Brien, *Air Defence*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1990, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*.

not been clear on the effect of noise on residents or wildlife, or how the department would mitigate the impact of low-level flying in the region.<sup>10</sup>

In May 1990, Defence Minister McKnight announced that, beginning on 3 May, the Canadian NORAD Region would "implement a policy of directing all unidentified aircraft which enter the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ) to land at a recognised point of entry."<sup>11</sup> Notice was also given of a new policy requiring all aircraft entering the CADIZ to file flight plans. These moves were intended to enhance Canadian Forces' support to the RCMP and other government departments in their effort to combat drug smuggling. In August 1989 the Government had authorized the employment of Canadian NORAD resources in support of drug interdiction efforts.<sup>12</sup>

The NORAD Agreement is up for renewal in 1991. Parliamentary hearings on the agreement and the renewal issue are expected to be held in the autumn of 1990. The New Democratic Party has long held a policy to cancel the NORAD Agreement if elected. The Liberal Party remains committed to maintaining the agreement.

The Department of Defence estimates that it will spend \$112 million in fiscal year 1990-1991 as its contribution to the NAADM Project.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The prospects for greater cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1989-1990 prompted NDP Member Bill Blaikie in November 1989 to ask the Government to reconsider its NORAD commitment. Said Blaikie:

[W]e urge the Prime Minister and the government to seek a replacement for our relationship with the United States now constituted in NORAD which would give us more ability to respond to initiatives that are made by the Soviet Union with respect to peace and security in the Arctic.<sup>13</sup>

On 2 May 1990, Liberal MP Derek Lee asked the Associate Minister of National Defence, Mary Collins, how Canada was going to fulfill its aircraft drug interdiction role using the CF-18, which he said had an air-speed envelope too high for the purpose. Ms. Collins replied that in addition to the CF-18, the Aurora aircraft could be used in this type of operation. She said: "We also require that slow-flying and unidentified aircraft identify themselves. If they do not, we are

---

<sup>10</sup> "Natives Upset Over Jet Base." *Toronto Star*, 24 May 1990, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup> "McKnight Announces Directed Landings Policy." *National Defence News Release* AFN: 20/90, 1 May 1990, p. 30.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>13</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6244.

able to use our own capability to track them until they land."<sup>14</sup> Mr. Lee then asked if the directed landings policy announced by the Defence Minister on 1 May had been prompted by the inability of the government to carry out effective and comprehensive air sovereignty surveillance. Ms. Collins answered negatively, saying that the policy was only one of the mechanisms, in addition to aircraft tracking and identification, by which Canada could have greater assurance that drug-smuggling aircraft did not enter its air space.<sup>15</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Canan, James W. "The Big Hole in NORAD." *Air Force*, vol. 72 no. 10 (October 1989), pp. 54-59.

Charo, Arthur, *Continental Air Defense: A Neglected Dimension of Strategic Defense*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs with the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *CSIA Occasional Paper* No. 7, 1990 (146 pp.).

Cannizzo, C. A., "NORAD-NATO Linkages." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 5 (April 1990), pp. 21-27.

O'Brien, J. D., *Air Defence*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1990 (58 pp.).

Piotrowski, J. L., "The Future of NORAD." *Forum*, vol. 5 no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 14-16.

Sokolsky, Joel J., "A Seat at the Table: Canada and its Alliances." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 16 no. 1 (Fall 1989), pp. 11-35.

#### FURTHER READING

Angell, David J.R., "NORAD and Binational Nuclear Alert: Consultation and Decision-making in the Integrated Command." *Defense Analysis*, vol. 4 no. 2 (June 1988), pp. 129-140.

Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Canada-US Defence Co-operation and the 1986 Renewal of the NORAD Agreement*. Ottawa, 14 February 1986 (79 pp.).

Canada, Senate, Special Committee on National Defence, *Canada's Territorial Air Defence*. Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, January 1985 (70 pp.).

Cox, David, *Canada and NORAD, 1958-1978: A Cautionary Retrospective*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, *Aurora Papers* No. 1, Winter 1985 (48 pp.).

Cox, David, *Trends in Continental Defence*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Occasional Paper* No. 2, February 1987 (50 pp.).

Haglund, David G., "Les missiles de croisière, aéroports soviétiques et la géopolitique de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du nord: une nouvelle perspective du nord canadien." *Études Internationales*, vol. 19 no. 2 (June 1988), pp. 245-272.

---

<sup>14</sup> *Commons Debates*, 2 May 1990, p. 10905.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10905-10906.

Hayward, Daniel, *The Air Defence Initiative*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, *Issue Brief* No. 9, August 1988 (32 pp.).

Jockel, Joseph T., *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987 (160 pp.).

Kattenburg, D., "Sneaking into Canada." *Nation*, vol. 246 no. 8 (February 1988), pp. 266-268.

Morton, Major-General R.W., "Surveillance: A Fundamental Aspect of Deterrence." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 18 no. 5 (April 1989), pp. 11-16.

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Arctic Sovereignty and Security

## 17. DEFENCE PLANNING AND PROCUREMENT

### BACKGROUND

On 5 June 1987, the Government tabled the Defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment*, in the House of Commons. The White Paper was intended to provide a new defence strategy for the Canadian Forces for the ensuing fifteen years. It stated that significant changes had occurred in the international environment since the previous White Paper on National Defence had been released in 1971. However, East-West rivalry remained the predominant feature of international affairs. Accordingly, one of the White Paper's main premises was the need to maintain Canada's support for the West and its contributions to the NATO and NORAD alliances.

The White Paper stated, however, that a "significant commitment-capability gap" existed in the structure of the Canadian Forces, the result of long-term inadequacy in defence spending. The Government decided that through consolidation of some of its commitments -- namely Canada's forces earmarked for Europe -- and an established long-term funding programme, the gap could be closed.

To accomplish this, the White Paper announced a new method for establishing the defence budget, based on annual increases of two percent real growth with additional funding to be determined in annual Cabinet reviews. The declared purpose was to allow for long-term planning, particularly with major equipment procurement in mind.

The White Paper listed a number of major equipment purchases planned for the fifteen-year period, including new tanks, nuclear-powered submarines, patrol aircraft, and communications systems. Most observers agreed that increases in the budget closer to five percent annual real growth were necessary to implement the procurement programmes.

The 1989-1990 Canadian budget of April 1989 in effect stripped the 1987 White Paper of its teeth. Planned expenditures for DND were limited to \$11.34 billion, a 0.9 percent increase over spending in 1988-1989. Over the following five years, DND was expected to cut \$2.7 billion from its planned budget. Much of the savings in this period were to come from the scaling back, rescheduling, postponement or cancellation of a number of major capital projects.

Projects cancelled include: the nuclear-powered submarines, which had an estimated cost of \$8 billion over twenty-seven years; six new Aurora long-range patrol aircraft at an estimated cost of \$450 million; the \$300 million Tracker aircraft update; and the planned acquisition of thirteen to twenty-eight CF-18A fighter aircraft to replace those lost through peacetime attrition.

Plans to acquire up to 250 main battle tanks were scaled back and delayed and the entire project was put on hold pending a decision to proceed with project definition at a later date. A planned total of 820 new northern terrain vehicles for use in both Canada and Europe, announced in July 1988, was reduced to approximately 400. Implementation of this project would not take

place before 1995-1996. Finally, the tactical command, control, and communications system project, which included plans to replace both combat radios and area communication systems, was scaled back to include only radios, and those only for forces committed to the NATO European theatre. In addition, in its 1989-1990 budget, DND declared its intention to reduce its operating expenditures by closing seven military bases in Canada, and reducing operations in seven others.<sup>1</sup> Initial DND figures estimated the cost of closing and reducing the bases to be \$153.5 million, compared to savings of \$3.3 billion over fifteen years. Reductions in the overall size of the Armed Forces were not ruled out, while the revitalization and restructuring of the Reserves was slowed down.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Prior to the tabling of the 1990-1991 Canadian budget in February 1990, there was widespread speculation that once again DND would be the target of drastic cuts. Instead, increases in defence spending for each of the next two years were limited to five percent. In contrast to the previous year's budget, no military bases were slated for closing and no major equipment programmes were cancelled. However, 1,500 military personnel were ordered cut, in addition to the 2,500 announced in 1989-1990. These latest personnel cuts would be managed through attrition. The current level of military personnel is 86,833.

The five percent ceiling on planned expenditures meant that DND would have \$658 million less to spend than anticipated over the next two years. The total planned budgetary expenditures for the Canadian government in 1990-1991 are \$147.8 billion. Of this DND estimates \$12.005 billion will be spent on defence.

Personnel costs, including the wages, salaries and benefits for approximately 120,000 civilian and military employees, account for nearly forty-five percent of defence expenditures. Around twenty-four percent of the defence budget is devoted to capital expenditures. Five major equipment acquisition projects -- the Canadian Patrol Frigate (phases I and II), the Low-Level Air Defence, the Tribal Class Update, the North American Air Defence Modernization, and the Heavy Logistics Vehicle -- account for approximately forty-five percent of capital expenditures.

On 8 March 1990, following the release of his department's spending estimates, Defence Minister Bill McKnight defended the premise of that document which stated: "The most serious direct threat to Canada is a Soviet nuclear attack on North America. At present, the only effective counter to such a threat is a strategy of deterrence based on the maintenance of diversified nuclear forces."<sup>2</sup> Mr. McKnight elaborated, saying that despite rapid change in East-

---

<sup>1</sup> The bases slated for closure include: CFB Sydney, Portage la Prairie, Holberg, Mont Apica, Barrington, Summerside, and London. The bases slated for reduction include: CFB Ottawa (North), Chatham, Penhold, Gander, Winnipeg, Moncton, and North Bay.

<sup>2</sup> Department of National Defence, *1990-91 Estimates*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1990, p. 22.

West relations, "the capability of the USSR strategic forces has not lessened since [Mikhail] Gorbachev became president, and it's only prudent to take the actions that are necessary." He added, however: "I don't believe that the present leadership of the Soviet Union is prepared to launch a nuclear attack."<sup>3</sup>

Referring to the fact that the 1990 budget did not include major cuts in defence spending, the Minister said: "Canada has been spending less of its gross national product on defence than other countries. We cannot reduce further and still maintain a structure that allows Canadians to feel secure -- that protects our maritime interests, carries out drug interdiction, coastal surveillance, peacekeeping, the forces in Europe, and so on."<sup>4</sup>

For some time now DND, in response to new fiscal and international realities, has been conducting a defence review. At the heart of that review, expected to culminate in a White Paper by the end of 1990, is Canada's role in Europe. Mr. McKnight explained:

We hope to have -- we will have, if I have anything to do with it -- a professional force in three environments; land, sea and air. It will have to be trained in a primary (combat) role and it will have to continue to have equipment to allow the force to function. We have national roles to fulfil, as well as the ongoing support of our allies. And that may well mean, over a short period, continued presence in Europe.<sup>5</sup>

On 16 May 1990, Mr. McKnight told the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs that the defence review would aim at a policy designed for a period of transition:

It will aim at preserving our options to the maximum extent. Its theme will be that of flexibility so that we can be responsive to an evolving situation. When our review is completed, in the not too distant future, it should provide a reasoned response to the emerging global strategic context; to the realities of Canada's fiscal circumstances; and to the unchanging demands of Canada's sovereignty.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Satya Das, "Soviets still main threat, defence minister says." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 March 1990, p. A16.

<sup>4</sup> "Ceiling slapped on military spending." *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 February 1990, p. D3.

<sup>5</sup> Carol Goar, "Can We Cut Our \$12 Billion Military Budget? NO Says Ottawa." *Toronto Star*, 14 April 1990, p. D1.

<sup>6</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* [hereafter: SCNDVF *Proceedings*], Issue No. 23 (16 May 1990), p. 23:6.

In any event, Mr. McKnight said, "Canada's security will continue to rest upon three major imperatives: defence and collective security, arms control and disarmament, and the peaceful resolution of disputes."<sup>7</sup> He acknowledged that there had been "a certain amount of agitation" for a new defence policy statement now, but said that, "We are proceeding with deliberate speed in the face of what I say and suggest to you is a dynamic strategic situation."<sup>8</sup> Though he was unable to be specific about when the defence review would be completed, Mr. McKnight said that he hoped to be able to present the results of the analysis before too many months had passed.<sup>9</sup>

Though DND did not suffer cuts to its own capital projects, the decision to cancel the Polar 8 icebreaker did in part affect its budget, since the department had been expected to contribute \$178 million to this project over a two-year period beginning 1 April 1993. The 1990 budget also stipulated a reduction in the Canadian Forces of 1500 personnel, to be managed through attrition. Finally, DND launched a study on how to eliminate 870 jobs at its headquarters. The goal of all of these cuts was to reduce manpower to 83,500.

The five percent ceiling on defence expenditures for the next two years fuelled speculation that DND would again be forced to delay some or all of its capital projects.<sup>10</sup> The current state of major equipment acquisitions is as follows:

*Mine counter-measures vessels:* A programme to acquire twelve MCM vessels to be operated by the Reserves is continuing. Total cost of the project is estimated at \$750 million,<sup>11</sup> with construction to begin in 1992 and delivery to take place between 1993 and 1998. In June 1989, Defence Minister McKnight selected two principal contractors, Canadian Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited of St Catharines and Fenco Engineering Inc. of Toronto, to conduct a one-year competitive contract definition for the vessels' construction. They were to submit their proposals in July 1990. In addition to their minesweeping capability, the ships will carry out coastal patrol and harbour surveillance, and will regularly be deployed up the St. Lawrence River and into the Great Lakes.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23:7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23:9.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23:9.

<sup>10</sup> John Geddes, "Defence-spending Growth Held to 5%." *Financial Post*, 21 February 1990, p. 28.

<sup>11</sup> \$750 million refers to the cost in escalating dollars over the lifetime of the project. In 1989 dollars the cost will amount to \$450 million.

<sup>12</sup> Ken Romain, "Minesweepers Making a Comeback in Wake of Persian Gulf War." *Globe and Mail*, 17 October 1989, p. B33.

*Shipborne Aircraft:* In August 1986, the government granted approval for DND to enter into the project definition stage for a new shipborne aircraft (NSA). DND says it will need between forty and fifty-one of the NSA to replace the current fleet of thirty-five Sea King helicopters which entered into service in 1963. On 5 August 1987, the Canadian Government selected the Anglo-Italian EH-101 as the NSA. The cost of the project is expected to be more than \$3 billion.<sup>13</sup>

EH Industries (Canada), owned jointly by Westland Helicopter of Britain, Agusta Group of Italy, and now including Unisys Corporation of the United States, formed a consortium to handle the project definition. Recently, Bell Helicopter Textron dropped out of the project. The consortium now consists of Paramax Electronics, a wholly owned Unisys subsidiary, Canadian Marconi of Montreal, IMP Group of Halifax, and Amtek Group of Ottawa. The NSA's primary functions are anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship surveillance and targeting. Its secondary roles consist of search-and-rescue, medical evacuation, troop transport and communications.

Approximately one-quarter of the cost of the project is destined for the actual aircraft and its engines. The remaining three-quarters of the cost are earmarked for mission suite avionics, logistics support, training, project management, and so forth. EHI was supposed to have completed project definition by April 1989, but was unable to meet this deadline. Initial delivery of the aircraft, planned for 1994, has been pushed back. Now delivery of the first squadron with an operational capability is expected to take place in 1997-1998.

*Tribal Update Modernization Programme (TRUMP):* TRUMP, announced prior to the 1987 White Paper, consists of a mid-life update for Canada's four DDH-280 destroyers, which entered service in 1972-1973. The destroyers will receive new command, control, communication, and combat systems. The new combat systems will provide defence against air and anti-ship missile attacks as well as the ability to defend other ships. The total estimated cost of this project, which will extend the operational life of these ships into the twenty-first century, is \$1.87 billion. Work on the first destroyer, the HMCS *Algonquin*, began in November 1987. Work on the HMCS *Iroquois* is also underway. Work on both was scheduled to be completed within eighteen months of commencement. However, in January 1990 Litton Systems Canada Limited was more than a year behind schedule and was found by DND to be in default of its contract. In the spring of 1990, Litton submitted a new completion schedule for the *Algonquin* and the *Iroquois* that tentatively promised delivery of the ships in December 1990 and October or November 1991, respectively. Work on these two destroyers and on the second batch consisting of the HMCS *Athabaskan* and the HMCS *Huron* is being done by Marine Industries Limited (MIL) of Montreal at its Davie Shipyard in Lauzon, Quebec.

---

<sup>13</sup> Ronald Lebel, "Bell Helicopter Quits Group Bidding on \$3 billion Contract." *Montreal Gazette*, 17 March 1990, p. E2.

*Patrol Frigates:* The Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) programme was initiated in 1983 for the procurement of six ships. Total estimated cost of the programme, including a second batch of six ships ordered in December 1987, was \$9.5 billion. This figure is likely to increase, however, since delays and cost overruns reportedly may push the cost of each frigate well beyond the original estimate of \$525 million.<sup>14</sup>

St. John Shipbuilding Limited and Marine Industries Limited of Montreal share the contract for the first batch of frigates, building three ships each (HMCS *Halifax*, *Vancouver*, *Toronto* and *Ville de Quebec*, *Regina* and *Calgary*, respectively). St. John Shipbuilding was awarded the contract to build the entire second batch of frigates.

Sea trials for the HMCS *Halifax*, originally scheduled for fall 1989, were delayed to early 1990, due to problems with the communications equipment. Delivery of the *Halifax* is not expected before the end of 1990, possibly later. It is expected that the *Vancouver* will be delivered by the end of 1991 and that the remaining four frigates will be delivered over the following three years. Delivery of the last of the twelve ships is expected by 1996. Because of the cost, plans for lengthening the frigates of the second batch by ten metres have been dropped.

*Low-Level Air Defence (LLAD) system:* On 16 April 1986, DND announced the awarding of a contract for a Low-Level Air Defence system for the Canadian Forces. The Oerlikon-Buhrle Litton consortium received the contract of \$1.14 billion to provide the Canadian Forces with thirty-six Air Defence/Anti-Tank Systems (ADATS) and twenty twin 35-mm twin guns with ten fire-control units. The ADATS will be deployed at bases in Baden-Soellingen and Lahr, West Germany. Initial delivery of the twin guns to the Canadian Army in Europe began in October 1988. As of December 1989, only one of a scheduled eight ADATS had been delivered. Now, deployment in Europe of the first operational ADATS is not expected until 1992, over two years behind schedule. The ADATS system is being manufactured in St. Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec.

*Heavy Logistics Vehicle Wheeled (HLVW) Project:* A programme for the CAF to acquire a replacement for its heavy truck fleet began in 1983. On 5 February 1987, Associate Defence Minister Paul Dick announced that the team of Urban Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC) Inc. of Kingston, Ontario (eighty-five percent owned by Lavalin Industries) and Styr-Daimler-Puch of Austria would fill an order for 1,200 heavy trucks. Over \$310 million was budgeted for the purchase. The trucks, called the Percheron, will replace the current fleet of 800 five-ton trucks, forty percent of which were acquired between 1953 and 1963 (the remaining sixty percent were built in 1975-1976). The first of the new trucks was delivered to DND in May 1989. The vehicles began being issued to units in early 1990, with production of all 1,200 vehicles scheduled to be completed by September 1990, at an estimated total cost of \$387.3 million.

---

<sup>14</sup>

Canadian Press, "Frigate Costs Skyrocketing, Letters Show." *Toronto Star*, 24 June 1990, p. 4.

*Arctic and Maritime Surveillance Aircraft (AMSA):* In the April 1989 budget, the White Paper commitment to purchase at least six new Aurora long-range patrol aircraft was cancelled. In June 1989 the government approved instead the purchase of three AMSA called "Arcturus." These aircraft will be used for maritime, arctic, and environmental surveillance; fisheries patrols; and as a backup for search-and-rescue operations. Unlike the Aurora, the Arcturus will not have extensive submarine-detection equipment. It will have high-powered radar and long-range communication capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft Systems Company will supply the aircraft, with delivery beginning in December 1992 and scheduled to be completed by February 1993. The estimated total cost of the project is \$257 million.

*Militia Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs):* In July 1989 the government approved the purchase of 221 wheeled and tracked vehicles for the militia, 199 wheeled light armoured vehicles (LAVs) and 22 tracked M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). On 28 July 1989, General Motors of Canada Ltd. was awarded a \$100 million contract to supply the 199 LAVs. It produces the vehicle under licence from Motorwagen Fabrik AG (MOWAG) of Switzerland, the developer of the LAV. The contract for the 22 APCs is still being negotiated. The estimated total cost of both the LAVs and the APCs is currently \$201.3 million.

*Other Projects:* It was reported on 15 November 1989 that the government of Canada had invited seven companies to bid on an \$800 million contract to supply the Armed Forces with a mobile tactical communications system.<sup>15</sup> The contract is expected to be awarded in June 1991.

In the spring of 1990 it was reported that Cabinet would approve the purchase of five new Hercules tanker/transport aircraft at a cost of approximately \$300 million. Delivery of all five aircraft would be made within two years of a Cabinet decision.<sup>16</sup> Using conversion kits the plane could be switched from a tanker (used for aerial refuelling of the CF-18) to a transport aircraft within two hours. By early summer, DND had yet to submit a proposal to Cabinet pending the outcome of the defence review.

The *Globe and Mail* reported on 21 September 1989 that DND had urged Cabinet to approve the building of at least six diesel-electric submarines.<sup>17</sup> The plan included an examination of various technologies, including low-powered nuclear reactors, that could eventually complement the diesel engines of the submarines and enable them to operate in the Arctic. In January 1990 it was reported that the option preferred by the Canadian Navy was to buy a diesel-powered version of the French *Améthyste* nuclear submarine and later convert that vessel to an air-independent propulsion system.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> "7 firms invited to bid for defence contract valued at \$800 million." *Globe and Mail*, 15 November 1989, p. B28.

<sup>16</sup> Ron Lowman, "5 New Hercules Aircraft In Works for Airforce." *Toronto Star*, 1 March 1990, p. 14.

<sup>17</sup> Paul Koring, "Defence Staff Asks for 6 Submarines to Beef-up Navy." *Globe and Mail*, 21 September 1989, p. A9.

<sup>18</sup> Marc Clark, "Keeping the Dream Alive." *Maclean's*, vol.103 no.3 (1 January 1990), pp. 48 and 49.

# PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In response to an inquiry by Liberal Member of Parliament William Rompkey on 30 January 1990, Defence Minister William McKnight denied that four frigates were going to be cut from the frigate programme.<sup>19</sup>

Commenting on the 1990 budget, Liberal MP Ronald Duhamel on 5 March 1990 took the government to task for increasing defence spending by five percent while making large cuts in health care and education.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, on 6 March, New Democratic Party MP and defence critic Derek Blackburn questioned the wisdom of investing over \$1 billion (including more than \$300 million this fiscal year) in ADATS, which he described as a system plagued by many failures and deficiencies, while allowing the Polar 8 icebreaker to be axed.<sup>21</sup> Mr. McKnight replied:

I would like the hon. member to understand that the low level air defence is designed to defend Canadian men and women and Canadian air pilots...and Canadian assets in a stationed atmosphere, particularly in central Europe. As the hon. member knows, it is something that was lacking, it is something that will continue to be important, it is something that we will continue to do in an acquisition point.<sup>22</sup>

Mr. Blackburn countered that the equipment was designed to be used only in Europe, where, in all likelihood, Canadian troops would be withdrawn within the next couple of years. He referred to a US report describing ADATS as working at only five percent efficiency, and asked: "Why is the Minister considering going ahead with this wasteful program that is probably going to lead nowhere and for no purpose?"<sup>23</sup> Mr. McKnight replied:

What hon. members have to understand is that the men and women who serve in Canadian forces desire and need protection. Low level air defence was not available to those men and women. It has been developed in Canada. It has jobs for Canadian men and women. It has brought employment.<sup>24</sup>

Toward the end of March 1990 Liberal MP William Rompkey asked the Minister of Defence if he was willing to open up his review of defence policy to the people of Canada and let them have their say. Mr. McKnight responded that there was an opportunity for Canadians to

---

<sup>19</sup> *Commons Debates*, 30 January 1990, p. 7607.

<sup>20</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 March 1990, p. 8772.

<sup>21</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 March 1990, p. 8876.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*.

express their views and concerns through the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. "However," he continued, "if a suggestion were made that the security of Canada would be emphasized by a Gallup poll and directed that way, I suggest to the hon. member that that is not adequate security for any country."<sup>25</sup>

As in the previous year, the issue of base closings was prominent in the House. Discussion focussed primarily on the government's plans to close CFB Portage la Prairie in Manitoba and CFB Summerside in Prince Edward Island. Responding to a question on the order paper tabled by Liberal MP John Harvard, Albert Cooper, the Prime Minister's Parliamentary Secretary, revealed that the net cost to the treasury for the closing of CFB Portage la Prairie would be \$93,140. The cost for relocating personnel, attributable directly to the closing of the base, was estimated at \$3.54 million. However, according to Mr. Cooper, the total cost for the physical closing of the base would depend upon whether the facilities were re-used.<sup>26</sup>

In that regard, Defence Minister McKnight noted that DND was "currently investigating the feasibility of contracting out its Primary Flying Training to coincide with the scheduled closure of Canadian Forces Base Portage la Prairie in 1992."<sup>27</sup> He had told the House in September 1989 that a Solicitation of Interest had been sent to some 260 companies around the world, from which expressions of interest had been received from fifty-seven.<sup>28</sup> In replying to Mr. Harvard's question on 29 January, Mr. McKnight noted that the location of CFB Portage la Prairie remained suitable for primary flight training and that several of the prospective companies who had responded to the solicitation of interest had proposed locating their contracted facility on that site in the context of an industrial park in which primary flight training would be one of several activities.<sup>29</sup>

Questions concerning the future of CFB Summerside, of which there were many, addressed the issues of the economic impact of the closing, the advisability of relocating the search-and-rescue squadron elsewhere, and the reduction of Canada's surveillance capabilities with the elimination of the Tracker aircraft. On 29 September 1989, Liberal MP Fred Mifflin drew attention to the fact that no socioeconomic impact studies had been undertaken on communities for which base closings were planned, nor on the impact of such closings on military effectiveness. Defence Minister McKnight replied that it was not the responsibility of DND to identify replacement economic opportunities, although the Department did provide estimates of community losses.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> *Commons Debates*, 26 March 1990, p. 9755.

<sup>26</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 January 1990, p. 7556.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>28</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 September 1989, p. 3974.

<sup>29</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 January 1990, p. 7557.

<sup>30</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1989, p. 4107.

In August 1989, a group of Liberal MPs led by Associate Defence Critic Joseph Volpe proposed that Summerside be used as the location for a UN International Peacekeeping Training Centre, with the majority of funding coming from the UN.<sup>31</sup> In a letter to the *Ottawa Citizen*, Mr. McKnight dismissed the idea on the grounds that "Canadian Peacekeeping operations are predominantly an army function, and our troops are trained to be effective and professional soldiers first...soldiers, who may ultimately be chosen to proudly serve Canada abroad, are trained at garrisons across our country. These facilities are more than adequate."<sup>32</sup>

On 8 March 1990, Liberal MP Catherine Callbeck criticized the decision to close Summerside, calling it arbitrary. Furthermore, she said, almost a year later there was still no firm commitment from the government to the people of the community. Said Ms. Callbeck: "A budget has been brought down and still it contains no special help for the people affected by the closure of CFB Summerside."<sup>33</sup> In April she elaborated:

This government's lack of planning has left an entire region of my province in limbo. People have been waiting for approximately one year for a firm federal commitment of jobs. For the past year, the people of Summerside and surrounding area have been working hard to save the base and to keep the economic security of their region intact. These people deserve nothing short of total admiration and praise from this House, for they are working against a government which does not plan ahead, which has not fulfilled its year-old commitment for jobs, and which, for all intents and purposes, does not listen to the people of my province.<sup>34</sup>

On 13 October 1989, Minister of Employment and Immigration Barbara McDougall had told the House:

We have three federal-provincial working groups looking at alternate uses of the physical assets of CFB Summerside, potential alternate public sector activities for the Summerside area, on which I am working very closely with my colleagues here, and industrial incentives and activities necessary to attract private sector investment to Summerside."<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> Joseph Volpe, "Liberals Propose an Alternative for the Operation of CFB Summerside." *News Release*, 24 August 1989.

<sup>32</sup> Bill McKnight, "Canadian Forces" (letter to the editor). *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 September 1989.

<sup>33</sup> *Commons Debates*, 8 March 1990, p. 8985.

<sup>34</sup> *Commons Debates*, 25 April 1990, p. 10665.

<sup>35</sup> *Commons Debates*, 13 October 1989, p. 4656.

Of considerable import in the debate over the closing of the Summerside base was the decision to transfer the 413 Search-and-Rescue (SAR) Squadron to Greenwood, Nova Scotia. A study by Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis Hopping, who commanded the squadron from 1981 to 1984, and Major Gary Naylor, former commander of the rescue co-ordination centre in Halifax, had identified Summerside as the optimum location for a SAR squadron in the maritimes. Citing this study and a major report on defence tabled in 1982 that had reached a similar conclusion, Liberal MP William Rompkey beseeched the government to restore search-and-rescue to PEI.<sup>36</sup> Citing the Hopping-Naylor report in more detail, Liberal MP Joe McGuire said it showed that "CFB Summerside is closer to some 90 percent of all search and rescue incidents in the Atlantic area, that the topography and climate at Summerside is superior, and that the transfer of 413 reduces the squadron's capability and endangers lives."<sup>37</sup> Defence Minister McKnight replied that: "Surveys done have shown that the majority of incidents in search and rescue occur closer to Greenwood and Halifax than to Summerside."<sup>38</sup>

In May 1990, Mr. McKnight answered a question tabled by Mr. McGuire asking for the specific number of search-and-rescue incidents to which aircraft from CFB Summerside had been asked to respond in the period 1 January 1986 to 1 January 1989. Mr. McGuire had also asked for the number of incidents that had occurred closer to Summerside than to CFB Greenwood. Mr. McKnight responded that there had been 202 incidents in that period, of which 152 were closer to Summerside than to Greenwood. He pointed out, however, that from 1981 to 1986 the reverse had been true; there were more search-and-rescue incidents closer to Greenwood than to Summerside. He also noted that the average incident occurred over 200 miles from either location and that the average difference in distance between the two locations and these incidents was just thirty-five miles.<sup>39</sup>

The decision as part of the Summerside base closing to eliminate the 880 Squadron of Tracker surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft also drew much attention in the House. Responding to a suggestion by Mr. McGuire that the Tracker squadron be restored in order to maintain fisheries surveillance, Associate Defence Minister Mary Collins said that DND would "continue to provide services through Aurora aircraft and newly purchased Arcturus aircraft when they come on board."<sup>40</sup> Ms. Collins added that the Cabinet had approved \$28 million in additional funding for the Department of Fisheries to provide for fisheries patrol surveillance.

---

<sup>36</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1989, p. 4097.

<sup>37</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 October 1989, p. 4429.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>39</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 May 1990, p. 11977.

<sup>40</sup> *Commons Debates*, 18 December 1989, p. 7057.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Ashton, Barry W., "Value for Money: Implications for Defence." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 6 (June 1990), pp. 39-44.

Blackburn, Derek, "Roundtable: NDP View on Defence." *Wednesday Report*, vol. 4 no. 19 (9 May 1990), pp. 1-2.

Critchley, Harriet, "Does Canada Have a Defence Policy?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 2 (Autumn 1989), pp. 7-10.

de Chastelain, A.J.G.D., "The Art of Prudent Wing Walking." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 6 (June 1990), pp. 11-14.

Halstead, John, "A Defence Policy for Canada: The White Paper Two Years On." Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 47 no. 2, Winter 1989-1990 (16 pp.).

Hill, Roger, *et al.*, "Roundtable: What is to be Done? Canada's Military Security in the 1990's." *Peace&Security*, vol. 5 no. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 2-6.

Langille, Peter, "Changing of the Guard." *Peace Magazine*, vol. 6 no. 4 (August/September 1990), pp. 21-23 and 28.

Monier, Claude, "La Défense du Grand Nord Canadien." *Défense nationale* (Juillet 1990), pp. 181-184.

"The Rise and Fall of the Three-Ocean Concept." *Canada's Navy Annual* No. 4 (1989), pp. 10-12.

Wood, Bernard, "Canadian Defence Policy -- Open Season?" *Peace&Security*, vol. 5 no. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 21.

## FURTHER READING

Bayer, J. A., "Is There Life After NATO?" *International Perspectives* (September-October 1987), pp. 13-16.

Bland, Douglas L., "Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence." *Defence Analysis*, vol. 5 no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-18.

Byers, Rod, *Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and Challenges*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Paper* No. 214, December 1986 (87 pp.).

Hawes, M., "Canadian Defence Spending: Lessons from Sweden." *International Perspectives*, vol. 16 no. 1 (January-February 1988), pp. 17-21.

Jockel, Joseph, T., and Sokolsky, Joel, J., *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out*. Washington: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Papers* No. 121, 1986 (118 pp.).

Middlemiss, Danford W. and Sokolsky, Joel J., *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*. Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Canada Inc., 1989 (249 pp.).

## CROSS REFERENCES

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  
North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)

## 18. THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

### *BACKGROUND*

With the release of the White Paper on national defence in June 1987, renewed attention was drawn to the issue of Canada's defence industry. Prior to both World War I and World War II, this sector was not a major contributor to the economy. As Canada entered each war, however, the need to provide equipment and supplies for its armed forces was met through massive mobilization of Canadian industry for production of war materials.

In the early stages of World War II, Canada and the United States recognized the need to combine their defence industry efforts in order to increase efficiency in production, and, thus, their ability to support the war effort and protect North America. Two agreements, the Ogdensburg Declaration (1940), which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), and the Hyde Park Declaration (1941), created the foundation for defence cooperation between the two countries. The PJBD was to administer the needs of an integrated continental defence of North America. This body, on which Canada and the United States are equally represented, still exists today as a formal institution to oversee Canadian and US continental defence interests.

The interdependent nature of North American defence and the recognition that each nation's industry should concentrate on producing articles it was best able to provide, were fundamental principles agreed to in the above arrangements. Following World War II, Canada and the United States maintained and enhanced these arrangements.

In 1959, the Defence Development and the Defence Production Sharing Arrangements (DD/DPSA) were agreed to, creating improved market access for Canadian defence industries in the United States. Through signing the DD/DPSA, Canada recognized that its own defence market was too small to be able to support a defence industrial base for major weapon systems of its own. The agreements provided a means by which Canada could take advantage of its ally's large-scale defence production. By reducing barriers to the US defence market, Canadian industries became specialized and more secure secondary sources of defence materials and products.

Apart from these general agreements, over 200 bilateral defence and cooperative research and development arrangements exist between the two nations. Between 1959 and 1987, the total value of defence exports to the United States was \$13.490 billion, while the value of imports from the United States was \$16.422 billion.

In 1984, work began in Canada on an inter-departmental Defence Industrial Base Review involving the Departments of National Defence, Supply and Services, Regional Industrial Expansion, and External Affairs. The purpose of the Review was to determine current Canadian industrial capabilities to provide for Canadian defence needs under varying conditions of mobilization and to make recommendations addressing any deficiencies.

At the March 1985 Quebec Summit, between Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan, continental defence industrial cooperation was again given prominence. The leaders pledged to work toward reducing barriers that existed in the North American defence market, improve the North American Defence Industrial Base (NADIB), and focus on industrial preparedness planning.

In May 1985, the Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force was created to examine the issue and provide recommendations on the state of the defence industry in Canada and North America. The Task Force completed its study in November 1987. It recommended, among other things, that Canada include industrial preparedness planning in DND's equipment acquisition and life-cycle management processes; that defence dollars be put into industrial preparedness measures, rather than stockpiling of materiel, which is more expensive; and that defence preparedness be viewed on a continental basis.

As a direct result of these initiatives, in March 1987 Canada and the United States signed a Letter of Guidance for the Charter of a North American Defence Industrial Base Organization (NADIBO). The purpose of NADIBO is to define ways to more effectively ensure complementary industrial support for North American security requirements. Much of its focus is to carry out peacetime industrial planning to ensure an adequate supply of equipment for the armed forces and sustenance of supply in times of crisis or war.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In the 1987 Defence White Paper the defence industrial base was given considerable attention. The White Paper declared the importance of maintaining and enhancing the defence industry in Canada as essential to support of both the Canadian Forces and those of our allies. It cited the need for Canada to cooperate with its allies, particularly the United States, in acquiring defence equipment and pursuing military research and development. It stated that the Government would pay greater attention to the long-term industrial implications of equipment purchases. The White Paper also noted the Government's intention to continue emphasizing industrial preparedness measures "to enhance the responsiveness of the defence industrial base."<sup>1</sup>

Following the White Paper, a Defence Industrial Preparedness Advisory Committee was formed, consisting of representatives from the business community, banking, and universities. The Committee has consulted with the Minister of National Defence to generate proposals for strengthening industrial preparedness.

Canada has also signed nine Research, Development and Production Agreements with European nations, beginning with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1964 and now including Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Britain, and Belgium. Other defence industrial arrangements involving Canada also exist through the NATO Alliance.

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, June 1987, p. 75.

By most measurements, the Canadian defence industry is relatively modest. Defence production accounts for less than one percent of Canada's gross national product and defence industries employ only 80,000 or 90,000 persons, or less than one percent of the workforce. The defence-industrial base is highly specialized, with aerospace, electronics, communications, vehicles, and shipbuilding representing its primary areas of concentration. Recent efforts on the part of the Canadian Government and industry have served to enhance the industrial base in the areas of naval design, naval electronics, military pattern vehicles, small arms, light and medium helicopters, and engines. These efforts include, for example, focussing on procurement programmes, on industry, and on the establishment of new manufacturing facilities.

In October 1989, it was reported that Canadian defence industrialists had decided to form the Defence Industries Association of Canada (DIAC), a lobby group whose purpose would be to "counter negative publicity the industry has received lately."<sup>2</sup> The defence industrialists were said to have felt such an organization to be necessary because 1989 had been a "black year" for the industry. The report continued, explaining that: "The Gorbachev era and the accompanying thaw in the Cold War rhetoric have caused both politicians and taxpayers to question defence spending." Three factors -- possible arms reductions, federal budget cuts and vocal opposition to Canadian arms exports as manifested in the public demonstrations against the Ottawa arms show ARMX -- had "convinced defence-related companies that they had to sell taxpayers on the benefits of defence purchases."

A study released in October 1989 by Government Consultants International revealed that the Department of National Defence accounted for 44.9 percent of federal Government procurement in Fiscal Year 1988-1989. By way of comparison, the Government agency with the next highest proportion was the Canadian Commercial Corporation, which accounted for 7.2 percent. The largest supplier to the federal Government, of twenty-five listed, was the US Navy. Also in the top twenty-five were such Canadian defence firms as Spar Aerospace, Canadian Arsenals Ltd., Bristol Aerospace, Microtel Ltd., Bendix Avelex, IMP Group Ltd., Marconi Canada, Saint John Shipbuilding, Bombardier Inc. and Martin Marietta Canada Ltd. The total dollar value of the 126,107 contracts awarded by DND amounted to \$3.4 billion.

The Fiscal Year 1990-1991 budget, which cut planned defence expenditures by \$210 million in 1990-1991 and \$270 million in 1991-1992, combined with the cuts of \$2.74 billion over five years announced the previous year, was expected by some to have a significant impact on Canada's defence industry, especially when compounded by reductions in the US military budget.<sup>3</sup> In February 1990, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed a US \$295 billion military budget that scrapped thirteen weapon systems "including programs that provided jobs and profits at Canadian defence firms for years down the line."<sup>4</sup> It is estimated that US orders traditionally account for between fifty and eighty percent of Canadian defence sales.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Patrick Sullivan, "Defence industries out to polish image." *Globe and Mail*, 17 October 1989, p. B32.

<sup>3</sup> Doug Kelly, "Canada, US budget cuts paint gloomy picture for industry." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 March 1990, p. G4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no comment in the House of Commons on the issue of the Canadian defence industrial base during this reporting period.

### CURRENT REFERENCES

Belzile, C. H., "Preparedness Under Fiscal Restraint." *Forum*, vol. 5 no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 19-20.

Epps, Ken, "Canada's Top Twenty." *Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 10 no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 8-9 and 12.

### FURTHER READING

Canada, Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987 (89 pp.).

Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence Industrial Preparedness: A Foundation for Defence*. Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, November 1987 (35 pp.).

"Defence Planning and Industrial Preparedness." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 18 no. 6 (Special No. 2/1989), 66 pp.

Haglund, David G. (ed.), *Canada's Defence Industrial Base: The Political Economy of Preparedness and Procurement*. Kingston, Ont.: R. P. Frye, 1988 (261 pp.).

Hill, Roger, "Unified Canada-US Defence Production: A Hazardous Road." *Peace&Security*, vol. 4 no. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 4-5.

Middlemiss, D.W. and Sokolsky, Joel, J., *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*. Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Canada Inc., 1989 (249 pp.).

North American Defence Industrial Base Organization, *Continental Preparedness: Strengthening the North American Defence Industrial Base*. Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1988 (20 pp. plus annexes).

Supply and Services Canada, *Industrial Support for Canada's Defence: The Defence Industrial Base Review 1987*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987 (22 pp.).

Yost, William J., *Industrial Mobilization in Canada*. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations, 1983 (106 pp.).

### CROSS REFERENCES

Defence Planning and Procurement  
Arms Transfers

## 19. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

### BACKGROUND

Canada is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO's declared aim is the prevention of war:

It works to achieve this by striving to improve understanding between East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter an attack on any member of the alliance. The Treaty provides that Alliance members will come to each other's assistance in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them.<sup>1</sup>

In the years immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the Allies set up machinery for collective defence, and extended membership to include Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany. By the mid-1950s they were facing a more varied Soviet challenge and recognized that progress on European and other issues required efforts to strengthen Western unity, solidarity and cooperation. A committee of "Three Wise Men", established in 1956, recommended ways of improving political consultation and led to improvements which helped NATO to face up to the difficulties and opportunities of the following decade: the Berlin crises, the Cuban missile crisis, French withdrawal from the integrated military structure, the question of the control of nuclear weapons, and negotiations on arms control focussing on such questions as nuclear non-proliferation.

In 1967, faced with a changing strategic situation, NATO carried out a review of its policies and issued a report entitled: "The Future Tasks of the Alliance" (the Harmel Report). This report identified the basic policy of NATO as being the pursuit of the twin objectives of defence and detente, and stated that the aim of all member countries was to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

The record of East-West relations over the last twenty years has been a mixed one. Nonetheless, NATO continued to pursue better relations with the East whenever that was possible. In the early 1970s it supported negotiation of the SALT I Treaty, the conclusion of the Berlin agreements, and the launching of negotiations on European security and conventional force reductions. A period of stagnation in East-West relations, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in the early 1980s, eventually gave way to renewed hopes for improvements focusing on the INF Treaty, new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, and progress on other arms control issues.

At the same time, NATO continued to give attention to the requirements of Western cohesion and defence. The Atlantic Declaration of 1974 reaffirmed the commitment of all members to the Treaty and clarified further their responsibilities in such fields as political consultation. Defence improvements and force modernization programmes also continued,

---

<sup>1</sup> NATO Information Service, *NATO and Warsaw Pact Comparisons*. Brussels, 1984, p. 1.

together with work on defence planning, infrastructures, communications, crisis management procedures and similar tasks.

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority in the Alliance. Composed of representatives of the sixteen member countries, it meets at the level of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors). Ministerial meetings, attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, and so on, are held twice a year or more, while the Council in permanent session meets once a week or as often as required. Special meetings of Heads of Government are also held at particularly important junctures in Alliance affairs.

Under the Council, there is a range of committees and commands, such as the Political Committee, the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Atlantic. The Secretary-General of NATO is the civilian head of the organization, chairing the Council and such other key bodies as the Nuclear Planning Group.

Given the scale and the nature of the changes that took place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1988-1989, Alliance leaders began to reexamine the very nature of NATO. In December 1989 in West Berlin, US Secretary of State James Baker proposed that the Alliance begin to think about changing from a military to a more political organization. As 1990 progressed, under the pressure of events that included the virtual collapse of the Warsaw Pact as a functioning military organization and rapid momentum toward German unification, NATO began to shift incrementally in the direction outlined by Secretary Baker.

At a meeting in Brussels on 3 May 1990, NATO foreign ministers agreed on a package of proposals emphasizing the political rather than the military aspect of the organization. Significantly, the ministers agreed to hold a NATO Heads-of-Government summit meeting in London in the summer where military strategy, the role of nuclear weapons, and the political function of the Alliance in light of impending German unification and continuing Soviet decline would be topics for discussion (at a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Kananaskis, Alberta on 9 and 10 May, they agreed that the London summit would take place on 5 and 6 July). As one official put it: "What is at issue in all this is the future shape of the Western economic and political community."<sup>2</sup>

On 17 May, the US revealed that it would no longer ask its NATO allies to increase their spending on defence by three percent a year. This policy was officially adopted by NATO at a meeting of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) in Brussels on 22 and 23 May. Arguing that "We can now begin to reap the benefits of the greatly improved climate in East/West relations," the DPC also decided to take steps to lower the readiness and availability of a number of standing forces (helicopter, airplane and ground units) and to look into the possibilities for greater use of

---

<sup>2</sup> Craig R. Whitney, "Europe Picks its Lodestar." *New York Times*, 4 May 1990, p. A1.

multinational forces.<sup>3</sup> Though NATO was reaffirmed as the foundation of the West's collective security, the DPC recognized the potential for the CSCE to complement the Alliance and to develop measures strengthening cooperative security. Finally, the ministers committed themselves to undertake a review of NATO's military strategy and to adapt NATO's defence requirements to ensure that they would "take full account of the new circumstances now emerging."<sup>4</sup>

A classified report by NATO's military committee, submitted to the DPC at its May meeting, concluded that the Warsaw Pact was no longer capable of launching a three-pronged invasion of Western Europe. It also stated that the West's warning time of a Soviet attack had increased to between thirty and forty-two days.<sup>5</sup> Earlier assessments had estimated just fourteen days' warning.

On 7 June 1990, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) declared that the "ideological enemy" image that East and West traditionally held of each other had been largely overcome and that "Confrontation elements contained in documents of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, that were adopted in the past, are no longer in line with the spirit of the time."<sup>6</sup> The declaration went on to say that the WTO was ready for "constructive cooperation" with NATO. It applauded some of the steps "recently taken by NATO," and stated that it expected "the new trend of changes in NATO to be accelerated and deepened and to be reflected by corresponding substantial changes in the activities of this alliance."<sup>7</sup>

NATO foreign ministers meeting in Turnberry, Scotland, the same day welcomed the WTO statement, in particular its declared readiness for constructive cooperation with NATO. In turn they said "we extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and cooperation."<sup>8</sup> The foreign ministers also declared that the CSCE process should be strengthened and given effective institutional form: "We see the CSCE process as an important framework for far-reaching reforms and stability and as a central element in the construction of a new Europe, along with other European institutions including the Alliance itself."<sup>9</sup> They agreed as well upon the necessity for establishing a NATO coordination mechanism for the verification of arms control treaties.

---

<sup>3</sup> *NATO Press Communique* M-DPC-1 (90)22 (23 May 1990). The present arrangement is for different members of the alliance to be responsible for defending their own sector of territory. Multinational units would involve several countries in the defence of a single sector.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "NATO Moves to Relax Readiness and Cut Back Training Programs." *New York Times*, 24 May 1990, p. A1.

<sup>6</sup> USSR Embassy Ottawa, *News Release* No. 29 (12 June 1990), p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> NATO, *Press Communique* M-1(90)29 (8 June 1990), p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

While the NATO ministers acknowledged that the historic events that had taken place in Europe confirmed that the continent was entering a new era, they agreed that not all grounds for concern had been removed: "... we cannot be oblivious to the fact that the Soviet Union will retain substantial military capabilities, which it is continuing to modernise and which have implications for our defence."<sup>10</sup> Therefore, they were steadfast about the continuing need to maintain the common defence, insisting that: "For the foreseeable future, the prevention of war will continue to require an appropriate mix of survivable and effective conventional and nuclear forces, at the lowest levels consistent with our security needs."<sup>11</sup>

### *Canada's Commitment to NATO*

In 1990-1991 Canada's commitment to Europe will account for 10.5 percent of total defence expenditures, or \$1.26 billion. At present, Canada's military commitments to NATO consist of:<sup>12</sup>

- 1st Canadian Division Forward, consisting of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, an artillery regiment, a combat engineer regiment, a tactical helicopter squadron and a portion of divisional support troops stationed in Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, West Germany;
- two wings, with three tactical fighter squadrons, of 1st Canadian Air Division equipped with CF-18s, plus related maintenance and headquarters elements at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, West Germany;
- a battalion group -- Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry -- committed on short notice to Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)) or to the NATO Composite Force (see below) for operations in northern Norway;
- two Rapid Reinforcement Fighter Squadrons in Canada, equipped with CF-18s, tasked with reinforcing the squadrons in Germany in event of war. One of these squadrons is also committed to regions other than the central front;
- 4th Air Defence Regiment, providing defence to 1 Canadian Air Division and 1st Canadian Division; and
- other land, air and maritime forces stationed in Canada and committed to the Allied defence of North America, to assist in the Allied naval defence of the North Atlantic and other waters, and to provide reinforcements for Europe in time of crisis or war.

On 30 November 1989, the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group, based in Canada and committed to reinforcing northern Norway in time of crisis, was terminated. In its stead, NATO has established a multinational "composite" force, including the 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. Previously slotted for the defence of either Norway

---

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>12</sup> National Defence, *Defence 89*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1990, pp. 68-78.

or Denmark, it is now committed exclusively to northern Norway. In turn, Belgium has replaced Canada in the role the latter previously filled in defence of Denmark.

In the aftermath of the April 1989 budget there was speculation that the Government would cancel plans for a "division-sized force" in Central Europe during a crisis.<sup>13</sup> In May 1989, however, both Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Defence Minister Bill McKnight were reported to have insisted that the commitment to field a 10,000-strong division in West Germany remained steadfast.<sup>14</sup> On 24 May 1989, the then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant General John de Chastelain, noted that while such plans were "still in place, the previous plan to equip the division and indeed reinforce it over the years, was not."<sup>15</sup> General de Chastelain's remarks echoed more detailed testimony he gave eight days earlier to the Special Senate Committee on National Defence. Then, he had observed:

It had been planned that these forces, as presently equipped (i. e., 4 CMBG, 5eGBC and divisional headquarters), would be jointly tasked for operations in southern Germany with effect 1 December, that their re-equipment would take place over a period of years. That plan has had to be modified. Because of budget cuts, the acquisition of much new equipment for the division is no longer possible. But the intention to change 5eGBC's fly-over role from Norway to Germany... will nonetheless proceed. There, it, along with the resources of the in-place 4 CMBG, plus the divisional headquarters in Kingston, will be joined to form the combined forces which has already been agreed to with NATO.<sup>16</sup>

Canada currently stations approximately 7,900 Armed Forces personnel in Europe.

### *Training Facilities*

Canada also provides training facilities for NATO forces on its territory. Shilo, Manitoba is used by West German troops for tank training, while the British Army employs facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. German, British, Dutch and US Air Forces use facilities at Goose Bay, Labrador, for training in low-level flying.

<sup>13</sup> See, for instance, "1st division Commitment to NATO Cancelled." *Canadian Defence Update*, vol.3 no.4 (May 1989), pp. 1 and 8.

<sup>14</sup> James Bagnall, "Cuts Cloud Canadian Role in NATO." *Financial Post*, 29 May 1989, p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> "1st Canadian Division Back On." *The Wednesday Report*, vol. 3 no. 21 (24 May 1989), pp. 2-3.

<sup>16</sup> Senate of Canada, Special Senate Committee on National Defence, *Proceedings*, 16 May 1989, p. 10.

Since 1984, Goose Bay had been under consideration as a possible site for a new NATO Tactical Fighting and Weapons Training Centre (NTFWTC). A site at Konya, Turkey, was recommended by NATO officials in September 1986, but Canadian officials were successful in convincing NATO to postpone a final decision until a more in-depth analysis could be carried out. The Canadian Government is currently spending \$93 million to expand the Goose Bay facility.<sup>17</sup> A detached operating base, designed by Air Command and completed at a cost of \$9 million, became operational in fall 1988. Also that year the NATO Fighter Training Centre Team conducted a resurvey of the base to update and refine its data for making a decision on the Centre's location.<sup>18</sup>

Whether Canada would be chosen as the site for the NTFWTC depended on the outcome of two processes. The first was the Environmental Assessment and Review Process conducted by the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office for the Department of National Defence. This involved an initial assessment of the environmental impact of low-level flying, and a public review of the results of that initial assessment by an independent panel of experts appointed by the Minister of the Environment.

The results of the initial assessment were made public at the end of October 1989. This "Environmental Impact Statement" (EIS) suggested that the establishment of a NATO training base at Goose Bay would have negligible impact on the environment and wildlife in the region, most of which could be mitigated. The study concluded that the economic benefits of a NTFWTC - construction of a \$500 million base, pumping \$2 billion into the economy of Goose Bay by the year 2000 -- would outweigh the risks.

The conclusions of the EIS stirred considerable controversy. For some years, the native Innu of the Goose Bay area have protested against the NATO practice of low-level flying in that region. During fall 1988, more than 200 Innu Indians were arrested while engaging in peaceful demonstrations protesting the low-level flights.<sup>19</sup> Fuelling their objections has been their claim to a large area of Labrador based on history and tradition, as no treaty has ever been signed with the Federal Government regarding the territory. This claim was bolstered on 17 April 1988 when a Labrador judge dismissed public mischief charges against four Innu arrested during a protest at the Goose Bay base, on grounds that their behaviour indicated a "genuine belief" that the air base land belonged to them. The judge observed that "(t)hrough their knowledge of ancestry and kinship, (the defendants) ha(d) shown that none of their people ever gave away rights to the land, to Canada."<sup>20</sup> The government of Newfoundland launched an appeal of the decision which was heard in St. John's on 3 October 1989. The Newfoundland Appeal Court struck down the ruling that found the four Innu innocent of public mischief, arguing that the judge in the original case

---

<sup>17</sup> *Commons Debates*, 1 March 1988, p. 13265.

<sup>18</sup> Department of National Defence, *Defence 1988*, January 1989, pp. 52-53.

<sup>19</sup> Terry Gavin, "Natives battle NATO." *Vancouver Sun*, 16 November 1988, p. C6.

<sup>20</sup> Michelle Lalonde, "Innu Vow to Step Up Court Fights, Protests Against Military Flying." *Globe and Mail*, 17 April 1989, p.A7.

had made a procedural error. It declared the trial null and void but did not order a new trial as the Crown had requested.<sup>21</sup> Nearly 200 other Labrador Innu face similar charges.

In February 1990, a panel assembled by the Innu accused the Government of fraud in the conduct of the EIS. The Innu have launched two court challenges to the low-level flight training. One seeks a permanent injunction on such flying and the other is based on the Rafferty-Alameda dam project in Saskatchewan in which the court ruled that a project cannot proceed while an environmental assessment hearing is pending.<sup>22</sup>

A "Federal Environmental Assessment Panel" composed of twenty-two independent scientists was hired by Environment Canada for public review of the EIS. It reported in April 1990 that the study contained more than 100 flaws. The panel called publicly for a reduction in low-level training flights over Labrador to counter "the public perception that the environmental panel is biased in favor of the military."<sup>23</sup>

The second process determining whether or not Canada would be the recipient of an NTFWTC was a NATO assessment of the relative merits of the two candidates. The outcome of that process was announced by NATO defence ministers meeting in Brussels on 22 and 23 May. In somewhat of a surprise move, NATO rejected both prospective sites on the basis of their merits. Less surprising was the decision in "light of the evolution of the international security environment and of pressures on the defence budgets of member states," to defer indefinitely the decision on a fighter training centre. However, this "left open the possibility of creating such a centre elsewhere than at Goose Bay or Konya should a requirement be identified at a later date."<sup>24</sup>

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

The momentous changes taking place in Europe in 1989 and 1990 kept the issue of Canada's military commitment to NATO in the forefront of discussion in this country. In a year-end interview in December 1989 Prime Minister Mulroney said: "It would be a horrendous mistake for Canada to consider withdrawing its NATO troops from Europe while Eastern European countries are undergoing such massive political changes."<sup>25</sup> The Prime Minister described NATO as an

---

<sup>21</sup> "Court quashes Innu not-guilty verdict." *Globe and Mail*, 4 October 1989, p. A9.

<sup>22</sup> Craig McInnes, "Ottawa accused of fraud over study." *Globe and Mail*, 14 February 1990, p. A9.

<sup>23</sup> Ross Howard, "Federal panel calls for cut in jet flights over Labrador." *Globe and Mail*, 4 April 1990, p. A1.

<sup>24</sup> National Defence, "NATO Defence Ministers Decide Against NATO Training Centre For Goose Bay." *News Release AFN:24/90*, 22 May 1990.

<sup>25</sup> "NATO pullout rejected." *Winnipeg Free Press*, 24 December 1989, p. 15.

instrument of stability, predictability and peace. Still, the issue of Canada's commitment to NATO, especially considering budget cuts, was worrisome for Canadians and their allies. Clarifying Canada's current contribution to NATO before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs on 19 October 1989, Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain said:

My point would be that we have not reduced anything yet. Indeed, since April we have further enhanced what we have. We have said we will place on hold all our future planned acquisitions to enhance or replace the equipment of our commitments to Europe. That has not necessarily pleased NATO. On the other hand we have not stopped doing anything we had planned to do at this point.<sup>26</sup>

On 5 December 1989 Mr. Mulroney was quoted as saying that "if and when there is an agreement at the Vienna talks on conventional forces, then Canada might expect to reduce its contingent of 7,500 troops in Europe on the same proportional basis that other NATO allies reduce their troop strength."<sup>27</sup>

In January 1990, at the East-West "Seminar on Military Doctrine and Strategies," General de Chastelain drew attention to the different aspects of Canada's contribution to NATO. He pointed out that "Canada's military role in NATO has just as much to do with the forces we deploy in North America, as it does with those we deploy in the eastern Atlantic and in Europe."<sup>28</sup> De Chastelain also observed that, numerically, the forces Canada stations in Europe are less significant militarily than the political message of their being there. He insisted that Canada and its allies had much to gain from a continued Canadian military presence in Europe: "For [Canada], it gives an extra dimension to our bilateral relationship on the North American continent, at the same time as it gives us a place at the table in Brussels, Vienna, and other CSCE fora."<sup>29</sup>

In February 1990, External Affairs Minister Clark acknowledged that "NATO's long-term relevance will hinge on its ability to supplement its military role with a political mission."<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 5 (28 September 1989 and 19 October 1989), p. 19.

<sup>27</sup> "NATO briefed on summit." *Globe and Mail*, 5 December 1989, p. A2.

<sup>28</sup> National Defence, "Address by General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain Chief of the Defence Staff To the Seminar on Military Doctrine and Strategies," Vienna, Austria, 17 January 1989, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>30</sup> Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech...at McGill University Department of Political Science and Economics." Secretary of State for External Affairs *Statement* 90/09, 5 February 1990.

He reiterated this theme in a speech delivered at Humber College in Toronto, where he proposed that NATO reduce the size of its military force and assume a more political role:

That is a change which Canada fully supports and which meets Canadian interests. But it is not enough to simply declare that NATO must become more political....it must be made more political .... NATO must review urgently and comprehensively all aspects of its nuclear and conventional strategy. It makes little sense to retain nuclear weapons whose only target can be our new friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It makes little sense to retain a military strategy which is based on a scenario of a surprise attack across a front which no longer exists and where surprise is no longer possible. And it makes little sense to continue to retain in Europe the largest peace-time deployment of military force in the history of the world.<sup>31</sup>

Mr. Clark was careful in his speech not to discount entirely NATO's military aspect. Noting that the possibility of instability in Europe remained, he stated: "Therefore, a strong military mandate for NATO continues to be valid and the North American commitment to Europe represented by the presence of Canadian and American troops there is crucial as we strive for strategic stability at significantly lower levels of military force."<sup>32</sup> However, he advised that NATO must lead the process of change. Specifically, he recommended regular meetings between the Soviet foreign minister and NATO foreign ministers and between the leaders of the USSR and the Western Alliance, enhanced roles in confidence-building and verification activities by NATO, including the establishment of a Verification Centre, and movement away from a rigid forward defence to a more flexible approach involving multinational units.<sup>33</sup>

On 8 March 1990, Liberal leadership candidate Jean Chretien said that Canada should remain a political member of NATO but pull its troops out of Europe. Mr. Chretien was cautious, however, not to specify a timetable for withdrawal: "I hope that the time will soon come when we can withdraw our forces from Europe as part of concerted progress towards a new European order."<sup>34</sup>

During the visit of Mr. Gorbachev to Ottawa on 29 and 30 May, Prime Minister Mulroney, too, argued that it was now possible to expand the original intent of Article 2 in the NATO charter, which defines the organization as a political as well as a military bloc.<sup>35</sup> His aim was to calm the fears expressed by the Soviet leadership concerning a unified Germany in NATO:

---

<sup>31</sup> Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech...at Humber College." Secretary of State for External Affairs *Statement* 90/32, 26 May 1990, p.3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Shelley Page, "Get Our Troops Out of Europe Chretien Says." *Toronto Star*, 9 March 1990, p. A3.

<sup>35</sup> Stephen Handelman, "Gorbachev Visit Was a Giant Step." *Toronto Star*, 2 June 1990, p. D1.

A reorientation of thinking based on Article 2 of the NATO charter, if better negotiated and properly enforced, could give a great deal of comfort to those in the Soviet Union who remember the scars of war.<sup>36</sup>

In a speech delivered in Montreal on 20 June, Mr. Clark expanded on his vision of NATO shifting to a more political footing,<sup>37</sup> saying that Canada intended to apply much of its effort to this task. He noted that he had told the NATO foreign ministers' meeting at Turnberry, Scotland, that "we must devote our energy to reforming NATO in such a way that no country will perceive it as a threat."<sup>38</sup> Mr. Clark said that the "Turnberry message" of "friendship and co-operation" was largely the result of a Canadian initiative ("Canadian diplomats drafted the first version") and "shows the dynamic role Canada can play in NATO."<sup>39</sup> Mr. Clark concluded: "Movement of the Alliance toward a more political role is thus a very positive element which, with successful negotiations on disarmament and arms control, should contribute to the establishment of a new security system in Europe."<sup>40</sup>

In March 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney expressed doubts that the NATO training base would be built in Labrador. His prognosis, which proved to be prescient, was that the entire undertaking was in doubt:

Given the recent events in Eastern Europe I'd be rather skeptical that even if it [the base proposal] met the environmental tests and satisfied aboriginal peoples...I somehow doubt if NATO would in these new circumstances decide to proceed.<sup>41</sup>

The following day, Mr. McKnight attempted to clarify the Prime Minister's statement: "What he said is that in light of the changes...he would not be surprised -- it was his personal opinion -- that NATO may make a decision not to go ahead.... That's not a signal at all."<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> Stephen Handelman, "Gorbachev Pleads for 'Timeout' on Future of Reunified Germany." *Toronto Star*, 31 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> Joe Clark, "Canada's Stake in Europe: Notes for a Speech...at a Luncheon Sponsored by the Conseil Des Relations Internationales de Montreal." Secretary of State for External Affairs *Statement* 90/38, 20 June 1990.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>41</sup> Kevin Cox, "Mulroney 'skeptical' low-level base will be built." *Globe and Mail*, 7 March 1990, p. A1.

<sup>42</sup> Susan Delacourt, "NATO base still possible in Labrador." *Globe and Mail*, 8 March 1990, p. A5.

Following NATO's May cancellation of plans to build an NTFWTC, Mr. McKnight said he regretted the decision, since the project would have been an economic boon to the Goose Bay region and would have given Canada a major role in meeting NATO's security objectives.<sup>43</sup> Canadian Ambassador to NATO Gordon Smith described the decision as "understandable in the circumstances, although disappointing to Canada."<sup>44</sup> Mr. McKnight was careful to point out that it would not affect current and future training operations conducted at Goose Bay by the air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands.<sup>45</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 27 November 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney briefed the House on his visit to Moscow. He referred to the fact that the people of Eastern Europe and the leadership of the USSR were handling the process of change very prudently, and emphasized that this period of transition would require careful management. In this regard, he said:

NATO retains its great importance because it is the locus for discussion of the Western response to political change in the East and for coordinating positions in the crucial conventional arms reduction discussions in Vienna and on the superpower negotiations on strategic weapons in Geneva.<sup>46</sup>

Liberal Leader John Turner remained unsatisfied by the Prime Minister's remarks. He thought that the Government should provide specifics of its policy with regard to the changes taking place in Europe: "What are the implications for NATO? What are the implications for Canada's position in this alliance? What direction do we want NATO to take?" asked Turner.<sup>47</sup> Also responding to the Prime Minister's statement, NDP MP Bill Blaikie offered some concrete suggestions to the Government in regard to NATO:

We recommend that the Prime Minister commit himself and his government to trying to eliminate the first use policy of nuclear weapons within NATO; that the Prime Minister and his Government commit itself to putting at least a moratorium on Canada's participation in the FOFA strategy of NATO...and take a different position than it did with respect to the modernization of nuclear weapons in Europe.

---

<sup>43</sup> Larry Pynn, "NATO Chiefs Shoot Down Labrador Training Centre." *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 May 1990, p. A6.

<sup>44</sup> J. A. C. Lewis, "NATO Training Base Axed." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 13 no. 22 (2 June 1990), p. 1076.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>46</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6237.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6240.

Finally, we recommend that Canada should seek, within the context of the mutual balance force reductions negotiations, to bring Canadian troops home from Europe, something which I see the Prime Minister has already talked about. Certainly if that can be done in the context of negotiated reductions, that is the way to do it.<sup>48</sup>

In defence of his Government's "steady as she goes" approach to NATO despite drastically changed international circumstances, the Prime Minister assured NDP Leader Audrey McLaughlin that it was an approach favoured even by the leadership of the Soviet Union. Referring to McLaughlin, he said:

I draw to her attention the comments made to me and the Secretary of State for External Affairs by President Gorbachev. He said that the most imprudent thing that could be done at this time, given the enormity of the changes in eastern Europe, would be changes in the structures of the alliances because at this particular time any such changes could be destabilizing with regard to the efforts that he and others are trying to bring about.<sup>49</sup>

In fact, argued the Prime Minister, it was the solidarity of NATO that in large measure had brought about the changes that were occurring.

On 1 February 1990, following President Bush's proposal for deeper reductions in Soviet and American troops in Europe, Liberal MP William Rompkey asked the government to clarify its position regarding Canadian forces stationed in Europe. The Prime Minister replied: "The Government of Canada is part of NATO. We have always indicated and conveyed our intention to act in concert with our allies. We will be doing precisely that."<sup>50</sup>

In a statement made to the House on 14 February 1990, Mr. Blaikie argued that it was time to look beyond NATO:

Instead, we should be talking about a new common security system for a Europe that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals, a common security system into which NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be absorbed and joyfully disappear.<sup>51</sup>

On 31 May 1990 Mr. Blaikie criticized the new approach to Europe articulated by Mr. Clark in his speech at Humber College. This new approach was explained to the House by Mr. Clark as: "A new direction for NATO, an expanded role for the CSCE and an intensified relationship with the European Economic Community -- those are the institutional pillars of our new policy toward Europe."<sup>52</sup> In opposition to this vision Mr. Blaikie said:

---

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6244.

<sup>49</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 December 1989, p. 6552.

<sup>50</sup> *Commons Debates*, 1 February 1990, p. 7719.

<sup>51</sup> *Commons Debates*, 14 February 1990, p. 8307.

<sup>52</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1990, p. 12098.

I do not accept the analysis that the CSCE and NATO are complementary institutions. I would have preferred to have heard the minister talking about the CSCE being one of the fora in which we will discover or create or agree upon the new architecture into which NATO will finally be absorbed and eventually disappear as we now know it.<sup>53</sup>

Conservative MP Girve Fretze defended the Government's position on maintaining a viable Atlantic Alliance: "First of all, it is important to remember that even after the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Soviet Union will retain the most powerful conventional and nuclear forces in Europe.... This underlines the need for western countries to continue the type of successful collective defence arrangements that NATO has embodied for this past 40 years."<sup>54</sup> Mr. Fretze continued:

To ensure that the changing nature of European politics remains on a peaceful path, NATO can and indeed should remain a cornerstone of European security, providing a body where some difficult western security issues, from arms control to German unification, can be dealt with in a co-ordinated fashion.<sup>55</sup>

Lastly, Mr. Fretze declared that Canada would "continue to play an active role in the alliance as it adjusts to a changing Europe, and every attempt will be made to harmonize Canada's contribution to NATO with the events in Europe and the defence policy review currently under way."<sup>56</sup>

The shifting tide of East-West relations and its implications for Canada's participation in NATO were a constant theme in the ongoing debate in Parliament about low-level flying and the NATO training base. On 28 November 1989, NDP defence critic Derek Blackburn asked the Prime Minister to help bury the cold war by cancelling Canada's bid for the tactical training centre.<sup>57</sup> In a question to the Minister of Defence a few weeks earlier, he asked:

At a time when a major effort is being made in Europe to reduce east-west tensions and when both alliances are undertaking confidence-building measures, as indeed are the two superpowers, does the minister actually believe that this is the time for Canada to be pushing for an expansion of NATO's military activities?<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12102.

<sup>54</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1990, p. 12141.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12142.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12143.

<sup>57</sup> *Commons Debates*, 28 November 1989, p. 6355.

<sup>58</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 November 1989, p. 5602.

On 12 February 1990, NDP Leader Audrey McLaughlin returned to this theme. Referring to the Prime Minister's address to the Open Skies Conference that began that morning, she asked Defence Minister McKnight:

This morning the Prime Minister said that the cold war is over. However, at the same time the government persists with plans to welcome a NATO tactical fighter centre to Goose Bay, Labrador, a move that would involve the largest military expansion in Canada since the cold war days of the 1950s.

I ask the minister to explain why he is even considering this now?<sup>59</sup>

The Government response to such questions, usually articulated by Mr. McKnight, was that Canada had to act in concert with its NATO allies: "...we should continue to have prudence. We should continue to work through the two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to reduce the presence of arms in this world."<sup>60</sup> Mr. McKnight criticized suggestions that Canada cancel its bid for the training base as encouraging Canada to act unilaterally. He also stressed that contrary to the opinion that low-level flight training supported an aggressive NATO strategy: "It is defensive training. It is training that all air forces throughout both the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Alliance continue to do and we will continue to do."<sup>61</sup> The charge that low-level flight training supported an aggressive military strategy had been made in the House by NDP Member Bill Blaikie on 8 November 1989, when he said that the flight exercises were representative of parts of NATO's FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack) strategy.<sup>62</sup>

The findings of the Environmental Impact Study generated considerable controversy in the House, especially given the preliminary assessment of that study by twenty-two independent scientists that it contained almost 100 major flaws. When asking the government to restrict the number of low-level flights over Goose Bay, NDP Member Dan Heap drew attention to some of the flaws cited by the independent review panel. He pointed out that the study did not consider the special effect of noise on children; insufficiently attended to issues of health; did not properly assess the economic and social costs of the project and was grossly inadequate in its assessment of economic benefits; and inadequately assessed the past, present and future impacts of fuel dumping

---

<sup>59</sup> *Commons Debates*, 12 February 1990, p. 8179.

<sup>60</sup> *Commons Debates*, 28 November 1989, p. 6355.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>62</sup> *Commons Debates*, 8 November 1990, p. 5703. FOFA is a strategy whereby NATO, after being the victim of an initial assault by the Warsaw Pact, would attempt, with aircraft or precision-guided weapons, to blunt the effectiveness and sustainability of the assault by attacking the enemy's rear, or "follow-on" forces. The offensive interpretation of this strategy arises from the fact that such counter-attacks would likely take place beyond the front lines of battle and perhaps deep into enemy territory.

in rivers and lakes. Mr. Heap, therefore, called on the government to start a new EIS and halt low-level flying until that study was complete.<sup>63</sup>

In reply to the suggestion of a new EIS, the then Minister of the Environment Lucien Bouchard stated:

Mr Speaker, I can give the House the assurance that my department is working closely with all government departments, including National Defence, on the environmental assessment process. We have always said, in this House and elsewhere, that the government has made commitments it intends to respect concerning the implementation of environmental assessment studies. The same applies to this particular case.<sup>64</sup>

Mr. Bouchard further insisted that "the government has undertaken to follow exactly what is required in terms of environmental evaluation;" "the government," he said, "will fulfil its obligations completely."<sup>65</sup>

On 7 March 1990, Mr. Mulroney was compelled in the House to clarify his comments concerning the prospects of NATO's Tactical Fighter and Weapons Training Centre being built. He responded to a suggestion made by NDP Member Robert Skelly who said that rather than await the NATO decision Canada should exercise its sovereignty and cancel its bid for the base. Mr. Mulroney countered that in spite of his personal feelings about the prospects for a NATO training base, he did not consider the issue "obsolete". He chided the NDP for what he said amounted to opposing the creation of thousands of jobs in Newfoundland and Labrador.<sup>66</sup> Mr. Skelly replied on 3 April:

We want to see jobs created in Newfoundland and Labrador.... We in this party, and I believe most Canadians, do not want to see jobs created in Newfoundland and Labrador at the expense of the Innu people and the environment in Labrador. We do not want to see jobs created at the expense of destroying the way of life of those people or undermining of the very underpinnings of their culture.<sup>67</sup>

On 4 April, the Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins told the House that steps were being taken to address the effects of low-level flying on the natives and the environment of Happy Valley-Goose Bay: "We have agreed to introduce mitigative measures, to introduce

---

<sup>63</sup> *Commons Debates*, 13 February 1990, pp. 8302-8304.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8267.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> *Commons Debates*, 7 March 1990, pp. 8916-8917.

<sup>67</sup> *Commons Debates*, 3 April 1990, pp. 10163-10164.

monitoring to ensure that we avoid areas with wildlife or with people and to ensure that that activity is carried out in a very responsible manner."<sup>68</sup>

Following the announcement by NATO in May 1990 that it would not proceed with the NATO Tactical Fighter Centre, Mr. Skelly congratulated the Innu people for their successful opposition. However, he reminded the House that "The cancellation of the base does not mean an end to the 7,000 over-flights a year already conducted out of Goose Bay. Under agreement they will continue for another six years.... If Canada could show sufficient respect for the Innu, it would abandon all low-level test flights in Labrador now."<sup>69</sup>

In the wake of Mr. Clark's Humber College speech in May calling on NATO to move away from a rigid forward defence policy, New Democratic Party Member Bill Blaikie commented:

A lot of the training that goes on [at Goose Bay] has to do with the forward defence strategy of NATO. If this is a strategy that the government thinks ought to be phased out or abandoned as a result of the need for changes in NATO's posture, then it could also, it seems to me, show some leadership on this and not just wait until NATO says that they do not want to do this anymore. Canada should be in a position to say that this is something that we do not want to be a part of anymore....<sup>70</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Alexander, Michael, "NATO's Role in a Changing World." *NATO Review*, vol. 38 no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 1-6.

Buteux, Paul, "NATO Strategy: Where Do We Go From Here?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 6 (June 1990), pp. 17 and 19-21.

Clark, Joe, "Canada and the New Europe: Notes for a Speech...at Humber College." Secretary of State for External Affairs *Statement* 90/32 (26 May 1990), 10 pp.

Cortier, Peter, "Quo Vadis NATO?" *Survival*, vol. 32 no. 2 (March/April 1990), pp. 141-157.

Eyskens, Mark, "The History of the Future." *NATO Review*, vol. 38 no. 3 (June 1990), pp. 1-8.

Gagné, Jérôme, "Les Innus face au système judiciaire canadien." *Option Paix*, vol. 8 no. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 23-24.

Kiss, Laszlo, "European Security and Intra-Alliance Reform Processes." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 21 no. 2 (June 1990), pp. 175-182.

---

<sup>68</sup> *Commons Debates*, 4 April 1990, p. 10176.

<sup>69</sup> *Commons Debates*, 23 May 1990, p. 11704.

<sup>70</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1990, p. 12102.

Latham, Andrew and Slack, Michael, "Security Policy at the Crossroads: What Direction for Canada in Europe." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 6 (June 1990), pp. 23-29.

Nunn, Sam, "A New Strategy for NATO." *European Affairs*, vol. 4 no. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 13-21.

Robinson, Bill, "What Role for NATO." *The Ploughshares Monitor*, vol. 11 no. 1 (March 1990), pp. 17-18 and 22.

Shevardnadze, Eduard, "Towards a Greater Europe -- The Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO in a Renewing Europe." *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, vol. 35 no. 3 (June 1990), pp. 18-19 and 21-22.

#### FURTHER READING

Blackburn, Derek, "Canadian Sovereignty, Security and Defence: A New Democratic Response to the White Paper," 31 July 1987 (26 pp.).

Bland, Douglas and Young, John, "Trends in Canadian Security Policy and Commitments." *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 15 no. 1 (Fall 1988), pp. 113-130.

Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment*, 5 June 1987 (89 pp.).

Department of National Defence, *Defence Update: 1988-89*, March 1988 (58 pp.).

Hicks, Robert, "Canada's Role in the North Atlantic Assembly." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 18 no. 4 (Fall 1988), pp. 57-58.

Holmes, J. W., Bow, M. N., and Halstead, J., *Canada, NATO and Arms Control*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, *Issue Brief* No. 6, March 1987 (27 pp.).

International Affairs Committee of the New Democratic Party, "Canada's Stake in Common Security," April 1988 (41 pp.).

Keating, Tom, and Pratt, Larry, *Canada, NATO and the Bomb: The Western Alliance in Crisis*. Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd., 1988 (246 pp.).

Sharpe, J. L., "The Maple Leaf in Europe." *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, vol. 33 no. 3 (1988), pp. 82-87.

Sloan, Stanley, *Nato's Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain*. Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 1985 (243 pp.).

Turner, John, "Building the Canadian Nation: Sovereignty and Foreign Policy in the 1990s" (Speech to the Canada Conference III, Vancouver, 7 February 1988).

#### CROSS REFERENCES

Defence Planning and Procurement



## 20. SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF)

### BACKGROUND

An increasingly significant question in recent years has been that of the modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear forces (SNF). Over the past decade, successive NATO decisions led to quantitative reductions in the Alliance's theatre nuclear capabilities. Not only were about 2,400 short-range systems unilaterally eliminated, but, under the 1987 INF Treaty, a significant portion of NATO's intermediate- and medium-range capabilities was eliminated as well. The desire to maintain a credible deterrent against Warsaw Pact forces, however, led to an Allied consensus that such reductions proceed in tandem with a commitment to modernize NATO's remaining short-range nuclear systems. This principle was asserted in 1983 at a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in Montebello, Canada, and was reaffirmed in successive NATO communiqués. Modernization plans have included replacing 88 Lance missiles currently deployed in Europe with an improved version. The question of follow-on systems was to be dealt with by the Alliance in 1992.

Allied enthusiasm for modernization varied, however. The United States and Britain at first strongly endorsed such plans, contending that modernization of SNF was necessary to offset Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces and thus to ensure a credible NATO deterrent. Other Allies, particularly West Germany, expressed unease with such plans on the grounds that an overwhelming proportion of the weapons involved were stationed on their territory and thus placed their homelands at risk.

In April 1989, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called for a postponement of a final decision on deployment of a follow-on to the Lance missile until after the West German elections in 1990, together with immediate negotiations on SNF. The United States and Britain, both favouring an early commitment to modernization and preferring to leave questions of SNF negotiation for the indefinite future, opposed the proposal. The Allied impasse was exacerbated by Moscow's arms control initiatives. On 12 May 1989, in an effort to increase momentum towards the removal of all theatre nuclear systems, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced the unilateral withdrawal of 500 short-range nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe.

In the weeks that followed, inter-allied bargaining resulted in some movement toward a compromise. By the beginning of the NATO Summit in Brussels on 29 to 30 May 1989, Washington had acquiesced in Bonn's desire to postpone a final decision on the deployment of a follow-on to Lance, and had also put forth a plan to begin discussions with Moscow on short-range nuclear systems. However, questions of when negotiations would commence, the extent of the reductions envisaged, and when the Alliance would reaffirm the need for developing a follow-on to Lance, remained unresolved.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> "Compromise on Missiles Heads Off NATO Rift." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 5 (June-July 1989), p. 22.

At their Summit on 29 May 1989, the NATO Heads of Government agreed to hold negotiations with Moscow for "partial" reductions of SNF once cuts in CFE began. Actual reductions of short-range nuclear forces, however, would begin only after a CFE accord had been fully implemented. As for Lance modernization, the Allies reasserted that nuclear forces should be "kept up to date," and added that the issue of a follow-on to Lance would be dealt with in 1992, in light of "overall security developments."<sup>2</sup>

On 6 July 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that Soviet short-range missiles would be reduced "without delay" if NATO agreed to negotiations on such systems. While the Soviet proposal seemed designed to force a reconsideration of the position adopted at the NATO Summit (i.e., that SNF negotiation could proceed only after a CFE accord had been signed and implemented), the Allied position remained unchanged.

At a two-day meeting of the NPG in Portugal in October 1989, NATO defence ministers said that they welcomed announced Warsaw Pact unilateral force reductions but noted that "this would have little effect on the Warsaw Pact's nuclear capability and, in particular, on their continuing massive superiority in short-range nuclear missile systems." Consequently, the defence ministers reaffirmed NATO's commitment to a strategy of deterrence based on "an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary; and, that where nuclear forces are concerned, land-, sea-, and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles, in the present circumstances and as far as can be foreseen will be needed in Europe."<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the NPG called upon the Soviet Union to unilaterally reduce its short-range missile systems to current NATO levels.

In his opening statement to a news conference following the NPG meeting, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner stated that "even if we reach a balance of conventional forces in Europe, we shall still need modern and survivable nuclear forces to underpin a credible deterrent posture."<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the NPG ordered that a study be undertaken on the role of nuclear weapons in Western Europe once Soviet conventional forces were reduced. A senior US official described the effort as a "conceptual study to talk about why we have nuclear weapons, what role they play in NATO strategy, and whether a CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) agreement would change that."<sup>5</sup>

The monumental nature and rapid pace of change that swept Europe and the Soviet Union in the latter part of 1989 and early 1990 forced NATO leaders to reassess their plans for ground-based short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Initially, bearing in mind the inevitability of German reunification, the Alliance members began to discuss alternatives to basing the bulk of

---

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23 and 27.

<sup>3</sup> NATO, *Press Release* M-NPG-2(89)30, 25 October 1989.

<sup>4</sup> NATO, *Press Release* (89)3, 25 October 1989.

<sup>5</sup> "NATO ministers order A-arms Study." *Montreal Gazette*, 25 October 1989, p. H10.

their ground-based nuclear weapons in West Germany. Other options explored included stockpiling unassembled Follow-on To Lance (FOTL) missiles in Britain or Italy, where they could be rapidly set up for launch in time of crisis, and redistributing the Alliance's nuclear-capable air wings among NATO allies other than West Germany and including France.<sup>6</sup> This latter option reportedly included immediate negotiations with the Soviet Union to eliminate the remaining land-based nuclear missiles in Europe, and the unilateral withdrawal by NATO of the 1,600 nuclear-tipped artillery shells.

In March 1990, US House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin revealed that the Pentagon's latest "net assessment" had concluded that for the first time in the postwar era the Western Alliance could now defeat any conventional Soviet military invasion of Europe without resorting to nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup>

The gradual reassessment of the role of SNF in NATO strategy culminated in April 1990 when reports surfaced that the Bush Administration was developing an arms control initiative that would include cancelling deployment of the FOTL in West Germany. Although formal announcement of such plans had to await consultation with the allies, the Pentagon quietly halted all development work on the missile in April. Administration specialists appeared to recognize that the value of short-range nuclear weapons that would explode on the territory of a reunified Germany or in Eastern European nations with democratically elected governments was dubious.<sup>8</sup> Instead of the FOTL, NATO began to consider seriously plans for deployment in Western Europe on airplanes of a new nuclear-tipped Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM). The TASM, also known as the SRAM-T (Short-Range Attack Missile -- Tactical), is scheduled for deployment in 1995, the same date as was the FOTL.

The decision to cancel the FOTL was formally announced by President Bush on 3 May 1990. At the same time, the President proposed pushing ahead the timetable for opening negotiations with the Soviet Union about short-range nuclear missiles and artillery in Europe. The original timetable had called for negotiations about SNF to begin once a CFE treaty was signed and implementation was underway. The new position was that negotiations could begin after a CFE treaty was signed but before it was implemented. President Bush also announced that he was ordering a halt to the modernization of nuclear artillery stockpiles. These proposals were adopted by the NATO foreign ministers at a meeting in Brussels on the day they were announced.

---

<sup>6</sup> See: Peter Adams and Caleb Baker, "Politics May Push New Lance to Britain." *Defense News*, 5 February 1990, pp. 1 and 53; and Peter Pringle, "Bush to seek NATO nuclear bases in France." *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 April 1990, p. A12.

<sup>7</sup> Molly Moore, "Pentagon Said to Imply Need for Atom Arms in Europe Has Faded." *Washington Post*, 14 March 1990, p. A12.

<sup>8</sup> Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Plans to Cut Short-Range Arms in Germany." *New York Times*, 19 April 1990, p. A12.

Later in May, at a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Kananaskis, Alberta, division arose among the NATO allies over the specifics of the new nuclear policy. There was widespread consensus that nuclear weapons should still be a part of the NATO deterrent in Western Europe. However, the Dutch and Germans argued that nuclear artillery shells should be removed from West German soil quickly, preferably by the end of 1991. The Americans were more cautious, believing that the future of nuclear artillery should be decided as part of a broad review of NATO's nuclear posture and strategy.

In the Final Communiqué issued at Kananaskis, the ministers acknowledged that while the principal elements of NATO's nuclear policy remained valid there was a need to reassess the future qualitative and quantitative requirements for NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces. Specifically, they noted that the changes in Eastern Europe and the prospect of a CFE treaty had resulted in a diminishing requirement for nuclear systems of the shortest range, and that sub-strategic nuclear systems offering both flexibility and longer range would assume relatively greater importance (this was interpreted by some as an endorsement of TASM).<sup>9</sup> They therefore formally welcomed President Bush's decision to cancel both the FOTL and further modernization of United States nuclear artillery shells in Europe.

As part of this reassessment NATO decided to direct US General John Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to start a comprehensive study of nuclear force requirements. His task would be to establish the minimum requirement given a CFE agreement and the changed situation in Eastern Europe. TASM was expected to become the mainstay of NATO's future nuclear arsenal, though Secretary-General Woerner said that there was no sense of urgency for a debate on the political merits of TASM since the Lance would be in service until 1995.<sup>10</sup>

On 5 June 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally withdraw sixty tactical nuclear missile launchers, 250 atomic artillery systems and 1,500 nuclear warheads from central Europe. The reaction from NATO was restrained; US Secretary of State said that it was hard to determine how many of these systems had been scheduled for withdrawal already under the terms of President Gorbachev's December 1988 UN announcement of unilateral troop cuts. Furthermore, he stated that these weapons would be removed anyway as Soviet troops pulled out of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and eventually East Germany.<sup>11</sup>

Meeting in Turnberry, Scotland on 7-8 June, the NATO foreign ministers formally endorsed President Bush's proposal that negotiations on US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapon systems in Europe begin shortly after a CFE agreement is concluded. On 15 June, it was revealed

---

<sup>9</sup> NATO, *Press Release*, M-NPG-1(90)24, 10 May 1990.

<sup>10</sup> "NATO Review of Nuclear Forces Centers on Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, vol. 132 no. 20 (14 May 1990), pp. 29-30.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "Soviets Promise to Pull Back Some Tactical Nuclear Arms." *New York Times*, 6 June 1990, p. A10.

that the Soviet Union had proposed to the United States an early start to such negotiations, in September or October, prior to the signing of a CFE treaty.<sup>12</sup> This proposal was rejected by the United States and other NATO leaders, however. It apparently called for inclusion of France's short-range nuclear systems in the proposed talks and for considering air-launched, as well as ground-launched, systems.<sup>13</sup>

Despite cancellation of the FOTL, the decision to forego modernization of nuclear artillery in Europe, and their stated willingness to begin negotiations on SNF as soon as a CFE treaty was signed, Alliance leaders decided at the end of June not to adopt a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons in the event of war. This decision effectively removed the first-use policy from discussion in a strategy review scheduled to begin at the NATO London summit in July.<sup>14</sup>

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In a speech delivered on 26 May 1990 at Humber College in Toronto, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark declared: "NATO must review urgently and comprehensively all aspects of its nuclear and conventional strategy. It makes little sense to retain nuclear weapons whose only target can be our new friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany."<sup>15</sup> Initially, those words were interpreted by some to mean that Canada had rejected NATO's longstanding policy of maintaining nuclear weapons in Europe.<sup>16</sup> But External Affairs officials were quick to clarify that Mr. Clark was referring only to land-based short-range nuclear missiles and artillery when he made his statement.

The meeting of NATO defence ministers at Kananaskis, Alberta on 10-11 May had raised the issue of Canada's position on the deployment of the TASM in Europe. On that subject a senior Canadian official said that Canada had not yet decided which nuclear systems it would support.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Reuter News Agency, "Nuclear Arms Talks Proposal Rebuffed." *Globe and Mail*, 16 June 1990, p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Edward Cody, "Soviets Ask Ban on Short-Range Arms." *Washington Post*, 16 June 1990, p. A19.

<sup>14</sup> R. Jeffrey Smith, "NATO Again Rejects 'No First Use' Policy." *Washington Post*, 28 June 1990, p. A36.

<sup>15</sup> Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech...at Humber College." Secretary of State for External Affairs *Statement* 90/32, 26 May 1990, p. 3.

<sup>16</sup> See: Paul Mooney, "NATO Policy in Europe Outdated, Says Clark." *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Canadian Press, "No Change in NATO Policy -- External Affairs Officials." *Montreal Gazette*, 28 May 1990, p. 8.

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 17 May 1990, following the Kananaskis meeting, New Democratic Party Member Bill Blaikie told Defence Minister McKnight that "Many Canadians were disappointed that [he], on behalf of the government, did not show any Canadian leadership on the issue of the modernization of nuclear weapons." He continued: "Why is the Canadian government not taking a stand against all forms of modernization, not just the elimination of ground based missiles but air launched and sea launched cruise missiles?"<sup>18</sup> Mr. McKnight replied that he welcomed the decision of President Bush to cancel modernization of the Lance and of nuclear artillery. However:

I am sure the hon. member understands, although he does not seem to from the way his question was phrased, that we will not be able to disinvent nuclear technology. As a mix of deterrents in the defensive alliance, NATO, we have to maintain the mix that has been successful in keeping peace in Europe for 45 years.<sup>19</sup>

Mr. Blaikie persisted: "Why is there this insistence on maintaining a mix of weapons against a people who are no longer our enemies, if they ever were?"<sup>20</sup>

On 31 May, Mr. Clark repeated in the House the statement he had made at Humber College concerning nuclear weapons in Europe. Mr. Blaikie responded that "we would be much more confident that what the Secretary of State for External Affairs says reflects government policy if the Minister of National Defence did not pour cold water on the idea...giving us the standard NATO line about the mix of weapons that has kept the peace for 45 years..."<sup>21</sup> He said that one of the ways that Canada could show leadership on this issue would be to make a decision not to be party to testing of future weapons systems such as "the tactical air to surface missile and other potentially modernized nuclear weapons that may come into force to replace the ground-based missiles, both the Lance and its successor, which have been cancelled."<sup>22</sup> Mr. Clark replied:

I want to assure the member and the House that not only is the government considering the evolution of SNF policy to which I referred, but so is NATO as a whole. It was discussed at the recent meetings at Kananaskis in Canada. It was discussed at the meetings my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, attended in Brussels last week and it will be on the agenda in Turnberry, Scotland, for a NATO meeting on Wednesday of next week.

---

<sup>18</sup> *Commons Debates*, 17 May 1990, p. 11559.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>21</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1990, p. 12101.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12102.

We will take part in those discussions, not by removing Canada from the alliance consensus, but rather by trying to shape and affect that alliance consensus.<sup>23</sup>

Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy pursued Mr. Blaikie's theme, pointing out:

On the one hand we had the Minister of National Defence as part of a NATO meeting out in Alberta a couple of weeks ago endorsing the concept of maintaining nuclear weapons in NATO and saying that that is the way it is going to be. On the other hand, last Saturday night the Secretary of State for External Affairs was saying: "Maybe we shouldn't do that". Who do we believe? Which minister is speaking for the government? It is hard to determine.<sup>24</sup>

Conservative MP Gerve Fretz replied that throughout NATO's history, nuclear weapons had provided a powerful inhibition to military conflict and therefore that the alliance was correct to maintain them. However, the changes in East-West relations along with the prospects of a CFE treaty suggested a diminishing need for NATO to field short-range weapons: "Consonant with this perception, Canada and the other alliance countries welcomed the Bush administration's decision to terminate the modernization of nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe as well as the development of the follow-on-to-ance missile."<sup>25</sup>

On 5 June 1990, Liberal MP Jesse Flis criticized the Department of External Affairs on the grounds that its Minister had rejected NATO's policy of maintaining nuclear weapons in Europe while other senior officials had said that Canada continued to support the strategy of maintaining a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons there. Mr. Flis went on to argue that if NATO gave up its nuclear weapons in Europe, it might find the Soviet Union less paranoid about a united Germany. Finally, the Member declared:

I truly feel that isolating the United States, Britain and France, the only members of NATO who are developing air-launched nuclear weapons to replace land-based nuclear missiles and artillery, and showing them up as countries with misplaced and outdated policies will serve to further the call from the international community to re-evaluate global priorities.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12105.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12125.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12142.

<sup>26</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 June 1990, p. 12322.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Bosch, Olivia (ed.), *Short-Range Nuclear Forces: Modernisation and Arms Control*. London: The Council for Arms Control, 1989 (74 pp.).

Cannon, Michael W., "Battlefield Nuclear Weapons and Tactical Gridlock in Europe." *Military Review*, vol. 59 no. 10 (October 1989), pp. 52-65.

Collet, André, "Les Missiles Tactiques." *Defense Nationale* (Novembre 1989), pp. 151-163.

Feinstein, Lee, "Bush 'Terminates' New Lance." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 20 no. 4 (May 1990), p. 27.

Payev, Pavel, *et al.*, "Is a Third Zero Attainable?" *International Affairs* (Moscow) No.4 (April 1990), pp. 3-12.

Rauf, Tariq, "The Next Step After INF: The Elimination of US-USSR SNF." Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, *Arms Control Communiqué* No. 68, 10 May 1990 (8 pp.).

Sigal, Leon, "The Case for Eliminating Battlefield Nuclear Weapons." *Arms Control Today*, vol. 19 no. 7 (September 1989), pp. 15-20.

## FURTHER READING

Barrett, John, "NATO's Flexible Response Strategy After the INF Agreement." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 18 no. 3 (Winter 1988), pp. 9-17.

Bertram, Christoph, "The Implications of Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 60 no. 2 (Winter 1981/1982), pp. 305-326.

Biddle, Stephen D. and Feaver, Peter D. (eds.), *Battlefield Nuclear Weapons: Issues and Options*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Centre for Science and International Affairs, CSIA Occasional Papers No. 5, 1989 (156 pp.).

Elliot, David C., "Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe." *International Security*, vol. 2 no. 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 163-183.

Freedman, Lawrence, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981 (473 pp.).

Kelleher, Catherine McArdle, "Managing NATO's Tactical Nuclear Operations." *Survival*, vol. 30 no. 1 (January/February 1988), pp. 59-78.

Mearsheimer, John J., "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe." *International Security* (Winter 1984/1985), pp. 19-46.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives*. London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1978 (371 pp.).

## CROSS REFERENCES

Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

## 21. PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION

### BACKGROUND

Peacekeeping may be defined as the employment, under the auspices of a recognized international authority, of military, para-military or non-military personnel or forces in an area of political conflict, for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. The purpose of peacekeeping is to enable the parties to disengage and to give them confidence that their differences can be settled by negotiation. Peacekeeping activities range from unarmed missions with a role of observation and reporting only, through roles of investigation, supervision and control, to the interposition of armed military units and formations between the parties.<sup>1</sup>

In the late 1940s, international observer missions were established along the India-Pakistan border, and in the Middle East following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution granting it the authority to recommend specific measures deemed necessary to maintain international peace. That same year, a UN Security Council resolution, sponsored by the United States in the absence of the Soviet Union, led to the creation of a unified military command to counter the North Korean offensive into South Korea. This action was unprecedented and has never been repeated.<sup>2</sup> The first large-scale UN peacekeeping operation was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), established with the help of Canada to supervise the ceasefire following the 1956 Suez Crisis. Since that time the UN has sent peacekeeping and observation missions to conflict areas including the Congo, Cyprus, the Middle East and Indochina. The 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the UN peacekeeping forces.

In addition to participating in seventeen UN peacekeeping missions, Canada has also contributed to five non-UN operations: the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), created in 1954 to oversee the ceasefire in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos; its successor, the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS), established in 1973; the Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN), created to supervise the 1968 elections in that country; the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, established in 1979 to observe the elections in Zimbabwe; and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, responsible for monitoring the security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. The Canadian contribution to the MFO began

---

<sup>1</sup> Colonel R.B. Mitchell, "Peacekeeping and the Canadian Army in the 21st Century" (Paper presented to the Seminar on "The Role of the Canadian Army in the 21st Century," Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia and the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 17 March 1989), pp. 2-3.

<sup>2</sup> UN operations in Korea, 1950-1953, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping. (*Peacekeeping*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security *Factsheet* No. 4 [October 1988, updated and reprinted March 1989], p. 2.) One Canadian attaché is posted at UNCMAC on the Participating Nations Advisory Group.

in 1986 and consisted of 128 Canadians providing helicopter transportation for both troops and civilian observers. In March 1990, the Canadian Forces helicopter unit was withdrawn, leaving a contribution of up to twenty-five soldiers to the mission.

Canada currently contributes to seven UN peacekeeping missions. The UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) was established in 1974 to monitor and supervise the ceasefire between Israel and Syria after the 1973 Middle East War. Two hundred and twenty-eight Canadians, of a total force of approximately 1,300, provide logistics, communications and other technical services. The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is an observer mission created in 1948 to monitor the observance of the truce called for by the Security Council and to supervise the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. The force of approximately 299 includes twenty Canadians. Canada also participates in the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964 following the outbreak of hostilities between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Out of approximately 2,100 participants, 575 are Canadians who are responsible for policing the ceasefire and resolving disputes between the opposing factions in a sector containing the capital, Nicosia (see *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* in this chapter). The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established in 1949 to supervise the India-Pakistan ceasefire in the Jammu-Kashmir area. Canada provides Hercules aircraft for moving the UN area headquarters biannually between Srinagar in India and Rawalpindi in Pakistan.

More recently, in 1988 Canada agreed to participate in the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). This operation was set up in May 1988 to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and to oversee the voluntary repatriation of refugees. Ten countries participated in UNGOMAP, each initially providing five military officers. One Canadian was stationed at Islamabad and four in Kabul with UNGOMAP's two Observation Teams. As of 1 May 1989, the number of Canadian military officers was reduced to three, two in Islamabad and one in Kabul. In January 1990 the UN Security Council extended the mandate of UNGOMAP for a further two months. Following the termination of the mandate on 15 March 1990, the UN Secretary-General established the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP). One Canadian continues to serve in this mission.

In January and February 1989, Canada began its participation in the Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP), a comprehensive humanitarian relief assistance programme for Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN. Canada provided a team of thirteen military personnel to train Afghan refugees in Pakistan in mine-clearing techniques. The Canadian contribution to the MACTP ended in July 1990. The continuing plan does not fall under the present definition of peacekeeping but is regarded as a "peacebuilding" programme.

On 9 August 1988, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and the then Defence Minister Perrin Beatty announced that Canada had agreed to participate in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). This operation was established by the UN Security Council, initially providing a force of 350 unarmed military observers from twenty-four countries to monitor the ceasefire implemented on 20 August 1988. Canada contributed a total of 525 persons to set up a fully self-sustaining communications network for all of UNIIMOG's

communications needs along the 1,200-km Iran-Iraq border, as well as fifteen observer troops who remain as part of the UN force. The soldiers arrived in Baghdad on 16 August 1988, followed by the communications team. The latter returned to Canada between November and mid-December 1988.<sup>3</sup> In its most recent renewal, UNIIMOG's mandate was extended by the UN Security Council to September 1990.

In February 1989, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was created by the UN Security Council to monitor Namibian peace plan agreements signed on 22 December 1988. Canada provided up to 301 soldiers as part of a peacekeeping force of 4,650 personnel. In addition, one hundred RCMP officers joined UNTAG police in monitoring the actions of Namibian police and protecting election facilities and personnel. The majority of the Canadian contingent and RCMP officers returned to Canada in early 1990 following the November 1989 Namibian election and March 1990 formal independence from South Africa. The remaining elements returned to Canada in mid-April 1990 upon the termination of UNTAG (see *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* in this chapter).

In December 1988, the Security Council unanimously voted to send a verification mission to Angola to verify the redeployment northward and total withdrawal of Cubans from that country. (This decision was a result of the regional accord formally signed in December 1988 by the US, South Africa, Angola and Cuba, which included the total withdrawal of Cuban soldiers fighting in the Angolan civil war). The mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) extends over a period of thirty-one months (January 1989 to July 1991). The verification team includes seventy military observers and twenty civilians from Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain and Yugoslavia. Canada was not invited to join UNAVEM and, therefore, is not party to it.<sup>4</sup>

On 7 November 1989, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (known by its Spanish acronym ONUCA) to conduct on-site verification of the cessation of aid to insurgent groups in the area and to monitor the borders of the five Central American countries. The Group's total strength at this time was expected to reach 675, including 260 military observers, naval and air support and medical and administrative staff. The Group's headquarters are in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, with liaison offices in other Central American capitals. Its military observers are from Canada, Colombia, Ireland, Spain and Venezuela, logistics experts from Canada and Venezuela and civilian elements from West Germany.

---

<sup>3</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 171 (9 August 1988); Department of National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 89/88; "Canadian Team Arrives in Iraq to Observe Truce." *Toronto Star*, 16 August 1988, p. A12; and Paul Koring, "UN Signallers Return Home Via Moscow." *Globe and Mail*, 5 October 1988, p. A8.

<sup>4</sup> Paul Lewis, "Security Council Votes to Send a Force to Angola." *New York Times*, 21 December 1988, p. A7; and James Brooke, "U.N.'s Angola Mission to Take Cuba at its Word." *New York Times*, 8 January 1989, p. A5.

Two other verification bodies were established as adjunct missions to ONUCA. The International Verification and Support Commission (CIAV) was established jointly by the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) to assist with the repatriation and resettlement of Nicaraguan *contra* forces. The United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) was set up to monitor the Nicaraguan elections scheduled for 25 February 1990. Canada contributed eight civilian observers to the ONUVEN mission, and contributes approximately 170 Canadian forces personnel to ONUCA and CIAV operations (see *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* in this chapter).

Approximately 1,100 members of the Canadian Armed Forces were posted at various points around the world in 1989 and 1990 in peacekeeping activities. Successive Canadian Governments have emphasized that Canada views peacekeeping as one aspect of conflict resolution, as an important contribution to the creation of the environment necessary to achieve political solutions to conflicts. Canada sees peacekeeping as an interim measure in the resolution of regional conflicts and has consistently called for a strengthening of the UN's peacekeeping expertise, as well as its institutional, financial and administrative base. The principles used to determine Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations were outlined in the Defence White Paper of 1987:

The Government's decision will be based upon the following criteria: whether there is a clear and enforceable mandate; whether the principal antagonists agree to a ceasefire and to Canada's participation in the operation; whether the arrangements are, in fact, likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term; whether the size and international composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate and will not damage Canada's relations with other states; whether Canadian participation will jeopardize other commitments; whether there is a single identifiable authority competent to support the operation and influence the disputants; and whether participation is adequately and equitably funded and logistically supported.... Canadian peacekeeping commitments flow from an established policy whereby up to 2,000 Canadian Forces members can be called on for peacekeeping duties at any one time.<sup>5</sup>

Within the UN itself there is disagreement on a number of issues concerning peacekeeping operations, such as the effectiveness of peacekeeping, support for non-UN operations, the use of force by UN peacekeepers and the financing of UN peacekeeping operations.

A number of countries have substantial debts to the UN, some withholding funds earmarked for peacekeeping. The UN estimates that the cost of peacekeeping activities will increase over the next few years to approximately \$2.1 billion, if existing peacekeeping operations continue and conflicts in Cambodia and the Western Sahara are resolved and require UN

---

<sup>5</sup> Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. Ottawa, 1987, pp. 24-25.

peacekeeping forces.<sup>6</sup> (Troop needs would increase from the present level of 10,500 to 30,000.<sup>7</sup>) By the end of 1989, UN members owed approximately \$700 million in unpaid contributions to its regular budget and a further \$500 million to its peacekeeping budget (compared to a total 1989 UN budget of \$900 million). Consequently, major peacekeeping operations, notably in Lebanon and Cyprus, are incurring large deficits, while troop-contributing countries such as Canada have generally borne most of the financial burden. The cost of Canada's current fiscal year peacekeeping commitments is in excess of \$40 million.<sup>8</sup>

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In his speech to the Forty-fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark commented on the "application of modern technology to the challenge of peacekeeping":

In April of this year, Canada completed a comprehensive study the purpose of which was to explore the utility of all forms of aerial surveillance to the peacekeeping tasks now before the international community. The conclusion of this study was that these overhead technologies - satellite or airborne - could significantly increase the efficiency of peacekeeping operations and related verification endeavours. This study will be submitted to the UN for its consideration. I believe this is an important development both symbolically and as an achievement in its own right. It is the sort of pragmatic, concrete work necessary to allow the UN to handle its ever-expanding peacekeeping responsibilities more effectively. It also symbolizes one of the fundamental purposes of this Organization: harmonizing the wonders of modern technology to the tasks of peace-building and not war-making.<sup>9</sup>

On 29 October 1989, it was reported that after a three-day visit to Cyprus, Defence Minister McKnight stated that Canadian troops would remain as part of the UN Force in Cyprus

---

<sup>6</sup> James Bone, "The Price of Peacekeeping." *World Press Review*, vol. 36 no. 12 (December 1989), p. 57.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Lewis, "U.N. Chief Warns of Costs of Peace." *New York Times*, 11 December 1988, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Supra* note 6; Andrew Cohen, "Blessed Are the Peacekeepers - But Costly: Canada's Role as Policeman under Review." *Financial Post*, 28 August 1989, p. 9; "UN Opens Annual Session, de Cuellar Calls for Funds to Aid Peace Efforts." *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 September 1989, p. A14; Fred Cleverley, "Canadians Pay a Bundle to Be UN Peacekeepers." *Winnipeg Free Press*, 6 November 1989, p. 7; "Strengthening UN Peace-keeping." *Disarmament Newsletter*, vol. 7 no. 6 (December 1989), pp. 12-13; and Thalif Deen, "Peacekeeping Deficit Grows." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 13 no. 5 (3 February 1990), p. 191.

<sup>9</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs...to the 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 26, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statement* No. 89/45, p. 1.

(UNFICYP) as long as they were needed.<sup>10</sup> The present 575-strong Canadian contingent is stationed in Sector 3, which begins on the outskirts of Nicosia and stretches east through the city along the Green Line or Buffer Zone (dividing line), then out to rural areas and the village of Louroujina. Since 1964, approximately 31,000 Canadians have served with the UNFICYP mission.<sup>11</sup>

Following a breakdown of UN-sponsored talks between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders earlier in the month, the UN Security Council on 12 March 1990 called on the two sides to reach a mutually acceptable solution providing for a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation in line with their 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements. Canada's Ambassador to the UN Yves Fortier said the Council's resolution was a "thinly veiled expression of disappointment" at the failure of the recent talks.<sup>12</sup> Speaking to a group of students at the Lester B. Pearson College of the Pacific on 24 March 1990, Ambassador Fortier stated that there was no doubt that UNFICYP troops were keeping Greek-and Turkish-Cypriots from fighting, but "the day may come that Canada will say 'we can't have an open-ended peacekeeping force'." He added that "[t]here appears to be very little political will to reach an agreement and countries like Canada are asking themselves whether the peacekeeping force is part of the problem rather than part of the solution."<sup>13</sup>

A report by the UN Secretary-General released on 5 June 1990 said that UNFICYP was in serious financial trouble with an accumulated deficit of \$179.3 million.<sup>14</sup> (The Cyprus Force is the only UN peacekeeping mission at present financed entirely by voluntary contributions from participating countries. Others are funded from the UN's main budget or by special assessments on member states.) It was also reported at this time that Canada had recently contributed a new team of mine-clearing experts in the area dividing the two Cypriot communities.<sup>15</sup>

The Canadian contingent of UNTAG commenced a personnel rotation of 237 of the then 253-member force on 15 September 1989.<sup>16</sup> At the United Nations on 26 September 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark said that Canada would send RCMP officers to Namibia to

---

<sup>10</sup> "Canada Will Keep Peacekeepers on Job." *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 October 1989, p. C1.

<sup>11</sup> Tim Wakefield, "25 Years of UNFICYP." *Armed Forces*, vol. 8 no. 12 (December 1989), p. 564.

<sup>12</sup> Olivia Ward, "U.N. Signals Its Impatience with Peace Process in Cyprus." *Toronto Star*, 14 March 1990, p. A22.

<sup>13</sup> Judith Lavoie, "Renaissance Time for UN, Fortier Tells Conference." *Times-Colonist*, 25 March 1990, p. B19.

<sup>14</sup> "Cyprus Peacekeepers in Cash Crisis." *Toronto Star*, 6 June 1990, p. 21.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>16</sup> National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 45/89 (15 September 1989).

monitor the November elections if requested to do so.<sup>17</sup> It was announced on 3 October 1989 by Mr. Clark and Solicitor General Pierre Blais that Canada had agreed to a 29 September formal request from the UN Secretary-General to provide police monitors for UNTAG, to be recruited from the RCMP through volunteer applications. One hundred RCMP officers left for Namibia on 17 October 1989 to join UNTAG police assembled from twenty-four countries. Serving for six months, their duties included monitoring the law-enforcement activities of the local South African-controlled police and protecting election facilities and personnel.<sup>18</sup>

On 12 October 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark announced that Canada had agreed to a request from the UN Secretary-General to provide forty election supervisors for UNTAG. Nominated by the three major political parties and by federal and provincial electoral institutions, they spent one month in Namibia overseeing that country's transition to independence, including the 7 to 11 November elections. They joined 800 supervisors from other countries and 500 from the UN Secretariat.<sup>19</sup>

On 12 November 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the judgement that "free and fair elections" had been held in Namibia. He also expressed his appreciation to the more than 400 Canadians who participated in the international effort to conduct the elections in Namibia under UN supervision and control.<sup>20</sup> In a news release on 15 January 1990, Mr. Clark and Defence Minister McKnight announced that the majority of Canadian Forces personnel in Namibia would return to Canada the following day, as part of a "phased withdrawal involving a number of national contingents." Mr. Clark stated that "[b]oth the United Nations and the people of Namibia are to be commended for the success of the peacekeeping mission.... I might also add it is most encouraging to see a mission completed on time and within budget." The Government of Canada news release further summarized Canada's role in UNTAG as follows:

Stable conditions in Namibia have allowed the withdrawal of UNTAG's military component to begin before its mandate expires in March, enabling the UN to cover the cost of an earlier increase in the number of police which had proven necessary.... Nearly 500 troops served in two rotations with the Canadian contingent, which reached a peak strength of 260 and provided logistical support to UNTAG's military, police and civilian components in central and southern Namibia. After a difficult start marked by fighting between nationalist guerrillas and South African-controlled forces

---

<sup>17</sup> *Supra* note 9, pp. 1-2.

<sup>18</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 235 (3 October 1989); Paul Koring, "RCMP Rank-And-File Eager to Serve in Namibia," *Globe and Mail*, 23 September 1989, p. D2; Ian Timberlake, "Mounties Leave for African Patrol," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 October 1989, p. A1; "Mounties Will Monitor Namibia's Police," *Globe and Mail*, 17 October 1989, p. A4; and Bill Schiller, "Mounties Guard Namibian Ballot Boxes," *Toronto Star*, 13 November 1989, p. 16.

<sup>19</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 243 (12 October 1989), pp. 1-2.

<sup>20</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 282 (12 November 1989).

last April, the UNTAG peacekeeping operation played a major role in creating conditions in which free and fair elections could be held in Namibia. At that time, in addition to the Canadian Forces, there were 100 Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers, 50 Canadian election supervisors and 12 technical experts serving with UNTAG. Canada also provided 4000 ballot boxes for the elections. The election supervisors and experts have already returned to Canada, along with about 30 military personnel. After the return tomorrow of the main group of Canadian soldiers, the RCMP officers and approximately 25 military personnel will remain in Namibia until March.<sup>21</sup>

It was reported on 29 March 1990 that Col. Mike Jeffery, in charge of the Canadian Forces contingent to UNTAG, had returned to Canada with most of his troops after the 21 March celebration of Namibian independence.<sup>22</sup> The remaining troops and RCMP officers returned to Canada in mid-April 1990 upon the termination of the UNTAG mission.

On 1 September 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark announced that Canadian experts would participate in a UN reconnaissance mission to define the operational requirements for the proposed UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The eighteen-member mission, including three Canadians, visited Central America from 3 to 23 September and reported its findings to the UN Secretary-General.<sup>23</sup>

On 30 November 1989, Defence Minister McKnight and Mr. Clark announced that Canada had agreed to participate in the first phase of ONUCA by deploying a nine-member advance party to ONUCA headquarters on 3 December 1989. Canada also agreed in principle to contribute about forty military observers, up to one hundred helicopter pilots and crew members and eight Canadian helicopters to the overall operation.<sup>24</sup> On 28 December 1989, the Defence and External Affairs Ministers announced that Canada would send twelve members of the Canadian Forces to Honduras by 4 January 1990 to augment the advance party.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 008 (15 January 1990), p. 1. See also: National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 03/90 (12 January 1990); "UN Peace Team Begins Pullout from Namibia." *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 December 1989, p. 10; "Canadian Peacekeepers Get Ready to Return Home." *Montreal Gazette*, 11 January 1990, p. G9; and "Canadian Soldiers Return." *Montreal Gazette*, 17 January 1990, p. B1.

<sup>22</sup> "Canadians Home from Namibia." *Montreal Gazette*, 29 March 1990, p. B1.

<sup>23</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 209 (1 September 1989), pp. 1-2.

<sup>24</sup> National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 58/89 (30 November 1989). See also: Dave Todd, "Canadians May Join UN Force in Nicaragua." *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 November 1989, p. A6; "Canadian Soldiers Join UN Peacekeeping Force." *Globe and Mail*, 1 December 1989, p. A9; and "Canadians on UN Force Start Work in Honduras." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 December 1989, p. B3.

<sup>25</sup> National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 59/89 (28 December 1989).

On 9 February 1990, Defence Minister McKnight rose to table an Order in Council confirming the intention of the Government of Canada to participate in the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). After offering the House a history of Canada's involvement in the Central American peace process from August 1987 to date, the Minister continued:

[T]here is no perfect moment in which to deploy our peacekeepers and there are inherent risks in peacekeeping at any time. But in the case of Central America the level of risk is manageable and is justified by the importance we attach to the process of advancing peace in that region. If at any time we conclude that these risks are becoming unacceptable we will, obviously, reconsider the total situation and our role in it.... The steps toward peace in Central America have been slow and at times painful. But progress is being made, and progress will continue to be made. The dispatch of our peacekeeping forces to another region is a sign of Canada's willingness to help those who seek peace and security anywhere in the world.<sup>26</sup>

It was reported that additional Canadian Forces personnel were dispatched in early 1990 to ONUCA and completed their first patrol missions on the Nicaraguan and Honduran borders. This second phase of deployment brought the Canadian contingent's strength to 122 troops and four Jet Ranger helicopters.<sup>27</sup> On 22 March 1990, Defence Minister McKnight announced that Canada would increase its contribution to ONUCA by providing forty-seven pilots and support personnel and four Twin Huey helicopters, bringing the Canadian troop level to 169 in this third phase of deployment.<sup>28</sup>

On 27 March 1990, the UN Security Council endorsed an expansion of ONUCA's size and mandate. The force was increased to over 1,000 troops and its role expanded to play a part in the demobilization of Nicaraguan *contra* forces, previously undertaken by the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) which was created in late 1989. On 20 April 1990, the Council once again expanded ONUCA's mandate to include the monitoring of a ceasefire reached a day earlier between *contra* leaders, the newly elected Nicaraguan government and the Roman Catholic Church in Nicaragua.

---

<sup>26</sup> *Commons Debates*, 9 February 1990, pp. 8126-8127.

<sup>27</sup> Gilles Paquin, "La force de paix des nations unies s'installe en Amérique Centrale." *La Presse*, 6 January 1990, p. A10; Les Whittington, "Central America: Peacekeeping in No-Man's Land." *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 February 1990, p. B3; and Robert Bousquet, "77 militaires Canadiens attendus au Honduras." *Le Droit*, 6 February 1990, p. 4. See also: House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 34 (14 December 1989), pp. 34: 4-22.

<sup>28</sup> National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 15/90 (22 March 1990); and "Speaking Notes for the Honourable Bill McKnight, P.C., M.P., Minister of National Defence, to Canada's ONUCA peacekeepers. Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, Ontario, March 22, 1990."

On 29 May 1990, External Affairs Minister Clark expressed his concern at the slow pace of demobilization, but one month later, with Defence Minister McKnight, congratulated the commander of ONUCA on the important role his forces played in the successful demobilization of *contra* forces along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The UN Mission collected weapons and ammunition from the *contras* in seven temporary "security zones." Mr. McKnight extended particular recognition and thanks to the now 170-member Canadian contingent for its role in the demobilization.<sup>29</sup>

Areas in which a Canadian contribution to UN peacekeeping forces may be called for in the near future include Cambodia, the Western Sahara and the Israeli occupied territories of the Middle East.

Canada was among many countries that refused to send observers to monitor the 21 to 27 September 1989 Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia.<sup>30</sup> However, at the month-long Paris Conference on Cambodia in July and August 1989 Canada, along with India, co-chaired a special committee responsible for developing an International Control Mechanism (peacekeeping mission) for Cambodia.<sup>31</sup> On 5 August 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark announced that Canada had agreed to participate in the UN Secretary-General's fact-finding mission to conduct a technical survey to define what infrastructures and resources would be available in Cambodia to sustain an eventual International Control Mechanism. The news release also stated:

At the opening Ministerial session of the Paris Conference..., Mr. Clark was a strong proponent for the sending of such a technical mission. Canadian participation is without prejudice to an eventual Canadian decision on whether or not to participate in an International Control Mechanism for Cambodia. This continues to depend on whether or not there is a genuine peace settlement and an agreement on effective operating rules, limited duration, and appropriate financing.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 118 (29 May 1990); and Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 143 (29 June 1990). See also: Evelyn Leopold, "UN Forced to Guard Camps of Nicaraguan Combatants." *Montreal Gazette*, 24 May 1990, p. 12.

<sup>30</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 175 (26 July 1989); *Commons Debates*, 28 September 1989, pp. 4035-4036; and "No U.N. Monitors for Cambodia." *New York Times*, 23 September 1989, p. 5.

<sup>31</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 175 (26 July 1989); Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Speech by the...Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Paris Conference on Cambodia, Paris, France, July 30, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statement* No. 89/36; and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 197 (27 August 1989).

<sup>32</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 184 (5 August 1989). See also: "UN Fact-Finding Group Begins Cambodia Mission." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 August 1989, p. A7; and "UN Team Studying Peace Plan Makes Surprise Vietnam Visit." *Montreal Gazette*, 9 August 1989, p. H8.

The five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council held three meetings on the Cambodian problem in early 1990 and called for a ceasefire, the dispatching of UN peacekeeping troops, the creation of an interim UN administration, and UN supervision of free elections. On 18 January 1990, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the outcome of the first of these meetings held on 15 and 16 January 1990,<sup>33</sup> and on 25 January 1990 provided a progress report to the House of Commons on international efforts to resolve the conflict in Cambodia. He indicated *inter alia* that Canada and other countries might be asked to participate in UN-led peacekeeping and interim administration arrangements. As part of this process, External Affairs and National Defence officials were reviewing Canada's peacekeeping experiences in Namibia and elsewhere to improve "the planning and organization of future peacekeeping operations such as Cambodia."<sup>34</sup>

On 9 April 1990, Mr. Clark announced that Canada would donate \$1.5 million to a special UN fund in support of the Cambodian peace process. In his words:

The Cambodian situation has long been a difficult and seemingly intractable problem.... Canada...considers it important to provide early support to ensure that the UN has the necessary financial resources at the out-set for a peacekeeping mission in Cambodia. The Canadian contribution is a signal to all the Cambodian parties that Canada is firmly committed to a United Nations role in a viable settlement.<sup>35</sup>

The news release added that a UN mission in Cambodia would be one of the most intricate peacekeeping operations ever undertaken and that Australia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and New Zealand would make similar contributions to the special fund.<sup>36</sup> In a visit to Ottawa in late May 1990, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar said that he was not yet prepared to ask Canada to send peacekeeping troops to Cambodia. It was also reported at this time that Canadian officials had estimated the cost to Canada of a possible peacekeeping operation in Cambodia at between \$65 million and \$100 million.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 012 (18 January 1990). See also: "Text of the U.N. Declaration on the Future of Cambodia." *New York Times*, 17 January 1990, p. A6; Olivia Ward, "Canadians May Join Cambodian Peace Bid." *Toronto Star*, 18 February 1990, p. A21; and David Clark Scott, "UN Role at Center of New Talks." *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 February 1990, p. 4.

<sup>34</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Statement...on Canada and Indochina, House of Commons, January 25, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/05.

<sup>35</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 075 (9 April 1990).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>37</sup> Jennifer Lewington, "Canada's Future Roles on Agenda in Ottawa during UN Chief's Visit." *Globe and Mail*, 26 May 1990, p. A5.

In 1989 and 1990, the United Nations and the OAU continued their attempts to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Western Sahara pitting the Moroccan government against the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO). During his 27 May 1990 visit to Ottawa, UN Secretary-General de Cuellar stated that he was not ready to invite Canada to send peacekeeping troops to the Western Sahara at the present time.<sup>38</sup>

In 1987, Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip launched an uprising (*intifada*) against Israeli rule in these occupied territories. Numerous international diplomatic efforts have thus far failed to push forward the broader context of an Arab-Israeli peace process and hence a resolution of the problem of the occupied territories. On 24 May 1990, appearing before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, External Affairs Minister Clark was asked whether Canada intended to send peacekeepers to the occupied territories in the Middle East. Mr. Clark replied:

We would be prepared to support some other UN presence [other than UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency)], although we are not making a proposal in the Security Council. Frankly we think a proposal, if one were to come, could come from other places more authoritative on this issue in these circumstances than Canada. We would be prepared to consider something like that if it could work.<sup>39</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In the House of Commons on 2 October 1989, Liberal MP Joseph Volpe called on the Government to establish a UN peacekeeping training centre at the closing military base at Summerside, PEI. He stated:

I and a committee of Liberals from P.E.I. took up the Tory challenge of coming up with alternatives to the defence department closing of military bases as a means of satisfying the finance minister's deficit cutting requirements. After much research and study we proposed that one of the military bases, Summerside, be used to establish a UN international peacekeeping training centre. Funding would come primarily from the UN and participating nations, and while Canadian government contributions to the camp would drop from \$40 million to about \$10 million, there would be little drop in personnel. The proposal was received with great

---

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>39</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 51 (24 May 1990), pp. 51: 24-25. See also: "U.N. Considers Observer Team for Occupied Areas." *Toronto Star*, 7 November 1989, p. 3; "U.S. Considers UN Observers." *Ottawa Citizen*, 24 May 1990, p. A6; Tim Harper, "Canada Backs U.N. Force for Mideast." *Toronto Star*, 25 May 1990, p. 3; and Paul Lewis, "U.S. Bars U.N. on Sending Mission to West Bank." *New York Times*, 27 May 1990, p. 6.

acclaim by many experts in the arms control and the disarmament community.... Canada would be able to apply and share its internationally recognized expertise and experience in peacekeeping. It would be afforded a leadership role in an increasingly important aspect of external affairs, and foreign capital would replace the funds from DND and breathe life into the local economy. I urge the Minister of National Defence to take a serious and hard look at our alternative and he can call on our committee for help.<sup>40</sup>

On 1 May 1990, the same Member rose in the House to make the following statement on the Government's commitment to peacekeeping operations world-wide:

Canada is involved in five peacekeeping operations around the world, including increasing its commitment to the UN forces in Central America and may become an important participant in a possible UN operation in Cambodia. The demands for UN peacekeeping and Canada's participation will likely increase further given the upsurge in ethnic tensions in the developed and developing world, increasing disputes over ocean sovereignty and mounting trans-border environmental dangers. The federal government has through budget cut-backs eliminated the acquisition of new communications equipment and new light observation helicopters, both important aspects of Canadian peacekeeping.... It is not enough that the government engage in internal reviews to reassess the new demands upon Canadian defence and foreign policy. We must allow the public to have input in these reassessments and be willing to provide the necessary financial support to ensure that its present and future commitments do not ring hollow.<sup>41</sup>

On 28 March 1990, Liberal Member Jim Karygiannis commented on the situation in Cyprus:

Almost daily we open our newspapers and read of sweeping political changes taking place all over the world. Everywhere the voice of democracy seems to be booming. However, it saddens me that while in other countries there is a general ease of tension, the situation in Cyprus has not changed. For the past 25 years Canada has had peacekeeping troops in Cyprus. I strongly urge the government to apply whatever pressure possible to encourage demilitarization and dialogue so that democracy might once again be restored and Canadian troops can return home.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> *Commons Debates*, 2 October 1989, p. 4171. See also: *Infra* note 45.

<sup>41</sup> *Commons Debates*, 1 May 1990, p. 10850.

<sup>42</sup> *Commons Debates*, 28 March 1990, p. 9863.

Upon returning from a visit to Cyprus, Progressive Conservative Member Stan Wilbee made the following statement:

The commanding officer of the whole UN peacekeeping force is the highly-regarded Canadian, General Milner. The 575-man Canadian contingent is made up primarily of the Princess Patricia Regiment, with some reservists as supplementals. Everywhere we [the Interparliamentary Union delegation] went on the island the Canadian forces were praised for their competence, fairness and co-operation, as well as for the excellent humanitarian work they are doing with both Greek and Turkish civilian populations.<sup>43</sup>

In the House on 20 March 1990, External Affairs Minister Clark reported on Canada's role in the Namibian independence process, including its contribution to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). Mr. Clark, along with Liberal MP André Ouellet and NDP Member Lynn Hunter, speaking on behalf of their Parties, approved the peacekeeping component of Canada's role and extended their congratulations to the Namibian people on their independence from South Africa which was to be celebrated the following day.<sup>44</sup>

On 9 February 1990, Liberal MP William Rompkey agreed with the initiative to deploy Canadian Forces in support of ONUCA, but stated that he believed ONUCA's mandate should be expanded to monitor the situation in El Salvador. During the same debate, NDP MP Bill Blaikie also approved the Canadian role in ONUCA, yet questioned the Government on its handling of the political problems in the region, notably toward Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama.<sup>45</sup>

On 24 May 1990, Liberal MP André Ouellet asked the External Affairs Minister whether Canada was prepared to support the USA in its purported intention to recommend sending UN observers to the occupied territories in the Middle East. Mr. Clark replied:

[N]either the United States nor any other [UN] Security Council member have actively advocated dispatching such an observer team. However the American Secretary of State did say that the U.S. administration would certainly entertain this kind of proposition. For our part we in Canada are also prepared to consider this proposition because our country has always been a strong supporter of peacekeeping activities and observer teams. Hon. members would know that Canada did lend strong support to the rather limited but no less important UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] mission concerning the Palestinians.... Canada is prepared to support any constructive activity that might be taken by the United Nations....<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> *Commons Debates*, 25 April 1990, p. 10643.

<sup>44</sup> *Commons Debates*, 20 March 1990, pp. 9505-9510 and 9559.

<sup>45</sup> *Commons Debates*, 9 February 1990, pp. 8127-8129.

<sup>46</sup> *Commons Debates*, 24 May 1990, p. 11805.

In response to a similar question by NDP Member Bill Blaikie on 14 June 1990, Mr. Clark stated that such a mission would have to be acceptable to Israel and that he believed Israel was willing to accept the visits of representatives of the UN Secretary-General in this regard.<sup>47</sup>

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Bardehle, Peter, "Blue Helmets' from Germany? Opportunities and Limits of UN Peacekeeping." *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 40 no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 1989), pp. 372-384.

*Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 19 no. 1 (August 1989), pp. 5-58 [entire issue].

Cox, David *et al.*, *The Reduction of the Risk of War through Multilateral Means: A Summary of Conference Proceedings (Kingston, 7-8 October 1988)*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Working Paper* 18, September 1989 (32 pp.).

Eknes, Aage, *Revitalizing Peacekeeping: Old Constraints, New Challenges*. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), *Notat* No. 406, August 1989 (15 pp.).

Fursdon, Edward, "UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus." *Conflict Studies* No. 232 (June 1990), pp. 11-18.

Glossop, Ronald J., "Improving UN Peacekeeping." *Transnational Perspectives*, vol. 15 no. 2 (1989), pp. 14-18.

Heiberg, Marianne, *Lebanon, Political Playground of the Middle East: The Role of Peacekeeping*. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), *Notat* No. 411, October 1989 (14 pp.).

Holst, Johan J., *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Present Trends and Future Opportunities*. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), *Notat* No. 416, December 1989 (18 pp.).

James, Alan, "Peacekeeping and Keeping the Peace." *Review of International Studies*, vol. 15 no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 371-378 [review essay].

Johansen, Robert C., "UN Peacekeeping: The Changing Utility of Military Force." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 12 no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 53-70.

Karns, Margaret P. and Mingst, Karen A., "Peacekeeping Efforts: Some Fly, Some Flop." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 46 no. 4 (May 1990), pp. 43-47.

Klintworth, Gary and Babbage, Ross, *Peacekeeping in Cambodia: An Australian Role?* Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, *Working Paper* No. 179, May 1989 (19 pp.).

Liu, F. T., *United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations*. New York: International Peace Academy, *Occasional Papers on Peacekeeping* No. 4, 1990 (37 pp.).

---

<sup>47</sup> *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1990, pp. 12775-12776.

Mills, Susan R., *The Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis*. New York: International Peace Academy, *Occasional Papers on Peacekeeping* No. 3, 1989 (33 pp.).

Norton, Augustus Richard and Weiss, Thomas George, *UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference*. New York: Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series* No. 292, Spring 1990 (52 pp.).

Puchala, Donald and Coate, Roger, "The Revitalization of United Nations Peacekeeping," in: *The Challenge of Relevance: The United Nations in a Changing World Environment*, [Study presented to the Academic Council on the United Nations System, Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 15-17 June 1989], pp. 10-34.

Quenneville, Maj. Serge, "Namibia's Road to Independence." *Sentinel*, vol. 25 no. 5 (1989), pp. 2-7.  
Rikhye, Indar Jit, *The Future of Peacekeeping*. New York: International Peace Academy, *Occasional Papers on Peacekeeping* No. 2, 1989 (34 pp.).

"The Role of UNTAG in the Namibian Independence Process." *ISSUP Bulletin* No. 3 (1989), pp. 1-14.

Skjelsbaek, Kjell, "United Nations Peacekeeping and the Facilitation of Withdrawals." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 20 no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 253-264.

"United Nations Peacekeeping." *Survival*, vol. 32 no. 3 (May/June 1990), pp. 195-288 [entire issue].

Urquhart, Brian, "The Future of Peacekeeping." *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 5 no. 1 (January 1989), pp. 25-32.

#### FURTHER READING

*The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1985 (350 pp.).

Gaffen, Fred, *In the Eye of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping*. Toronto: Deneau & Wayne Publishers Ltd., 1987 (302 pp.).

Gaffen, Fred, "Middle Power Brokerage in a Super Power World: Canadian Participation in Peacekeeping Operations" (Paper presented to the XIVth International Military History Colloquium, Montreal, 15-19 August 1988) (18 pp.).

Mitchell, Robert, *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 23, October 1988 (8 pp.).

Rikhye, Indar Jit, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*. London: C. Hurst & Company for the International Peace Academy, 1984 (205 pp.).

Wiseman, Henry (ed.), *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1983 (461 pp.).

Wiseman, Henry, *Peacekeeping and the Management of International Conflict*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 15, September 1987 (8 pp.).

## SECTION III - CONFLICT RESOLUTION

22. CENTRAL AMERICA	223
<i>Background</i>	223
<i>The Central American Peace Process</i>	223
<i>Panama</i>	228
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	230
<i>The Central American Peace Progress</i>	230
<i>Panama</i>	235
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	238
<i>The Central American Peace Process</i>	238
<i>Panama</i>	240
23. THE MIDDLE EAST	247
<i>Background</i>	247
<i>Iran-Iraq</i>	247
<i>Lebanon</i>	249
<i>Israel and the Occupied Territories</i>	251
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	254
<i>Iran-Iraq</i>	254
<i>Lebanon</i>	255
<i>Israel and the Occupied Territories</i>	257
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	262
<i>Iran-Iraq</i>	262
<i>Lebanon</i>	263
<i>Israel and the Occupied Territories</i>	264
24. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	269
<i>Background</i>	269
<i>Namibia</i>	269
<i>Angola</i>	270
<i>South Africa</i>	272
<i>Mozambique</i>	276
<i>The Horn of Africa</i>	277
<i>Ethiopia</i>	277
<i>Somalia</i>	278
<i>Sudan</i>	379

<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	280
<i>Namibia</i>	280
<i>Angola</i>	284
<i>South Africa</i>	285
<i>Mozambique</i>	293
<i>The Horn of Africa</i>	294
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	297
<i>Namibia</i>	297
<i>South Africa</i>	298
<i>Mozambique</i>	301
<i>Ethiopia</i>	301
25. SOUTHERN ASIA	309
<i>Background</i>	309
<i>India-Pakistan</i>	309
<i>India-China</i>	312
<i>Afghanistan</i>	313
<i>Sri Lanka</i>	315
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	318
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	319
26. EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	323
<i>Background</i>	323
<i>Sino-Soviet Relations</i>	323
<i>The Indochina Conflict</i>	324
<i>Japan-Soviet Union</i>	327
<i>East Timor</i>	328
<i>North and South Korea</i>	329
<i>The Philippines</i>	331
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	333
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	338
27. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	345
<i>Background</i>	345
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	347
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	348

## SECTION III - CONFLICT RESOLUTION

### 22. CENTRAL AMERICA

#### BACKGROUND

##### *The Central American Peace Process*

In the 1960s and 1970s Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala were ruled by authoritarian régimes, with guerrilla movements active in the latter two countries. In the late 1970s open conflict broke out in Nicaragua when the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) overthrew the Somoza régime, and the left-wing Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) guerrillas gained strength in El Salvador. The FMLN was supported by the Nicaraguan Sandinista government, which itself began facing a challenge from the Honduran-based, US-supported *contras*. Throughout this period, Costa Rica remained the only stable democracy in the region.

In January 1983, the Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela met on the Panamanian island of Contadora to discuss ways of reaching a comprehensive negotiated settlement between the five Central American countries. They set out twenty-one objectives, including an end to all cross-border incursions and outside destabilization of the region's governments, an end to foreign military bases and advisors, cessation of outside arms shipments, and attainment of full democracy and respect for human rights in all countries of the region. In 1985 the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay formed the Contadora Support Group to assist in furthering the Contadora Group's objectives. The two Groups are commonly referred to as the Group of Eight.

Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez put forth a proposal in January 1987 in an effort to re-launch the stalled peace process. The "Arias Plan," signed on 7 August 1987 at Esquipulas, Guatemala, has retained its importance because it was the first time leaders of the five Central American countries -- Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras -- agreed in principle to comply with a process aimed at bringing peace to the region. The plan, known also as the Esquipulas II Accord, essentially requires of each Government a national reconciliation with opponents, a ceasefire within the existing constitutional framework, efforts to halt foreign aid to insurgents, a commitment not to provide assistance to groups aimed at destabilizing other governments, free and democratic elections, measures to help refugees return home and joint efforts to obtain international economic aid. The peace agreement won considerable international support, with President Arias receiving the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize for his initiative.

Implementation and verification of the planned measures under the Esquipulas II Accord were the main tasks facing the signatories in 1988. In Nicaragua, direct talks between the Nicaraguan Government and *contra* leaders took place for the first time at Sapoá, Nicaragua in

March 1988, after the US Congress cut off military aid to the *contras*. However, four subsequent rounds of talks failed to make significant progress toward a comprehensive settlement. Talks between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) guerrilla forces and talks between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN guerrilla forces also produced little result in 1988.

In early February 1989, an accord was reached by the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua. The Sandinistas agreed to make serious moves toward democratization and to ensure fair procedures at the election set for February 1990, in return for promises by the Honduran Government to disband the *contra* forces operating within its borders.

At Tesoro Beach, El Salvador on 13 and 14 February 1989, the five Central American Presidents held a Summit meeting to "reactivate the Arias Plan." The five agreed to the Honduran-Nicaraguan accord reached days earlier, with the additional provision that the *contra* forces and their families operating within Honduran borders would be repatriated or moved to other countries after disbanding. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega reaffirmed his intention to eliminate all censorship laws and to hold all-level government elections by 25 February 1990. At the Summit, the Presidents also agreed to invite UN observers into the region.

On 24 February 1989, in a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Foreign Ministry officials from all five signatories of the Esquipulas II Accord requested that a team of unarmed military observers from Canada, Spain and West Germany, as well as from an unnamed Latin American country, be sent to Central America. The main role of the observers would be to verify that none of the countries involved in the peace process supported any subversive activities against a neighbour country, to report on cross-border guerrilla movements, and to observe the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. Canada, Spain and West Germany agreed to take part in the peacekeeping mission.

On 27 July 1989, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 637, urging the UN Secretary-General to continue his efforts to assist the five Central American Governments in achieving the objectives set out in the Esquipulas II Accord. The USA voted for the resolution, which also called for a disbanding of *contra* forces.

The five Central American Presidents held a Summit meeting at Tela, Honduras, from 5 to 7 August 1989. On 7 August, they signed an accord calling for the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation of the *contras*, under UN and Organization of American States (OAS) supervision, by the end of 1989. The Tela Accord also called for a "constructive dialogue" between the Salvadoran Government and FMLN guerrilla forces. In a separate agreement accompanying the Accord, Nicaragua agreed to abandon its claim for war reparations against Honduras launched at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1988.

As called for in the Tela Accord, the UN began setting up three separate verification bodies for Central America. The International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) was established jointly by the UN and the OAS in September 1989 to assist with the repatriation and resettlement of *contra* forces. On 7 November 1989, the UN Security Council approved Resolution

644, creating the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), with contingents from Canada, Spain, West Germany, Venezuela and Ireland, to verify compliance with the security provisions of Esquipulas II. The United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) was also set up, to monitor the election scheduled for 25 February 1990. (For further details, refer to **PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION**.)

From 27 to 28 October 1989, seventeen Heads of State from OAS member and observer countries attended a Hemispheric Summit in San José, Costa Rica honouring one hundred years of democracy in that country. At the Summit, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega announced that the ceasefire with *contra* forces, in place since March 1988, would be ended due to attacks and border infiltrations by *contra* forces. At the same time, harassment of opposition and Sandinista candidates in the Nicaraguan election campaign began to intensify.

After two rounds of failed talks between the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN in September and October 1989 (in Mexico City and San José, respectively), the situation in El Salvador deteriorated. On 31 October 1989, the National Federation of Salvadoran Workers' (FENASTRAS) trade union building in San Salvador was bombed, killing ten and wounding over twenty people. The FMLN announced an end to its discussions with the Government shortly after the bombing, and on 11 November 1989 launched a major offensive, including an attack on the National Guard headquarters. President Alfredo Cristiani responded by declaring a state of emergency and increasing military actions, including reported aerial bombings of the civilian population. On 14 November 1989, the nineteenth Assembly of the OAS called for a cessation of the hostilities in El Salvador, which by this time had claimed the lives of an estimated 2,000 Government and FMLN soldiers.

On 25 November 1989, after an aircraft from Nicaragua carrying missiles and other armaments crashed in El Salvador, the Cristiani Government accused Nicaragua of sending armaments to the FMLN. Five days later, the UN Security Council held a debate on the situation in El Salvador, after President Cristiani had announced a suspension of his country's diplomatic and economic ties with Nicaragua. On 5 December 1989, the UN Secretary-General and OAS Secretary-General Joao Baena Soares informed the five Central American Presidents that the Tela plan for demobilization of the *contras* by the end of 1989 had stalled.

From 10 to 12 December 1989, the five Central American Presidents attended a Summit meeting in San Isidro de Coronado, Costa Rica. The leaders signed a new peace agreement calling for international control of all aid to the Nicaraguan *contras* and immediate steps to demobilize the FMLN. Specifically, the Presidents ordered all funds for the *contras* to be diverted to the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV), which would use the resources to disband *contra* bases along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. The Group was also asked to assist with the demobilization of the FMLN in El Salvador. The Presidents further requested that the mandate of the ONUCA force be expanded, to prevent the supply of weapons to both the *contra* forces and the FMLN. (This proposed expansion was debated in the UN Security Council on 16 March 1990. Refer to **PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION**.) Finally, the Presidents supported El Salvador's President Cristiani in his efforts to find a "peaceful and democratic solution" to the civil war in his country and appealed to the FMLN to resume its dialogue with the Government.

In the Nicaraguan election, held under intense international observation on 25 February 1990, the fourteen-party National Opposition Union (UNO) coalition headed by Mrs. Violeta Chamorro was victorious. The coalition won fifty-one seats in the ninety-two-member National Assembly, with the Sandinista National Front winning thirty-nine seats, and the centrist Social Christian Party and far-right Revolutionary Unity movement obtaining one seat each. The UNO victory fell four seats short of what was required to amend, unilaterally, the Nicaraguan Constitution, raising implications for the dismantling of the 100,000-strong Sandinista People's Army, whose right to exist as an "armed branch of the people" is enshrined in that document. On 13 March 1990, US President Bush announced the lifting of US trade sanctions against Nicaragua, imposed by his predecessor in May 1985.

The five Central American Presidents met in Montelimar, Nicaragua on 3 and 4 April 1990 for another Summit meeting. This Summit opened with Nicaraguan President-elect Chamorro announcing in Managua that *contra* leader Israel Galeano had agreed to abide by a 23 March 1990 accord ("Toncontin Agreement") between the newly elected Government and a lower-ranking *contra* commander, wherein *contra* forces already in Nicaragua would report to internationally supervised zones to surrender their weapons by 20 April 1990.

On 5 April 1990 in Geneva, the Cristiani Government of El Salvador signed an agreement with the FMLN to begin UN-sponsored peace talks to end their ten-year war which had to this date claimed an estimated 75,000 lives. The seven-point agreement provided for a ceasefire, moves toward full democracy, respect for human rights and the legalization of the FMLN as a political party. Talks began in Caracas, Venezuela on 16 May 1990. It was reported at this time that during the previous year, the FMLN had accepted elections as the legitimate road to power, implicitly recognized the legality of the 1983 Constitution and the Government's legitimacy, acknowledged that El Salvador was within the sphere of influence of the United States, and dropped demands for integration into the army. The Cristiani Government, while remaining deeply suspicious of the FMLN's motives, was said to be willing to discuss meeting some of its demands, including a reduction of Government army personnel from 60,000 to about 18,000 men.<sup>1</sup>

On 19 April 1990, a ceasefire accord was signed by the Nicaraguan Army, *contra* leaders and Roman Catholic Church prelate Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, ending the ten-year civil war in which an estimated 30,000 Nicaraguans had been killed. A separate demobilization accord was signed by Cardinal Obando y Bravo, *contra* leader Oscar Sovalberro and President-elect Chamorro's chief representative, Antonio Lacayo. Under the demobilization accord, the *contras* agreed to disarm by 10 June 1990, handing over their weapons to UN and OAS officials and to Cardinal Obando y Bravo. The accord broke down on 19 May 1990 when the *contras* stopped disarming, stating that Mrs. Chamorro, after being sworn in as President on 25 April 1990, was not fulfilling her commitments to provide jobs and housing for those who had turned in their weapons. On 31 May 1990, in an accord signed by *contra* leader Israel Galeano and the Chamorro Government, the rebels agreed to restart their demobilization at approximately 200 men a day in

---

<sup>1</sup> Lindsey Gruson, "Salvadoran Foes Open Peace Talks." *New York Times*, 17 May 1990, p. A19.

each of seven zones where the 16,000-strong guerrilla force had concentrated. In exchange for the demobilization, the Government agreed to establish more than twenty rural development centres in the sparsely settled south-eastern corner of Nicaragua, in order to integrate the *contras* back into civilian life. The Government also promised them their own police force and a voice in government. By mid-June 1990, 3,000 *contras* still remained to be disarmed. On 15 June 1990, President Chamorro announced that she had ordered a one-third reduction in the size of the Nicaraguan Army (headed by and predominantly made up of Sandinistas) from 61,000 to 41,000 soldiers by 3 August 1990. On 27 June 1990, in a public ceremony marking the end of the civil war, Nicaraguan *contra* commanders led by Mr. Galeano surrendered their weapons to President Chamorro. The weapons were destroyed on the spot by ONUCA and OAS forces that had been overseeing the three-month demobilization.

In Guatemala on 4 June 1990, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) guerrillas agreed not to sabotage the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for November 1990, in exchange for a promise by the present Guatemalan political parties to permit URNG participation in a Constitutional Convention slated for 1991. The agreement, however, fell short of a full ceasefire.

From 16 to 18 June 1990, leaders of the six Central American countries (including Panama) held a Summit meeting in Antigua, Guatemala. On 17 June they signed a general accord on regional peace and economic development. In a speech closing the Summit, Costa Rican President Rafael Calderón stated: "We will never see peace in Central America while hunger exists in thousands of homes." By the end of the Summit, US Secretary of State Baker and other US officials arrived in Guatemala for discussions with the leaders. Secretary Baker reportedly called for the beginning of an economic assistance programme for Central America similar to the Group of 24's (world's most industrialized nations) efforts to revitalize the economies of East European countries.<sup>2</sup>

The Salvadoran Government and the FMLN ended a round of peace talks on 25 June 1990, falling short of an accord, but reportedly opening debate on a number of substantive issues to end the civil war. The rebels reportedly demanded the dissolution of the National Intelligence Agency, civilian defence patrols and the US-trained elite Atlacatl Battalion, the latter accused of carrying out the November 1989 slayings of members of the Jesuit community. United Nations mediator Alvaro de Soto insisted that the established timetable for a mid-September ceasefire, agreed to in meetings in May 1989 in Caracas, Venezuela, could be met. The two sides also agreed to meet again at the end of July 1990 at an undisclosed location. As the talks ended, the human rights organization Amnesty International released a report accusing the Government of El Salvador of having done nothing to curb the death squads and torture being carried out by the military. The organization further stated that a delegation it had sent to El Salvador in April 1990 had documented seventeen death-squad killings since the beginning of the year.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Mark Trumbull, "News Currents." *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 June 1990, p. 2; Elizabeth A. Brown, "News Currents." *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 June 1990, p. 2; and "Accord au sommet centraméricain." *La Presse*, 19 June 1990, p. C6.

<sup>3</sup> Charlotte Montgomery, "Death Squad Killings in Salvador Denounced." *Globe and Mail*, 26 June 1990, p. A6; and Jane Bussey, "Salvadoran Peace Talks Take Hold." *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 June 1990, p. 4.

## *Panama*

On 7 September 1977, US President Carter and Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos signed new Panama Canal treaties that would hand control of the Canal over to Panama on 31 December 1999. The treaties guaranteed the Canal's status as an international waterway and replaced US administration of the Canal with a Panama Canal Commission, run jointly by American and Panamanian officials. The US Senate ratified the treaties in April 1978, adding a provision permitting US intervention if the Canal's operation was interrupted.

Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos was killed in an air crash in Panama on 31 July 1981. Shortly afterward, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Torrijos' former chief of intelligence, became head of the Panamanian Defence Forces. On 11 July 1987, accusations in Panama that General Noriega had rigged 1984 Presidential elections sparked violent anti-government protests. In response, the Government imposed a ten-day "state of urgency."

In February 1988, the US Justice Department indicted General Noriega on charges of international drug trafficking. On 25 February 1988, Panamanian President Eric Delvalle attempted to fire the General, but was instead ousted by the National Assembly and replaced by Mr. Noriega's friend Manuel Solis Palma. In early March 1988, Mr. Delvalle, still recognized by the USA as Panama's legitimate President, froze Panama's assets abroad and urged a boycott of all payments to the Noriega régime. In mid-March and early April 1988, the USA announced economic sanctions against Panama.

On 7 May 1989 Panamanians voted to elect a new President. The candidate backed by General Noriega, Carlos Duque, claimed victory but international observers reported massive fraud during the election count. Observers claimed Opposition Leader Guillermo Endara had won the election handily with his running mates Ricardo Arias Calderón and Guillermo Ford. Days later, General Noriega annulled the election, and during a protest march in Panama City, Government-organized paramilitary units severely beat Messrs. Endara, Calderón and Ford. On 11 May 1989, US President Bush recalled US Ambassador Arthur Davis from Panama, dispatched 2,000 additional US troops to join the 11,000 already there, and asked the Pentagon to stage a series of military manoeuvres in Panama. The Organization of American States (OAS) in an emergency meeting on 17 May 1989 adopted a resolution condemning General Noriega's actions and calling for the "peaceful transfer of power" to a democratically elected government. On 20 July 1989, an OAS declaration called for the transfer of power in Panama on 1 September 1989 (in keeping with Panamanian constitutional requirements) and urged that free elections be held in the country as soon as possible.

In early September 1989, Francisco Rodriguez, a government bureaucrat, was installed as President of Panama. The USA suspended diplomatic relations with Panama and the OAS announced its failure to mediate a constitutional solution to the situation at this time. On 3 October 1989, officers of the Panamanian Defence Force attempted to overthrow General Noriega, but troops loyal to the General crushed the rebellion. The US Administration had been informed about the coup in advance. In mid-November 1989, a report by the OAS Human Rights

Commission accused the Noriega Government of denying the Panamanian people their basic political rights by annulling the May election. The report stated that General Noriega's actions had violated the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and the OAS Charter. It also accused Panamanian authorities of numerous human rights violations.

On 15 December 1989, the Panamanian National Assembly, appointed by General Noriega the previous October, named him "Maximum Leader" of Panama and declared that the country was in a "state of war" with the United States. One day later, a US officer was shot and killed by Panamanian soldiers. On 18 December 1989, a Panamanian police officer was shot and wounded by a US soldier. On 20 December 1989, US forces invaded the country, with President Bush citing a threat to US citizens and Panama Canal treaty rights, as well as the death of the American officer, as reasons for the intervention. The assault, termed "Operation Just Cause" by US authorities, was a multi-pronged operation carried out by the 13,000-strong US Southern Command force in Panama and an additional 10,000 troops flown in from the United States. At the time, the US Government set the invasion's casualty figures at 23 American soldiers, 3 US citizens, 314 Panamanian troops and 220 Panamanian civilians dead, with 324 US soldiers and 124 Panamanian soldiers wounded. Estimates from various other sources, however, placed the Panamanian civilian death toll as high as 5,000. On 27 December 1989, the Bush Administration and the new US-backed Panamanian Government headed by Guillermo Endara pleaded with the Vatican to turn over General Noriega, who had taken refuge in the Vatican Embassy in Panama City on 24 December 1989.

On 22 December 1989, the OAS approved a resolution by a twenty to one vote "deeply regretting" the US invasion of Panama and calling for a withdrawal of its invasion forces from the country. The United States cast the dissenting vote. The UN Security Council on 23 December 1989 considered a draft resolution also demanding the cessation of the US intervention and the withdrawal of forces. The USA, Canada, Britain and France voted against the draft; ten other Security Council members voted in favour; and Finland abstained. On 30 December 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 240 by a vote of seventy-five to twenty, with forty countries absent or abstaining. It demanded the immediate cessation of the US intervention and the withdrawal of its forces, terming the invasion "a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States." On the same date, the General Assembly allowed a Panamanian diplomat, accredited to the UN under the Noriega régime, to occupy the Panamanian seat in the Assembly after he had switched his allegiance to the Endara Government. On 8 January 1990, the UN Secretary-General accepted the credentials of a new envoy appointed by the Endara Government.

Also on 8 January, the OAS approved a resolution censuring the USA for allowing its troops to break into the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Panama City on 29 December 1989. The USA had issued an apology immediately after the raid, but twenty US diplomats were expelled from Nicaragua in reprisal. At the UN Security Council on 17 January 1990, the United States vetoed a draft resolution similar to the one adopted by the OAS condemning the US raid on the Ambassador's residence. Thirteen members, including Canada, voted in favour of the resolution, while Britain abstained from the vote.

On 3 January 1990, General Noriega left the Vatican Embassy in Panama City and was taken by helicopter to Howard Air Force Base. There he was arrested by US Drug Enforcement Agency agents and put aboard a US Air Force transport plane to be brought to the USA to face the drug trafficking charges filed against him in 1988. A day later in Miami, General Noriega was arraigned on the charges. A trial is expected to begin no earlier than November 1990.

In mid-January 1990, Panamanian President Endara called on the USA to help rebuild his country's devastated economy by providing a generous aid package. On 25 January 1990, US President Bush called for a US\$1 billion package of loans, grants, investment guarantees and other aid for Panama. On 31 January 1990, President Bush announced a reduction in US troop strength in Panama to its pre-invasion level of 13,000 by the end of February 1990. He also stated that US troops would continue to assume police duties throughout Panama. The US Congress approved a US\$42 million package of emergency aid on 7 February 1990 and days later announced a lifting of the trade and aid sanctions targeted against the Noriega régime. On 15 March 1990, the Panamanian Government demanded compensation for large arms caches seized by US troops in the December invasion.

The Group of Eight Latin American countries held two days of meetings at the end of March 1990 and demanded that Panama hold elections to choose a new government without any external interference. It also insisted that American troops in Panama remain in the Canal Zone and limit their activities to protecting the Canal. The Foreign Ministers of the seven Latin American countries (Panama was suspended from the Group in February 1988 because of the illegal rule of General Noriega) also discussed the readmission of Panama to the Group, although no consensus to do so was reached at the meetings.<sup>4</sup>

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

### *The Central American Peace Process*

Canada has always openly supported peace efforts in Central America, particularly those of the Contadora Group. The Canadian Government has repeatedly shown its support for the objectives of the Esquipulas II Accord of 1987. Noting that "[t]he disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict," External Affairs Minister Clark has declared that "Canada is prepared to contribute to that process in any direct and practical way open to us."<sup>5</sup> In addition, Ottawa has provided Central American governments with technical information on peacekeeping operations and on the verification of regional agreements aimed at ending hostilities. Canadian Official

---

<sup>4</sup> "Latin American Group Demands New Elections Be Held in Panama." *Globe and Mail*, 31 March 1990, p. A3.

<sup>5</sup> Department of External Affairs, *Statements* 87/49 (22 September 1987). See also: Department of External Affairs, *News Release(s)* Nos. 154 and 163 (10 and 16 August 1987, respectively).

Development Assistance (ODA) in the region, approximately \$52 million in 1988-1989, is another important aspect of Ottawa's policy toward Central America.

On 18 July 1989, United Nations officials announced that Canada, Spain, Sweden and the European Community had promised to provide \$1.8 billion in aid to Central America over a three-year period. The aid money is to be administered by the UN Development Programme, and is said to be dependent upon the progress the region makes towards peace and democratic reforms.<sup>6</sup>

External Affairs Minister Clark announced on 1 September 1989 that Canadian experts would participate in a UN reconnaissance mission set up to define the operational requirements for the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUSCA).<sup>7</sup> (See *BACKGROUND "The Central American Peace Process"* in this chapter; and **PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION**.)

On 15 September 1989, Mr. Clark stated that he was encouraged by an agreement reached by the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) to begin talks in Mexico City. He also welcomed the related announcement by the FMLN of a ceasefire, and the reported decision of the Salvadoran Government to permit wounded FMLN fighters to seek treatment abroad. Mr. Clark noted that Canadians were shocked by the recent increase in violence in El Salvador, including reports of disappearances and torture.<sup>8</sup>

Canadian Government support for the February 1990 election in Nicaragua, announced in early 1989, was confirmed on 28 September 1989 when External Affairs Minister Clark announced a contribution of approximately \$700,000 worth of materials and technical assistance to the Nicaraguan Electoral Commission. The contribution provided funding for a voter education campaign, newsprint for staff training manuals and cardboard for making ballot boxes.<sup>9</sup>

On 27 and 28 October 1989, some fourteen members of the thirty-two-member Organization of American States (OAS), along with Canada, Spain and Portugal as OAS observer nations, met in San José, Costa Rica for a Hemispheric Summit. At the opening of the Summit, Prime Minister Mulroney publicly expressed Canada's desire to formally join the OAS as a full member. At the same time, the Canadian Government announced that it would not endorse the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance provisions of the OAS Charter which call on members to support each other militarily in certain circumstances.<sup>10</sup> At the Summit External Affairs Minister

---

<sup>6</sup> "Canada Offers Aid to Central America." *Toronto Star*, 19 July 1989, p. A19.

<sup>7</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 209 (1 September 1989).

<sup>8</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 215 (15 September 1989).

<sup>9</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 230 (28 September 1989).

<sup>10</sup> Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, "Notes for an Address...[at the] Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders, San Jose [sic], Costa Rica, October 27, 1989." Office of the Prime Minister; "Costa Rican Summit Celebrates Democracy." *Globe and Mail*, 27 October 1989, p. A4; "Canada to Join OAS; Mulroney Pledges New Relationship." *Globe and Mail*, 28 October 1989, pp. A1 and A2; and Dave Todd and Les Whittington, "Mulroney Dismisses Fears of Undue U.S. Influence." *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 October 1989, pp. A1 and A2.

Clark expressed dismay and concern at the announced intention of Nicaraguan President Ortega to end the nineteen-month-old ceasefire in his country. Mr. Clark stated that the "ceasefire was an integral part of the peace process in Central America," and of particular concern to Canada, given the possible deployment of UN verification forces in the area.<sup>11</sup>

On 2 November 1989, Mr. Clark expressed shock and sadness at the bombing of the national offices in San Salvador of the Mothers of Disappeared Persons (COMADRES) and Salvadoran Union-Workers (FENASTRAS), which caused ten deaths.<sup>12</sup> On 16 November 1989 Mr. Clark, on behalf of Canadians, also expressed outrage at the brutal slayings of six members of the Jesuit community and their two employees in El Salvador.<sup>13</sup> On the same date, the Minister announced that Canada would provide the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with \$100,000 for medical and other assistance for victims of the fighting in El Salvador.<sup>14</sup> On 17 November 1989, Mr. Clark welcomed the release in San Salvador of Reverend Brian Rude, a Canadian Lutheran Church Minister serving in El Salvador as a volunteer for Peace Brigades International (PBI). Reverend Rude, together with other church officials and relief workers, had been arrested a day earlier by Salvadoran police.<sup>15</sup> Another Canadian PBI volunteer, Karen Ridd of Winnipeg, was taken into custody by Salvadoran security forces on 20 November 1989. She was released a day later and returned to Canada on 23 November 1989.<sup>16</sup>

As a result of the November rebel offensive and increased fighting in El Salvador, on 22 November 1989 Michael Jay, Central American programme officer for the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), announced that the Canadian government's bilateral aid programme for El Salvador had been temporarily halted. The programme consists of over one hundred projects agreed upon by the Governments of Canada and El Salvador since 1986. Canadian labour organizations, church groups and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have repeatedly called for a cancellation of these bilateral aid projects, maintaining that better NGO channels exist for helping Salvadoran civilians, and that paying for El Salvador's social services frees government funds to be used for military purposes.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 264 (30 October 1989).

<sup>12</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 270 (2 November 1989).

<sup>13</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 285 (16 November 1989).

<sup>14</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 286 (16 November 1989).

<sup>15</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 289 (17 November 1989); and Les Whittington, "Canadian Freed in War-Torn El Salvador." *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 November 1989, p. A6.

<sup>16</sup> Charlotte Montgomery and Linda Hossie, "El Salvador Frees Jailed Canadian Volunteer." *Globe and Mail*, 21 November 1989, pp. A1 and A2; and April Lindgren, "Missionaries Do Diplomats' Work in El Salvador." *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 November 1989, p. A8.

<sup>17</sup> Charlotte Montgomery, "Ottawa Has No Plan to End Aid to El Salvador, Officials Contend." *Globe and Mail*, 23 November 1989, p. A4; and "Aid to El Salvador Stalled." *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 November 1989, p. A14.

Also within the first week of the rebel offensive and Government retaliation, Canadian immigration officers in El Salvador reportedly issued one hundred emergency minister's permits to Salvadorans for reunification with their families in Canada, and ran an emergency airlift that rescued about three hundred Salvadoran refugees from the raging civil war.<sup>18</sup> It was also reported that a Canadian church and development agency project to send up to \$1 million in medicine, food and other supplies to victims of the civil war had been delayed in late November and early December 1989 by delivery problems caused by the arrests and harassment of aid workers by Salvadoran authorities. On 12 December 1989, a group of Canadian churches and NGOs announced that it had received \$315,000 from CIDA as an initial installment in a \$1 million relief programme for Salvadoran war victims.<sup>19</sup>

After having participated in the Organization of American States (OAS) as an observer since 1972, Canada became the 33rd member of the Organization, signing the OAS Charter, on 13 November 1989.<sup>20</sup>

On 13 December 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the Declaration of the five Central American Presidents at their 10 to 12 December 1989 Summit meeting in Costa Rica condemning insurgencies and reaffirming the key role of the UN in the region. Mr. Clark summarized Canada's contribution to the peace process as follows:

Canada is a major contributor to the UN Observer Group (ONUCA), and is contributing heavily in many other ways; [sic] for example, our growing programme of development assistance; in sending experts to observe elections; in technical and material assistance to the election process in Nicaragua; in the effective help we have provided, on an urgent basis, to refugees; and in speaking out strongly on the need to respect and strengthen human rights in Central America.

---

<sup>18</sup> Paul Watson, "Salvador Airlift a Mercy Mission." *Toronto Star*, 2 December 1989, p. 1; and "Canadian Airlift Saves Hundreds of Salvadorans." *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 December 1989, p. D11.

<sup>19</sup> Charlotte Montgomery, "Canadian Aid to El Salvador Stalled by Delivery Problems." *Globe and Mail*, 9 December 1989, p. A4; and Charlotte Montgomery, "El Salvador Initiates Public-Relations Drive." *Globe and Mail*, 13 December 1989, p. A4.

<sup>20</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 281 (13 November 1989); Scott White, "Canada Takes OAS Chair." *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 November 1989, p. A3; Colin MacKenzie, "Democratic Principles Praised as Canada Formally Joins OAS." *Globe and Mail*, 14 November 1989, p. A4; Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Notes for Remarks...at the Meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., November 13, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statement* No. 89/62. See also: House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 35 (1 February 1990), pp. 35: 6-17; and Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 141 (29 June 1990).

The External Affairs Minister also reiterated his plea for the cessation of bloodshed and violence in El Salvador.<sup>21</sup>

In a speech at the annual consultation meetings with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerning human rights on 22 January 1990 in Ottawa, Mr. Clark stated:

In Central America...many countries have subscribed to various international human rights instruments. But such a step in itself has not protected people from human rights abuses. In organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States, Canada help [sic] improve the situation in those countries. In the last session of the [UN] General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored a resolution dealing with human rights in El Salvador, and the Canadian delegation will be dealing with this situation at the [UN Human Rights] Commission as well.<sup>22</sup>

In a speech to an audience at the University of Calgary on 1 February 1990, the External Affairs Minister referred to Canada's role in the peace process in this way:

In addition to being part of the neighbourhood, we possess and exercise precisely the talents which can overcome confrontation. Indeed these are precisely the talents Canada has been applying to help advance the peace process in Central America. From the outset, the five governments of that region turned to Canada.... The structure of the peace-keeping operation closely followed the recommendations which Canada made after studying the requirements for an effective U.N. presence. That is the sort of useful role Canada has played - and will continue to play - in the region. It is a role which not all can play.... Some Canadian NGOs criticize Canada's continued relations with El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. We have been urged to cut off links, to walk away. Some European countries have done just that. But when it came time to prepare for peace in Central America, it was not to those countries that the region turned. It was to Canada.<sup>23</sup>

On 8 February 1990, Mr. Clark announced that eight Canadians would serve as observers of the 25 February 1990 Nicaraguan election in response to UN and OAS requests.<sup>24</sup> According to a news release issued on 26 February 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney offered congratulations

---

<sup>21</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 306 (13 December 1989).

<sup>22</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech...at the Annual Consultations with the Non-Governmental Organizations Concerning Human Rights, Ottawa, January 22, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/03, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech...to the University of Calgary on Canadian Policy towards Latin America, Calgary, Alberta, February 1, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/08, pp. 3-4; and Tim Harper, "Clark Sees Clashes with U.S. over Latin American Policy." *Toronto Star*, 2 February 1990, p. 12.

<sup>24</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 027 (8 February 1990).

on behalf of the Canadian Government to Mrs. Violeta Chamorro and her National Opposition Union (UNO) coalition on their election victory. The news release further stated:

Nicaraguans have had the opportunity to express their democratic choice under free and fair circumstances. The leadership and supporters of UNO and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) can take pride in the manner in which the campaign and election were conducted. The Government welcomes and strongly supports Mrs. Chamorro's call for national reconciliation and her statement that Nicaraguans wish to live in democracy, peace and liberty. Canada looks forward to a vibrant, open and democratic political process in Nicaragua and offers its congratulations to the people of that country who have so effectively participated in this democratic renewal. The Prime Minister also conveyed congratulations and best wishes to President Ortega for his adherence to the democratic process initiated in Nicaragua.... Prime Minister Mulroney declared Canada's intention to maintain its traditionally friendly relations with Nicaragua and its continuing commitment to a programme of development assistance in that country. Canadian direct development assistance to Nicaragua was \$58 million for the five year period 1984-85 to 1988-89.<sup>25</sup>

On 4 April 1990, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the resumption of peace talks in Geneva between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN rebel group and added that Canada would "consider positively any request to assist in these vital negotiations."<sup>26</sup>

### *Panama*

On 28 August 1989, an External Affairs news release explained the Canadian Government's position on the political crisis in Panama, beginning with a statement by the Minister for External Affairs:

I am very disappointed that, despite its best efforts, the special mission of the Organization of American States (OAS) has been unable to help bring about a negotiated settlement of the political crisis in Panama. Canada gave its support to an OAS declaration July 20 which called for a transfer of power in Panama on September 1, in keeping with constitutional requirements, and urged the holding of free elections as soon as possible....

The news release continued:

Following the aborted elections of May 7, Canada condemned the betrayal of the democratic aspirations of the Panamanian people, and took the decision to limit official contacts with the present government.

---

<sup>25</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, *Release* (26 February 1990).

<sup>26</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 068 (4 April 1990).

Finally, External Affairs Minister Clark was quoted as follows:

General Noriega, by his actions, is isolating himself and his country from his neighbours and from the rest of the democratic world. Canada hopes that the constructive efforts of the OAS to bring about an acceptable solution to the Panama problem will continue....<sup>27</sup>

On 20 December 1989, regarding the US invasion of Panama of the same date, the Secretary of State for External Affairs issued the following statement:

The Canadian Government regrets the use of force by the USA in Panama but understands and is sympathetic to the American action in the circumstances, particularly given their concern over the escalating threats to American citizens in Panama. Canada has, in the past, condemned the betrayal of the democratic process in Panama, most recently General Noriega's refusal to respect the results of the democratic election in May. Intervention by force is a dangerous precedent and we note that the USA relied on force in the last resort, only after the failure of attempts to resolve the situation in Panama peacefully. We hope for a quick return to democracy and stability in Panama. The Prime Minister was advised of the American action early this morning through a phone call from President Bush.<sup>28</sup>

Hours after the US invasion of Panama began, Prime Minister Mulroney was reported to have said that the USA was justified in using military force to oust General Noriega, whom he described as "a thug and drug-runner" who had looted his country.<sup>29</sup> In the House of Commons on 20 December 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark stated, in part:

In the past week, there have been developments that were particularly alarming -- would be to anyone in this House, were to many of us -- including the statement by General Noriega that Panama is in a state of war, to use his words, with the United States. That declaration...was followed by harassment of Americans stationed by treaty in Panama; indeed it was followed by the murder of an off-duty member of the American services, and threats to the family of that individual. It's important here...to emphasize two facts which distinguish the situation in Panama from that which might exist in other parts of the world. One of those facts is that the United States' presence there is the result of a treaty. It is not a presence that is the result of the occupation.... The American troops...have a right to be there, and they have a right to be protected while they are there.... A second thought that I want to underline is that peaceful solutions had been sought, and peaceful

---

<sup>27</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 199 (28 August 1989).

<sup>28</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 313 (20 December 1989).

<sup>29</sup> John Valorzi, "Bush Thanks Mulroney for Support." *Montreal Gazette*, 5 January 1990, p. 8.

solutions had failed. In fact, what was remarkable for so long was the willingness of the Bush Administration to put its faith in mediation, to put its faith in negotiation, to put its faith in peaceful processes.... I want to mention three things that I think should be on our minds as we try to look forward. One is that we have to work and use all of the influence and standing of Canada to ensure that intervention not become a precedent. There were unique factors here, and if they can justify actions that were taken early this morning by the United States, it is their uniqueness that justifies them. There is not a precedent established here that this parliament or this country would approve in other circumstances.... Secondly, we believe it is important that we help the government that was elected in May in Panama to establish stability and democracy in that country.... And thirdly, I think there is a lesson here of the real need to strengthen the regional institutions in Latin America, particularly in Central America.... The point to underline...is that Central America is not anybody's backyard. Central America consists of sovereign countries with ambitions of their own, histories of their own, qualities of their own.<sup>30</sup>

On 22 December 1989 the OAS approved a resolution, with the USA casting the only dissenting vote, "deeply regretting" the US invasion of Panama. Canada did not vote on the resolution because its full membership in the OAS did not take effect until 1 January 1990.<sup>31</sup>

On 23 December 1989, the USA, Britain and France vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution condemning the US intervention. Canada also voted against the resolution, with Canadian Ambassador to the UN Yves Fortier pointing to the harassment of American citizens in Panama as justification for the US action. He also stated that General Noriega's statement that Panama was in a "state of war" with the United States had left President Bush "with few options."<sup>32</sup>

On 30 December 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding the immediate cessation of the US intervention and withdrawal of its invasion forces from Panama. Canada joined nineteen other nations in voting against the resolution, while seventy-five voted in favour and sixty-four were absent or abstained.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Statement...in the House of Commons on the Situation in Panama, Ottawa, December 20, 1989." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement No. 89/70*, pp. 3-5; and *Commons Debates*, 20 December 1989, pp. 7286-7287.

<sup>31</sup> Norma Greenaway, "Panama Focus of OAS Agenda as Canada Joins." *Toronto Star*, 9 January 1990, p. A11; and Ross Howard, "Canada's Backing Invasion Not Damaging, Officials Say." *Globe and Mail*, 19 January 1990, p. A10.

<sup>32</sup> Trevor Rowe, "Report from the Security Council." *Peace&Security*, vol. 5 no. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 17.

<sup>33</sup> "UN Condemns Panama Invasion, Canada Backs U.S." *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 December 1989, pp. A1 and A2.

It was reported on 5 January 1990 that US President Bush had telephoned Prime Minister Mulroney to talk about the surrender of General Noriega to US forces in Panama and to thank Canada for supporting the US invasion.<sup>34</sup>

On 8 January 1990, the OAS approved a resolution expressing "deep concern" over the US raid on the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Panama City on 29 December 1989. Canada joined eighteen other members voting in favour of the resolution, while seven, including the USA, abstained. After the vote, Canadian Ambassador to the OAS Jean-Paul Hubert described the raid as "reprehensible."<sup>35</sup>

It was reported on 11 January 1990 that Canada had ignored a plea from the Panamanian Ambassador to the OAS for assistance and official recognition of the new US-backed Panamanian Government.<sup>36</sup>

On 17 January 1990, the USA vetoed a UN Security Council draft resolution condemning its raid on the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Panama City. Britain abstained, while Canada and twelve others supported the resolution. Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN Philippe Kirsch said that Canada had taken into account a 29 December 1990 US apology for the incident, but maintained that the US raid was "against well-recognized principles of international law."<sup>37</sup>

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

### *The Central American Peace Process*

During the latter half of 1989, some Members of Parliament rose in the House to speak about Canada's involvement in the Organization of American States (OAS). Several Opposition MPs questioned the Government's intention to join the OAS as a full member when, in their view, the OAS was perceived as an "extension of U.S. foreign policy." Both Liberal and New Democratic Party Members stated that the change in status could possibly compromise Canada's independence in dealing with OAS member countries.<sup>38</sup> Others questioned the Government's intention to upgrade Canada's status at the OAS without carrying out public consultations with Canadian

---

<sup>34</sup> Valorzi, *supra* note 29.

<sup>35</sup> Norma Greenaway, "Canada Condemns Raid by U.S." *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 January 1990, pp. A1 and A2; and "New Member." *Financial Post*, 9 January 1990, p. 2.

<sup>36</sup> Bob Hepburn, "Canada Ignores Call to Recognize Panama." *Toronto Star*, 11 January 1990, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> "U.S. Vetoes UN Condemnation of Raid." *Globe and Mail*, 18 January 1990, p. A10.

<sup>38</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1989, p. 4095; 30 October 1989, pp. 5291-5293; and 31 October 1989, p. 5355.

groups and agencies that regularly work with OAS member countries.<sup>39</sup> Some Opposition MPs questioned the Government on its intention to monitor human rights abuses within OAS countries.<sup>40</sup> They also questioned the Government's commitment to the region at a time of announced cut-backs to Canadian foreign aid programmes and diplomatic services.<sup>41</sup>

A major focus in Commons' statements and debates on Central America from mid-1989 to mid-1990 was the continuing civil war in El Salvador. Many MPs condemned the human rights abuses taking place in that country and called on the Canadian Government to condemn them as well.<sup>42</sup> Several Members called on the Government to do everything possible to press the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN guerrillas toward a negotiated peace settlement,<sup>43</sup> while some MPs called for a distancing between Canadian Government policy and US support of the Cristiani Government.<sup>44</sup>

Liberal MP Christine Stewart and NDP MP Lynn Hunter rose in the House on 20 November 1989 to condemn the murders of Father Ignacio Ellacuria, the Rector of the University of Central America, and other members of the Jesuit community in El Salvador. Mrs. Stewart stated:

We deplore the brutal and senseless murder of this man, his five colleagues and two staff by the El Salvadoran military as witnessed last week. As a new member of the OAS, Canada must exert independent and distinctive initiatives to achieve an immediate cease-fire and a negotiated settlement to the conflict in El Salvador. "Monitoring" of the situation is insufficient and unacceptable as a Canadian response. Canada must officially take up the baton from the slain priests of El Salvador and courageously use every diplomatic facility to demonstrate its commitment to peace and the people of El Salvador. Delivery of increased humanitarian assistance through Canadian NGOs and multilateral channels must be assured. The human rights of all, but especially of civilians, must be protected. Canadian volunteers such as Karen Ridd of

---

<sup>39</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 October 1989, pp. 4361-4362; and 10 October 1989, pp. 4481-4482.

<sup>40</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 October 1989, p. 5219; and 30 October 1989, pp. 5291-5293.

<sup>41</sup> *Commons Debates*, 30 October 1989, pp. 5291-5293.

<sup>42</sup> *Commons Debates*, 13 October 1989, p. 4646; 27 October 1989, pp. 5219-5220; 2 November 1989, p. 5465; 20 November 1989, pp. 5836, 5838 and 5841-5842; 21 November 1989, pp. 5930 and 5939-5940; 28 November 1989, pp. 6357-6358; 13 December 1989, p. 6855; 14 December 1989, pp. 6938-6939; and 12 February 1990, p. 8176.

<sup>43</sup> *Commons Debates*, 24 November 1989, pp. 6186-6187; 6 December 1989, p. 6545; and 5 February 1990, pp. 7827-7828.

<sup>44</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 October 1989, pp. 5219-5220; 22 November 1989, pp. 5985-5986; 23 November 1989, p. 6087; 24 November 1989, pp. 6186-6187; 27 November 1989, pp. 6262-6263; 6 December 1989, p. 6545; and 12 February 1990, p. 8176.

Peace Brigades International [detained by Salvadoran police on 20 November 1989] must be assured safety. The U.S. must be pressured to stop its unsuccessful eight year long aid programme to the El Salvador military.<sup>45</sup>

On 21 November 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie expressed relief upon learning of the release from detention of Karen Ridd, the Canadian working with Peace Brigades International in El Salvador. He told the House:

The work of people like Karen and Peace Brigades International, people who go to Central America to provide an escort service which is designed to protect Salvadorans who may be under threat of death or kidnapping, is truly in the spirit of Canada's peace-keeping role. These are people who are real peacekeepers, who put themselves, their bodies, between the victimized and the oppressors, in this case the Cristiani government. I think it is about time the Canadian Government showed the courage of some of its citizens like Karen Ridd in El Salvador and put itself, diplomatically, politically and economically between the United States, its puppet regime in El Salvador, and the people of El Salvador.<sup>46</sup>

The same day New Democratic Party MP Dan Heap called on the Government to speed up the processing and issuing of visas and Minister's permits for those wishing to leave El Salvador for Canada, and to halt any deportations of Salvadorans then in Canada.<sup>47</sup> On 5 December 1989, Mr. Heap commended the Government for its swift response in dealing with Salvadoran civilian requests for immigration to Canada and called on Canadians to sponsor the incoming refugees.<sup>48</sup>

On 21 November 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie asked the Government about US military aid to El Salvador and called on it to cut off all bilateral aid to the Salvadoran Government. Minister for External Relations and International Development Monique Landry replied:

[T]he Central American countries are very thankful for the role played by Canada to restore lasting peace in that region of the world, and we will continue our efforts to that end.... [W]e have always urged foreign powers not to intervene in a conflict but to put pressure on the parties with a view to negotiating lasting peace. We believe that is the only way to find a solution. As to assistance, I must say that in view of the precarious situation in El Salvador

---

<sup>45</sup> *Commons Debates*, 20 November 1989, p. 5836. See also: 20 November 1989, p. 5838.

<sup>46</sup> *Commons Debates*, 21 November 1989, p. 5930.

<sup>47</sup> *Commons Debates*, 21 November 1989, p. 5930. See also: 20 November 1989, p. 5841-5842; and 30 January 1990, pp. 7600-7601.

<sup>48</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 December 1989, p. 6500.

and to ensure the security of Canadians, the implementation of the assistance project has been deferred. I might point out...that assistance has been provided through Canadian and Salvadoran NGOs to help displaced people who are now victims of the armed conflicts.<sup>49</sup>

Liberal MP David Walker made the following recommendations on behalf of his Party on 22 November 1989:

First, that the Canadian government through its new role in the OAS urge the United States to reconsider its policy on El Salvador and in that context suspend its aid to the Salvadoran military and condition its economic aid to political negotiations, human rights and compliance with the Esquipulas II peace accord. Second, encourage the OAS, specifically its human rights arm, to investigate the human rights abuses in El Salvador and report as soon as possible, as well as call on El Salvador's government to cease and desist immediately from human rights violations. Third, that Canada adopt an open-door policy for refugees escaping the conflict in El Salvador during this time of crisis and hardship and put a moratorium on the deportation of any El Salvadoran refugees now living in Canada.<sup>50</sup>

A day later in the House, NDP Member Lynn Hunter noted that the FMLN rebel group had appealed for a UN-monitored ceasefire. She urged the Canadian Government "to impress upon the United States...that U.S. military interference in Central America is unacceptable," adding that the UN Commission on Human Rights had noted "a dramatic increase in the number of human rights violations" in El Salvador since the coming to power of the Cristiani Government in early 1989.<sup>51</sup>

In the House on 24 November 1989, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy called for an emergency debate on the situation in El Salvador. The request was denied by the Deputy Speaker who did, however, acknowledge that the situation in El Salvador was "most serious."<sup>52</sup>

On 27 November 1989, NDP Member Bill Blaikie asked the Prime Minister to elaborate on representations made by the Canadian Government to US President Bush on the situation in El Salvador. Mr. Mulroney and External Affairs Minister Clark replied that they would draw the attention of the United States and OAS member countries to the loss of life, threats to human rights, and threats to the success of peacekeeping and observation plans in El Salvador.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>49</sup> *Commons Debates*, 21 November 1989, pp. 5939-5940.

<sup>50</sup> *Commons Debates*, 22 November 1989, p. 5984.

<sup>51</sup> *Commons Debates*, 23 November 1989, p. 6087.

<sup>52</sup> *Commons Debates*, 24 November 1989, p. 6199.

<sup>53</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, pp. 6262-6263.

On 5 February 1990, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy asked the Prime Minister whether his Government would respect previous undertakings to provide aid to NGOs working in Central America, in particular El Salvador; whether he would pressure the Bush Administration to make US support of the Cristiani Government contingent upon improvements in its human rights record; and whether Canada would pressure the USA to bring the two opposing sides together for negotiations to achieve a peace settlement in El Salvador. The Prime Minister replied, in part:

[W]e give a lot more aid on a per capita basis around the world than does the United States of America...and we do not throw in military aid for the ends of the calculations either. I think the nation has an excellent record in terms of foreign aid, without strings attached. That is what we propose to continue to do. The Secretary of State for External Affairs and myself have already spoken to the United States many times in regard to this approach for its foreign aid. The parliamentary committee discussed \$100 million in aid to the region. It is our intention to make sure that undertaking is respected.<sup>54</sup>

At various times in the House in late 1989 and early 1990, Members of Parliament questioned the Canadian Government's policies toward Nicaragua. On 31 October 1989 NDP Member Howard McCurdy asked:

Will Canada denounce continued covert aid to the Contras whose present activities have resulted in the death of hundreds and which threaten to destabilize the Nicaraguan peace process? Will Canada denounce the \$9 million spent by the United States government in support of opposition parties in the Nicaraguan election as an unacceptable intrusion in the internal affairs of another state? In short, will Canada resist the OAS' historic compliance with U.S. military and political intervention in the affairs of member states, or will the Secretary of State [for External Affairs] be fearful that in reflecting Canadian opinion the Americans will perceive him...as too vigorous?<sup>55</sup>

On 7 March 1990, NDP Member Bill Blaikie commented on the Nicaraguan election as follows:

[The] election in Nicaragua was a democratic event that owes its existence to the Sandinista revolution. We can be assured that, had the American backed Somoza never been overthrown, democracy would still be a stranger to Nicaragua. So would literacy, community health care, land reform and the absence of death squads, to name a few of the benefits brought on by the Sandinistas. Nevertheless, the people of Nicaragua cried uncle under the combined burden of the [US] trade embargo, mistakes made by the Sandinistas themselves, and the prospect of continued

---

<sup>54</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 February 1990, pp. 7827-7828.

<sup>55</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 October 1989, p. 5355.

war with the Contras, given the widespread expectation that Washington would not have been as gracious as Ortega if its side had lost the election. We must hope now that Mrs. Chamorro and Daniel Ortega will be able to build an understanding based on their once mutually shared abhorrence of pre-revolutionary Nicaragua.... Essential...is the total and immediate disbanding of the Contras, something that only Washington can ensure by cutting off the Contra support.... This having been done, negotiations about the army in Nicaragua and other issues could proceed. In the meantime, the Canadian government should continue to keep Nicaragua an important country in its development aid programs and urge President Bush to do the right thing.<sup>56</sup>

On 4 June 1990, NDP Member Lynn Hunter made the following statement on Canadian policy toward Guatemala:

[H]uman rights abuses in Guatemala are once again on the rise. Allegations of corruption and misuse of development funds raise grave concerns about this government's decision [in November 1987] to renew bilateral aid to Guatemala.... Amnesty International reports that humanitarian workers, trade unionists, clergy and academics have faced an escalation of abductions, disappearances and killings over the last three years.... We must find a way to assist the oppressed without giving legitimacy to a corrupt and vicious regime.<sup>57</sup>

### *Panama*

The Government came under sharp attack from Opposition MPs on 20 December 1989 over its support, announced that morning, for the US invasion of Panama.<sup>58</sup> Prime Minister Mulroney rejected charges that the invasion was unjustifiable and should be condemned by Canada. Both he and External Affairs Minister Clark referred to the "unusual circumstances" in Panama and stated that the Canadian Government position was one of "regret but not condemnation."<sup>59</sup> (For details of the Government's position, see *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION Panama*.)

During the heated debate in the House on 20 December 1989, Leader of the New Democratic Party Audrey McLaughlin asked the Prime Minister:

Is this the way for a civilized government to act in a civilized world? When is the Prime Minister going to communicate to the American government that Latin America is no longer the private backyard of the United States?

---

<sup>56</sup> *Commons Debates*, 7 March 1990, pp. 8909-8910.

<sup>57</sup> *Commons Debates*, 4 June 1990, p. 12198.

<sup>58</sup> *Commons Debates*, 20 December 1989, pp. 7247, 7256-7257 and 7288-7292.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7254.

In response Prime Minister Mulroney stressed the "special circumstances" in Panama and reiterated his belief that in those circumstances the United States had acted properly. The Prime Minister added that the "sentiments expressed" by the NDP Leader were "so far removed from the mainstream fundamental values of Canadians, that she...will never...be called upon to form a government in this country."<sup>60</sup>

Liberal Member Christine Stewart asked the Prime Minister whether the Canadian Government accepted "without exception" the UN principle of non-intervention. In response, External Affairs Minister Clark repeatedly referred to the "unusual circumstances" that had existed in Panama at the time of the intervention.<sup>61</sup>

On 23 March 1990, NDP MP Bill Blaikie asked the External Affairs Minister whether he had seen a report issued by the Central American Human Rights Commission which disclosed that the US invasion had caused a higher number of civilian casualties than first reported by the US Government. Mr. Clark replied that he would "look at the report and take whatever action...[was] appropriate."<sup>62</sup>

On 23 April 1990, NDP Member Lynn Hunter asked Mr. Clark whether the Government had sought legal opinion before expressing support for the US military intervention in Panama. He replied that "related questions concerning the nature of any such opinion constitute a request to render public the confidential advice provided by the Government to the Prime Minister. The confidentiality of this information is protected under the Access to Information Act."<sup>63</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Barre, Marie-Chantal, "Le difficile processus de paix en Amérique centrale." *Défense nationale* (October 1989), pp. 113-121.

Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 28 (23 November 1989), pp. 28: 6-29 and 28A: 1-37 [El Salvador]; Issue No. 33 (13 December 1989), pp. 33: 4-23 [El Salvador]; Issue No. 34 (14 December 1989), pp. 34: 4-36 [Current Developments in Central America]; Issue No. 35 (1 February 1990), pp. 35: 6-17 [OAS]; Issue No. 38 (6 March 1990), pp. 38: 3-28 [Nicaraguan Elections]; and Issue No. 40 (13 March 1990), pp. 40: 4-25 [El Salvador].

"A Chance for Central America to Pull Itself Together." *The Economist*, 21-27 April 1990, pp. 45-46.

Dinges, John, *Our Man in Panama: How General Noriega Used the United States and Made Millions in Drugs and Arms*. New York: Random House, 1990 (402 pp.).

Kempe, Frederick, *Divorcing the Dictator: America's Bungled Affair with Noriega*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1990 (469 pp.).

---

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7252-7253.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7253-7255.

<sup>62</sup> *Commons Debates*, 23 March 1990, p. 9697.

<sup>63</sup> *Commons Debates*, 23 April 1990, pp. 10537-10538.

Lindenberg, Marc, "World Economic Cycles and Central American Political Instability." *World Politics*, vol. 42 no. 3 (April 1990), pp. 397-421.

Maechling, Charles Jr., "Washington's Illegal Invasion." *Foreign Policy* No. 79 (Summer 1990), pp. 113-131.

Massing, Michael, "New Trouble in Panama." *New York Review of Books*, vol. 37 no. 8 (17 May 1990), pp. 43-49.

North, Liisa and Draimin, Tim, "The Decay of the Security Regime in Central America." *International Journal*, vol. 45 no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 224-257.

#### FURTHER READING

Bagley, Bruce M. (ed.), *Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace in Central America: The United States, Central America and Contadora - Volume I*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987 (275 pp.).

Buvollen, Hans Petter, "Low-Intensity Warfare and the Peace Plan in Central America." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 20 no. 3 (1989), pp. 319-334.

Destexhe, Alain, *Amérique centrale, enjeux politiques*. Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1989 (276 pp.).

Dunkerly, James, *Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America*. London: Verso, 1988 (691 pp.).

Haglund, David G. and Jones, Peter L., *Canada, the "Lessons" of Peacekeeping, and Central America*. Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, *Occasional Paper* No. 33, May 1989 (46 pp.).

Handy, Jim, *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala*. Toronto: Between The Lines, 1984 (319 pp.).

Holmes, John and Leys, Colin (eds.), *Frontyard / Backyard: The Americas in the Global Crisis*. Toronto: Between The Lines, 1987 (241 pp.).

Hopmann, P. Terrence, "Negotiating Peace in Central America." *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 4 no. 4 (October 1988), pp. 361-380.

McFarlane, Peter, *Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America*. Toronto: Between The Lines, 1989 (245 pp.).

North, Liisa, *Bitter Grounds: Roots of Revolt in El Salvador*. (2nd ed). Toronto: Between The Lines, 1985 (124 pp.).

North, Liisa and Draimin, Tim, *The Central American Peace Process and Canadian Foreign Policy: An Overview*. Toronto: Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives, *Working Paper*, February 1988 (48 pp.).

Turner, Robert F., *Nicaragua v. United States: A Look at the Facts*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987 (184 pp.).



*BACKGROUND**Iran – Iraq*

On 18 July 1988, Iran accepted UN Resolution 598 as the basis for talks with Iraq to end their eight-year war. Among other provisions, the Resolution called for a UN-supervised ceasefire, withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries, prisoner exchanges, the establishment of a panel to determine responsibility for the war, and the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement. On 20 August 1988, a ceasefire commenced and both parties agreed to begin talks. In addition, the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was established by the UN Security Council, providing a force of 350 unarmed military observers from twenty-four countries, including Canada, to monitor the ceasefire.

Between late 1988 and September 1989, fifteen rounds of negotiations and three meetings of the parties, separately with UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, failed to make significant progress in implementing UN Resolution 598. On 8 August 1989, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called on Iran to sign a peace treaty to formally end the war. On 18 September 1989, newly elected Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani insisted that renewed peace talks would not advance until Iraq withdrew from Iranian border lands seized in the last days of the war. At the United Nations on 29 September 1989, the Security Council called upon Iran and Iraq to implement Resolution 598 and extended the mandate of the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) for a further six months.

Beginning in October 1989, UN mediator Jan Eliasson of Sweden began a diplomatic shuttle mission between Baghdad and Teheran in an effort to facilitate the implementation of UN Resolution 598. In November 1989, Iran and Iraq exchanged competing proposals. Iran announced that it was ready to exchange prisoners with Iraq, provided the latter withdrew from captured Iranian border territory. Iraq insisted that a prisoner exchange, coupled with the clearing of debris and the re-opening of the Shatt al'Arab waterway, had to precede consideration of other issues. The waterway forms the southern border between Iran and Iraq and connects the Iraqi port of Basra to the Persian Gulf.

In mid-December 1989, the UN Secretary-General again held separate meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Iraq. Iran rejected Iraqi demands to redraw the border between the two countries and reiterated its support for the 1975 Algiers Treaty which divided the Shatt al'Arab waterway between the two countries. Iraq demanded a new border accord giving it control over the waterway.

On 27 February 1990, the UN Security Council called on the two countries to "co-operate fully" with the UN Secretary-General in his efforts to facilitate direct talks between them. On 29 March 1990, the Council extended the mandate of UNIIMOG for a further six months and heard a call from the Secretary-General for Iran and Iraq to notify him of their acceptance of his

proposed agenda for direct talks. In mid-May 1990, it was reported that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had offered new peace proposals to Iran and proposed a face-to-face meeting with Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani to break the deadlock.

In related developments, on the issue of prisoner exchanges, about 400 prisoners have been freed since the 1988 ceasefire, but a further exchange was halted after Iran and Iraq accused each other of bad faith. On 25 December 1989, Iran released fifty ailing and disabled Iraqi prisoners of war to International Red Cross representatives. The Red Cross estimated that Iran still held approximately 50,000 registered Iraqi prisoners of war and between 10,000 and 20,000 other Iraqi prisoners. Iraq was estimated to hold 18,000 registered Iranian prisoners and between 22,000 and 27,000 other Iranian prisoners.

It was reported in August 1989 that the United States would challenge Iran's claim that the International Court of Justice had jurisdiction in the case of the Iranian passenger plane shot down by the US warship *U.S.S. Vincennes* on 3 July 1988. In July 1989, the USA offered compensation to the families of those killed in the incident, but reportedly did not accept liability. Iran has refused to cooperate on this issue and has elected to take its case to the ICJ.

On 7 March 1990, Iran agreed to allow a UN Human Rights Commission lawyer to make a second visit to the country to investigate accusations of serious human rights violations. The mission had been unanimously endorsed by a meeting of the forty-three-member Commission. Also on 7 March 1990, Iraq invited the UN Human Rights Commission to visit the country at Iraq's expense to investigate reports of the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish rebels. A group of Commission countries accepted the invitation on the condition that the visit be carried out under UN auspices, but Iraq refused, and the initiative was subsequently defeated in a Commission vote of eighteen to fourteen, with nine abstentions. On 11 February 1990, the human rights group Middle East Watch charged that Iraq used torture and executions to silence opposition within its country.

In March 1989, Iran broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, after demanding that the British Government denounce the Indian-born British author Salman Rushdie and his novel *The Satanic Verses*. The late Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini passed a death sentence on the author which has not been withdrawn by the Iranian leaders who succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini. Mr. Rushdie remains in hiding.

In March 1990, an Iranian national working as a journalist for a British newspaper was sentenced to death in Baghdad for allegedly spying on secret military installations in Iraq. Despite international appeals for clemency, Farzad Bazoft was executed on 15 March 1990, causing a new diplomatic crisis between Britain and Iraq. Subsequently, international attention focussed on the extent of Iraqi experimentation with chemical and bacteriological weapons and on the large rearmament campaign under way in that country despite the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war.

## *Lebanon*

The fifteen-year-old civil war in Lebanon continued throughout 1989 and the first half of 1990, recently pitting Lebanese Christians against Syrian forces and their Lebanese Army Muslim and Druze militia allies. An added element in late 1989 was the outbreak of inter-Christian fighting in Beirut and its surrounding areas between Lebanese Army units commanded by General Michel Aoun and the Lebanese Forces, a militia led by Samir Geagea. In southern Lebanon, inter-Shiite militia fighting resumed, and Israeli air raids against positions of the Hezbollah militia, Amal militia and the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) continued.

In September 1988, then Lebanese President Amin Gemayel ended his six-year term with the Lebanese Parliament unable to elect a successor. Mr. Gemayel appointed then Army Commander Aoun as interim Prime Minister, with Muslims responding by establishing a rival government headed by Selim al-Hoss. Beginning in March 1989, eight months of war followed between the Aoun Christian forces headquartered in East Beirut and the Syrian-supported Muslim forces based in West Beirut. The fighting was sparked by General Aoun's blockade of illegal ports south of Beirut, run by Syrian-backed militias, which were allegedly depriving the State Treasury of customs duties and preventing General Aoun from obtaining arms from Iraq, Syria's enemy. The ensuing battles killed more than 900 people.

On 24 October 1989, a majority of Lebanese parliamentarians endorsed an Arab League-sponsored peace accord and restructuring plan for the Lebanese Parliament, reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia two days earlier. The Taif agreement called for a unified government reducing the power of the Lebanese President, who by tradition since the 1943 National Pact (unwritten) is a Maronite Christian, and strengthening the powers of the traditionally Sunni Muslim Prime Minister and Shiite Muslim Speaker of Parliament. This change in the redistribution of power among Lebanon's seventeen religious sects was negotiated mainly to reflect the changed demographic situation in Lebanon, as Muslims outnumber Christians as a result of higher birthrates and the influx of Muslim Palestinian refugees.

On 5 November 1989, the Lebanese Parliament elected René Muawad, a Christian Maronite, as President. His election was recognized by the United States, France, Saudi Arabia and Syria, as well as by the leader of the Lebanese Christian Phalangist Party (Lebanon's largest Christian party), George Saddeh. On 13 November 1989, President Muawad named Sunni Muslim Selim al-Hoss as Prime Minister and asked him to form a government. Selim al-Hoss, upon taking up his new role, simultaneously resigned his post as leader of the rival government in West Beirut. The Lebanese Army's Christian units headed by General Aoun refused to accept the Taif accord or the election of Mr. Muawad. Part of the Arab League-sponsored peace plan included the phased withdrawal of the approximately 40,000 Syrian soldiers who entered Lebanon in 1976 under the auspices of the Arab League (at the time to battle Palestinian fighters), and who now control about seventy percent of Lebanese territory. General Aoun refuses to accept anything less than the immediate total withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

On 22 November 1989, President Muawad was assassinated by a remote-control bomb in Muslim West Beirut which killed twenty-three others. The Lebanese Parliament convened shortly afterwards to choose Elias Hrawi, a Maronite Christian, as Lebanon's tenth President. He pledged to abide by the provisions of the Taif agreement. In late November and December 1989, Syrian forces increased their troop strength in Lebanon to approximately 50,000 and were poised for battle against Christian forces who had occupied the Presidential Palace in Baabda, a Christian suburb of Beirut. Syria attempted to persuade General Aoun to leave the Palace and allow Mr. Hrawi to take over. In late January 1990, Mr. Hrawi held talks in the Syrian capital of Damascus, reportedly on ways to oust General Aoun. On 29 January 1990, the Phalange Party leader George Saddeh quit the Syrian-backed Government of President Hrawi, saying that the latter's Cabinet had failed to become the government of national unity as stipulated in the Taif agreement. On 8 March 1990, General Aoun indicated that he was softening his position on the Taif agreement and called for internationally backed negotiations to end Lebanon's civil war.

On 31 January 1990, inter-Christian fighting broke out between Lebanese Army Christian units headed by General Aoun and the Lebanese Forces militia (formerly the Christian Phalangist militia) headed by Samir Geagea. Mr. Geagea was reported to be loyal to the Government of President Elias Hrawi, but opposed to Syria's presence in Lebanon. In the first round of fighting for control of the Christian East Beirut enclave, more than 800 people were killed and 2,000 wounded. On 16 February 1990, the two sides agreed to their sixteenth ceasefire since the 31 January outbreak of hostilities. After eleven days, however, the Aoun and Geagea forces again began trading artillery and rocket fire in East Beirut. Despite various failed ceasefires, another 300 civilians were killed and 1,500 wounded between mid-February and June 1990.

From mid-1989 through early 1990, numerous international efforts to mediate an end to the strife in Lebanon continued. Officials from the Soviet Union held discussions with Christian and Muslim forces in Beirut and joint statements by the Soviet Union and the USA in May and September 1989 urged a ceasefire and the initiation of a process of political settlement in Lebanon. On 15 August 1989, the United Nations Security Council appealed for an immediate ceasefire by all parties in the Lebanese conflict and expressed its support for the efforts of the Tripartite Committee of the Arab Heads of State, established by the Casablanca Summit of May 1989. On 20 September 1989, with fighting continuing, the Council issued a similar statement. In November 1989, it condemned the assassination of René Muawad, and in December called on the Lebanese people to support Elias Hrawi. In late February 1990, the UN lodged a protest with the Israeli Army after two soldiers of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were killed by Israeli-backed Christian militia in southern Lebanon.

In southern Lebanon, rival Shiite Muslim militias continued to compete for dominance amongst themselves and on tactics in their struggle with Israel. Fighting resumed in December 1989 between the Syrian-backed Amal militia headed by Nabih Berri and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militias and continued sporadically through April 1990. A ceasefire was announced between the two groups in mid-May 1990 after Shiite Muslim mediators said that they had obtained firm promises from the rival factions that they would resolve their differences through negotiations. By 26 November 1989, Israel had launched sixteen air raids during the year outside of its self-declared "security zone" in southern Lebanon, mainly against PLO positions near the

port of Sidon, 40 km south of Beirut, and against the Hezbollah militia, believed to be holding American and Israeli hostages. On 26 December 1989, Israeli troops raided the headquarters of the Lebanese Communist Party at Nabi Safa in the Bekaa Valley.

Early in 1988, a Hezbollah faction kidnapped US Marine Lt. Col. William Higgins who was attached to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Lebanon. On 31 July 1989, Lt. Col. Higgins was executed. The Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, thought to be an offshoot of Hezbollah, described the act as a reprisal for Israel's kidnapping weeks earlier of Sheikh Abdul Kaim Obeid, a spiritual and military leader of the Hezbollah. The execution brought worldwide condemnation. Reports surfaced in March 1990 of meetings between Hezbollah and Iranian officials in east Lebanon and also of diplomatic contact between Iran and the USA concerning the fate of the remaining eight American and ten other Western hostages being held in Lebanon. On 22 April 1990 Robert Polhill, an American hostage held for thirty-nine months by Shiite Muslim kidnappers in Lebanon, was freed by a faction calling itself Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. Nine days later US hostage Frank Reed, held in captivity for forty-four months, was freed by an organization calling itself Islamic Dawn. On 13 May 1990, the commander of Israel's proxy force in Lebanon (the South Lebanon Army) said he was willing to exchange a "large number" of the 300 Muslims held by his militia for the remaining Western hostages being held by pro-Iranian Shiites. There was no immediate reaction to General Antoine Lahd's offer from pro-Iranian factions holding the hostages, from Lebanese Muslim clergymen or from Iran.

### *Israel and the Occupied Territories*

During 1989 and the first part of 1990, the Palestinian uprising (*intifada*) in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip continued. From the beginning of the uprising to 30 June 1990, approximately 725 Palestinians, 47 Israelis and 228 suspected collaborators (killed by Palestinians themselves) had died.

Amid great diplomatic flurry involving, to varying degrees, the United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the Vatican and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), three major peace proposals for the occupied territories were under discussion from 1989 through mid-1990. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's proposal, first presented in May 1989, called for the holding of Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to choose representatives to negotiate a period of self-rule in the territories, followed by negotiations for a permanent solution (see *The Guide* 1989, p. 169). In the months following the proposal, Israel insisted on limiting the agenda of proposed talks to a discussion of the rules for the occupied territory elections. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat insisted on his Organization's indirect control over the composition of the Palestinian negotiating team and the right of Palestinian residents of Arab East Jerusalem to vote in the election.

In September 1989, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak proposed a ten-point peace plan. Under its provisions, free elections to choose Palestinian representatives would be held under international supervision in the occupied territories, including Arab East Jerusalem. Israel would not interfere in the elections and would publicly agree in advance to accept the outcome as a

precursor to negotiations on a final comprehensive settlement. In addition, Israel would agree to negotiate land in exchange for peace and to halt the construction and expansion of Jewish settlements in the territories. The Mubarak plan sidestepped the sensitive issues of a Palestinian state and direct talks between Israel and the PLO. President Mubarak further suggested that Israelis and Palestinians from inside and outside the occupied territories meet in Cairo to work out the details of his proposal. During a visit to the United States in early October 1989, President Mubarak received US support for his proposal to host talks between Palestinian and Israeli delegations prior to the holding of elections in the occupied territories. On his return to Egypt on 4 October 1989, Mr. Mubarak produced a list of twelve Palestinians, including exiles and prominent West Bank citizens, to negotiate with an Israeli delegation. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir rejected the Mubarak plan, saying it would eventually force Israel to deal with the PLO, which he described as a terrorist organization. The PLO, which demands the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories, objected to the Egyptian plan because it did not refer to Palestinian statehood. The PLO also rejected Israel's subsequent call for an end to the *intifada* prior to elections.

In early October 1989, US Secretary of State James Baker presented a five-point programme intended to bridge the Shamir and Mubarak demands. The plan called for Israeli and Egyptian representatives to meet and draw up a list of Palestinians who might take part in Israeli-Palestinian discussions of rules for a proposed election in the occupied territories. In mid-October 1989, Prime Minister Shamir reiterated that his government would not compromise on its refusal to talk with the PLO or trade land for peace. In early November 1989, the Israeli inner Cabinet accepted the Baker plan on condition that the PLO be excluded and the agenda be limited to a discussion of elections. On 11 November 1989, Mr. Shamir added another condition, stating that the Palestinian delegation must be sufficiently educated and experienced to discuss the election plans.

It was reported on 6 December 1989 that Egypt, on behalf of the PLO, had conditionally accepted the US plan to begin tripartite talks in Cairo between the USA, Egypt and Israel to choose Palestinian representatives. The United States noted agreement that Israel should conduct a dialogue with a Palestinian delegation in Cairo, and that Egypt was not a substitute for Palestinians in the peace process and therefore should consult with them. In February 1990, Secretary of State Baker presented his formula for Israeli-Palestinian talks in Cairo. It called for at least one Palestinian deportee and at least one Palestinian East Jerusalem resident to be eligible to participate in the talks. On 23 February 1990, Mr. Baker urged Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens to accept the compromise plan. On the same day, PLO Chairman Arafat endorsed the idea of Palestinians from the occupied territories entering into peace negotiations with Israel.

Israel's coalition government, formed on 19 December 1988, remained bitterly divided in 1989 through early 1990 on the proposed peace plans. An internal struggle within the Likud Party centred on whether Israel should participate in the planned talks to choose a Palestinian negotiating delegation. Then Trade and Industry Minister Ariel Sharon, the principal opponent within the conservative Likud Party to the concept of negotiations with Palestinians, resigned his post in early February 1990. Five other Likud members, forming thirteen percent of the Party's strength in the Knesset, announced in early March that they would try to form a separate

parliamentary faction. After eight months as the coalition government's junior partner, Deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister and Labour Party leader Shimon Peres threatened to break up the coalition if Prime Minister Shamir did not move swiftly toward negotiations with the Palestinians. In mid-March 1990, the coalition government fell, with both Likud and Labour parties jockeying for the support of several smaller political parties to form a new coalition government. After several attempts in April and May 1990, Mr. Peres failed to form a new government.

On 30 May 1990, a failed seaborne guerrilla raid on a Tel Aviv beach, attributed to a faction of the PLO, resulted in the deaths of four Palestinians and the capture of eleven others. In mid-June 1990, the Bush Administration said it was disappointed that the PLO had failed to condemn the raid or denounce those responsible for it. The PLO announced that it was carrying out an in-house investigation to determine whether Israeli civilians were the target of the raid. On 20 July 1990, President Bush announced that he was suspending his country's eighteen-month-old discussions with the PLO because of the Organization's failure to condemn the terrorist attack of 30 May and to discipline those responsible.

On 13 June 1990, one day after forming a new Government comprising right-wing parties, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir stated that Israel would not negotiate with any Palestinians who opposed the idea of granting residents of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip limited autonomy under Israeli rule. His new Government's guidelines also excluded Arab residents of East Jerusalem from any role in talks or elections for the occupied territories. In Washington on the same day, Secretary of State Baker criticized the conditions and said there would be no peace in the Middle East if Israel stuck to this hard-line position. On 28 June 1990, in response to requests by the US Administration for movement in negotiations, Prime Minister Shamir stated that his Government would not accept a Palestinian negotiating delegation that had Palestinian deportee or Palestinian East Jerusalem representation.

Since capturing the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the 1967 Middle East War, Israel has built 143 settlements in the occupied territories that are home to 75,000 Jews. About 1.7 million Palestinians live in the territories. An additional 120,000 Israelis have moved into neighbourhoods built in the Israeli-annexed sector of East Jerusalem where 140,000 Palestinians live. On 11 April 1990, 150 Jewish settlers occupied a hospice of the Greek Orthodox Church in Arab East Jerusalem, sparking two days of clashes between Israeli soldiers and demonstrators. On 23 April 1990, a group of Israeli settlers installed the first mobile homes at a new settlement at Dugut in the Gaza Strip. Citing the 20 May killing of seven Palestinians by an Israeli gunman (which caused the most serious rioting in the occupied territories and neighbouring Jordan since the start of the *intifada*) and Israeli settlement plans for the territories, Arab leaders at a Summit in Baghdad at the end of May 1990 adopted a series of resolutions. These focussed on preventing Israel from annexing the occupied territories and expelling Palestinians and urged an increased role for the UN and European countries in the peace process. Other resolutions called for international protection for Palestinians and a UN observer mission to prevent an alteration of the religious and legal status of Jerusalem and to curb Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

On 24 January 1990, Egyptian President Mubarak stated that the Arabs would not tolerate any Israeli moves to settle Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union in the occupied territories. Israel expects that up to 100,000 Soviet Jews will arrive in Israel in 1990 and up to 750,000 in the next five years. On 29 January 1990, the USA and the Soviet Union criticized Israel for its efforts to settle thousands of Soviet Jews in the occupied territories. At the Washington Summit in early June 1990, Soviet President Gorbachev threatened to halt emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel by denying them exit visas. Both he and President Bush condemned Israel for expanding Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, but President Gorbachev's threat to cut off exit visas was not endorsed by President Bush. In response to the Soviet threat, on 4 June 1990 Israeli Prime Minister Shamir said that incoming Soviet Jews had a right to settle anywhere in Israel, including the occupied territories. However, on 24 June 1990 Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Sharon pledged that future Soviet Jewish immigrants would not be settled in the territories, and that homes would be constructed for them in central Israel, the northern Galilee and the southern Negev desert. By the end of 1989, approximately 4,000 of the 55,000 Soviet Jews who had arrived in Israel since early 1989 had settled there. Three hundred had settled in the West Bank.

For a discussion of UN activity on the occupied territories question, including Canada's role at the UN, see *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* in this chapter.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

### *Iran – Iraq*

After an eight-year hiatus in official relations, on 18 July 1988 External Affairs Minister Clark announced that, effective immediately, Canada and Iran would resume normal diplomatic relations, and accordingly the two sides would exchange ambassadors.<sup>1</sup> The Canadian Embassy in Teheran reopened its doors officially on 16 October 1988.<sup>2</sup> Responding to Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini's call for the death of author Salman Rushdie, on 22 February 1989 Canada followed the lead set by the twelve European Community nations and Norway and Sweden by withdrawing its chargé d'affaires from Teheran.<sup>3</sup> It was reported in August 1989 that Canada and Iran were planning to exchange ambassadors in 1990. A source at External Affairs commented that "[t]he timing of the nomination of Canada's ambassador to Iran will depend upon the future state of our relations with that country.... No decision had yet been made along these lines. These things take time."<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 152 (18 July 1988); and Government of Canada, "Canada Welcomes Iranian Acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, New York, July 18, 1988." New York: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, *Press Release* No. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 226 (17 October 1988).

<sup>3</sup> "Canada Recalls Diplomat from Iran." *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 February 1989, p. A1.

<sup>4</sup> Patrick Best, "Exchange of Top Envoys between Iran and Canada Still on the Back-burner." *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 August 1989, p. A16.

Canada supported the UN Security Council's 29 September 1989 and 27 February 1990 calls on Iran and Iraq to implement UN Resolution 598 and extensions of the mandate of the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) for a further twelve months. This mission, set up to monitor the 20 August 1988 ceasefire, includes Canadian participation (see **PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION**).

On 12 February 1990, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) announced that in response to an appeal by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, it would contribute \$400,000 for housing construction in Turkey to "facilitate local integration of Kurdish refugees from Iraq."<sup>5</sup>

In a 15 March 1990 news release from his office, External Affairs Minister Clark expressed his horror at the execution of Farzad Bazoft, the British-based journalist convicted of spying by an Iraqi Revolutionary Court. The news release stated further that Canada joined international condemnation of this act of "barbarism" and that reports of human rights abuses in Iraq were "disturbingly frequent."<sup>6</sup>

### *Lebanon*

In a 31 July 1989 news release, External Affairs Minister Clark condemned the assassination of US Lt. Col. William Higgins in Lebanon, and described it as an affront to UN peacekeeping initiatives.<sup>7</sup> On the same day, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, sponsored by Canada and Finland, condemning all hostage-taking and calling for a world-wide release of hostages and abducted persons. The Council also condemned the Higgins killing.<sup>8</sup>

On 15 August 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark expressed "very serious concern over the severe escalation of violence in Lebanon." He called on Syria and all Lebanese parties to agree to a comprehensive ceasefire and to respect it unconditionally. Mr. Clark added that Canada was consulting with the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, particularly France, and supported the mediation efforts of the Tripartite Committee of Arab Heads of State on Lebanon.<sup>9</sup> After meeting with Lebanese community leaders in Ottawa on 28 August 1989, Canada's UN Ambassador Yves Fortier stated that Canada had been working "quietly but effectively" through diplomatic representation to countries with influence in the region to stop the "senseless killing" in Lebanon. Ambassador Fortier explained:

---

<sup>5</sup> Canadian International Development Agency, *News Release* No. 90-06 (12 February 1990).

<sup>6</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 052 (15 March 1990).

<sup>7</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 180 (31 July 1989).

<sup>8</sup> Trevor Rowe, "Report from the Security Council." *Peace&Security*, vol. 4 no. 3 (Autumn 1989), p. 13.

<sup>9</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 192 (15 August 1989).

What is happening in Lebanon is a microcosm of what has been happening in the Middle East for several years and there are no dramatic or quick solutions.... The only solution lies in quiet diplomacy and that is what Canada has been doing.<sup>10</sup>

Addressing the Forty-fourth Session of the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark renewed Canada's call for "the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon and reiterate[d]...strong support for the efforts of the Tripartite Committee of the Arab League."<sup>11</sup> On 8 November 1989, the Minister paid tribute to Lebanese parliamentarians and the continuing efforts of the Arab Heads of State toward resolving the conflict. He welcomed the election of René Muawad as President of Lebanon and urged all parties involved to implement the Taif accord. He also urged the Lebanese people "to rally behind their new President in his efforts to make progress towards the reconstruction of Lebanon and the complete realization of Lebanese sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity."<sup>12</sup> On 22 November 1989, Mr. Clark and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney expressed dismay at the assassination of President Muawad. The External Affairs Minister added his condolences to those expressed by the Prime Minister to the Muawad family and to the people of Lebanon, noting:

Mr. Muawad was a man of dialogue and his election as the head of the Lebanese State had been welcomed by Canadians as a sign that peace and national reconciliation were possible in Lebanon after more than 14 years of conflict....<sup>13</sup>

Mr. Clark also called upon all parties with influence in Lebanon to show restraint and continue to work towards finding a political solution to the Lebanese conflict.<sup>14</sup>

In early November 1989, Employment and Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall responded to the report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration, entitled *Immigration of Lebanese Citizens to Canada*. The Government accepted four recommendations of the report concentrating on service improvements at the temporary Canadian immigration office in Nicosia, Cyprus. It also accepted a recommendation that Canada press the United Nations to "seek a resolution" to the Lebanese conflict. Two recommendations not accepted by the Government were, first, the creation of a designated class to facilitate the entry into Canada of Lebanese immigrants and, second, permitting church and other groups to

---

<sup>10</sup> Mohammed Adam, "UN Envoy Gives Hope to Lebanese Community." *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 August 1989, p. B7.

<sup>11</sup> "Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 26, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statement*, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 278 (8 November 1989).

<sup>13</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 291 (22 November 1989); and Office of the Prime Minister, *Release* (22 November 1989).

<sup>14</sup> Department of External Affairs, *supra* note 12.

sponsor these immigrants. Ms. McDougall was reported on 9 November 1989 to have said that the Lebanese fleeing civil war were not considered refugees by the Government because they were not under individual persecution.<sup>15</sup>

### *Israel and the Occupied Territories*

Speaking to a delegation of Canadian Jewish leaders on 19 September 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that he was planning to visit Egypt, Israel and Jordan in the latter half of 1990. Visits to Canada by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak were expected to precede Mr. Mulroney's trip.<sup>16</sup>

King Hussein of Jordan visited Canada from 10 to 16 October 1989, and addressed a joint session of Parliament. The King stated that Israel's "inability to reach a decision on the future of the Arab territories that it has occupied by force for over 20 years" was "[t]he one remaining obstacle to a just peace." He also suggested that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) "has met all the prerequisites and requirements to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict...." He accused Israel's Likud-Labour coalition Government of trying to "mire the peace process in debates over modalities and procedures in order to gain time and forestall the moment of decision." Prime Minister Mulroney praised the King's dedication to the cause of peace in the Middle East and assured him that the respect and admiration he had earned worldwide was "shared by every member of [the] House [of Commons] and by all Canadians." The Prime Minister continued:

Successive Canadian governments have supported all constructive efforts to achieve a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the problems of the Middle East. Canada's support for Israel's right to exist and for its security is well known. It enables us to speak frankly to our Israeli friends, as I did in the presence of President Herzog in this House in June [1989], when I said that Canada supports the concept of land for peace.... We believe that peace will only come on the basis of respect for the security, well-being and legitimacy of all states in the region, and of respect for the rights of the Palestinian people. And those rights include their participation in the determination of their own future. Over the past year and a half, developments in the Middle East have altered long-standing assumptions about the nature of the peace process. [Jordan's decision] to disengage [its] historical links with the West Bank was a turning point in the peace process. The time is now arriving when other leaders in the Middle East must make equally difficult but far-sighted decisions.... The Israeli government's proposal for elections was, we believe, a significant initial step in a political process that could lead to a negotiated settlement. We are

<sup>15</sup> Minister of Employment and Immigration, *News Release* No. 89-24 (8 November 1989), pp. 1-2; and "McDougall Rejects Category for Lebanese Fleeing War." *Globe and Mail*, 9 November 1989, p. A10.

<sup>16</sup> Paul Koring, "Mulroney Trip to Three Middle East States Would Be First Official Visit by Canadian PM." *Globe and Mail*, 20 September 1989, p. A1.

encouraged that President Mubarak has joined actively in the search for progress; his ten points have taken the peace process a step further. Canada stands ready to advance this process in whatever ways we can.<sup>17</sup>

On 8 December 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the announcement of the acceptance of the Baker plan by both Israel and Egypt, stating:

Canada views the acceptance of USA Secretary of State Baker's 5 points, by both Israel and Egypt, as a most welcome and significant step towards eventual negotiations among the parties directly involved, which is a necessary step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement.<sup>18</sup>

Mr. Clark noted that "Egypt had worked closely with the PLO in developing a positive response and had helped to facilitate arrangements for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue." He also expressed his satisfaction at the planned tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Egypt and the USA early in 1990.<sup>19</sup>

Addressing the Forty-fourth Session of the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1989, the External Affairs Minister stated:

In the Middle East, there is an urgent need for confidence and dialogue. We support Israel's proposals for direct elections in the occupied territories. We welcome the moderation evident in the positions of the PLO. But much more confidence-building is needed on both sides if these initial gestures are to be translated into a meaningful peace process for this troubled and war-ravaged region. Canada welcomes President Mubarak's imaginative ten-point plan as one avenue out of the current impasse.<sup>20</sup>

On 30 August 1989, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution deploring the continued deportation of Palestinians suspected of organizing the *intifada*. Fourteen countries, including Canada, voted in favour of the resolution, while the USA abstained.<sup>21</sup> On 7 November 1989, the Council debated a draft resolution that "strongly" deplored Israeli practices "which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territory" through the "siege of towns, ransacking of the homes of inhabitants...and the confiscation of their property and valuables."

---

<sup>17</sup> "Address of His Majesty, King Hussein Bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to Both Houses of Parliament in the House of Commons Chamber, Ottawa on Wednesday, October 11, 1989." *Commons Debates*, 11 October 1989, pp. 4570-4572.

<sup>18</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 301 (8 December 1989).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Department of External Affairs, *supra* note 11.

<sup>21</sup> "UN Council Lambastes Israel." *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 August 1989, p. A7.

Canada voted in favour of the resolution, which the USA vetoed on the grounds that it was unbalanced and failed to address violence committed by Palestinians.<sup>22</sup>

In related developments at the UN, on 5 October 1989, the USA warned UNESCO not to accept the PLO as a member, saying that such a move would close off any possibility of the USA ever rejoining the organization.<sup>23</sup> On 27 November 1989, the Bush Administration threatened to suspend all US financial support for the UN if the General Assembly recognized Palestine as a country, rather than merely an observer, as at present.<sup>24</sup> Two days later, the USA warned of "grave consequences" for the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) after ninety-six countries voted in favour of a resolution authorizing the agency to assist agricultural development in the occupied territories "in close co-operation with the Palestine Liberation Organization." The resolution also accused Israel of hindering economic development in the occupied territories and of confiscating Palestinian land and water. The USA and Israel voted against the resolution, while Canada, Australia and eight Latin American countries abstained.<sup>25</sup> On 9 January 1990, the USA cut its 1990 financial contribution to the FAO from US\$61.4m to \$18m.<sup>26</sup>

Under broad international pressure, on 5 December 1989, Arab members of the UN deferred indefinitely a General Assembly vote on a resolution to recognize the PLO as representing a Palestinian state. France, speaking on behalf of the European Community, and Canada, speaking on behalf of Australia, New Zealand, Finland and the Nordic countries, praised the deferral but refused to comment on the November 1989 US threat to withhold funding from the UN.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Trevor Rowe, "Report from the Security Council." *Peace&Security*, vol. 5 no. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 17.

<sup>23</sup> "Keep PLO Out, U.N. Group Warned." *Toronto Star*, 6 October 1989, p. 19.

<sup>24</sup> "Don't Admit Palestine, U.S. Warns UN." *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 November 1989, p. A11.

<sup>25</sup> Paul Lewis, "U.S. Threatens Sanctions against UN Food Agency after Vote to Work with PLO." *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 November 1989, p. D2.

<sup>26</sup> Paul Lewis, "U.S. Cuts Funds to U.N. Food Agency over P.L.O." *New York Times*, 10 January 1990, p. A5; and "UN Body's Support of PLO Spurs U.S. Contribution Cut." *Globe and Mail*, 11 January 1990, p. A5.

<sup>27</sup> Paul Lewis, "U.N. Puts Off Its Vote on P.L.O." *New York Times*, 7 December 1989, p. A8; "Arab Group at UN Drops PLO Motion." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 December 1989, p. A15; Paul Lewis, "Arabs at U.N. Relax Stand on P.L.O." *New York Times*, 6 December 1989, p. A3; and "PLO Backs Off UN Showdown with U.S." *Montreal Gazette*, 5 December 1989, p. A2.

On 8 March 1990, an External Affairs spokesperson stated that the External Affairs Minister's chance encounter and exchange of words with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in Lusaka, Zambia days earlier, did not mean that Canada was ready for formal heads-of-government meetings with the PLO. Chairman Arafat and Mr. Clark were among other government officials at the Lusaka airport, awaiting the arrival of Nelson Mandela from South Africa. The spokesperson added that the Canadian Government was maintaining its policy that formal meetings at the highest governmental level were not appropriate. On that basis, Canada had refused an earlier request from PLO officials in Africa for a formal meeting.<sup>28</sup> External Affairs Minister Clark has permitted senior Canadian officials to meet with PLO representatives in Ottawa and at embassies abroad since September 1988.<sup>29</sup> Mr. Clark told the House of Commons on 7 March 1990 that he had urged Chairman Arafat to "continue the course of moderation that [the PLO] has demonstrated in the Middle East" and indicated to him that "it would be helpful if he would take one further step along that path of moderation and lead to the withdrawal of Article 19 of the Covenant of the PLO" (which calls for the destruction of Israel).<sup>30</sup>

The UN Security Council met on 15 March 1990 to consider allegations that Israel intended to settle incoming Soviet Jewish immigrants in the occupied territories. At a follow-up meeting on 29 March 1990, Canadian Ambassador to the UN Yves Fortier urged Israel to settle the new immigrants exclusively within its pre-1967 borders. He added that Canada did not recognize "the permanence" of Israeli control over the territories and would continue to oppose any actions taken by the Israeli Government to alter the "demographic" situation of the occupied territories. It was reported that although Ambassador Fortier stopped short of condemning the existing Jewish settlements in the territories, he made it clear during the debate that Canada opposed the movement of more Israeli citizens into those areas. Ambassador Fortier, nevertheless, reportedly pressed the Soviet Union to continue to loosen its restrictions on emigration for Soviet Jews. In the Council debate, Britain and France termed Israeli settlements illegal, including those in East Jerusalem. Canada and Finland condemned the settlements as defying international law under the Fourth Geneva Convention but did not cite East Jerusalem, which Israel maintains is part of its undivided capital.<sup>31</sup>

In a speech to students at the Lester B. Pearson College of the Pacific in British Columbia on 24 March 1990, Ambassador Fortier reportedly had said that he saw "little hope for a breakthrough" in the Israeli-Palestinian problem and that the situation in the occupied territories

---

<sup>28</sup> Rosemary Speirs, "Top-level Meetings with PLO Ruled Out." *Toronto Star*, 9 March 1990, p. A14.

<sup>29</sup> Paul Koring, "Canadian Jews Urge Ottawa to Downgrade Relations with PLO." *Globe and Mail*, 5 August 1989, p. A3; and Gordon Barthos, "Israelis Worried by Canada's Move to Improve PLO Ties." *Toronto Star*, 29 November 1989, p. A3.

<sup>30</sup> *Commons Debates*, 7 March 1990, p. 8928.

<sup>31</sup> Trevor Rowe, "Report from the Security Council." *Peace&Security*, vol. 5 no. 2 (Summer 1990), p. 18; and Olivia Ward, "Canada Attacks Israeli Policy on Settlements." *Toronto Star*, 30 March 1990, p. A3.

"continues to be unacceptable to the international community." Palestinian homes were being demolished and too much force was being used by Israel, he said, but UN resolutions censuring Israel were regularly vetoed by the United States. Ambassador Fortier also stated that although significant steps towards peace had recently been taken by the PLO, it should be recalled that it was not Israel that had started the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars.<sup>32</sup>

According to a news release from his office, External Affairs Minister Clark expressed shock at the "unprecedented" violence in the Israeli-occupied territories following the "brutal" murder of seven Palestinians on 20 May 1990. The news release quoted Mr. Clark as follows:

The large number of civilians injured by live fire from Israeli forces is of particular concern. Canada appeals to the Israeli authorities to demonstrate maximum restraint.... The existing stalemate in the peace process exacerbates the frustrations of those in the occupied territories and Israel who want to believe that a negotiated settlement is possible, and contributes to a volatile atmosphere.<sup>33</sup>

In response to questions in the House of Commons on the same day, Mr. Clark stated that Canada's Ambassador to Israel had officially expressed Canada's "shock and great concern at the increasing violence in the Middle East and...urge[d] the Government of Israel to take appropriate steps to try to restrain the sources and incidents of that violence." The Minister also "encouraged" Canada's Ambassador to the UN to "use every means available to us to explore whether there is a useful role the [UN] Security Council might play in dealing with circumstances that become every day more dangerous."<sup>34</sup>

On 26 May 1990, the United States barred an attempt by the UN Security Council to dispatch a mission to examine the treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Fourteen of the fifteen Security Council members, including Canada, were prepared to send a small team to investigate complaints and report to the Council in June 1990.<sup>35</sup> It was reported on 10 June 1990 that Arab countries at the UN were planning to convene the UN General Assembly in emergency session to seek an international force to protect Palestinians in the occupied territories against Israeli troops. They were hoping to utilize a seldom-used procedure known as "uniting for peace," that permits the General Assembly to acquire the Security Council's responsibility when the Council is prevented from doing so by the veto of one of its five Permanent Members.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> Judith Lavoie, "Renaissance Time for UN, Fortier Tells Conference." *Times-Colonist*, 25 March 1990, p. B19.

<sup>33</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 108 (22 May 1990).

<sup>34</sup> *Commons Debates*, 22 May 1990, p. 11661; and Tim Harper, "End the Violence, Canada Tells Israel." *Toronto Star*, 23 May 1990, p. 18.

<sup>35</sup> Paul Lewis, "U.S. Bars U.N. on Sending Mission to West Bank." *New York Times*, 27 May 1990, p. 6.

<sup>36</sup> Paul Lewis, "Arabs Plan Moves in U.N. to Aid Palestinians." *New York Times*, 10 June 1990, p. 17.

# PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

## Iran – Iraq

In December 1989 and January 1990, the House of Commons heard several statements concerning human rights abuses in Iran. On 30 January 1990, Liberal MP David Walker observed:

[N]ot much has changed in Iran since the departure of Khomeini and the installation of the new president. Human rights abuses continue. In fact, there has been a dramatic increase in the abuse of human rights and in prosecutions for ordinary offences. Today marks the end of a visit to Iran by the United Nations special rapporteur, Reynaldo Pohl. Mr. Pohl will be presenting a report on human rights abuses in Iran to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.... Serious violations have been reported by Canadian friends and families of prisoners in Iran, as well as by over 1,000 Iranian exiles world-wide, who today terminate their hunger strike held in solidarity with the prisoners. Seventy-five of these protesters were Canadian. We hope the Canadian government will carefully consider Mr. Pohl's report...and take leadership for the first time in denouncing these persistent abuses which are intolerable and unacceptable to all Canadians.<sup>37</sup>

On 13 December 1989, Liberal MP Jesse Flis made representations in the House regarding the case of an eleven-year-old Canadian citizen detained by Iraqi authorities on a visit to her natural parents in 1988.<sup>38</sup>

On 16 March 1990, NDP Member Ian Waddell rose in the House to condemn the execution of British-based journalist Farzad Bazoft in Iraq. During Question Period the same Member asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Patrick Boyer, for Canada's response to the execution. Mr. Boyer replied that the External Affairs Minister had "publicly issued a statement regretting this barbarous act."<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> *Commons Debates*, 30 January 1990, p. 7604. See also: 15 December 1989, p. 6981; and 23 January 1990, pp. 7376-7377.

<sup>38</sup> *Commons Debates*, 13 December 1989, pp. 6857-6858.

<sup>39</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 March 1990, pp. 9394 and 9404.

*Lebanon*

Representatives of the three major parties in the House of Commons expressed their shock and dismay at the assassination of Lebanese President René Muawad in Beirut on 22 November 1989.<sup>40</sup> Liberal MP Jesse Flis declared:

I want to call on the Arab League to not be discouraged by this brutal act, to not let this act deter them in their efforts toward a final resolution of this long and tragic conflict, and to elect another president quickly to avoid any further deterioration that would almost undoubtedly result in absolute anarchy. I want to call on General Aoun to endorse the peace plan [the Taif accord] by offering full support to the process and decisions agreed upon by the Lebanese legislators and the Arab League. I want to call on the Government of Canada, this time to use our seat on the Security Council, bring [sic] the matter up for action....<sup>41</sup>

NDP MP Bill Blaikie also offered support for the Arab League's mediation efforts.<sup>42</sup>

On several occasions Liberal MP Mark Assad questioned the Government on its handling of refugees from Lebanon, in particular the granting of refugee status and the alleged deportation of Lebanese refugees from Canada back to Lebanon via the United States. On 10 May 1990, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, John A. MacDougall, replied:

[S]ince the beginning of the civil war in the mid-1970s the Canadian government has with only brief interruption facilitated the immigration of Lebanese affected by the fighting who have close relatives in Canada. The Lebanese special measures have allowed more than 17,000 assisted relative category immigrants to come to Canada under relaxed criteria.... Canada is the only country to have implemented such special measures and to have increased the levels of service in response to the flight of Lebanese nationals to Cyprus.... [The] temporary immigration office in Nicosia, Cyprus...[has] three Canadian visa officers, four Quebec immigration officers, and 22 locally engaged employees.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> *Commons Debates*, 22 November 1989, pp. 5986–5987. See also: 23 November 1989, pp. 6088–6089; and 24 November 1989, p. 6184.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5987.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>43</sup> *Commons Debates*, 10 May 1990, pp. 11299–11300. See also: 9 April 1990, p. 10341; and 8 June 1990, p. 12521.

On 31 May 1990, Deputy Leader of the Government in the House Marcel Danis promised Mr. Assad that he would convey to the Minister of Employment and Immigration his concerns regarding the deportations of Lebanese nationals to the United States.<sup>44</sup>

### *Israel and the Occupied Territories*

Two days after Jordanian King Hussein's address to the joint session of Parliament, Progressive Conservative MP Bob Corbett told the House:

Those of us who have favoured dialogue and promoted moderation were particularly impressed with the eloquent, reasonable and pragmatic approach to peace outlined by [King Hussein].... I also commend our Prime Minister for reiterating Canada's support for the concept of land for peace. To bring peace to a region fraught with violence, the voices of moderation such as those of King Hussein deserve our unconditional support. The peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the crux of the problem, can be attained by the creation of an independent Palestinian state to complement all the others in the region.<sup>45</sup>

On 16 February 1990, commenting on human rights violations in several regional conflicts, NDP MP Derek Blackburn had this to say about the situation in the Middle East:

[T]he problems of the Middle East will not be addressed and peace will not come to that tortured part of the world until the Palestinian cause is addressed and settled.... [T]he fundamental fact remains that the Palestinian people have been denied a homeland.... It is rather interesting that the State of Israel today can say, "The reunification of Germany is up to the Germans. As long as they promise to be democratic, law-abiding it is not going to be a bad thing, it is not going to hurt us." I agree with that argument. But when it comes to re-establishing a homeland for the Palestinians, when it comes to Palestinian rights, human rights and liberties, somehow Israel cannot apply the same measure of honesty and decency. With wave after wave of Soviet Jews now emigrating from the Soviet Union, no doubt for many good reasons, and going to the Middle East, going to Israel, this powder keg is going to blow up. There is no other way of putting it. Why is the Canadian government not taking a more active role? I know the Secretary of State for External Affairs has come out as a much stronger defender of the Palestinians and the Palestinian cause than any of his predecessors. I congratulate him for his courage. But I call on this government...[to] adopt the same humanitarian approach to all...examples where human rights are being violated, whether it is in El Salvador, Panama, East Timor or as they were in Romania and as they have been for 40 years in the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1990, p. 12116.

<sup>45</sup> *Commons Debates*, 13 October 1989, p. 4646.

<sup>46</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 February 1990, p. 8462.

On 6 February 1990, Progressive Conservative MP Lee Richardson asked External Affairs Minister Clark about Canadian actions to secure the release of two Calgary journalists and their Palestinian escort being detained by the Israeli Army. Mr. Clark replied that due to the intervention of Canadian officials in Israel, the three had been released unharmed.<sup>47</sup>

Also on 6 February, Progressive Conservative MP Bob Corbett and Liberal MP David Berger condemned the murder of eight Israeli tourists in the Suez region of Egypt and called on all parties to "search for a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict."<sup>48</sup>

On two occasions in the House, PC Member Bill Attewell called on and commended the Soviet Union for speeding up "the process of emigration by permitting direct passage of Jews to Israel and to exploit all possible safe exit routes to the Jewish homeland."<sup>49</sup>

On 23 May 1990, Liberal MP Mark Assad asked the Government to call upon Israeli authorities to assure that "proper medical treatment" was made available to those living in the occupied territories.<sup>50</sup>

A day later in the House, on behalf of his Party, Liberal Member André Ouellet "echo[ed] the remarks" made by the External Affairs Minister "when he expressed Canada's dismay concerning the unprecedented violent acts following the murder of seven Palestinians at Richon-Letion near Tel-Aviv." The Member also asked the Minister whether Canada was "prepared to support the Americans who would send United Nations observers to the occupied territories." External Affairs Minister Clark replied:

[N]either the United States nor any other Security Council member have actively advocated dispatching such an observer team. However the American Secretary of State did say that the U.S. administration would certainly entertain this kind of proposition. For our part we in Canada are also prepared to consider this proposition because our country has always been a strong supporter of peacekeeping activities and observer teams.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 February 1990, p. 7895.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7886 and 7888.

<sup>49</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 March 1990, p. 9821; and 29 May 1990, p. 11995.

<sup>50</sup> *Commons Debates*, 23 May 1990, p. 11704.

<sup>51</sup> *Commons Debates*, 24 May 1990, p. 11805.

In a wide-ranging debate on Canadian foreign policy in the House on 31 May 1990, Liberal MP Mark Assad commented:

Dr. Israel Schack of Israel, a most outstanding scholar, a man who survived the Warsaw ghettos and the concentration camps was in Canada last week. This man has the courage to bring up the violations of his government. He spoke of the uprooting of olive and citrus trees which the Palestinians need to survive. Since the *intifada* started, 180,000 trees have been deliberately uprooted by Israeli forces.... [Water is] a cherished commodity in the Middle East. Yet there is illegal use of resources of occupied territories, forbidden under the Geneva Convention. The use of water by the Palestinians has been frozen at the 1967 level. The 1988 water census shows that 1,100,000 Palestinians in the occupied territories were allowed to use 17 per cent of the total annual amount of the underground water....<sup>52</sup>

A day later, Liberal MP David Berger rose in the House to condemn the PLO for its attempt of 30 May 1990 "to attack Israeli civilians on a beach in Tel Aviv." He called on the Canadian Government to "condemn those who plan and organize such atrocities."<sup>53</sup>

On 14 June 1990, New Democratic Member Bill Blaikie questioned the External Affairs Minister on recent developments in the Middle East:

[There has been] the formation of a new hard-line government in Israel; Tuesday's tear gas attack by Israeli troops on a Swedish maternity clinic; and yesterday's statement by the new government in Israel that it would not negotiate with the PLO, thus making any real peace prospects almost impossible. I wonder if the Secretary of State for External Affairs shares the view that what we have...is a rapidly deteriorating situation, in a region of the world where nuclear and chemical warfare confrontations are not out of the question. In that light, what action does the Government of Canada intend to take, either through its seat on the Security Council at the United Nations, or in other ways, to send the appropriate messages to Israel - and, for that matter, the United States - that there has to be movement instead of intransigence on the part of the Israeli government?... Has the minister considered...using our position on the Security Council to influence the development of a UN peacekeeping force that would finally be acceptable to Israel to operate in the occupied territories to protect Palestinians?... [W]ould the Canadian government not consider enhancing its relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization as a way of indicating to the Israeli government that we feel these are the people who will finally have to be dealt with, whether the Israelis like it or not?

---

<sup>52</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1990, p. 12149.

<sup>53</sup> *Commons Debates*, 1 June 1990, pp. 12173-12174.

Mr. Clark replied:

I am sure that all members of the House share [the Member's] concern not simply about developments in the Middle East, but the evidence that there is no apparent break in the cycle of violence and all the implications that holds for the difficulty of moderates maintaining their position in the region. There is a new government now formed in Israel. I will be in touch with their foreign minister directly...as soon as possible. With regard to the United States, I signed a letter yesterday to the U.S. Secretary of State urging him to persevere in discussions, including the maintenance of consultations between the Government of the United States and the PLO.... The hon. member was careful in suggesting that any [peacekeeping] action by the United Nations would have to be something that was acceptable to Israel. We would certainly be prepared, as we have in the past, to try to apply our influence to achieve that kind of result. My understanding is that there has been, in fact, a willingness on the part of Israel to accept the visit of representatives of the [UN] Secretary General. We think that is an important step forward. With regard to the question of the PLO and Canada's relations, the hon. member will know that the government has acted to increase the level of contact between Canada and the leadership of the PLO. We are trying to use that contact to encourage continued moderation by leadership [sic] of the PLO.<sup>54</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Abukhalil, Asad, "Syria and the Shiites: Al-Asad's Policy in Lebanon." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 12 no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 1-20.

Bishop, Donald H., "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Past, Present and Future." *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives*, vol. 9 no. 1 (March 1990), pp. 5-38.

Bonnefous, Marc, "Israel: crise d'un nouveau type." *Défense nationale* (June 1990), pp. 139-145.

Eknes, Aage, "The Iran-Iraq War: United Nations Efforts and Options," in: Indarjit Rikhye (ed.), *Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq: External Involvement and Multilateral Options*. New York: International Peace Academy, 1989, pp. 60-81.

Entessar, Nader, "The Kurdish Mosaic of Discord." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 83-100.

Giniewski, Paul, "La perestroika, Israël et les juifs." *Politique internationale* vol. 46 (Winter 1989-1990), pp. 135-153.

Hagopian, Elaine C., "From Maronite Hegemony to Maronite Militancy: The Creation and Disintegration of Lebanon." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 101-117.

Hollis, Rosemary, "Israel on the Brink of Decision: Division, Unity and Crosscurrents in the Israeli Body Politic." *Conflict Studies* No. 231 (May 1990), pp. 1-29.

---

<sup>54</sup> *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1990, pp. 12775-12776.

Hunter, Robert E., "The United States Role in the Middle East." *Current History*, vol. 88 no. 544 (February 1990), pp. 49-52 and 88-89.

Norton, Augustus Richard and Greenberg, Martin H. (eds.), *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization*. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press/Scholarly Book Services, 1990 (233 pp.).

Peretz, Don, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990 (246 pp.).

Perlmutter, Amos, "Israel's Dilemma." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68 no. 5 (Winter 1989-1990), pp. 119-132.

Rabinovich, Itamar, "Paralysis in Lebanon." *Current History*, vol. 88 no. 544 (February 1990), pp. 73-76 and 89-90.

Rieck, Andreas, "A Peace Plan for Lebanon? Prospects after the Taif Agreement." *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 41 no. 3 (Third Quarter 1990), pp. 297-309.

Waller, Harold M., "Israel's Continuing Dilemma." *Current History*, vol. 88 no. 544 (February 1990), pp. 69-72.

Yorke, Valerie, "Imagining a Palestinian State: An International Security Plan." *International Affairs London*, vol. 66 no. 1 (January 1990), pp. 115-136.

#### FURTHER READING

Angus Reid Associates, "Canadian Public Opinion Regarding the Israel-Palestinian Conflict." *The Reid Report*, vol. 3 no. 4 (April 1988), pp. 23-26.

Aruri, Naseer (ed.), *Occupation: Israel over Palestine*. London: Zed Books, 1984 (467 pp.).

Brière, C., *Liban: guerres ouvertes 1920-1985*. Paris: Ramsay, 1985 (225 pp.).

Chubin, Shahram, "The Last Phase of the Iran-Iraq War: From Stalemate to Ceasefire." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 2 (April 1989), pp. 1-14.

Lecours, Francine, *The War in the Gulf*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 19, May 1988 (7 pp.).

Lockman, Zachary and Beinín, Joel (eds.), *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation*. Toronto: Between The Lines, 1989 (423 pp.).

Mendelsohn, Everett, *A Compassionate Peace: A Future for Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East* (revised edition). Toronto: Collins Publishers, 1989 (321 pp.).

Muslih, Muhammad Y., *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988 (277 pp.).

Norton, Augustus Richard, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987 (238 pp.).

O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Gulf War*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988 (232 pp.).

Taras, David and Goldberg, David H. (eds.), *The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989 (250 pp.).

*BACKGROUND**Namibia*

Namibia, declared a German colony in 1885, fell under South African administration after military victory over the Germans in World War I. (The name of the territory was changed from South-West Africa to Namibia by the United Nations in 1968.) The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was formed in 1958 and began a guerrilla war for independence from South Africa in 1966. In 1973, the UN General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "sole authentic representative of the Namibian people" after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in 1971 that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal. In 1978, the UN Security Council adopted a plan for Namibian independence known as Resolution 435, which called for a ceasefire, a UN peacekeeping force, and UN-supervised elections.

Concrete plans for Namibian independence became the central element in interlocking peace accords signed in 1988, which also sought to end conflict in neighbouring Angola (see *Angola* in this chapter). On 22 December 1988, representatives of Angola, Cuba and South Africa formally signed an agreement calling for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), while expanding its terms to secure the departure from Namibia of all South African military forces and an internationally supervised redeployment and phased withdrawal of the approximately 50,000-strong Cuban contingent from Angola. A second agreement, signed by Cuba and Angola, set out the withdrawal timetable for the Cuban troops. Further provisions of UN Resolution 435 and the agreements signed in December 1988 included full independence for Namibia by April 1990, preceded by the election of a Constituent Assembly in November 1989 to draft a Constitution and organize a new government. The UN plan, however, did not address the question of Walvis Bay, the only deep-water port in the area; this would be dealt with bilaterally by an independent Namibia and South Africa.

On 16 February 1989, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), composed of 4,650 peacekeeping troops (including approximately 250 Canadians), 500 police officers and 1,000 civilian election monitors. Pressure from the five Permanent Members of the Security Council reduced the number of peacekeeping troops from an original count of 7,500.

Implementation of UN Resolution 435 commenced on 1 April 1989, but was almost derailed by SWAPO-South African Defence Force clashes, after SWAPO forces crossed the border into Namibia from their bases in Angola. In addition, early in July 1989, Namibian refugees began returning from Angola with allegations of torture and imprisonment by SWAPO in Ethiopia and Angola. Reports also surfaced of violent intimidation in Namibia of SWAPO supporters by members of Koevoet, a 2,000-member counterinsurgency force established by South Africa in the early 1980s. Following stepped-up UN pressure in August and September 1989, South Africa announced it was to disband Koevoet. Prior to the scheduled elections, at the end of October

1989, South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha charged that SWAPO was preparing for an invasion of Namibia. Mr. Botha subsequently withdrew the charges.

On 15 September 1989, SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma returned to the Namibian capital of Windhoek after twenty-three years in exile. SWAPO is under the control of Ovambo tribe leaders headed by Mr. Nujoma. The Ovambo tribe constitutes approximately fifty percent of Namibia's 1.63 million inhabitants. From 7 to 11 November 1989, slightly over 700,000 registered voters chose representatives to a seventy-two-member Constituent Assembly. About 1,300 UN electoral monitors from thirty countries, including Canada, and 1,500 police monitors from twenty-four countries, including 100 Canadian RCMP officers, were deployed across the territory during the election. According to Namibia's proportional representation method, SWAPO won forty-one of seventy-two seats and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a multi-racial party largely financed from South Africa, took twenty-one seats. The United Democratic Front, composed of members from Namibia's Demara tribal group, won four seats; the Conservative Christian Nation Action Party, financed by South Africa's ruling National Party, won three seats; and three smaller parties won one seat each. SWAPO gained the bulk of its support from the populous northern region of Ovamboland, the rest of the vote splitting largely along tribal lines, with SWAPO winning only modest support from non-Ovambo groups. With its forty-one seats, SWAPO fell short of the two-thirds majority (forty-eight seats) required by the Constituent Assembly Proclamation of 6 November 1989 to approve all major aspects of a new Constitution for Namibia.

After month-long negotiations among parties in the Constituent Assembly, on 20 December 1989 the Assembly agreed in principle on a Constitution. The new Constitution, adopted on 9 February 1990, provides for an entrenched bill of rights, an executive presidency responsible to a bicameral legislature elected by proportional representation, an independent judiciary, regular multiparty elections and abolition of the death penalty. On 16 February 1990, Sam Nujoma was unanimously elected by the Constituent Assembly as Namibia's first President. On 21 March 1990 Namibia gained its full independence, with Mr. Nujoma being sworn into office by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar. On the same day, Namibia became the Commonwealth's fifteenth member. Two days later, the UN Secretary-General declared Namibia the United Nations' 160th member.

For a discussion of UN activity on Namibia, including Canada's role at the UN, see *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* in this chapter.

### *Angola*

Angola obtained its independence from Portugal in 1975. The Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) formed the Government and sustained its position with the help of 13,000 Cuban troops. (This number eventually grew to an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Cuban soldiers.) A guerrilla group known as the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), aided by South Africa, became the major opposition force. South Africa defended its involvement on the grounds that Angola was being used as a base by the (Namibian) South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in its war for Namibia's independence from South Africa.

In 1987, the civil war in Angola reached a stalemate as a result of Cuban and Soviet aid to the MPLA being matched by South African and US aid to UNITA. On 22 December 1988, two US-brokered agreements were signed, preparing the ground for peace talks by ending South African support for UNITA and securing the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Under the terms of the first agreement, signed by Angola, Cuba and South Africa, Angola and South Africa pledged cooperation with the UN in bringing Namibia to independence, and Cuba was to withdraw all of its forces from Angola under UN verification. The second agreement, signed by Angola and Cuba, provided a detailed timetable for the staged withdrawal of the approximately 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola over a twenty-seven-month period beginning 1 April 1989. To oversee Cuban troop withdrawals, a seventy-member UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) had been established in December 1988 by the UN Security Council.

By 1989, over 100,000 had died and 1.5 million required emergency food and other aid because of the continuing Angolan civil war. On 22 June 1989, at a summit meeting of eighteen African heads of state in Gbadolite, Zaire, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi agreed to a peace plan which included an immediate ceasefire and unspecified terms of integration of UNITA members in the MPLA Government. Negotiations to implement the plan broke down shortly afterwards, with each side accusing the other of serious violations of the truce. In the weeks that followed, the Angolan Government insisted that the original plan included the voluntary retirement of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, while UNITA claimed that the Government had agreed to an interim coalition government to be followed by elections. On 23 August 1989, the Angolan President accused South Africa and the United States of continuing to arm the approximately 25,000-strong UNITA rebels. One day later, UNITA rebels said they were back at war with the Angolan Government after Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda stated that UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi had agreed to a "voluntary and temporary exile" in Morocco under the peace plan of 22 June 1989.

At the end of August 1989, South African President F. W. de Klerk and Zairean President Mobutu Sésé Séko agreed to a round of shuttle diplomacy in an attempt to salvage the peace plan. After meeting with Mr. de Klerk on 27 August 1989, Jonas Savimbi stated that he was willing to resume talks. In September 1989, however, he failed to attend the Kinshasa Summit of African leaders, a follow-up to the 22 June Summit. It was reported on 10 October 1989 that Mr. Savimbi, following a meeting in Washington with US President Bush, had received renewed assurances of US support if he resumed negotiations. On 15 October, Zaire's President Mobutu met with Jonas Savimbi and a senior US envoy. It was reported two weeks later that Cuba had withdrawn half of its troops from Angola, as agreed to in its 1988 bilateral agreement with Angola.

On 3 December 1989, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi said that he was willing to agree to an immediate ceasefire. A fierce battle for control of Mavinga, a southern provincial town and UNITA stronghold, began at this time, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. In late January 1990, Cuba announced that it was temporarily halting its troop withdrawal following the death of four Cuban soldiers in south-western Angola and six others in August 1989 at the hands of UNITA rebels. On 19 March 1990 the Angolan President met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and a day later with US Secretary of State James Baker. The two meetings

were followed by meetings between Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze and US and Angolan officials. At the meetings, the US reportedly urged the Angolan Government to agree to a ceasefire and to negotiate with UNITA, promising to cut its military aid to the latter and to provide diplomatic and financial aid for Angola. It was also reported that once a ceasefire was in place, the Soviets would pressure the Angolan Government to drop certain conditions for talks, including UNITA acceptance of the present Angolan Constitution and integration into the ruling MPLA Government.<sup>1</sup> In early April 1990, the Angolan Government reportedly agreed to start direct peace talks with UNITA in Portugal and Cape Verde. No date was set for their commencement, however.

### *South Africa*

In mid-July 1989, at the outset of the election campaign leading to the early September 1989 South African Parliamentary elections, the leader of the ruling National Party, Frederik W. de Klerk, said that his Government would negotiate with the outlawed anti-*apartheid* African National Congress (ANC) if the organization followed the lead of its jailed leader Nelson Mandela and "committed itself to the pursuit of peaceful solutions." This statement came two weeks after a meeting between Mr. Mandela and South African President P. W. Botha.

F. W. de Klerk took over as acting President on 15 August 1989 after a power struggle with P. W. Botha which revolved around Mr. de Klerk's decision to meet with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, who had allowed the ANC to establish its base in exile in his country. Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and thousands of other anti-*apartheid* activists began waging a non-violent defiance campaign on 2 August 1989. The campaign, under the leadership of the Mass Democratic Movement, a broad-based coalition comprising the United Democratic Front (UDF), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), church and other anti-*apartheid* organizations, sought to challenge South African segregation laws and mobilize opposition to the upcoming elections. Church officials and other activists claimed that twenty-nine people died as a result of violence in the townships around Cape Town, while South African police reported thirteen dead in inter-clan election-night violence in the township of Khayelitsha.

On 6 September 1989, South Africa's 5.5 million eligible voters cast their ballots in the South African Parliamentary elections that excluded the country's twenty eight million blacks. The National Party lost seats in Parliament to both the Democratic Party, a new alliance of anti-*apartheid* groups, and to the Conservative Party, which demands stricter racial segregation. However, the National Party surpassed the eighty-four seats needed to form a majority in Parliament. Within two weeks of the elections, President-elect F. W. de Klerk approved the first mass anti-government marches in decades and reprieved several prisoners on death row. A series of mass marches and demonstrations, permitted by the Government, took place across the country shortly afterward.

---

<sup>1</sup> John Battersby, "Namibia Success Raises Hopes for Angola Cease-Fire." *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 March 1990, pp. 1-2.

On 15 October 1989, eight black anti-*apartheid* leaders, seven of whom had been sent to prison with Nelson Mandela in 1964, were released unconditionally. They were greeted by jubilant crowds, the largest in Port Elizabeth where an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 people assembled. The eight included ANC former General Secretary Walter Sisulu. South African newspapers depicted the releases as a *de facto* legalization of the ANC itself. At the same time, the ANC presented six preconditions to the start of negotiations with the South African Government. They included lifting the forty-month-old state of emergency, ending restrictions on political activity, releasing political prisoners and granting clemency for those on death row. The preconditions were endorsed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in its Harare Declaration of 21 August 1989.

On 16 November 1989, President de Klerk announced the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act of 1953, to take place at the 2 February 1990 opening of Parliament. This legislation had been used by white local governments to bar blacks from beaches, parks, libraries, and other facilities. On 27 November 1989, President de Klerk rejected the ANC's call for an interim government, as embodied in the OAU Harare Declaration. In early December 1989, Mr. de Klerk announced a full-scale probe into forty-nine political assassinations of anti-*apartheid* activists over the previous ten years, and the suspension of five policemen from active duty after a former policeman exposed an alleged police-led hit squad. On 13 December 1989, the South African President met with jailed Nelson Mandela, reportedly to discuss how to conduct a dialogue on the country's future. On 14 December 1989, the South African Appeal Court in Bloemfontein overturned the convictions of five black activists in South Africa's longest treason trial (the "Delmas Treason Trial"). The five, including three anti-*apartheid* leaders jailed since 1985, had been convicted of treason in November 1988.

On 15 January 1990, after being issued South African passports, seven ANC leaders recently released from jail arrived in Lusaka, Zambia, for meetings with other ANC members to discuss the opening of negotiations with the South African Government. The ANC vowed to continue its armed struggle, but left open the possibility of peace talks if the ban on political activity in South Africa was lifted. At the opening of the South African Parliament on 2 February 1990, President de Klerk announced, among other measures, that Nelson Mandela would be freed soon; that the ANC, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and South African Communist Party were unbanned; that certain political prisoners would be released; that restrictions had been lifted on thirty-three organizations and 374 individuals; that media emergency regulations were abolished except for new security regulations to control TV and film coverage of unrest; and that there would be a moratorium on hangings.

On 11 February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from Victor Verster prison. In an address to a Cape Town crowd variously estimated at between 50,000 and 120,000, Mr. Mandela called for the continuation of sanctions and of the armed struggle against the Government. On 28 February 1990, Mr. Mandela stated that the ANC would make no concessions to the South African Government until it met the organization's conditions for opening talks. The comment was made after Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda had said that the ANC should suspend its military operations in South Africa as a sign of support for the efforts at change by President de Klerk. Mr. Mandela refused and stated that stumbling blocks to the opening of negotiations

remained the Government's refusal to lift the state of emergency, the continued detention of political prisoners, and continuing uncertainty over the legal status of exiles who entered South Africa independently or as part of a negotiating team.<sup>2</sup>

After being issued a South African passport for travel, on 2 March 1990 Nelson Mandela was elected Deputy President of the ANC at a two-day meeting of the organization's executive committee in Lusaka. Due to the illness of ANC President Oliver Tambo, General Secretary of the ANC Alfred Nzo remained in his post as acting President. Two of Mr. Mandela's colleagues earlier released from prison, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki, were also elected to the executive committee.

A brutal civil war which erupted three years ago in South Africa's Natal Province has claimed approximately 3,000 lives. The roots of the conflict between the ANC and the Inkatha movement, formed in 1975, lie in a struggle for power within the black community and differing strategies for fighting *apartheid*. The Zulu-based Inkatha, loyal to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, has also clashed with members of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) reported to be loyal to ANC leader Nelson Mandela. In the days following Mr. Mandela's release from prison, fifty-seven people were killed in fighting across Natal. Violence and deaths continued through March and April 1990 despite pleas for peace issued by Mr. Mandela to a predominantly Zulu crowd at a rally in Durban at the end of February 1990.

On 4 March 1990, a military coup swept the President of South Africa's Ciskei black homeland from power, following an earlier coup in the homeland of Transkei. Hundreds of South African soldiers were sent to Ciskei to quell the unrest. A state of emergency was also declared in the black homeland of Bophuthatswana on 7 March 1990 after police opened fire on protesters, killing fourteen. Another military coup toppled the Government of the homeland of Venda on 4 April 1990. (The South African homeland policy was created to reduce the number of blacks living around urban areas reserved for whites. The system created six black "self-governing" territories and four nominally independent black states, where fifteen million blacks live. The four "independent" states, recognized by no government other than South Africa, are Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.)

At least eleven people were killed and scores injured on 26 March 1990 in the black township of Sebokeng (also known as Sharpeville), south of Johannesburg, when South African police opened fire on anti-*apartheid* protesters. As a result of the continuing violence and Government actions to stop unrest in the black townships and Natal, a first round of talks between Nelson Mandela and other anti-*apartheid* groups and President de Klerk were postponed.

After three days of talks beginning 2 May 1990, the South African Government and a team of ANC negotiators headed by Nelson Mandela reported significant progress toward full-scale negotiations on South Africa's future. The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the talks said that the Government and the ANC "agree on a common commitment toward the resolution

---

<sup>2</sup> "Mandela Won't Back Down on Demands." *Montreal Gazette*, 1 March 1990, p. 8.

of the existing climate of violence and intimidation from whatever quarter as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations." The parties agreed to establish a working group to make recommendations to advise on mechanisms for the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles. In addition, the Government agreed to grant temporary immunity from prosecution for prior political offences, to undertake the repeal of existing security legislation, and to work toward the lifting of the nation-wide state of emergency.

Immediately after the talks, President de Klerk spent eighteen days touring nine European capitals, reportedly asking the European Community countries to consider dropping their economic sanctions because of the "dynamic changes" taking place in South Africa.

On 4 June 1990, Nelson Mandela left on a six-week, thirteen-country tour. Throughout his visits, Mr. Mandela urged the world community to maintain economic sanctions against South Africa until *apartheid* was eliminated. In Washington on 26 June 1990, Mr. Mandela told President Bush that he could not renounce the use of violence and armed struggle to achieve racial equality in South Africa, but that the ANC would cease hostilities if the South African Government accepted its conditions for talks on a new Constitution. President Bush assured Mr. Mandela that US sanctions would not be lifted until all the conditions set by the ANC were met.

In May and June 1990, the South African Government proceeded with several political and legislative measures. On 16 May, it announced the opening of South Africa's segregated hospitals to all races, and declared that it would give up trying to turn six black "self-governing" territories into independent states. President de Klerk announced on 7 June 1990 that the nation-wide state of emergency, imposed on 12 June 1986, would be lifted in three of South Africa's four provinces. According to Mr. de Klerk, the state of emergency was left intact in the province of Natal because of the continuing factional fighting between the Inkatha movement and the ANC.

On 19 June 1990, the South African Parliament voted overwhelmingly to repeal the Separate Amenities Act, in a move promised originally by Mr. de Klerk for 2 February 1990. The repeal of the Act, however, did not affect school or neighbourhood segregation, only applying to facilities such as parks, hotels and swimming pools. The bill which repealed the Separate Amenities Act also negated a section of the Group Areas Act of 1966 that had required segregation in restaurants and clubs and amended the Road Transportation Act of 1977 that had barred the integration of public transport. Legislation awaiting repeal includes: the main part of the Group Areas Act, which mandates racial segregation; the Land Act, which allocates eighty-seven percent of the land in South Africa to whites; and the Population Registration Act, which classifies each South African by race from birth and is the mechanism whereby blacks are prevented from voting. In April 1990 President de Klerk indicated to Parliament that he wanted the Group Areas Act repealed in 1991.

Key immediate demands of the ANC in its next round of talks with the South African Government, scheduled for August 1990, reportedly are the release of political prisoners (said by the ANC to number 1,300), a declaration of general amnesty for political offences (that would

allow 22,000 exiles to return to South Africa), a halt to political trials, the lifting of the state of emergency in Natal, and the repeal of security legislation. The South African Government reportedly will press the ANC to resolve its conflict with the Inkatha movement and to call off its armed struggle against the Government. On a new Constitution, the ANC demands a non-racial democracy based on one-person, one-vote election, a Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary. The Government favours "non-discriminatory" structural protection for minorities through a Bill of Rights and constitutional checks and balances.

For a discussion of UN and Commonwealth activity on South Africa, including Canada's role, see *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* in this chapter.

### *Mozambique*

After Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in 1975, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won control of the new nation. An opposition guerrilla group, known as RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana), was founded by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization in 1977 and formed out of former Portuguese colonists, remnants of elite colonial troops, and deserters from the FRELIMO army. After the end of white-minority rule in Rhodesia in 1982, South African Military Intelligence took over the support and training of RENAMO guerrillas. In 1984, Mozambique's President Samora Machel signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa, which provided for an end to its support of RENAMO and to the use of Mozambican territory by African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas in their operations against South Africa. President Machel was killed in a plane crash on 19 October 1986 and Joachim Chissano took over the presidency.

In the years following the Nkomati Accord, Mozambique regularly accused South Africa of violating it by continuing to support RENAMO. The rebels were also said to have received unofficial support from South African security forces and from former Portuguese colonists in South Africa and Portugal. Neighbouring Zimbabwe and Tanzania have sent major military expeditions to assist the Mozambican Government. The US, Canada, Britain, Italy and other European countries have contributed to the repair and defence of transportation corridors against RENAMO incursions, in an attempt to prevent the cut-off of inland countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana from links to sea ports in Mozambique.

Between 1983 and 1985, an estimated 100,000 Mozambicans died of starvation or disease during a prolonged drought. Over the past two years, the RENAMO rebels have reportedly killed at least 100,000 civilians. An estimated one million have fled Mozambique, with another million living in displaced persons camps within the country.

On 19 July 1989, the leader of South Africa's governing National Party, F. W. de Klerk, met with Mozambican President Joachim Chissano. Mr. Chissano maintained that supplies to RENAMO were still being smuggled in from South Africa, but accepted South Africa's assurances that its military was not responsible. Mr. de Klerk publicly supported ending the fourteen-year-old civil war. Also in July 1989, talks to end the war were initiated after Kenyan President Daniel T. arap Moi and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe agreed to act as mediators, following a

Mozambican request. In August 1989, following official talks in Nairobi, Kenya, with Mozambican church leaders representing the Government, RENAMO released a sixteen-point peace plan including insistence on free national elections. The church delegation countered with a twelve-point proposal, calling for RENAMO recognition of the legitimacy of current Mozambican institutions, including its Constitution; full constitutional guarantees for RENAMO to participate in the existing political system; and eventual renunciation of violence by the rebels. While the talks were taking place in Kenya, it was reported that RENAMO rebels, armed with axes, machetes and clubs, had massacred fifty-four civilians near the southern coastal town of Xai-Xai. In January 1990, following another meeting with South African President de Klerk on 15 December 1989, President Chissano proposed sweeping constitutional changes to allow for popular elections and a "clean break with the Marxist-Leninist policies of the past."

### *The Horn of Africa:*

#### *Ethiopia*

Ethiopia, in 1989-1990, saw intense fighting continue on two fronts. Eritrea, an Italian colony from 1889 until World War II, was federated with Ethiopia by a UN resolution in 1952. Under the UN plan, the former colony was to control its domestic affairs, while Ethiopia managed its external relations and trade. However, Ethiopia annexed the area in 1962, and Eritrean rebels have been fighting for independence since that time. Other rebels, in the region of Tigré, have been fighting since the mid-1970s for greater autonomy from Ethiopia, with some factions demanding self-determination for the region, and others wanting more power within a renewed federation. The fighting in Ethiopia has led to an exodus of approximately 625,000 refugees into Sudan during the past two decades. Until 1989, attempts at arranging talks between the Ethiopian Government and the two rebel groups had all failed.

On 17 August 1989, Ethiopian President Mengistu Hailé Mariam agreed with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) to send high-ranking four-member teams to peace negotiations to be held under the mediation effort of former US President Jimmy Carter. Mr. Carter arranged the talks in a series of three trips to Africa between April and July 1989. Talks between the Government and EPLF began on 7 September 1989 in Atlanta, Georgia, and on 20 September 1989 a set of procedural accords were signed. A second round of talks began on 20 November, with both sides accusing each other of hindering efforts to end the civil war. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere was added as co-chairman of the mediation effort at this time. With full procedural details settled in the negotiations, both sides agreed to hold full-scale peace talks in 1990, but no date was set.

Tigrean rebels began a large offensive against Ethiopian Government forces in August 1989, south and east of the Tigré region. On 24 August 1989, the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) announced that it had accepted an offer from former US President Carter for separate talks with the Ethiopian Government. However, on 28 October 1989, the TPLF announced that it had begun talks with the Ethiopian Government and Italian officials in Rome. By December 1989, the rebels had advanced far south of their region, to within 100 miles of the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. They also claimed to have taken the town of Jihur, an

important transportation link connecting Addis Ababa with the port of Assab on the Red Sea coast. A Government counteroffensive, begun in January 1990, appeared to have halted the TPLF's southern advance.

In early February 1990, Ethiopian Government troops and EPLF forces began a battle for the vital Red Sea port of Massawa, also a key staging point for international emergency food aid for an estimated four million people facing famine in northern Ethiopia. The fierce fighting and destruction of the port halted the delivery of 50,000 tons of Western-donated food, enough to feed three million people for one month. Western relief agencies were uncertain whether alternative delivery routes could be developed in time. The chief problem lay with the Mengistu Government's refusal to grant permission to deliver food to areas controlled by the two rebel groups. However, the Government did allow a consortium of Ethiopian churches to deliver food to these areas. Many Western governments were sending smaller quantities of food to rebel areas through Port Sudan in neighbouring Sudan for delivery by rebel-controlled truck convoys.

On 12 February 1990, the EPLF captured the port of Massawa and stated that it agreed with a long-standing US proposal to make the city an international port under United Nations control. The Ethiopian Government launched three unsuccessful counteroffensives in the following two months (the last from 19 to 23 April 1990), with a loss of 30,000 government soldiers. The failure of the counteroffensives allowed the EPLF to tighten its siege of Asmara, capital of Eritrea.

At the United Nations on 24 April 1990, famine relief donor countries, including the European Community, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, the US and Canada, endorsed a "Statement of Principles," a code of conduct aimed at ensuring the delivery of famine relief supplies to northern Ethiopia. Under an agreement reached at the US-Soviet Summit in Washington on 3 June 1990, the two superpowers agreed to cooperate in a joint relief programme to deliver US food aid in Soviet aircraft to Ethiopians threatened by starvation caused by drought and the civil wars. In addition, the two Powers welcomed the Ethiopian Government announcement days earlier to permit a UN-sponsored relief effort to enter northern Ethiopia through the port of Massawa, and said that they would support an "international conference of governments" under the auspices of the UN to try to end the conflict situations in the Horn of Africa.

On 7 June 1990, Ethiopian President Mengistu announced in a statement that he would allow the UN to act as an observer at negotiations with the EPLF, one of the rebel group's preconditions for the start of peace talks. The Mengistu Government was reported at the end of June 1990 to be on the verge of collapse.

### *Somalia*

Somalia was created out of two colonies, British and Italian, and achieved its independence in 1960. In October 1969, Mohammed Syad Barré proclaimed himself President-for-life. His main opponents were the northerners of Somalia, composed largely of members of the Isaak tribe, who make up fifty percent of the country's population. The Soviet Union abandoned its previous support of President Barré in 1975. The United States subsequently offered military and financial

aid to the Government in exchange for military bases in the country. Human rights conditions deteriorated drastically in May 1988 when full-scale civil war broke out between the Somali National Movement, an opposition military force from the north, and Government forces. The pastoral economy was destroyed in savage fighting and an estimated 450,000 Somalis fled their homes for Ethiopia, with another 600,000 displaced within Somalia. A 1988 peace treaty between Ethiopia and Somalia, ending their ten-year war, prevented hundreds of thousands of refugees from fleeing to Ethiopia. According to the US State Department, at least 5,000 unarmed civilians had been killed in the civil war in the ten months leading up to March 1989.

On 14 July 1989, an estimated 450 people died and thousands were injured in protests against the Government's jailing of four religious leaders. On 16 July 1989, forty-six Isaaks were massacred in Mogadishu. Within a week of the massacre, the US Administration suspended US\$25 million in military aid to Somalia. A further US\$21 million of economic aid slated for Somalia was redirected to other African countries in August 1989. Fighting was reported underway in Mogadishu and Kismayu in September. Early that month, the United Nations announced that it was suspending delivery of supplies to Ethiopian refugees in Somalia because they were being inducted into the Somalian Army.

On 18 January 1990, the US-based human rights group Africa Watch reported that at least 12,000 civilians had been shot and killed by the Somali Army since May 1988, while another 25,000 had been killed by Government aerial bombings and artillery shelling in rebel areas. The report conceded that the rebel Somali National Movement had killed unarmed civilians as well, but asserted that the Government was responsible for a greater number of deaths.

## *Sudan*

Between 1955 and 1972, the Muslim Arabs of northern Sudan fought a major war against the Christian and animist rebels of the south. Despite a negotiated peace settlement, the southern peoples formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1983 to fight oppression from state security forces and the imposition of Islamic laws (*sharia*). Receiving arms from Ethiopia, the SPLA, led by Colonel John Garang de Mabior, encouraged the Dinka tribe, of which he is a member, to retaliate against the Sudanese Army. War-induced starvation, aggravated by the obstruction of international food relief deliveries, was estimated to have killed 250,000 southern Sudanese in 1988 and led to the displacement of 1.6 million people.

On 14 May 1988, Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq el-Mahdi announced the formation of a twenty-seven-member coalition Government. On 29 September 1988, President Museveni of Uganda affirmed that negotiations to end the civil war would take place between the SPLA and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the second largest partner after Mahdi's Umma Party in the Sudanese coalition Government. Meetings between the SPLA and the DUP took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and on 16 November 1988, a peace agreement was reached calling for an immediate ceasefire, an end to the state of emergency, and an all-party conference to end the war and form a new government. The Mahdi Government accepted the peace accord on 26 March 1989 under pressure from its own army, moderate Arab states concerned with Islamic fundamentalism, and the US Government (which had objected to the use of food as a weapon of

war). On 30 June 1989 Sudanese Army officers staged a bloodless coup, toppling the Mahdi Government and imposing martial law. The new military leader, General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, declared a month-long ceasefire in the civil war. This followed a unilateral rebel ceasefire called on 1 May 1989.

The first direct talks between Sudan's new military rulers and SPLA rebels collapsed on 20 August 1989. Lam Akol, military commander of the SPLA forces, stated afterwards that the SPLA had demanded the abolition of *sharia*, the resignation of the military junta, and its replacement by an interim government comprising representatives of the army, the SPLA, and the political parties represented in the Parliament before the June coup. This was to be followed by the holding of free elections. In early October 1989, SPLA leader Colonel Garang rejected a proposal by the military Government to consider the formal division of Sudan between the Arabicized north and the Christian south.

Peace talks, held 1 to 5 December 1989 under the auspices of former US President Carter foundered on the issue of whether Islamic laws would be suspended while a proposed constitutional conference was held. Heavy fighting resumed, with the Government suspending relief flights to the south after accusing the SPLA of breaking another ceasefire. On 26 January 1990, it was reported that Sudan had eased its ban on relief flights to the south, but that intense fighting around the town of Juba, the southern provincial capital, had prevented supplies from being distributed. A vast international effort led by the UN had commenced in April 1989 in an attempt to avert war-induced starvation of the magnitude suffered in Somalia in 1988.

In December 1989, Amnesty International reported that Sudanese Government forces had executed tens of thousands of unarmed civilians and had tortured rebel prisoners. The human rights group also denounced the SPLA's killing of prisoners and civilians opposed to its policies. In March and April 1990 General Bashir survived two alleged coup attempts, followed by the arrests of many opponents of his régime. Numerous sources have suggested, however, that the Sudanese Government has used the pretext of coup attempts to quell opposition to its régime, particularly by discontented Sudanese Army officers.

## *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

### *Namibia*

The UN Security Council continued to monitor events in Namibia from mid-1989 through 1990. On 28 June 1989, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar warned the Council that an atmosphere of "fear and intimidation," created by the activities of the South African paramilitary organization Koevoet, jeopardised conditions for fair elections in Namibia.<sup>3</sup> On 16 August 1989, the Council met to discuss "South Africa's non-compliance with the requirements of Security

---

<sup>3</sup> Trevor Rowe, "Report from the Security Council." *Peace&Security*, vol. 4 no. 3 (Autumn 1989), p. 13.

Council Resolution 435," the UN Namibian independence plan.<sup>4</sup> On the same day, the South African Government announced it was to remove former Koevoet personnel from Namibian police forces. Canadian Ambassador to the UN Yves Fortier welcomed the South African announcement and stated that "[t]he United Nations...[had] long sought this goal, and members of the Council...[had] played their part in diplomatic efforts to achieve it."<sup>5</sup> On 29 August 1989, the Council adopted Resolution 640 which demanded strict compliance with the terms of the Namibian peace plan, especially by South Africa, and the dismantling of all paramilitary forces, "in particular Koevoet."<sup>6</sup> Under the leadership of Ambassador Fortier as President of the Security Council at this time, on 31 October 1989 the Council adopted a resolution that again demanded strict compliance by all parties and called for a complete disbandment of Koevoet and the South-West African Police Force.

A delegation of Canadian representatives from non-governmental organizations visited Namibia in July 1989. The group, led by former Cabinet Minister Flora MacDonald, recommended that UN military personnel remain in Namibia after the November election to ensure a peaceful transition to independence scheduled for early 1990. The group also recommended generous Canadian development aid to Namibia, criticized election procedures, and expressed grave concerns over the continuing presence of former members of Koevoet counterinsurgency units in the Namibian police force.<sup>7</sup> On 30 August 1989, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced that he had asked an all-party Parliamentary group to observe the pre-election process in Namibia and report its findings to Parliament. The group, composed of four Members of Parliament, visited Namibia from 6 to 13 September 1989 and, upon its return, urged Canada to assist Namibia's post-independence development and encourage investment in that country. The Parliamentary observers' report also stated that high levels of voter registration in Namibia constituted a "remarkable achievement." The report recommended that, to minimize voter intimidation, Koevoet forces should be confined to base and effectively monitored until the election, then disbanded and retrained.<sup>8</sup>

On 25 September 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark announced the arrival in Namibia of the Commonwealth Observer Group for Namibia, which observed the pre-election process until 11 October 1989. Led by Australia, the Group included members from Canada, Gambia,

---

<sup>4</sup> Trevor Rowe, "Report from the Security Council." *Peace&Security*, vol. 4 no. 4 (Winter 1989/1990), p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> S/PV. 2878 (Statement by Ambassador L. Yves Fortier to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Namibia), 18 August 1989, p. 32.

<sup>6</sup> Rowe, *supra* note 4.

<sup>7</sup> Oakland Ross, "Canadian Observers in Namibia Urge Amending of Electoral Law." *Globe and Mail*, 29 July 1989, p. A3; and "Keep UN in Namibia, Observers Urge." *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 July 1989, p. A6.

<sup>8</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 204 (30 August 1989); Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 240 (6 October 1989); and "MPs to Urge Ottawa to Aid Independent Namibia." *Montreal Gazette*, 14 September 1989, p. 10.

India, Jamaica, Malaysia and Zambia. The Group owed its origin to a meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, chaired by Mr. Clark, in Canberra, Australia on 7 to 9 August 1989. The Group reported to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October 1989.<sup>9</sup>

The Canadian Government announced a series of measures in 1989-1990 in support of the Namibian independence plan. In April 1989, approximately 250 Canadian Forces troops became part of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) [see **PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION**, *Chapter 21*]. In June 1989, Canada announced that it would provide \$2 million in aid to the Namibian refugee repatriation system. In July, Canada donated 4,000 ballot boxes and the services of an electoral computer expert for the UN-monitored elections for Namibia's Constituent Assembly.<sup>10</sup> In a statement to the UN Security Council on 18 August 1989, Ambassador Fortier outlined Canada's policies and concerns as follows:

Canada, as a key sponsor of the original settlement plan under resolution 435 (1978), has worked to support the plan's implementation in all practical ways. Our commitment has taken such forms as prompt financial contributions, substantial aid for refugee repatriation, early troop deployment, the supply of ballot boxes and technical expertise on electoral matters. We also initiated a series of joint *démarches* for the release of all political detainees, and we have helped a number of independent observers to visit Namibia to ensure maximum transparency of the electoral process. [On 7 to 9 August 1989 in Canberra, Australia]...the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa...put forward four ideas. First, it encouraged Commonwealth countries...to be prepared to supply additional police if the need arises. Quite apart from former Koevoet personnel, the UNTAG police will face growing demands as the election approaches, and Canada for one stands ready to redeem that pledge. Secondly, the Committee viewed with favour the formation of a Commonwealth observer group.... The Commonwealth would thereby lend its weight to other international efforts to buttress the United Nations operation in the key pre-election period. Thirdly, the Committee anticipated significantly expanded aid in the operational, development and constitutional fields, beginning with the provision of Commonwealth expertise as soon as appropriate. Fourthly, ...the Committee...called for the utmost vigilance and fundamental changes to ensure the integrity of the secret ballot, as well as for careful consideration of the following: voter identification prior to balloting; a full role for party agents; expeditious and decentralized counting; recognition of the constituent assembly as the only authentic representative body; and the idea that the Administrator-General should be guided by the constituent

<sup>9</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 224 (25 September 1989).

<sup>10</sup> *The Election Process in Namibia: An International Roundtable - A Summary Report* prepared by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. Ottawa, Canada, 6-7 July 1989, pp. 7-8 and 10; and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 152 (22 June 1989).

assembly until independence. In addition, [External Affairs Minister]...Clark, writing...[recently] to the South African Foreign Minister on behalf of the Committee, stressed that the question of the broadcast of propaganda [from South Africa]...had to be addressed urgently.... Canada [also] remains concerned that less than fully reliable information on...[SWAPO] combatants remaining in Angola has contributed to instability more than once.<sup>11</sup>

On 3 October 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark and Solicitor General Pierre Blais announced that Canada had agreed to a 29 September 1989 request from the UN Secretary-General to provide police monitors for the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). A contingent of 100 RCMP officers, recruited from volunteer applications throughout the force, were deployed in mid-October 1989. They joined UNTAG police from twenty-four countries as part of an overall expansion of the force to 1,500 officers. The Canadian contingent eventually served for six months, mostly in northern Namibia, monitoring the law enforcement activities of the local police and protecting election personnel and facilities.<sup>12</sup> On 12 October 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark announced that Canada had agreed to a further request from the UN Secretary General to provide forty election supervisors for a 1,300-strong UNTAG election supervisory team. The Canadian contingent left for Namibia at the end of October 1989 and returned to Canada after the Namibian elections.<sup>13</sup>

On 12 November 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the UN judgement that free and fair elections had been held in Namibia. With nearly ninety-eight percent of eligible voters participating in the 7 to 11 November 1989 election, UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari declared that "the voting process has been free and fair." Mr. Clark praised UN efforts and expressed appreciation to the more than 400 Canadians who had participated in the international effort to conduct the Namibian elections under UN supervision and control. He also stressed that the work beginning on a new Constitution for Namibia should give full effect to the principles agreed to by all parties and the UN, including constitutional guarantees of democracy and human rights. Mr. Clark stated: "Canada is a committed sponsor of the [Constitutional] Principles, and fully shares the UN Secretary General's view, approved by the Security Council, that they are an integral and binding part of the UN plan for Namibia." The External Affairs Minister also noted that Canada placed great importance on the successful completion of Namibia's independence process, as this would further strengthen the UN's ability to address regional conflicts elsewhere. He added: "The example of Namibia's transition to independence will provide an invaluable demonstration to South Africans of the feasibility of fundamental change through a peaceful, democratic and negotiated process."<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> Fortier, *supra* note 5, pp. 31-33.

<sup>12</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 235 (3 October 1989).

<sup>13</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 243 (12 October 1989).

<sup>14</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 282 (12 November 1989).

On 15 January 1990, Mr. Clark and Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced that the majority of Canadian Forces personnel serving with UNTAG would return to Canada the following day.<sup>15</sup> In the same news release, the Canadian Government reported that work on the Namibian Constituent Assembly's drafting of a new Constitution was progressing in "accord with the UN constitutional principles of 1982 strongly supported by Canada."<sup>16</sup> In Namibia on 19 to 21 March 1990, External Relations Minister Monique Landry met with several Namibian Government Ministers to discuss various aspects of the new bilateral relationship between their country and Canada. On 20 March 1990, Mr. Clark in the House of Commons, and Mrs. Landry in Namibia, announced several new measures. Canada would provide a "special independence contribution" of up to \$1 million to finance an expanded programme of immunization through UNICEF. It would also lift certain economic sanctions against Namibia, including the end of a ban on imports of Namibian uranium. The federal Export Development Corporation and major Canadian chartered banks had been advised that there were no longer any barriers to providing financing to the country. Mrs. Landry added that the RCMP was ready to provide police training services, and that Namibia had been invited to join Canada's military training assistance programme. With \$1 million previously pledged through the Commonwealth Fund, Canada will provide more than \$4 million in aid to Namibia in 1990. It has also opened a high commission in Windhoek. On 21 March 1990, Mrs. Landry led the Canadian delegation to the celebrations marking Namibia's independence from South Africa. In Ottawa, Mr. Clark stated that Canada had spent \$22 million in its thirteen-year contribution to the achievement of Namibian independence.<sup>17</sup> At the ceremony in New York on 23 April 1990 marking Namibia's entry into the United Nations, Canadian Ambassador to the UN Yves Fortier said Namibia will need the "continued support and goodwill of the international community to develop its economic and social infrastructure."<sup>18</sup>

### *Angola*

On 22 December 1988, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the agreements signed in New York providing for the UN-supervised Namibian independence plan, including the phasing out of Cuban troops from Angola.<sup>19</sup> On 20 September 1989, the Canadian Government announced a \$3 million aid package of food, seeds and agricultural implements to assist Angola in its famine-

---

<sup>15</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 008 (15 January 1990). See also: National Defence, *News Release* AFN: 03/90 (12 January 1990); and "Canadians Home from Namibia." *Montreal Gazette*, 29 March 1990, p. B1.

<sup>16</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 008 (15 January 1990), p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Minister for External Relations and International Development, *News Release* No. 048 (12 March 1990); Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech...on Namibian Independence, House of Commons, March 20, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/16, pp. 1-3; Tim Harper, "Clark Announces High Commission to Mark Namibian Independence." *Toronto Star*, 21 March 1990, p. 18; and "\$4-Million Pledged in Aid to Namibia." *Globe and Mail*, 21 March 1990, p. A11.

<sup>18</sup> Olivia Ward, "Cheers Ring as Namibia Takes Up U.N. Spot." *Toronto Star*, 24 April 1990, p. A14.

<sup>19</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 255 (22 December 1988).

stricken areas, particularly the province of Huila.<sup>20</sup> The aid is to be administered by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Project Angola, an umbrella group of some twenty-five Canadian non-governmental aid and development agencies. It was reported on 26 March 1990 that a truck convoy, arranged by OXFAM Canada and paid for by CIDA, had brought 360 tonnes of maize to Kunene province in south-western Angola.<sup>21</sup> (See also *Mozambique* in this chapter.)

### *South Africa*

In Canberra, Australia from 7 to 9 August 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark chaired the fourth meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. The Committee was created by the Heads of Government Meeting in October 1987 in Vancouver, and is made up of the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the Canberra meeting, among other items, the Ministers discussed sanctions against South Africa, South Africa's links with the international financial community and the results of a final report of independent experts on the evaluation of the application and impact of sanctions. The report recommended tougher economic sanctions against South Africa and suggested that all trade with South Africa be ended within five years. Mr. Clark stated that the Ministers would study and consider the report's recommendations, but pointed out that the authors' views were independent of each Minister's respective government's views and positions. Nevertheless, African countries led by Nigeria argued for the report's full implementation. The eight Foreign Ministers requested that international banks impose tough repayment terms on South Africa during negotiations on the rescheduling of \$8 billion of its total \$21 billion foreign debt. The Ministers also decided not to impose mandatory economic trade sanctions against South Africa at this time.<sup>22</sup> Canada proposed strengthening the institution of the Commonwealth Games, particularly the creation of a Commonwealth Games Trust, in order to assist developing countries seeking to host the Games.<sup>23</sup>

On 10 August 1989, on behalf of the Ministers, Mr. Clark sent a letter to South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha in response to an earlier letter by South African President P. W. Botha. The latter had argued that South Africa played a positive role in the subcontinent,

<sup>20</sup> "\$3 millions à l'Angola." *La Presse*, 20 September 1989, p. E8.

<sup>21</sup> Jonathan Manthorpe, "Angolans Give Canadian Relief Convoy Hero's Welcome." *Montreal Gazette*, 26 March 1990, p. A9; Bill Schiller, "15-Year War, 3-Year Drought Have Broken Angola's Dreams." *Toronto Star*, 1 April 1990, p. A23; and Jonathan Manthorpe, "Angolan War No Cat-and-Mouse Affair." *Montreal Gazette*, 3 April 1990, p. 14.

<sup>22</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 173 (26 July 1989); "Commonwealth Split Over Call for More S. African Sanctions." *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 August 1989, p. A7; "Banks Are Asked to Put Pressure on South Africa." *Globe and Mail*, 10 August 1989, p. A4; and "Commonwealth Countries to Pressure for Sanctions." *Financial Post*, 10 August 1989, p. 9.

<sup>23</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 187 (9 August 1989).

and that sanctions against it were ineffective and rejected by a majority of black South Africans. Mr. Clark countered that the Commonwealth intended to maintain pressure on South Africa "until we see concrete evidence of the dismantling of apartheid and negotiations with genuine black leaders towards the establishment of non-racial, representative government."<sup>24</sup>

Statistics Canada reported in August 1989 that Canada had imported \$112.3 million in goods from South Africa between January and June 1989, an increase of 62.4 percent over the first six months of 1988. For the same period, exports to South Africa had fallen to \$44.7 million, a decrease of 17.8 percent. The increase in imports came largely in minerals, particularly ferro-chrome and ferro-manganese, which are used in the manufacture of steel. These materials account for approximately 60 percent of Canadian imports from South Africa.<sup>25</sup>

On 31 August 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark expressed profound concern about the response of the South African Government to peaceful protests against racial discrimination.<sup>26</sup> A week later he expressed outrage at police violence in the wake of the South African elections.<sup>27</sup> On 15 September 1989, Mr. Clark applauded the large and peaceful protest marches which had taken place over the preceding three days, as well as the restraint shown by South African police. He added:

I am encouraged by the South African Government's promise both to investigate recent instances of police violence and not to interfere with peaceful political protests. If President-elect F.W. de Klerk's professed desire to begin a dialogue about a new South Africa is to become a reality, these promises must be kept. I remain deeply concerned, however, about the continuing detentions of leading opposition figures and urge their immediate release. Other important steps must also be taken, including the lifting of the State of Emergency, the release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners, the unbanning of the ANC and other political parties and the initiation, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, of negotiations towards the establishment of non-racial, representative government.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 186 (10 August 1989).

<sup>25</sup> Andrew Cohen, "Sanctions Issue Dogs Ottawa." *Financial Post*, 19-21 August 1989, p. A11.

<sup>26</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 205 (31 August 1989).

<sup>27</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 211 (7 September 1989).

<sup>28</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 217 (15 September 1989).

On 28 September 1989, in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Mr. Clark outlined the Canadian Government's role within the Commonwealth in pressing for reform in South Africa:

Since the 1985 Commonwealth meeting [in Nassau], no country has adopted more measures designed to end apartheid and encourage dialogue than has Canada - over 50 distinct steps. These have ranged from financial and trade sanctions to assistance programs for the education of blacks; from a ban on sporting contacts to support to the Front Line States; from an embargo on the import of South African arms to support for workshops and conferences which have brought together South Africans of all races. The purpose of Canadian policy has been clear and constant: to convince South Africa that it must abolish the system of apartheid.... Had we ended totally our relationship with South Africa, our influence would have expired.... Our ability to assist apartheid's foes inside South Africa would have been sharply diminished if our Embassy had been closed. Our capacity to monitor events would have disappeared.... We have had disagreements with others, notably the United Kingdom, on the effectiveness of sanctions. Their position, described briefly, has been that sanctions do not work and that they hurt those most in need. Our position has been that sanctions are necessary to convince the South African regime that change is necessary.... [T]here are...hopeful signs. The unprecedented peaceful march in Cape Town two weeks ago was welcome. So too were contacts between President de Klerk, Bishop Tutu and Alan Boesak and the talks with President Kaunda of Zambia. Marches and meetings do not constitute reform. But they can be a precursor to it. They may be a symbol that Mr. de Klerk intends to make history.... [W]e have been pleased by the moderation in the attitude of the African National Congress. That moderation has been encouraged by Canada, beginning with Prime Minister Mulroney's meeting with Oliver Tambo, the ANC's President in 1987. The ANC now talks about the desirability of peaceful, negotiated change rather than of violent revolution.... It also recognizes that there are other legitimate voices of opposition in South Africa....<sup>29</sup>

From 17 to 24 October 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney and External Affairs Minister Clark attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, with Mr. Clark attending the fifth session of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. In a general conference statement issued on 22 October, all the leaders agreed that although there were signs of change in South Africa, sanctions should not be relaxed. British Prime Minister Thatcher, however, issued a separate declaration in which she called for a more positive attitude toward recent "important and positive" South African Government actions. On 23 October 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney told the attending press that Britain had breached

"fundamental procedure" within the Commonwealth by releasing a separate position paper which could, in his view, undermine future Commonwealth cooperation.<sup>30</sup>

From 12 to 14 December 1989, Minister for External Relations and International Development Monique Landry led the Canadian delegation at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Apartheid, the first of its kind. Mrs. Landry told the Assembly:

There have been several hopeful signs coming from South Africa, gestures that contain within them a tantalizing element of hope. Hope that the new de Klerk government is bringing with it a sense of reality, a sense of compassion, a sense of decency that have been sadly lacking in previous administrations. In particular, we welcome the commitment to repeal the Separate Amenities Act; the release of Walter Sisulu and other political prisoners; the decisions to allow peaceful protest marches, the rally for released political prisoners and, most recently, the Conference on a Democratic Future. We hope that these are not just gestures, but harbingers of real change.... Sanctions work. We readily acknowledge that they are far from perfect: they hurt South Africans black and white; but there has simply been no other recourse left to the international community to impress upon Pretoria the urgent need for fundamental change. For forty years the world attempted through diplomatic efforts to bring about apartheid's demise. It did not work. Apartheid is still very much with us, and its pillars, the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act, the Land Act, segregated education and health care, the homelands system, and, above all, the denial of the vote to the black majority, remain entrenched in law. So sanctions must stay.... Canada and all of the Commonwealth recently noted with satisfaction the strong preference for the path of negotiated and peaceful settlement inherent in the 1989 Harare Declaration of the Ad-Hoc Committee of the OAU [Organization for African Unity] on Southern Africa. The Commonwealth also reaffirmed its belief that the constitutional system was a matter for all the people of South Africa to decide, and that its own role remained essentially to facilitate the opening of negotiations. For our part, we are confident that the South African people, in determining their new constitutional order, will be guided by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>31</sup>

At the Special Session, Presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia called on the General Assembly to endorse the Harare Declaration. They also called for mandatory

---

<sup>30</sup> Ross Howard, "British PM Snubs Allies in Statement on Sanctions." *Globe and Mail*, 23 October 1989, pp. A1 and A2; Ross Howard, "Thatcher's Action Called Threat to Commonwealth Co-Operation." *Globe and Mail*, 24 October 1989, p. A4; and Ross Howard, "PM, Thatcher Claim Victory As Tumultuous Summit Ends." *Globe and Mail*, 25 October 1989, pp. A1 and A2.

<sup>31</sup> Minister for External Relations and International Development, *News Release* No. 303 (12 December 1989); and Hon. Monique Landry, "Notes for a Speech...at the United Nations Special Session on Apartheid, New York, December 12, 1989." Minister for External Relations and International Development, *Statement* No. 89/68, pp. 1-3.

and comprehensive economic sanctions, including an arms and oil embargo, until South Africa agreed to meaningful negotiations.<sup>32</sup>

On 15 December 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark stated that he was pleased that the convictions and sentences imposed on the Delmas Treason Trialists in South Africa had been set aside.<sup>33</sup> On 15 January 1990, speaking to the South African Education Trust Fund, a Canadian charitable group, Mr. Clark warned that South Africa had only several months to show that it was indeed serious about dismantling its racist policies or it would risk additional economic sanctions. Mr. Clark suggested that the release of Nelson Mandela offered hope for the dismantling of *apartheid* and that there was no need to take stronger measures against South Africa at this time. He also stated that overall trade between Canada and South Africa had "plunged" by almost one-third since the imposition of sanctions in 1986.<sup>34</sup> On 2 February 1990, Mr. Clark described as "an encouraging beginning" President de Klerk's opening speech to the South African Parliament announcing the imminent freeing of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and other organizations. Both he and Prime Minister Mulroney stated, however, that Canada would not remove its economic sanctions until it was clear that reforms in South Africa were "irreversible."<sup>35</sup>

On 10 February 1990, Mr. Mulroney expressed deep pleasure at the announcement of Nelson Mandela's unconditional release from prison to take place the following day.<sup>36</sup> In a telephone conversation with the Prime Minister on 15 February 1990, Mr. Mandela accepted an invitation to visit Canada in the near future.<sup>37</sup> In Lusaka, Zambia, on 26 February 1990, awaiting the arrival of Mr. Mandela, Mr. Clark stated that the ANC should renounce its armed struggle against *apartheid* to further the chances of beginning negotiations with the South African Government.<sup>38</sup> The following day, Mr. Clark and a handful of world leaders were called to the

---

<sup>32</sup> Olivia Ward, "Pretoria Going Too Slow On Reform, Landry Says." *Toronto Star*, 13 December 1989, p. 16.

<sup>33</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 310 (15 December 1989).

<sup>34</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech...on South Africa,...Ottawa, January 15, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/02; and Julian Beltrame, "Clark Issues Warning to South Africa." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 January 1990, p. A3.

<sup>35</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 021 (2 February 1990); and Peter Bakogeorge and Peter Maser, "More Reforms Needed Before Sanctions End." *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 February 1990, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, *Release* (10 February 1990); and Office of the Prime Minister, *Release* (11 February 1990).

<sup>37</sup> "Mandela Accepts PM's Invitation to Visit Canada." *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 February 1990, p. A7.

<sup>38</sup> "ANC Should Renounce Armed Struggle Against Apartheid, Clark Says." *Montreal Gazette*, 27 February 1990, p. A12.

podium to welcome Mr. Mandela before 60,000 Zambians at Lusaka International Airport.<sup>39</sup> On 1 March 1990 it was reported that Mr. Mandela had "politely but firmly rebuffed" Mr. Clark's suggestion that the ANC suspend its armed struggle. In response to an appeal by Mr. Mandela for international funds, Mr. Clark stated that the Canadian Government could not give political contributions to the ANC.<sup>40</sup> Upon his return from Zambia, Mr. Clark told the House of Commons that he had explained to Mr. Mandela the "firm policy of successive governments of Canada not to support political parties in other countries." He added, however: "...[T]here are thousands of private citizens in Canada who would want to support the return home of the ANC. This resource should be tapped, and I have initiated discussions with representatives of the three parties in Parliament to identify individuals and strategies which we can be offered [sic] to the ANC to help them secure substantial private Canadian support."<sup>41</sup>

En route to Nigeria for a two-day meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, External Affairs Minister Clark met with South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha in Athens on 13 May 1990. Reportedly, although Mr. Botha had not asked Canada to lift its sanctions against South Africa, Mr. Clark said that Canada still wanted to see "clear evidence of irreversible change" before changing its stand on the sanctions issue. Mr. Clark also reportedly said that although there had "undoubtedly been progress" in reforms in South Africa, "we will want to see [*apartheid*] laws off the books. [But] Mr. Botha makes the case that they can't simply remove laws and leave a vacuum." Finally, Mr. Clark said that he was encouraged by the talks between the South African Government and the ANC which took place from 2 to 4 May 1990 and the fact that the two sides "were so evidently prepared to use imagination and compromise" when they decided to work toward ending political violence and make way for negotiations on a new Constitution.<sup>42</sup>

In Abuja, Nigeria from 16 to 17 May 1990, External Affairs Minister Clark chaired the sixth session of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. In his opening remarks, Mr. Clark highlighted the vital importance of assistance to black South Africans in the areas of education, training and work experience. On 17 May the External Affairs Minister announced that Canada would provide an additional \$1 million to expand its education and training programmes for black South Africans, to be channelled through the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria and through the South African Education Trust Fund. Mr. Clark also announced an increase in funding for the Canadian Fund for the Promotion of Dialogue and Negotiations Towards a Non-Racial, Democratic South Africa, bringing to \$1.8 million the amount committed

---

<sup>39</sup> Bill Schiller, "Mandela Welcomes Clark Canadian Effort Praised." *Toronto Star*, 28 February 1990, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Bill Schiller, "Mandela Rebuffs Clark Truce Plea." *Toronto Star*, 1 March 1990, p. 4.

<sup>41</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Statement in the House of Commons...on His Visit to Southern Africa, Ottawa, March 7, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/14, p. 2.

<sup>42</sup> Carol Reed, "S. Africa Sanctions Stay: Clark." *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 May 1990, p. F1.

to the Fund by Canada in 1990.<sup>43</sup> Upon his return to Canada, on 24 May 1990 in the House of Commons Mr. Clark tabled the text of a letter, signed by himself and the eight other Foreign Ministers at the Abuja meeting, setting forth their view "on the appropriateness of maintaining sanctions now in place with respect to South Africa." The letter was sent to the Foreign Ministers of the European Community and the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations.<sup>44</sup>

On 26 May 1990, at the Annual Conference of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAFSA) in Ottawa, External Affairs Minister Clark made the following remarks:

Hope for a peaceful settlement in South Africa has never been greater. The unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other nationalist leaders; the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, UDF and...the IDAFSA; the Groote Schuur "talks about talks" [2 to 4 May 1990]; the progress achieved by the joint ANC/government working group addressing the question of political prisoners, the return of exiles and other obstacles to negotiations; and the obvious rapport and mutual respect that have developed between Mr. Mandela and President de Klerk; all bode well for the future. But there is no denying that none of these significant developments has touched the heart of the matter; none of the pillars of apartheid has crumbled. The constitution remains in place, a constitution that denies Nelson Mandela and the majority of his compatriots the vote. [Other apartheid legislation] remains in force.... Violence and repression continue. The conflict in Natal..., and police actions in Sebokeng and Welkom, have not only led to tragic loss of life but have also become a serious impediment to successful negotiations. Right wing vigilante violence is an increasing, and worrying, phenomenon. The Human Rights Commission reports that 353 people are still being detained under security legislation.... To relax sanctions now would run the risk of aborting the negotiations process before it had properly begun.<sup>45</sup>

According to a 7 June 1990 news release from his office, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed President de Klerk's decision to end the four-year-old state of emergency in three of South Africa's four provinces, but expressed regret that it would stay in force in Natal. The news release further stated that by ending the state of emergency "in most parts of the country, the

---

<sup>43</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 093 (9 May 1990); Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Notes for a Speech...[at] the Opening of the Sixth Session of the Committee of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers, Abuja, Nigeria, May 16, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/28, p. 4; and Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 102 (17 May 1990).

<sup>44</sup> *Commons Debates*, 24 May 1990, p. 11765.

<sup>45</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Remarks...[at] the Annual Conference of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Ottawa, May 26, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/31.

South African Government had removed one of the most significant obstacles to meaningful negotiations towards a non-racial democracy."<sup>46</sup>

As part of his six-week, thirteen-country tour, from 17 to 19 June 1990, Nelson Mandela visited Canada and was warmly and emotionally welcomed throughout his stay by tens of thousands of people.<sup>47</sup> Introducing Mr. Mandela to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Mulroney said that "[t]he fight against apartheid has long been a central element of Canada's foreign policy" and that Canada believes "the way to advance the process of democracy in South Africa is to maintain the existing economic sanctions."<sup>48</sup> Addressing the joint session of the House of Commons and the Senate, Mr. Mandela began by thanking those present and the people of Canada for granting him "the honour and privilege to speak from the podium of the House..., an eminent example of the democratic perspective toward which our people aspire." He added: "The fact that we have not had the opportunity to do the same thing in our country, even as guests, emphasizes the inequity of the apartheid system which we are all determined to abolish without delay."<sup>49</sup> In his speech, the Deputy President of the ANC outlined his vision for a "truly democratic, non-racial and united South Africa" and described the present state of negotiations with the South African Government.<sup>50</sup> Mr. Mandela also praised Canada for its anti-apartheid role within the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the G-7 and the Francophonie. He stated: "You have been and are with us as we struggle to end the system of white minority domination. As an expression of our common humanity, and not an act of charity, we ask that you continue to walk the last mile with us."<sup>51</sup> He also urged the continuance of economic and trade sanctions against the South African Government, saying: "Any move at this stage toward lifting or relaxing international pressure would create a situation in which white South Africa would feel comfortable with the minimal changes that have taken place and once more regress into their opposition where they felt that possible pressure had not reached sufficient strength to oblige them to move forward."<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 130 (7 June 1990).

<sup>47</sup> Tim Harper, "Anti-Apartheid Leader Has 'Message of Hope'," *Toronto Star*, 18 June 1990, pp. A1 and A11; and Tim Harper, "'Walk Last Mile,' Mandela Urges MPs." *Toronto Star*, 19 June 1990, p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> *Commons Debates*, 18 June 1990, pp. 12918 and 12919 (attached Appendix entitled: *Address of Mr. Nelson Mandela...to Both Houses of Parliament in the House of Commons...June 18, 1990*).

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12920.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12920-12924.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12923 and 12924.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12923.

At a dinner in honour of Mr. Mandela in Toronto on 18 June 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada would "commit \$5 million for the repatriation and resettlement of South African exiles and for the reintegration of political prisoners into their communities." The Prime Minister added that "[t]aken together with funds already budgeted for education, management training, legal and humanitarian assistance for black South Africans, Canada's assistance to the victims of apartheid will total \$16 million this year."<sup>53</sup>

### *Mozambique*

Canada annually provides an estimated \$140 million in economic and other aid, chiefly through the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), to front line states (those bordering South Africa) such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. Both Prime Minister Mulroney (speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on 29 September 1988<sup>54</sup>) and External Affairs Minister Clark have responded to requests from front line states for the protection of SADCC and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) projects from sabotage, by pledging logistical support, food and training to these states. On 29 September 1988, Mr. Clark explained that "[t]he success of development projects in the SADCC region, particularly in the transportation and energy sectors, depends on the ability of those countries to protect the project sites. Destabilization and insurgency activities continue to be a threat to major development projects...."<sup>55</sup> In February 1989, the External Affairs Minister announced that Canada would provide close to \$1 million to the Canadian Council of Churches to assist displaced persons in Mozambique and Mozambican refugees who had fled to neighbouring states as a result of RENAMO guerrilla activities.<sup>56</sup> On 26 July 1989, the Canadian Government announced an expansion of Canada's Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP) as part of its commitment to provide security assistance to southern Africa, especially the front line states.<sup>57</sup>

In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on 28 September 1989, Mr. Clark gave his views on the major problem facing the front line states and, in particular, Mozambique:

There are rich mineral reserves and other natural resources in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. These economies are functioning far below capacity. This is partly as a result of the structural weaknesses of the South African economy to which they are so tied, but also because of the foregone benefits of foreign investment. Foreign corporations are not going to rush to invest in societies which are unstable as a result of South African support for

<sup>53</sup> Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, "Notes for an Address...[at the] Dinner in Honour of Nelson Mandela, Toronto Harbour Castle, June 18, 1990." Office of the Prime Minister, p. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, "Address...before the UN General Assembly, New York, United States, September 29, 1988." Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>55</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 213 (29 September 1988), p. 1.

<sup>56</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 025 (7 February 1989).

<sup>57</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 176 (26 July 1989).

rebel movements. Nor are they going to be inclined to invest heavily in economies whose transportation systems are subject to regular interruption by South African-inspired terrorism.... Canada is investing millions of dollars in the development of secure lines of supply for the states to the North of South Africa, lines of supply which connect these economies directly to ocean ports on the African coast. Other countries are doing the same, especially the UK, which has put \$60 million into rail lines in Mozambique. The bottom-line here is as follows: A southern Africa plagued by apartheid is a southern Africa which is economically crippled. A southern Africa freed of apartheid would be a southern Africa open to business. Indeed, the transition away from apartheid could trigger the long-sought economic development of the entire, impoverished African continent. This possibility is even more compelling when one looks at the welcome shift already evident in the region towards a market economy, for example in Mozambique.<sup>58</sup>

### *The Horn of Africa*

In December 1989, External Relations Minister Landry appointed a special adviser on Ethiopia to monitor developments in the famine-stricken northern provinces of that country. Mrs. Landry told church groups, development agencies and service groups that the Canadian Government was prepared to increase the \$17.7 million in food aid already committed to Ethiopia. She also appealed to Ethiopian authorities to provide Western relief workers access to the regions of Eritrea and Tigré. Some twenty organizations, including OXFAM, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank, the United Steelworkers of Canada and the Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief, began mobilizing their resources and efforts to help avert the looming famine forecast for Ethiopia in 1990.<sup>59</sup> It was reported that an eighty percent crop failure in Tigré and complete failure in Eritrea had coincided with the worst fighting in the civil war thusfar.<sup>60</sup>

The Government's special adviser on Ethiopia, Doug Lindores, led a delegation of officials from the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to Ethiopia, Sudan and Italy in late January and early February 1990, and to New York and Washington in early March, to meet with representatives of the Ethiopian Government, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), donor countries and UN officials.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Clark, *supra* note 29, p. 9.

<sup>59</sup> Carol Goar, "Ethiopia Again Needs Canada's Help." *Toronto Star*, 28 December 1989, p. 19.

<sup>60</sup> Dave Todd, "Canada Launches Drive to Feed More Victims of War-Torn Ethiopia." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 March 1990, p. A3.

<sup>61</sup> Hon. Monique Landry, "Speech...[to the] House of Commons...March 28, 1990." Minister for External Relations and International Development, *Statement No. 90/17*, pp. 4-5.

On 3 March 1990, Mr. Lindores stated that "[t]he degeneration of the civil war means there is a very, very large number of potential deaths. We have to face it and our ability to respond is limited." He also questioned "the wisdom of further donations" to the cause of famine relief for Ethiopia, in view of the fact that combatants in the civil war were using food as a weapon. He said that even if an airlift of food could be organized, there would still be 2.8 million people who could not be reached.<sup>62</sup> Although fewer than ten percent of Ethiopia's drought victims live in Ethiopian Government-held territory, more than two-thirds of Canadian food aid is transported through areas controlled by Ethiopian Government forces.<sup>63</sup>

On 6 March 1990, the Canadian Government announced that it would begin a diplomatic offensive to try to persuade Ethiopia's warring forces to let relief food convoys reach their destinations.<sup>64</sup> On 18 March 1990 External Relations Minister Landry met with Ethiopian President Mengistu and strongly urged him to negotiate a settlement of the civil wars in his country. Prior to her departure for Ethiopia, it was announced that CIDA had provided \$26 million in food aid and relief assistance to Ethiopia in fiscal year 1989-1990. From Ethiopia, Mrs. Landry travelled to Rome and held discussions with Italian Government officials who had been conducting peace talks between the Ethiopian Government and the TPLF.<sup>65</sup>

On 28 March 1990, Mrs. Landry reported to the House of Commons on her recent visit to Ethiopia. On the same date, the House passed an all-party resolution which stated:

[N]oting that:

- 4 to 5 million innocent Ethiopians in northern regions of Eritrea, Tigray and Wollo, are seriously and unnecessarily threatened by starvation;
- Canada is a major aid donor to the region today and was so during the 1984 famine crisis;
- and, further noting that Canada, with other western nations, could prevent today the loss of any life through starvation in the region;
- does unanimously condemn any and all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray who would use food as a weapon to attain strategic military and political objectives; or,
- who would not assist the international donor community to provide adequate, timely and sufficiently widespread delivery of food to the starving millions in the area.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Tim Harper, "Canada to Increase Aid to Ethiopia." *Toronto Star*, 3 March 1990, p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> John Cruickshank, "Problems of Fighting a Famine." *Globe and Mail*, 8 June 1990, p. A7; and House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* Issue No. 47 (5 April 1990), pp. 47: 4-26.

<sup>64</sup> Todd, *supra* note 60.

<sup>65</sup> Minister for External Relations and International Development, *News Release* No. 048 (12 March 1990), p. 2; and "Starvation Under the Mengistu Regime." *Globe and Mail*, 27 March 1990, p. A6. See also: *Infra* notes 66 and 67.

<sup>66</sup> *Commons Debates*, 28 March 1990, pp. 9879-9880.

Appearing before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on 10 April 1990, External Relations Minister Landry revealed that she intended "to propose an initiative, in cooperation with other donors and influential countries, that would result in a statement of principle[s] that would serve as a guide for all...[parties to the conflict], as well as donor countries and United Nations agencies in delivering emergency aid."<sup>67</sup>

In a news release on 7 June 1990, Mrs. Landry expressed satisfaction at measures recently announced by the Government of Ethiopia. The news release quoted the Minister as follows:

The decision of the Ethiopian Government to reopen the Port of Massawa for delivery of famine relief supplies to northern Ethiopia as well as a UN sponsored airlift of relief supplies to the besieged northern city of Asmara, in conjunction with the recently announced joint airlift of famine relief supplies by the United States and Soviet Governments, will do much to eradicate the famine threatening some one and a half million people in Eritrea.... These measures are fully supportive of the objectives of the Statement of Principles that I announced on behalf of donor governments and the European Community at the United Nations on April 24.... Canada applauds the Ethiopian Government's readiness to take action to enable the UN to serve as an observer in substantive negotiations between the Government of Ethiopia and the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF).... The peace talks have been deadlocked over this particular issue for several months. Canada regards this as a positive and constructive action by the Ethiopian Government in the pursuit of peace.<sup>68</sup>

It was announced on 17 October 1988 that Canadian Government officials had met with the Sudanese Ambassador to Canada to discuss the civil war in his country. According to an External Affairs press release, "The Canadian Government used the occasion to reiterate its serious concerns about the disastrous effects the civil war is having on the Sudanese population and pressed the Sudanese Government to explore all means available to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict." Canada contributed a total of \$17.5 million in aid to Sudan during 1988, including \$9 million in food aid, \$2 million for Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, and approximately \$2 million for Canadian and UN relief activities in Sudan.<sup>69</sup>

---

<sup>67</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* Issue No. 49 (10 April 1990), p. 49: 6.

<sup>68</sup> Minister for External Relations and International Development, *News Release* No. 131 (7 June 1990).

<sup>69</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 225 (17 October 1988), pp. 1-2.

# PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

## Namibia

On 5 October 1989, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade held a roundtable discussion on Namibia. The Committee heard from Canadian Government officials, a representative of OXFAM Canada, and two professors. They discussed Canadian Government, Canadian non-governmental organization, UN and Commonwealth efforts in the Namibian electoral process, the period of transition from elections to the formal declaration of independence, and longer-term economic and social implications.<sup>70</sup>

In the House of Commons on 23 November 1989, Liberal MP Bob Speller suggested that, at this stage of its development, Namibia required "international support to make up for the withdrawal of budgetary support from South Africa." Mr. Speller also outlined his expectations of the Canadian Government:

Canada's long-time commitment to the well-being of Namibia cannot be abandoned now. With this government's slashing of foreign aid budgets, CIDA [Canadian International Development Agency] has been forced to cut proposed aid to Namibia by 50 per cent. I call on the government to put its money where its mouth is, restore full funding assistance and a major package of bilateral aid to Namibia, and ensure through its position on the [UN] Security Council that Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep water port, is removed from South African to Namibian control. Last, we must establish a high commission in Namibia, or minimally, an aid commission to Namibia.<sup>71</sup>

On the same day, NDP MP Bill Blaikie called on all Canadians and the Government "to do everything in its power" to assist Namibia after its elections.<sup>72</sup>

On 20 March 1990, the House gave its unanimous consent to approval of the following resolution:

[T]his House, at this moment of Namibia's long-awaited independence, extend[s] to its members now in Windhoek its warmest congratulations to the National Assembly and people of the Republic of Namibia on their attainment of sovereignty and on their new constitution.<sup>73</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 13 (5 October 1989), pp. 13: 3-33 and especially pp. 13A: 1-16 (attached Appendix entitled: *The security situation and the transfer of power in Namibia: a review at 30th September 1989* by Professor Colin Leys).

<sup>71</sup> *Commons Debates*, 23 November 1989, p. 6087.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6090.

<sup>73</sup> *Commons Debates*, 20 March 1990, p. 9559.

Preceding the adoption of the resolution, External Affairs Minister Clark rose in the House and summarized Canada's role and UN and Commonwealth efforts in the Namibian independence process. He stated, in part:

In 1977, Canada, with France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., took the lead in negotiating a settlement plan for Namibia that came to be universally accepted as Security Council Resolution 435. Several years of negotiations followed, with Canada centrally involved in what was called the Contact Group, to overcome obstacles to the implementation of Resolution 435 through a parallel agreement on constitutional principles and UN impartiality. The final obstacle, linkage to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, was resolved in the fall of 1988 through an American-mediated regional agreement. Canada then pitched in to implement the plan it had helped to devise.<sup>74</sup>

Mr. Clark went on to describe Canada's involvement in the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), other electoral assistance measures and Government aid to Namibia. Speaking on behalf of the Liberal Party, Member of Parliament André Ouellet extended thanks to all Canadians who participated in the independence process in Namibia. He made special mention of the role played by various non-governmental organizations, in particular OXFAM Canada, which regularly distributed reports and analyses filed by the Namibia communications centre, a Namibian church-sponsored news service. On behalf of the New Democratic Party, MP Lynn Hunter joined the House in celebration of Namibian independence and called for more generous Canadian aid commitments to help Namibia "overcome the poverty and imbalance of years of apartheid rule." She also called for Namibian control over the port of Walvis Bay and a recognition that Namibia "is not entirely free...as long as they remain economic vassals of South Africa."<sup>75</sup>

### *South Africa*

On 26 September 1989, Liberal MP Jesse Flis rose in the House to comment on recently released Canada-South Africa trade statistics:

Since 1985 we have been hearing about the leadership role our country is taking with respect to economic sanctions on South Africa, and yet this year we see that our imports from that country have jumped up by an incredible 62 per cent.... [This gives] our country a reputation not of credibility but of hypocrisy.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9505.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9505-9510.

<sup>76</sup> *Commons Debates*, 26 September 1989, p. 3916.

Several MPs cited the Government's promise of 28 October 1985 to sever all economic relations with South Africa if there was no improvement in the situation with respect to *apartheid*.<sup>77</sup> In response to demands by Liberal Opposition Leader John Turner for total sanctions, Prime Minister Mulroney told the House on 10 October 1989:

[T]here is general recognition in the Commonwealth, particularly in the front-line states but also in many areas of the industrialized world, that the Commonwealth and Canada have provided very vigorous leadership in the fight against apartheid which began in earnest some four or five years ago. Canada has taken some 50 initiatives, many of which have been followed by other industrialized nations. We are satisfied that the growing impact of these sanctions and policies has had a beneficial effect on developments in southern Africa: the results in Namibia, the developments in Angola, the election of President de Klerk and his recent visit to Zambia which would have been absolutely inconceivable some two or three years ago, his statements on the record of his desire to bring about fundamental change. All of this means for us that we have to maintain the pressure that Canada initiated, along with others...some four or five years ago.<sup>78</sup>

Several MPs discussed the intentions of the new South African leadership under President de Klerk and questioned his promises to begin to dismantle *apartheid*. Some Members of Parliament called for the imposition of comprehensive, mandatory economic sanctions in order to increase pressure on de Klerk's Government to follow through on his promises of reform.<sup>79</sup>

At various times in the House, MPs raised the issue of the rescheduling of South Africa's \$20 billion debt.<sup>80</sup> In response to NDP Member Lynn Hunter's concerns, on 20 October 1989 Minister for External Relations Monique Landry said:

As stated by the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Commonwealth Conference, we will continue to exert the pressure on South Africa through our current sanctions, to ensure that the present government will ultimately have to change its position. As for financial sanctions,...the [rescheduling] package was negotiated by 14 banks which imposed conditions that were much stricter than before, and we will continue to initiate measures with a view to dismantling apartheid.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>77</sup> *Commons Debates*, 11 October 1989, pp. 4526-4527; 16 October 1989, pp. 4689-4690; 17 October 1989, p. 4752; and 12 February 1990, pp. 8177-8178.

<sup>78</sup> *Commons Debates*, 10 October 1989, pp. 4480-4481.

<sup>79</sup> *Commons Debates*, 13 October 1989, pp. 4647-4648; 31 January 1990, pp. 7657-7658; and *supra* note 75.

<sup>80</sup> *Commons Debates*, 19 October 1989, pp. 4873-4874; 20 October 1989, pp. 4941-4942 and 4948-4949; and 1 November 1989, p. 5396.

<sup>81</sup> *Commons Debates*, 20 October 1989, p. 4948.

On 1 November 1989, Liberal MP Christine Stewart made the following statement:

[O]n September 28 [1989] the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that major banks co-ordinating South Africa's debt "agreed that they would be seeking the highest possible interest payments and the fastest possible repayments". As we all know, this did not materialize. In fact, South Africa won more favourable terms on its agreement with the banks for debt rescheduling. In light of the propaganda victory for South Africa, the words of our Secretary of State for External Affairs have become an embarrassment.... Although we can hope the present government in South Africa may reconsider its apartheid policy, we know that it is increased sanctions, not hope, that will influence the required changes.<sup>82</sup>

In February 1990, the House heard several statements from MPs celebrating the release of Nelson Mandela from prison.<sup>83</sup>

On four occasions at the end of May and beginning of June 1990, Opposition MPs questioned the Minister of Employment and Immigration about the case of Mahmood Hassan Randeree, a member of the ANC purportedly being asked by immigration officials to leave Canada.<sup>84</sup> On 4 June 1990, replying to NDP Member Howard McCurdy's allegations that Mr. Randeree was being asked to depart to East Germany, the Minister said:

[T]he person in question has been given a departure notice. That means that he can go to any country of his choosing.... It is a departure notice, not a deportation, and it was a decision that was made by an independent [refugee] board. If the head of the refugee board feels that this is worthy of another look, I am sure that he will do that.<sup>85</sup>

Following Nelson Mandela's visit to the House of Commons on 18 June 1990, Liberal MP André Ouellet asked the Government whether it intended "to make a positive response to Mr. Mandela's request that economic sanctions against South Africa be maintained, and...[to] explain why, despite its statements on economic sanctions, the level of Canada's trade relations with South Africa still remains very high?" In a supplementary question, the Member asked whether the

---

<sup>82</sup> *Commons Debates*, 1 November 1989, p. 5396.

<sup>83</sup> *Commons Debates*, 2 February 1990, pp. 7765 and 7767; 12 February 1990, pp. 8173 and 8175; and 13 February 1990, p. 8255.

<sup>84</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 May 1990, pp. 12005-12006; 4 June 1990, pp. 12206-12207; and 5 June 1990, p. 12289.

<sup>85</sup> *Commons Debates*, 4 June 1990, p. 12208.

Government would "reconsider its decisions to refuse to give direct subsidies to the ANC." Minister for International Trade John Crosbie replied:

[T]he Government of Canada intends to continue with the present economic sanctions until such time as there is a clear indication that the apartheid system in South Africa has been done away with. I do not think there is any doubt about policy in that regard. With respect to the question of trade with South Africa, it is minimal with the exception of some very necessary material that we import for use in certain of our Canadian industries. There certainly has been no increase in trade with South Africa.... [O]ne of the constant principles of our foreign policy...endorsed by all three Canadian political parties and approved on a number of occasions when there has been a parliamentary review of foreign policy...[is] that we do not provide financial assistance to any political organization overseas.<sup>86</sup>

### *Mozambique*

On 24 April 1990 NDP Member Lynn Hunter drew the attention of the House to the presence in Canada of Francisco Nota Moises who, according to the Member, was prominent among RENAMO rebels in Mozambique. Ms. Hunter continued:

Originally sponsored by South Africa, RENAMO is now financed by funds raised by Mr. Nota Moises from U.S. groups. Granted refugee status in 1987, Mr. Moises has been actively soliciting funds from his Victoria residence to support an organization which has killed over 100,000 people, destroyed schools and hospitals and contributed to the creation of some three million refugees. The brutality of RENAMO is legendary. The acts of inhuman torture and ritual assassination defy the imagination of civilized individuals. Yet, an active proponent of these atrocities has been admitted to Canada and remains here today with the tacit consent of the Government of Canada. Efforts to have Mr. Moises' status in Canada reviewed has [sic] met with obstruction.... We are supporting development in Mozambique with much needed assistance while we house a major contributor to the agony we are trying to relieve.<sup>87</sup>

### *Ethiopia*

In December 1989, the House heard calls from MPs for the Canadian Government to assist Ethiopia in the face of an impending famine and continuing civil war.<sup>88</sup> On 15 December 1989, Progressive Conservative MP David MacDonald asked the acting Secretary of State for External

---

<sup>86</sup> *Commons Debates*, 18 June 1990, p. 12868.

<sup>87</sup> *Commons Debates*, 24 April 1990, pp. 10599-10600.

<sup>88</sup> *Commons Debates*, 4 December 1989, p. 6435; 14 December 1989, p. 6929; 14 February 1990, pp. 8309-8310; and 7 March 1990, p. 8909.

Affairs about Canadian Government actions to ensure that relief assistance to Ethiopia was distributed. John Crosbie replied:

We have been working with other donors. We have been working with UN organizations and international relief agencies to persuade the Government of Ethiopia to allow access to those who are starving in northern Ethiopia. We were encouraging the UN organizations to ensure that a co-ordinator, either in New York or Addis Ababa as was the case in 1984 and 1988, act as a focal point for the relief organizations and strive to win co-operation of the parties in Ethiopia. Finally, the government has approved \$17.7 million in food aid and emergency relief assistance to Ethiopia this year: \$13.4 million to the Canadian non-governmental organizations and \$4.25 million to the World Food Program and UNICEF.... CIDA's country program manager for the Horn of Africa has just returned from a visit to Ethiopia and Sudan.... His report is being reviewed urgently to try to ensure that we have in place a mechanism which is adequate to meet the challenge. This is being given every attention and priority.<sup>89</sup>

On 20 December 1989, NDP Member Lynn Hunter questioned the Government's commitment:

[F]amine looms again for millions of people in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigré. The United Nations has announced a 100 per cent crop failure in the region where food production has long been disrupted by war.... Ethiopia has been thwarting the international response to this situation. In November, diplomatic negotiations for safe passage agreements [for aid deliveries] broke down.... Canada is moving too slowly to meet this challenge. Quiet diplomacy has become silent complicity as millions of people face death in the region today. CIDA has approved only half the food aid committed last year, which was a non-crisis year. The worst fears of those of us who spoke out against the government cuts to development assistance are being realized. The result of Tory deficit reduction is indeed people dying in Africa. Canadians opened their hearts in 1984. We must respond with equal urgency and generosity....<sup>90</sup>

On 23 January 1990, the Member rose in the House to request an emergency debate on the Ethiopian situation. Ms. Hunter's request was denied by the Speaker of the House.<sup>91</sup>

Progressive Conservative MP David MacDonald asked the External Affairs Minister on 16 and 19 February 1990 about the current situation and Canada's response to events in Ethiopia,

---

<sup>89</sup> *Commons Debates*, 15 December 1989, p. 6991.

<sup>90</sup> *Commons Debates*, 20 December 1989, pp. 7249-7250.

<sup>91</sup> *Commons Debates*, 23 January 1990, pp. 7390-7391.

particularly the dislocation of the Massawa seaport and the cut-off of main food-relief supply lines. Mr. Clark responded on 16 February 1990:

[W]e are very concerned about the impact of conflict upon people already struck by famine. The Port of Massawa is to all intents and purposes now closed. We have diverted a ship bound for that port with food and supplies from Canada to Port Sudan where there is a better prospect of getting that cargo delivered.... We have delivered the strongest possible requests to the governments of both Ethiopia and Sudan, and indirectly to rebel leaders, urging them to go back to negotiation.<sup>92</sup>

And on 19 February 1990:

We are working with the United Nations, with other countries that are involved and with NGOs to try to open corridors that can stay open to try to bring relief to trapped people. We are also seeking to identify alternative routes. I think the realistic conclusion is that unless there is a ceasefire or some agreements to suspend hostilities, all of this will be in vain.... I have signed a letter today to former President Carter offering Canada's full and continuing support and, indeed, suggesting some actions that might be helpful for us to take if the peace negotiation succeeds in the hope that perhaps the prospect of that action may strengthen the hand of former President Carter and President Nyerere.<sup>93</sup>

In response to a question by Progressive Conservative MP Girve Fretz to the External Affairs Minister on 22 March 1990 concerning Canadian initiatives regarding the war in Ethiopia, Mr. Clark replied:

One initiative...is that we are exploring the possibility of putting together a delegation of parliamentarians from the Parliaments of Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union and Italy to see if they might be able to have some impact on the situation.<sup>94</sup>

On 29 November 1989 and 25 January 1990, PC Member Stan Wilbee asked the Government for its policy toward reunification of Ethiopian Jewish families, thousands of whom were airlifted from Ethiopia to Israel in 1984-1985. External Affairs Minister Clark responded:

[M]y department and I have been involved in this issue for some years and will continue to do what we can to bring about the reunification of families of Ethiopian Jews. Of course, what is easiest for us to do is to encourage the reunification of families which have connections in Canada. We make regular representations to the Government of Ethiopia to facilitate that process and will continue to do that. If there are particular cases..., I would like to receive them and I will pursue them.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 February 1990, pp. 8447-8448.

<sup>93</sup> *Commons Debates*, 19 February 1990, pp. 8507-8508.

<sup>94</sup> *Commons Debates*, 22 March 1990, p. 9643.

<sup>95</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 November 1989, p. 6368; and 25 January 1990, p. 7467.

Progressive Conservative MP David MacDonald told the House on 27 April 1990 that two days earlier the Ethiopian Government had agreed "to ensure that relief supplies would reach all those in need of assistance" and had assured the international community of "its determination to reach peaceful political solutions."<sup>96</sup>

On various dates, general statements regarding human rights problems in Namibia, South Africa and Ethiopia were made in the House of Commons, apart from those focussing on Canadian policy toward these conflict areas.<sup>97</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Bowen, Merle L., "Economic Crisis in Mozambique." *Current History*, vol. 89 no. 547 (May 1990), pp. 217-220 and 226-228.

Brionne, Bernard, "Namibie: l'attente se poursuit." *Défense nationale* (January 1990), pp. 197-200.

Cliffe, Lionel, "Forging a Nation: The Eritrean Experience." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 131-147.

Dean, James W., "Myths about South Africa Sanctions." *International Perspectives*, vol. 18 no. 4 (July/August 1989), pp. 23-26.

Evans, Graham, "Walvis Bay: South Africa, Namibia and the Question of Sovereignty." *International Affairs [London]*, vol. 66 no. 3 (July 1990), pp. 559-568.

Freeman, Linda, "Leading from the Rear: Canada and South Africa 1989." *Southern Africa Report*, vol. 5 no. 3 (December 1989), pp. 4-8.

Gunn, Gillian, "Unfulfilled Expectations in Angola." *Current History*, vol. 89 no. 547 (May 1990), pp. 213-216 and 234.

Haysom, Nicholas, "Legerdemain in the Legal Domain: A Review of Recent Legislation in South Africa." *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, vol. 7 no. 4 (1989), pp. 413-434.

Helin, William H., *et al.*, "Dossier: The Horn of Africa." *Refugees* No. 72 (February 1990), pp. 19-37.

Henderson, Robert D'A., "South Africa Sanctions at Work." *International Perspectives*, vol. 18 no. 3 (May/June 1989), pp. 17-19.

---

<sup>96</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 April 1990, p. 10747.

<sup>97</sup> *Commons Debates*, 11 October 1989, pp. 4526-4527; 8 December 1989, pp. 6653 and 6655-6656; and 16 February 1990, pp. 8463-8464.

Hull, Richard W., "United States Policy in Southern Africa." *Current History*, vol. 89 no. 547 (May 1990), pp. 193-196 and 228-231.

Joffre, André, *et al.*, *Mozambique 1989: New Directions*. Montreal and Ottawa: Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe; Cooperation Canada Mozambique, 1990 (185 pp.).

Klen, Michael, "Quel avenir pour le Mozambique?" *Défense nationale* (July 1990), pp. 127-134.

Kühne, Winrich, *Southern Africa after the Independence of Namibia: From Destabilization to Detente?* Ebenhausen, West Germany: Forschungsinstitut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* No. SWP-1P2622, October 1989 (41 pp.).

Landgren, Signe, *Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry*. New York: Oxford University Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1989 (276 pp.).

Marcum, John A., "Namibia's Independence and the Transformation of Africa." *SAIS Review*, vol. 10 no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1990), pp. 153-165.

Markakis, John, "Nationalities and the State of Ethiopia." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 118-130.

McFaul, Michael, "Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola." *International Security*, vol. 14 no. 3 (Winter 1989/1990), pp. 99-135.

Moorcraft, Paul, *African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa, a Military Study*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1990 (400 pp.).

Nagle, Patrick, "Namibia: Rites of Passage." *Peace&Security*, vol. 4 no. 3 (Autumn 1989), pp. 2-3.

Sanger, Clyde, *Namibia: The Black Man's Burden*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *Between the Headlines*, vol. 48 no. 4, Summer 1990 (20 pp.).

Swatuk, Larry A., *Canadian Policy in Southern Africa and the Future of Angola and Namibia: Report of a Workshop Held at Dalhousie University, 23-24 March 1990*. Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 24 March 1990 (48 pp.).

Voll, John O., "Political Crisis in Sudan." *Current History*, vol. 89 no. 546 (April 1990), pp. 153-156 and 178-180.

von der Ropp, Klaus Freiherr, "The Return to Diplomacy in Southern Africa." *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 41 no. 1 (First Quarter 1990), pp. 91-102.

## FURTHER READING

Anglin, Douglas G., *Canada and South Africa: Challenge and Response*. Ottawa: Carleton University, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, 1986 (64 pp.).

Anyang'nyong'o, Peter (ed.), *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*. London: Zed Press, 1987 (288 pp.).

Berger, Peter L. and Godsell, Bobby (eds.), *A Future South Africa: Visions, Strategies and Realities*. Capetown, South Africa: Human & Rousseau and Tafelburg, 1988 (344 pp.).

Dreyer, Ronald, *Namibia and Angola: The Search for Independence and Regional Security (1966-1988)*. Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, *Occasional Paper* No. 3, 1988 (59 pp.).

Duignan, Peter and Jackson, Robert H. (eds.), *Politics & Government in African States, 1960-1985*. Palo Alto, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986 (442 pp.).

Godfrey, Steve, "Canadian Sanctions and Southern Africa." *International Perspectives* (November/December 1985), pp. 13-16.

Godfrey, Steve, "Keeping South Africa at Bay." *Peace&Security*, vol. 3 no. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 8-9.

Keller, Edmond J., "Revolution and State Power in Ethiopia." *Current History*, vol. 87 no. 529 (May 1988), pp. 217-220.

Kitchen, Helen (ed.), *Angola, Mozambique and the West*. New York: Praeger for Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1987 (168 pp.).

Laitin, David D. and Samatar, Said S., *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987 (198 pp.).

Létrilliart, Philippe, "Les décolonisations portugaises de 1975: histoire d'un échec." *Défense nationale* (February 1988), pp. 117-129.

Liebenow, J. Gus, *African Politics: Crises and Challenges*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986 (305 pp.).

Minter, William, "South Africa: Straight Talk on Sanctions." *Foreign Policy* No. 65 (Winter 1986-1987), pp. 43-63.

Munton, Don and Shaw, Timothy M., "Apartheid and Canadian Public Opinion." *International Perspectives* (September/October 1987), pp. 9-12.

Nossal, Kim Richard, "Out of Steam? Mulroney and Sanctions." *International Perspectives*, vol. 17 no. 6 (November/December 1988), pp. 13-15.

O'Meara, Dan, *Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-1987*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Background Paper* No. 20, June 1988 (8 pp.).

Payne, Richard J., "Canada, South Africa and the Commonwealth." *International Perspectives* (July/August 1987), pp. 9-11.

Pratt, Renate, "The Costs of Procrastination: Canada's Policy towards Namibia, 1966-87." *Southern Africa Report*, vol. 3 no. 2 (October 1987), pp. 9-12.

Sévry, Jean, "Afrique du Sud: l'Apartheid en crise." *Problèmes politiques et sociaux* No. 559 (May 1987), pp. 1-40.

Somerville, Keith, *Angola: Politics, Economics and Society*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1986 (207 pp.).

Wood, Brian (ed.), *Namibia 1884-1984: Readings on Namibia's History and Society*. London/Lusaka: NSC in Cooperation with the UN Institute for Namibia, 1988 (762 pp.).



## BACKGROUND

*India – Pakistan*

Past tension between India and Pakistan has resulted from border disputes, complex ethnic and religious problems and, in more recent times, a regional arms race. On 29 December 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India visited Pakistan, the first time in nearly thirty years that the head of an Indian Government had done so. During his meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the two leaders finalized agreements on trade and cultural ties, as well as signing a separate agreement in which they pledged not to attack each other's nuclear power installations.<sup>1</sup> On 15 to 16 July 1989, the two Prime Ministers met again in Islamabad and reaffirmed their determination to normalize ties between their two countries. However, it was reported that they had "failed to bridge [their] differences" over disputes such as Kashmir, their nuclear programmes and military build-ups.<sup>2</sup>

Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars, of which two, in 1947–1948 and in 1965, were over Kashmir. When India and Pakistan were divided in 1947, Pakistan believed that Kashmir, with its majority Muslim population, should have fallen under its control. India did not agree and an armed conflict ensued, resulting in the division of the region between the two countries. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), in which Canada participates, was established in 1949 to supervise the "line of control." Canadian observers provide Hercules aircraft for moving the UN area headquarters biannually between Srinagar (India) and Rawalpindi (Pakistan).

At the end of June 1989, it was reported that India and Pakistan had agreed to discuss the possibility of withdrawing their troops from the Siachen (Himalayan) glacier, to create a demilitarized zone. The Siachen glacier, located in Kashmir and bordering China, has never been officially demarcated. Tensions over the glacier have intensified since 1984 when India seized the area.<sup>3</sup> At the meetings held between Prime Ministers Gandhi and Bhutto on 15 to 16 July 1989, Ms. Bhutto told reporters that she favoured "an early agreement" on the Siachen dispute, which she described as a "flashpoint."<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Barbara Crossette, "What Gandhi and Bhutto Didn't Discuss: Kashmir." *New York Times*, 3 January 1989, p. A10; and Stephen Engelberg, "Talk to Pakistan, Bush Urges India." *New York Times*, 9 July 1989, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> "Indo-Pak Meetings Fail to Resolve Longstanding Disputes." *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 July 1989, p. D14.

<sup>3</sup> Sanjoy Hazarika, "India and Pakistan Plan Pullout of Troops from Disputed Glacier." *New York Times*, 28 June 1989, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> "Bhutto Fears Nuclear-Arms Spread." *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 July 1989, p. A7.

In the first half of 1990, tension increased in the Kashmir area and more than 700 people were killed as Muslim secessionists expanded their fight for independence from India, which accused Pakistan of supporting them. The Muslim secessionist movement is based in Srinagar, the capital of Jammu-Kashmir, and demands unification with Pakistan or a separate Kashmir homeland.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his Cabinet resigned on 29 November 1989 after his Congress (I) Party lost its majority in the Indian Parliament. Newly elected President V. P. Singh, leading a minority government, took office on 2 December 1989 and sought immediately to establish his authority in the Indian-governed Kashmir State (a part of Jammu-Kashmir) and to gain control over the Muslim militants.<sup>5</sup>

After the Indian Government dissolved the State Assembly of Jammu-Kashmir on 19 February 1990, approximately 400,000 demonstrators marched through Srinagar to press their demands for independence.<sup>6</sup> On 21 January 1990, Indian Army soldiers had opened fire in clashes with demonstrators defying a curfew in Srinagar, killing at least twenty-five and wounding more than sixty others.<sup>7</sup> In the next six weeks over 120 died in confrontations between Indian troops and Kashmiri militants, including twenty-nine in Srinagar on 1 March 1990.<sup>8</sup> Violence and killings continued through March 1990, with 1,000 Indian troops being sent to Srinagar on 11 April 1990. Prime Minister V.P. Singh issued a statement a day earlier saying that India should be "psychologically prepared for an armed conflict with Pakistan."<sup>9</sup> Also at this time, Prime Minister

---

<sup>5</sup> Ben Tierney, "India's Opposition Coalition Set to Choose Reluctant PM." *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 December 1989, p. A7; "V.P. Singh Sworn in as India's PM." *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 December 1989, p. C2; "India Accuses Pakistan of Backing Militants." *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 January 1990, p. A13; and Sheila Tefft, "Separatist Violence Boils in Kashmir." *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 May 1990, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> "India Dissolves Assembly in Muslim Kashmir State." *Toronto Star*, 20 February 1990, p. A13; "Thousands March for Free Kashmir." *Ottawa Citizen*, 24 February 1990, p. 1; and Sanjoy Hazarika, "400,000 Kashmiri Protesters Urge Independence." *New York Times*, 24 February 1990, p. A3.

<sup>7</sup> Barbara Crossette, "25 Reported Dead as Indian Army Opens Fire on Kashmir Protestors." *New York Times*, 22 January 1990, pp. A1 and A5; and "Indian Army Kills 25, Wounds 60 in Kashmir." *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 January 1990, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> "Casualties Increase as Indian Police Battle Separatists in Muslim Kashmir." *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 February 1990, p. 12; Sanjoy Hazarika, "Indian Troops Kill 29 Protesters in Secessionist Rally in Kashmir." *New York Times*, 2 March 1990, pp. A1 and A9; and *infra* notes 9 and 10.

<sup>9</sup> "Violence in Kashmir Is Intensified and India Sends in 1,000 Troops." *New York Times*, 12 April 1990, p. A8.

Bhutto established a \$6 million fund to aid Kashmiris fleeing "Indian oppression" and stated that her country would fight a "1,000 year war" over Kashmir.<sup>10</sup>

On 15 May 1990, Prime Minister Bhutto left on a tour of eight Muslim countries, beginning with Iran, to seek support for Pakistan's position on Kashmir. Days before her departure, Ms. Bhutto publicly saluted the Kashmiri people's struggle as "part of the worldwide movement for democracy and independence."<sup>11</sup> It was reported on 21 May 1990 that India had begun mobilizing "tens of thousands" of troops on its border with Pakistan.<sup>12</sup> On 8 June 1990 India rejected a suggestion from Pakistan that discussions be held between high-level Foreign Ministry officials to ease tensions.<sup>13</sup> Ten days later, the two countries agreed to hold talks in July 1990 to avert the threat of war over Kashmir.<sup>14</sup>

In an address to the US Congress in June 1989, Prime Minister Bhutto repeatedly denied that Pakistan had nuclear weapons and stated that her country "remain[ed] ready to accept any safeguards, inspection and verification that are applied on a non-discriminatory regional basis."<sup>15</sup> Pakistan and India are not signatories to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, Pakistan has stated that it would sign the Treaty if India agreed to do so.

Also in June 1989, during an official visit to Britain, Prime Minister Bhutto said that Pakistan had formally invited India to engage in bilateral arms control talks as well as discussions that might lead to a regional agreement on nuclear non-proliferation.<sup>16</sup> In July 1989, US President Bush reportedly urged India to begin talks with Pakistan about each other's nuclear research programmes in order to reduce tensions between the two countries.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Mark Fineman, "Attacks Spark War Fears between India, Pakistan." *Toronto Star*, 15 April 1990, p. A24.

<sup>11</sup> Ahmed Rashid, "Bhutto Seeks Support from Muslim Nations." *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 May 1990, p. A11; and Elizabeth A. Brown, "News Currents." *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 May 1990, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> "Indian Troops Sent to Border with Pakistan." *Toronto Star*, 21 May 1990, p. A3.

<sup>13</sup> Barbara Crossette, "India Rejects Talks with Pakistan over Kashmir." *New York Times*, 9 June 1990, p. A3.

<sup>14</sup> "India and Pakistan to Talk." *New York Times*, 19 June 1990, p. A6.

<sup>15</sup> "Pakistan Has No Nuclear Arms, Bhutto Tells U.S. Congress." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 June 1989, p. A20; and "Bhutto obtient le soutien du président américain." *Le Devoir*, 7 June 1989, p. 4.

<sup>16</sup> "Bhutto Has Invited India to Talk about Arms Control." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 June 1989, p. A2.

<sup>17</sup> Stephen Engelberg, "Talk to Pakistan, Bush Urges India." *New York Times*, 9 July 1989, p. 5.

At a news conference ending her meetings with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on 16 July 1989, Prime Minister Bhutto stated that Pakistan's nuclear program was "a peaceful one" and "not under the control of the military."<sup>18</sup> On the same date, she reiterated that Pakistan was prepared to join "any arrangement" that would avert the spread of nuclear weapons in Southern Asia. However, Indian officials rejected the idea of an Indo-Pakistani agreement forbidding nuclear weapons or a regional pact, saying that this would exclude a nuclear power such as China.<sup>19</sup>

In late September 1990, it was reported that India had successfully tested a short-range surface-to-surface missile (approximately 270-km range), called the Prithvi.<sup>20</sup> The previous year it had launched its first intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Agni (with a range of 2,500 km), while Pakistan had tested shorter-range surface-to-surface missiles and vowed to develop a counterpart to the Agni.

### *India - China*

On a visit to India in November 1988, Soviet President Gorbachev stressed that the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union, China and India would not only be beneficial to all parties involved, but also "crucial for Asia and the world." However, Prime Minister Gandhi reportedly told President Gorbachev that although China had expressed the need for improvements in relations with India, it had not yet given any indication of change in what Mr. Gandhi described as its "rigid" stand on settlement of their border dispute.<sup>21</sup>

The following month, Prime Minister Gandhi visited Beijing, marking what has been described as the "beginning of a new era" in relations between India and China.<sup>22</sup> The two countries signed accords on science and technology, civil aviation (the establishment of direct air flights between New Delhi and Beijing), and culture (exchanges of students, artists and films).

Prime Minister Gandhi and his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng, also signed an agreement establishing a high-level working group to negotiate a possible solution to the Himalayan border dispute which has soured relations between the two countries since the eruption of a brief border war in 1962. India claims that China is illegally occupying an area of approximately 38,000 sq km on the western Himalayan border; China is calling for the return of approximately 90,000 sq km

---

<sup>18</sup> *Supra* note 2.

<sup>19</sup> Sanjoy Hazarika, "At Reception for Visiting Gandhi, Bhutto Urges Nuclear Arms Ban." *New York Times*, 17 July 1989, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup> "India Tests Missile with Range of 150 Miles." *New York Times*, 28 September 1989, p. A3.

<sup>21</sup> Salamat Ali, "A Shot in the Arm: Gorbachev Reassures Gandhi over China Rap-prochement." *The Economist*, 1 December 1988, p. 38.

<sup>22</sup> "Gandhi se rend à Pékin." *Le Devoir*, 19 December 1988, p. 5.

of mountainous frontier making up India's northeast Province of Arunachal Pradesh.<sup>23</sup> Eight rounds of talks on the territorial dispute have been held between experts from the two countries since 1981, but without success.

Prime Minister Li Peng also reportedly discussed the issue of Tibet with Mr. Gandhi, underlining the hope that India would retain its traditional position of "non-interference" as well as "non-involvement" with the alleged "separatist" activities of some members of the Tibetan community in India. The Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet, and approximately 100,000 Tibetan refugees live in India.<sup>24</sup> China boycotted the award ceremony of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama in Oslo on 10 December 1989.<sup>25</sup>

### *Afghanistan*

In Taif, Saudi Arabia on 3 to 5 December 1988, the Soviet Union and the Afghan-guerrilla alliance based in Pakistan held their first meeting since Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in 1979. The Kabul Government was excluded from the talks at the request of the guerrilla coalition. Following sessions in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in January 1989, the guerrillas broke off the negotiations as a result of the Soviets' insistence that President Najibullah be included in any future Afghan coalition government. On 3 January 1989, the guerrilla alliance announced the formation of a temporary representative council that would have the authority to name an interim government in Afghanistan.

In accordance with the agreement signed in Geneva in April 1988 by Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union and the USA as guarantors, the last Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan on 15 February 1989. Afghan guerrilla leaders called for a *shura* or consultative council of about 400 delegates to form the basis of a new government-in-exile. The council, which met from 10 to 24 February 1989, elected Sibgatullah Mojadedi as acting President and Adurab Resul Sayyaf as acting Prime Minister of the government-in-exile. Feuding between various groups dominated the council, particularly on the issue of representation of Afghanistan's largest minority, Shiite Muslims. At the start of March 1989, the guerrilla Provisional Government held its first cabinet meeting inside Afghanistan, followed by a second meeting in early April.

On 6 March 1989, intense fighting began in a prolonged guerrilla attack on the border city of Jalalabad, 160 km east of Kabul near the Afghan border with Pakistan. Fighting continued through to July 1989, the summer months traditionally witnessing the heaviest fighting in

---

<sup>23</sup> "Gandhi prône l'amitié sino-indienne." *La Presse*, 20 December 1988, p. B10; and "China and India Agree to More Border Talks." *New York Times*, 23 December 1988, p. A3.

<sup>24</sup> "Rajiv Gandhi quitte Pékin avec quelques accords, dans une nouvelle 'ambiance'." *La Presse*, 23 December 1988, p. B5.

<sup>25</sup> Jonathan Mirsky, "Giving Peace Prize to Dalai Lama May Tighten China's Screws on Tibet." *Globe and Mail*, 9 October 1989, p. A7; and "Dalai Lama in Norway for Peace Prize." *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 December 1989, p. D11.

Afghanistan, before the winter hampers guerrilla movements. During mid-July 1989, Afghan government troops recaptured several key positions around Jalalabad, including the important army base of Samarkhel.

Ending a five-day visit to the USA on 10 June 1989, Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto joined with US President Bush in stating that they were both committed to a political solution to the Afghan war, but would continue to provide weapons, transport and food to Afghan rebel groups. For its part, the Soviet Union has continued to supply weapons to the Kabul Government since its military withdrawal from the country.

By July 1989, open warfare had broken out among the guerrilla forces. In one incident of many, on 9 July 1989 some thirty guerrillas belonging to the Jamiat-e Islami Party were massacred by the rival Hezb-e Islami Party, the best-supplied resistance organization, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Guerrilla infighting reportedly resulted in a decrease of operations against the Kabul Government, except for the indiscriminate firing of rockets at the capital. It was also reported in early August 1989 that Sibgatullah Mojadedi, president of the guerrilla government-in-exile, had said that the movement would be better off without Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who serves as the group's foreign minister.<sup>26</sup> On 19 September 1989, rebel leader Hekmatyar accused the United States of "colluding" with the Soviet Union and opting "to betray and sell out" the resistance movement in the hope of "suppressing Islamic resurgence in Afghanistan."<sup>27</sup> Also in September, it was reported that the USA had opened discussions with the exiled King of Afghanistan in Rome on the role he might play in a political settlement.<sup>28</sup>

At the insistence of the Soviet Union, on 1 November 1989 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on Afghanistan, calling for new peace talks. The UN approach would reduce the importance of the seven-party guerrilla alliance and that of the government-in-exile and merge the two groups into a delegation of tribal chiefs, individual guerrilla commanders, and prominent Afghan exiles that would negotiate with Kabul on the creation of a broad-based "government of national reconciliation."<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> "U.S., Soviet Union Start Afghan Peace Talks." *Globe and Mail*, 1 August 1989, p. A8; "Afghan Rebel Govt. Faces Growing Rift." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 August 1989, p. A7; and "300 Killed in North Afghanistan as Rebels Attack Rival Group." *Globe and Mail*, 29 August 1989, p. A5. See also: Sheila Tefft, "Afghanistan: Return of Warlords." *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 April 1990, pp. A1 and A2; Mark Fineman, "Mujaheddin all but Giving Up War against Kabul." *Montreal Gazette*, 1 May 1990, p. A14; and Sheila Tefft, "Afghan Commanders Move to Break Civil War Stalemate." *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 June 1990, pp. A1 and A2.

<sup>27</sup> "Afghan Rebel Leader Accuses U.S. of Selling Out Resistance." *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 September 1989, p. A11.

<sup>28</sup> "U.S. to Talk with Ex-King of Afghanistan." *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 September 1989, p. H15.

<sup>29</sup> "U.N. Calls for 'Early' Afghan Peace Talks." *New York Times*, 2 November 1989, p. A13; and Paul Lewis, "U.N. Chief Taking His Afghan Plan to Moscow." *New York Times*, 14 January 1990, p. 15.

On 5 February 1990, it was reported that US Secretary of State Baker would propose to the Soviet Union an approach that would permit President Najibullah to stay in power in Kabul during a transitional period leading up to elections.<sup>30</sup> On 14 February 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed the demilitarization of Afghanistan and a four-power peace conference composed of the Soviet Union, the USA, Pakistan and Iran. His proposal included a halt to all arms shipments to Afghanistan and a ceasefire between the Kabul Government and rebel forces before elections would be held in the country.<sup>31</sup>

A failed coup attempt against President Najibullah on 6 March 1990 was led by Defence Minister Shah Nawaz Tanai, and according to the Government was carried out "in collaboration" with rebel leader Hekmatyar. After the coup attempt, Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto called on the guerrilla factions to negotiate a transitional government and stated: "It is time not only for Pakistan to stop playing favourites, it's a time for the Soviet Union to stop playing favourites."<sup>32</sup>

At the US-Soviet Summit in Washington on 4 to 5 June 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reportedly failed to resolve major differences over Afghanistan. The chief stumbling block was apparently the role of the Kabul Government during a transitional period leading to elections. It was reported that Soviet officials had pressed the USA to agree to have President Najibullah stay in power throughout an election campaign, while US officials continued to support the guerrilla position that the Afghan Government should step down in favour of an interim government.<sup>33</sup>

### *Sri Lanka*

On 29 July 1987, President J. Jayawardene of Sri Lanka and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an agreement to "legitimize" India's military presence on the island in the form of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Indian troops were deployed to help the Government in Colombo put an end to Tamil militant violence against the majority Sinhalese, specifically by

---

<sup>30</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "New Afghan Deal during Soviet Trip." *New York Times*, 5 February 1990, pp. A1 and A13; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker Meets in Moscow on Arms and Afghans." *New York Times*, 9 February 1990, p. A9.

<sup>31</sup> Press Office of the USSR Embassy in Canada, *Press Bulletin*, 16 February 1990, pp. 4-5; and "Moscow Offers Afghan Peace Plan." *Toronto Star*, 15 February 1990, p. 21.

<sup>32</sup> Matthew Fisher, "Afghan Coup Bid Repelled." *Globe and Mail*, 7 March 1990, pp. A1 and A2; "25 Dead, 150 Injured in Overthrow Attempt, Afghan President Says." *Globe and Mail*, 9 March 1990, p. A9; and Catherine Pigott, "Bhutto Urges Ceasefire in Afghanistan." *Montreal Gazette*, 15 March 1990, p. A10. See also: "Afghan Rebels Hold Talks with Govt. in Bid for Peace." *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 August 1989, p. A14.

<sup>33</sup> Clifford Kraus, "Aides Say Summit Talks Didn't Narrow Gap on Afghanistan." *New York Times*, 5 June 1990, p. A18.

disarming all militant Tamil groups including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who had become the "undisputed masters" of the Tamil resistance (separatist) movement.<sup>34</sup> However, ethnic strife and the guerrilla war, which had erupted in 1983, continued. Within a year there were an estimated 45,000 to 70,000 Indian troops in the northern and eastern regions of the country.

Since the start of the Tamil separatist insurgency in 1983 approximately 10,000 to 11,000 Sri Lankans have died as a result of the civil war, and 5,000 have been killed as a result of the terrorist activities of the resurrected Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP or People's Liberation Front), a militant Sinhalese group operating in the south. The IPKF suffered more than 1,100 casualties from 1987 to March 1990.<sup>35</sup>

On 8 and 9 September 1988, President Jayawardene issued a proclamation allowing for a temporary merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, essentially creating a semi-autonomous Tamil-dominated province as stipulated by the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. Elections to the North-Eastern Provincial Council (also provided for under the Agreement) were held on 19 November 1988. The majority in the seventy-one-member Assembly was won by the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), which has since been under the protection of the Indian Force. The LTTE boycotted the elections.<sup>36</sup>

Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa of the ruling United National Party (UNP) won the Presidential elections held on 19 December 1988. On 12 January 1989, the new President lifted the state of emergency which had been imposed by President Jayawardene in May 1983. In addition, President Premadasa quickly acted to fulfill an electoral promise calling for a "negotiated withdrawal" of the IPKF by requesting a partial removal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka. The Indian Government subsequently withdrew approximately 3,000 soldiers.

The first direct negotiations between the LTTE and the Colombo Government since 1983 were held in May and June 1989. On 28 June, it was announced that the two sides had agreed to an immediate ceasefire, and had decided to pursue discussions on a variety of important issues, including demands for a Tamil independent state.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> John Laffin, *The World in Conflict 1989 - War Annual 3*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989, p. 205.

<sup>35</sup> "Les Sri Lankais vont voter dans la peur et le sang." *Le Devoir*, 19 December 1988, p. 5; "India Seeking Way Out of Sri Lankan Conflict." *Montreal Gazette*, 8 May 1989, p. A10; "Agreement with Sri Lanka Means Indian Troop Pullout by December." *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 September 1989, p. A6; and Crossette, *infra* note 41.

<sup>36</sup> Barbara Crossette, "If the War Has Ended, Why Are So Many Dying?" *New York Times*, 9 March 1989, p. 4.

<sup>37</sup> "Sri Lanka and Tamil Rebels Agree to a Cease-fire." *New York Times*, 29 June 1989, p. A5.

In early June 1989, President Premadasa officially requested that India begin a total withdrawal of its personnel from Sri Lanka, to be completed by 29 July 1989, the second anniversary of the signing of the July 1987 "Peace Accord." This request was repeated on 27 June. Prime Minister Gandhi replied in a letter to President Premadasa in mid-July that a withdrawal would be possible only when the terms of the July 1987 Agreement had been fully implemented, especially those regarding an end to the Tamil insurgency.

Renewed violence was reported in both the north and the south at the end of June 1989. The militant Sinhalese (JVP) demanded the complete withdrawal of Indian troops and an end to Tamil autonomy before agreeing to lay down their arms. Tamil groups also began an offensive against the Tigers (LTTE), fearing that any peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Government would exclude them from the "political picture." On the other hand, the Tigers demanded total removal of the Indian Force and dissolution of the Provincial Council in the Northeastern Province, which was administered by members of Tamil groups protected by Indian troops.<sup>38</sup> Growing opposition was reported among the Sri Lankan population to the presence of Indian troops on their soil, which were being perceived as an "army of occupation."

Fierce fighting continued to the end of 1989 between the Tigers (LTTE) and Sri Lankan troops in the Northeastern Province, and between the JVP and Government forces in the south. In November 1989 Sri Lankan security forces scored several decisive victories against the JVP and reported the capture and killing of JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera. After a partial withdrawal by Government troops from the south, however, a three-way battle broke out in northeastern Sri Lanka between Government forces, the Tigers and the newly formed 4,000-member renegade Tamil National Army, reportedly created and organized by India to take the place of withdrawing Indian troops.<sup>39</sup>

India and Sri Lanka reached agreement in early September 1989 for the withdrawal of the estimated 43,000 Indian soldiers from northeast Sri Lanka. A final agreement, signed in Colombo on 18 September 1989, committed India to accelerate the pace of withdrawal so as to complete it by the end of the year.<sup>40</sup> India withdrew 4,000 of its troops in October 1989, but Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Ranjan Wijeratne demanded in December 1989 that newly elected Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh step up the pace. The withdrawal of the remainder of the Indian troops was eventually completed on 24 March 1990.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> Gabriella Gmini, "Insurgency Pushing Sri Lanka Near Chaos." *Toronto Star*, 9 July 1989, p. H3.

<sup>39</sup> "Sri Lanka Claims Death of Top Rebels." *Globe and Mail*, 15 November 1989, p. A9; "1,000 A Month Reported Slain in Sri Lanka Strife." *New York Times*, 14 December 1989, p. A18; and Sheila Tefft, "Violence Complicates Indian Army Pullout." *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 December 1989, p. 5.

<sup>40</sup> "Agreement with Sri Lanka Means Indian Troop Pullout by December." *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 September 1989, p. A6.

<sup>41</sup> Steven Erlanger, "India's Symbolic Pullout Begins in Sri Lanka." *New York Times*, 30 July 1989, p. 6; "India Asked to Withdraw Troops." *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 December 1989, p. 13; "Indian Army Vacates Tamil Stronghold." *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 January 1990, p. A7; and Barbara Crossette, "India, Stymied, Pulls Last Troops from Sri Lanka." *New York Times*, 25 March 1990, p. A4.

By March 1990, the Tigers (LTTE) had recaptured control of much of the Northeastern Province from other Tamil groups as the Indian troops withdrew. The Tigers reportedly reached a general agreement with Sri Lankan President Premadasa about their future role in governing the Tamil sections of the country, including retention of weapons reportedly acquired from withdrawing Indian troops. Tiger leaders also reportedly agreed to hold elections in the following months to ratify their control of the Northeastern Province. In early April 1990 Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Wijeratne called on the Tigers to lay down their arms.<sup>42</sup> After a four-day Government offensive in mid-June which killed 400 rebels, fighting intensified around towns and army camps in northeastern Sri Lanka, with an estimated 70,000 refugees fleeing the front lines. Foreign Minister Wijeratne announced that there was now an "all-out war" in the northeast. He also said that Army commanders had been given complete powers to carry out any military operations they deemed necessary. It was also reported at this time that the Tigers had been aggressively recruiting since the Indian troop withdrawal in March 1990 and had switched their tactics from guerrilla warfare to full-scale assaults on army camps.<sup>43</sup>

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced on 21 February 1989 that Canada had agreed to participate in a comprehensive humanitarian relief and economic assistance programme for Afghanistan, under the auspices of the United Nations. To train Afghan refugees in Pakistan in mine-clearing techniques, Canada would provide a team of twelve military personnel for a period of four months, starting 23 March 1989. There are reportedly millions of unexploded mines in war-torn Afghanistan. Other countries providing teaching teams included France, Italy, Norway, Turkey and the United States. Mr. Clark described the Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) as "a most important one in the overall relief and reconstruction of Afghanistan." "Canada's participation," he said, was "a concrete and highly visible demonstration of our commitment to the United Nations' humanitarian assistance efforts."<sup>44</sup> The Canadian contribution to the MACTP ended at the end of July 1990 (see *PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION*). Canada also pledged \$22 million over the next two years

---

<sup>42</sup> Marc Kaufman, "Sri Lanka May Find Peace after Indians Leave." *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 March 1990, p. A6; and John Colmey, "Sri Lanka Rebuilds after Bitter Ethnic Clash." *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 April 1990, p. 5.

<sup>43</sup> " 'All-Out War' Raging in Sri Lanka." *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 June 1990, p. A10.

<sup>44</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. AFN: 13/89 (21 February 1989), p. 1; Captain Marsha Dorge, "Helping the Afghans Home." *Sentinel*, vol. 25 no. 3 (March 1989), pp. 2-4; and Robert Stone, "Canadian Soldiers Help Afghans Deal with Deadly Soviet Mines." *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 September 1989, p. 7.

to the Afghanistan Repatriation and Rehabilitation Programme. This pledge was in addition to the \$19 million which Canada had been providing annually to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.<sup>45</sup>

In September 1989, two Canadian medical doctors joined International Red Cross efforts on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, financed by a \$150,000 grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).<sup>46</sup>

On 15 September 1989, according to a news release from his office, Prime Minister Mulroney "warmly welcomed" Pakistan's return to the Commonwealth and "expressed his satisfaction that Canada's bilateral links with Pakistan will once again be reinforced by the special ties of Commonwealth membership."<sup>47</sup>

It was reported on 13 October 1989 that, although Canada had expressed concern over human rights abuses in Tibet, according to a spokesperson from the Department of External Affairs, the Dalai Lama was officially viewed only as the "spiritual leader" of the area.<sup>48</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Liberal Member Beryl Gaffney made the following statement in the House on 25 May 1990 concerning "the current escalation in the dispute between India and Pakistan over the status of Kashmir":

Hundreds of people, including many civilians, have been killed in recent clashes that threaten to erupt into a third war [over the region]. In 1948 Canada, as a member of the United Nations Security Council, was instrumental in stopping the war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. It is time for Canada to act again. We should use our current place in the Security Council to increase international pressure on the two sides to affirm their commitment to the 1965 ceasefire, withdraw military forces from the ceasefire line, desist from indiscriminate violence against civilians and negotiate peaceful solutions to the conflict. Canada should encourage the UN Secretary General to offer his good offices to achieve a just and lasting settlement. The international community should act now before it is too late.<sup>49</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> Government of Canada, *supra* note 44, p. 2.

<sup>46</sup> Tina Reilly, "Canadian Doctors Off to Aid Afghan Refugees." *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 August 1989, p. A15; and Mohammed Adam, "Afghan Refugee Camps Desperate for Help, Says Red Cross Officer." *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 September 1989, p. B19.

<sup>47</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, *Release* (15 September 1989). See also: Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 047 (12 March 1990).

<sup>48</sup> Christina Spencer, "China's Oppression of Tibet Ignored, Envoy Charges." *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 October 1989, p. A15.

<sup>49</sup> *Commons Debates*, 25 May 1990, p. 11887.

Three days later, Liberal MP Derek Lee called on the Government "to communicate in forceful terms to New Delhi and Islamabad its view that assertions of political interest by national and state authorities be made only by peaceful and non-violent means...in a manner that ensures respect for human rights, international law and the goals of the UN Charter."<sup>50</sup>

On several occasions, Members rose in the House to condemn human rights abuses against Punjabis and Sikhs in India<sup>51</sup> and Ahmadis Muslims in Pakistan.<sup>52</sup>

In a statement to the House on 6 June 1990, Liberal MP David Berger appealed to the Minister of Employment and Immigration to stop the deportation of a refugee claimant from Sri Lanka. The Member said:

Sri Lanka is one of the most violent countries in the world. As many as 20,000 people have been killed in that country in the last year. Many areas, particularly in the south where this man comes from, look like ghost towns. Five members of...[the claimant's] family have already been killed in the strife in that country. He has lost two brothers, two uncles and a cousin for their involvement with the JVP, the People's Liberation Front. A Sri Lankan M.P. and human rights activist was recently shot dead outside the Canadian embassy. He was calling to arrange a visa for a speaking trip to Britain and North America. The government should not be deporting people to Sri Lanka. I ask the minister to reconsider her decision.<sup>53</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Baitenmann, Helga, "NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 12 no. 1 (January 1990), pp. 62-85.

Banerjee, D., "Chinese Nuclear Weapon Capability and India." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12 no. 12 (March 1989), pp. 1347-1361.

Bush, Kenneth, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka." *Conflict Quarterly*, vol. 10 no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 41-58.

Coward, Harold (ed.), *Peace, Development and Culture: Comparative Studies of India and Canada*. Canada-India Conference on Comparative Studies, *Issues in Peace, Development and Culture*, 1990 (123 pp.).

---

<sup>50</sup> *Commons Debates*, 28 May 1990, p. 11925.

<sup>51</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 October 1989, pp. 4698-4699; 7 November 1989, p. 5651; and 8 December 1989, p. 6659.

<sup>52</sup> *Commons Debates*, 19 October 1989, p. 4878; and 12 March 1990, p. 9088.

<sup>53</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 June 1990, p. 12325.

- Dassé, Martial, "Sri Lanka: les guerres civiles." *Défense nationale* (April 1990), pp. 133-148.
- Dorronsoro, Gilles, "Afghanistan: après le retrait soviétique." *Défense nationale* (October 1989), pp. 137-152.
- Eliot, Theodore L. Jr., "Afghanistan in 1989: Stalemate." *Asian Survey*, vol. 30 no. 2 (February 1990), pp. 158-166.
- Ganguly, Sumit, "The Sino-Indian Border Talks, 1981-1989: A View from New Delhi." *Asian Survey*, vol. 29 no. 12 (December 1989), pp. 1123-1135.
- Fuller, Graham E., "The Emergence of Central Asia." *Foreign Policy* No. 78 (Spring 1990), pp. 49-67.
- Harrison, Selig S., *Paths to Peace in Afghanistan: The Geneva Accords and After*. New York: International Peace Academy, *Occasional Papers on Peacekeeping* No. 1, 1989 (31 pp.).
- "India and the World: Regional Aspirations and Strategic Constraints." Ottawa: *Proceedings of the International Security Seminar Series*, vol. 2 no. 3, 18 November 1989 (4 pp.).
- Matthews, Bruce, "Sri Lanka in 1989: Peril and Good Luck." *Asian Survey*, vol. 30 no. 2 (February 1990), pp. 144-149.
- Roy, Oliver, "Afghanistan: Back to Tribalism or on to Lebanon?" *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 70-82.
- Rupesinghe, Kumar, "Sri Lanka: Peacekeeping and Peace Building." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 20 no. 3 (1989), pp. 335-350.
- Security in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific: Challenges of the 1990s*. New York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers for the International Peace Academy, *IPA Report* No. 29, 1989 (228 pp.).
- Singer, Marshall R., "New Realities in Sri Lankan Politics." *Asian Survey*, vol. 30 no. 4 (April 1990), pp. 409-425.
- Singh, Jasjit, "Siachen Glaciers: Facts and Fiction." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12 no. 7 (October 1989), pp. 697-708.
- "South Asia." *Current History*, vol. 88 no. 542 (December 1989), pp. 417-454 [entire issue].
- "Special Forum on Ethnic Conflict and Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord." *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives*, vol. 8 no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 79-138.
- Subramanian, R. R., "South Asian Security: The China-Pakistan-India Tangle." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12 no. 7 (October 1988), pp. 735-744.
- Vohra, Sahdev, "Parameters of a Border Settlement with China." *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 12 no. 12 (March 1990), pp. 1249-1256.
- Westad, Odd Arne, "Afghanistan: Perspectives on the Soviet War." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 20 no. 3 (1989), pp. 281-294.

## FURTHER READING

Austin, Dennis and Gupta, Anirudha, "Lions and Tigers: The Crisis in Sri Lanka." *Conflict Studies* No. 211 (May 1988), pp. 1-26.

Cohen, Stephen Philip (ed.), *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987 (290 pp.).

Gordon, Sheldon, "India and the Bomb: An Arms Race with Pakistan?" *Peace&Security*, vol. 1 no. 3 (Autumn 1986), pp. 2-3.

Jayawardena, Kumari, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Regional Security," in: Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), *Asia: Militarization & Regional Conflict*. London: Zed Books, 1988, pp. 137-154.

Kapur, Ashok, "India-Pakistan Normalisation." *International Perspectives*, vol. 17 no. 6 (November/December 1988), pp. 16-18.

Klass, Rosanne, "Afghanistan: The Accords." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 66 no. 5 (Summer 1988), pp. 922-945.

Matinuddin, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Kamal, *et al.*, "Afghanistan Crisis: Policy Positions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, U.S.S.R., U.S., Iran and India." *Strategic Studies*, vol. 11 no. 3 (Spring 1988), pp. 23-59.

Metge, Pierre, *L'URSS en Afghanistan*. Paris: Centre interdisciplinaire de recherches sur la paix et d'études stratégiques, *Cahiers d'études stratégiques* No. 7, December 1984 (186 pp.).

Murty, T. S., *India-China Boundary: India's Options*. New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987 (143 pp.).

Piyadasa, L. (ed.), *Sri Lanka: The Unfinished Quest for Peace*. London: Marram Books, 1988 (140 pp.).

Ramachandran, K. N., "India, China and the Super Powers." *IDSA Journal*, vol. 19 no. 1 (July/September 1986), pp. 140-152.

Rifaat, Syed, "Superpower and Major Power Rivalry in South Asia: The US, USSR, India and China." *Strategic Studies*, vol. 12 no. 1 (Fall 1988), pp. 16-37.

Seth, S. P., "The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet and the United States." *Asian Survey*, vol. 28 no. 7 (July 1988), pp. 711-728.

Tambiah, S. J., *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986 (198 pp.).

Wirsing, Robert G., "The Siachen Glacier Dispute-II: The Domestic Political Dimension." *Strategic Studies*, vol. 11 no. 3 (Spring 1988), pp. 83-97.

Wirsing, Robert G., "The Siachen Glacier Dispute-III: The Strategic Dimension." *Strategic Studies*, vol. 12 no. 1 (Fall 1988), pp. 38-54.

## BACKGROUND

### *Sino-Soviet Relations*

In the early 1980s, Soviet overtures to China ran up against China's declaration of three major obstacles to better relations with the Soviet Union, namely, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet troops along the Chinese border, and Moscow's support for the Vietnamese in Cambodia. Gradually, steps were taken which improved the climate for the establishment of better relations, including the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and agreement to resolve border disputes and help end the Cambodian conflict.

Against the background of student-led pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing and other Chinese cities, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev attended a Summit meeting with Chinese leaders on 15 to 18 May 1989, the first such meeting held between the two countries in thirty years. As reported in the communiqué issued at the end of the Summit, agreement was reached on various fronts. The two countries stated that their relationship would develop on the principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. Both sides agreed to take steps to reduce armed forces on the Soviet-Chinese border to a minimum, with the Chinese welcoming the December 1988 Soviet announcement of the withdrawal of seventy-five percent of its troops stationed in Mongolia. The Chinese expressed the hope that the remaining Soviet troops would soon be fully withdrawn from Mongolia.

Concerning unresolved border issues, the countries agreed to upgrade the negotiations under way, from the deputy foreign minister level to the foreign minister level. In Shanghai at the end of his visit, on 18 May 1989, President Gorbachev proposed talks to demilitarize the 6,400-km border. The Summit communiqué also declared that neither country laid claim to hegemony in any form in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other parts of the world. Both also agreed to the active development of economic, trade, scientific, technological and cultural ties between their countries. Discussions were also held on the Cambodian problem (see *The Guide 1989*, p. 210).

In November 1989 and February 1990 the Soviet Union and China held two rounds of talks on cutting their forces along their mutual border. On 9 to 12 January 1990 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev visited China for consultation on the Cambodian issue.

In Moscow on 24 April 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, signed an accord laying down "guiding principles" for reducing the number of troops along their common border. The Soviet Union has an estimated 650,000 soldiers in the region, following a unilateral reduction of 120,000 soldiers announced in May 1989, while China reportedly stations 1.2 million soldiers there. Also on 24 April 1990, President Gorbachev and Chinese Premier Li Peng signed a number of agreements, including a ten-year

programme for economic, scientific and technical cooperation. Other Sino-Soviet accords included one on cooperation in space research and peaceful uses of outer space and a protocol on consultations between the Foreign Ministries of the two countries.

In mid-June 1990, a high-level military delegation from China held talks in Moscow on cooperation between the two countries' armies. The talks reportedly centered around Chinese acquisition of high-tech military equipment from the Soviet Union in exchange for civilian goods produced by Chinese defence industries. The Chinese Army produced an estimated US\$4.3 billion worth of civilian goods in 1989.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Indochina Conflict*

The eleven-year Cambodian conflict continues to be a focal point of tension in East Asia. The major parties to this conflict remain the Soviet-funded, Vietnamese-backed Government of Cambodia led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, and the insurgent tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under the titular leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The United Nations has recognized the CGDK as Cambodia's legal Government, but there were strong indications in 1989-1990 that this would change in the near future.

On 5 April 1989, Vietnam announced that all of its estimated 50,000 troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia by 27 September 1989. Following numerous ill-fated regional peace talks held in Jakarta and Paris in the first half of 1989 (the last round in Paris on 25 to 27 July 1989), a month-long International Conference on Cambodia began on 30 July 1989. This Paris Conference involved nineteen nations, including Canada, and Cambodia's four warring factions - namely, the Government of Prime Minister Hun Sen, the Khmer Rouge represented by Khieu Samphan, and two non-communist rebel groups (one led by Prince Sihanouk and the other by former Prime Minister Sonn Sann). At the Conference, the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Canada and several Asian countries agreed in principle that United Nations forces should supervise a ceasefire after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. This, in turn, would be followed by free elections. Differences arose, however, over the timing of the ceasefire and its enforcement, the preservation of the CGDK, and the allocation of power in a new government among the four warring factions.

The International Conference on Cambodia reflected the alignment of the four Cambodian groups with major international powers. The USA backed the non-communist factions, the Soviet Union and its allies backed the Vietnamese-supported Government and its Army, and China backed the Khmer Rouge. The USA supported Prince Sihanouk, but not his position that the Khmer Rouge be given some role in a new Cambodian government. Prince Sihanouk demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and maintained that the Khmer Rouge, as the country's strongest and best-organized faction with some 40,000 armed fighters, would continue fighting unless it was included in a new government. The Sihanouk and Sonn Sann

---

<sup>1</sup> James L. Tyson, "China and Soviet Union Improve Military Ties." *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 June 1990, p. 1.

forces numbered approximately 12,000 each, while the Phnom Penh Government had an estimated 50,000 regular troops and another 50,000 militiamen.

Four working commissions were established by the Paris Conference. The first committee, chaired by Canada and India, was given the task of drawing up ceasefire terms and defining the mandate of an effective "international control mechanism" for implementation of a settlement. The second committee, chaired by Laos and Malaysia, was to define guarantees for Cambodian independence, including the removal of all foreign interference and external arms supplies. The third committee, chaired by Australia and Japan, was to set out the conditions for the return to Cambodia of its refugees, and to formulate an economic renewal plan for the country. The fourth committee, an "ad-hoc" committee comprised of France, Indonesia and the four warring Cambodian factions, was to examine the internal aspects of the conflict. The Conference also accepted a proposal of the UN Secretary-General to send a UN fact-finding mission to the country to gather information of a "purely technical nature." A fifteen-member mission visited Cambodia and the Thai-Cambodian border on 8 to 17 August 1989 and reported that a 6,000-strong UN force would be necessary for the effective monitoring of a ceasefire.

The Paris Conference broke down in late August over a power-sharing formula, with the Hun Sen Government refusing to allow the Khmer Rouge any participation in an interim government. However, Hun Sen had proposed that free elections be held in Cambodia six months after the signing of a ceasefire, in answer to Prince Sihanouk's charge that a previously proposed three-month period was insufficient to organize such elections. Another area of disagreement, which arose at the Ministerial Session on 28 August 1989, was over the role of the UN in the "international control mechanism." The Phnom Penh Government expressed wariness of any mechanism under UN auspices because of the UN General Assembly's continued recognition of the CGDK.

After two rounds of talks with Prime Minister Hun Sen in Bangkok in early 1989 (25 to 27 January 1989 and 5 to 6 May 1989), on 11 September 1989 Thailand's Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan began a form of shuttle diplomacy among the four rival Cambodian factions. He indicated his willingness, long withheld, to accept the Hun Sen Government once Vietnam removed its troops from Cambodia.

It was reported on 22 September 1989 that the Phnom Penh Government had been rebuffed in an attempt to assemble an international force of observers to monitor the Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia. Only India, which recognizes the Hun Sen Government, agreed to send observers. Nations refusing to do so included Canada, Sweden, Finland, Australia, Japan, Colombia, Poland and Yugoslavia. The six members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) encouraged other countries not to send observers, stating that to do so would legitimize the Hun Sen Government and reduce the chances of a negotiated end to the conflict. On 27 September 1989, after nearly eleven years of occupation, Vietnam completed the pullout.

On 16 November 1989, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution calling for a "just, lasting and comprehensive political settlement" in Cambodia, including the withdrawal of all foreign forces under the supervision and control of the UN and the creation of an interim

administering authority. The resolution also called for the promotion of national reconciliation among all Cambodians under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk while internationally supervised elections were being prepared. For a second year running, the resolution warned against a return to the "universally condemned policies and practices of the recent past," alluding to the brutal Khmer Rouge rule of Cambodia between 1975-1978 which claimed over one million lives. One hundred and twenty-four countries, including Canada, voted in favour of the resolution to seventeen opposed, with twelve abstentions.

On 2 December 1989, Prince Sihanouk endorsed an Australian proposal under which the Hun Sen Government would be dismantled and Cambodia placed under a trusteeship run by the United Nations and accompanied by UN peacekeeping forces. Once such a trusteeship was in place, Prince Sihanouk pledged, he would vacate the Cambodian seat at the UN held since 1982. The first stage of the plan would ensure the permanence of the Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia, the implementation of a ceasefire and the cessation of all external supplies to the warring factions. The plan suggested that Cambodian sovereignty then be vested in a Council, comprised of members of the Phnom Penh Government and the CGDK. Once formed, the Council would delegate executive powers to a UN Interim Organization. The plan then envisaged "full and fair elections" with "enhanced UN involvement."

In Paris on 16 January 1990, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council called for a settlement of the Cambodian conflict along the lines of the Australian proposal. The Hun Sen Government announced it would support the plan if the UN seat for Cambodia was vacated by Prince Sihanouk and his Khmer Rouge coalition partners. However, less than two weeks later Hun Sen proposed the partition of Cambodia, with the CGDK administering the western lands bordering Thailand. This would be followed by a ceasefire and then relinquishment by the two governments of their authority to a UN Interim Organization. The Khmer Rouge reportedly rejected both the Australian and the Hun Sen proposals.

From October 1989 through June 1990, fighting continued between CGDK forces, particularly the Khmer Rouge, and Phnom Penh Government forces, in north-western Cambodia and in western Battambang Province. Both sides had reportedly escalated their military activities prior to the Paris Conference in July 1989. Large numbers of refugees were reported to have fled the battle zones. There were also allegations of increased military aid to the Hun Sen Government by the Soviet Union (October 1989), increased funding for the non-communist factions by the United States (November 1989), and new shipments of arms to Khmer Rouge guerrillas by China (May 1990).

On 12 December 1989, Hong Kong authorities began transporting Vietnamese boat people against their will back to Vietnam. According to UN figures, about 110,000 Vietnamese are in detention centres in Southeast Asia, including 50,000 in Hong Kong. More than 30,000 sailed from Vietnam to Hong Kong in 1989-1990, the largest exodus since 1979. In addition, some 300,000 displaced Cambodians live in refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. An international conference on Vietnamese refugees opened in Geneva on 23 January 1990 with the USA and Britain disagreeing on proposed solutions to the problem. The talks collapsed when Britain said it was prepared to accept a six-month moratorium on repatriation of refugees until

1 July 1990, but the USA insisted on one year with none of the refugees to be sent back before 1 January 1991.

The five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council met on 25 to 26 May 1990 and spelled out conditions for UN participation in the implementation of Cambodian peace proposals. The five Powers stated that a political settlement between the parties to the conflict must include "specific provisions" for UN control over a ceasefire, a cessation of foreign military aid, free and fair elections under UN auspices, human rights guarantees and a system to guarantee the territorial integrity and unity of Cambodia. The Council also invited all Cambodian parties to its July meeting on the Cambodian question in Paris.

A new round of talks between the Cambodian factions began on 5 June 1990 in Tokyo. The Khmer Rouge faction boycotted the meetings and rejected the agreement signed between the others present. The agreement called for a so-called Supreme National Council, composed of Hun Sen Government and opposition faction representatives, to be formed by the end of July 1990, the same month a timetable for the implementation of a ceasefire was to be established.

### *Japan – Soviet Union*

Despite Soviet diplomatic initiatives in the Pacific, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be strained. Widely cited as the greatest obstacle to an improvement in relations is the territorial dispute over the four islands northeast of Hokkaido seized by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War and over which Japan claims sovereignty. The two countries normalized relations in 1956, but the territorial dispute has prevented them from formally signing a peace treaty.

In December 1988, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Tokyo (for the first time in almost three years) for a round of talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno. Some of the issues discussed included economic cooperation between the two countries, regional security, the environment and the disputed territories. The only concrete result of the talks was an agreement in principle to establish a working group to continue talks on the territorial issue at the deputy foreign minister level.

An eight-member delegation from the Supreme Soviet led by Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev made a six-day visit to Japan beginning 12 November 1989. Mr. Yakovlev told Japanese leaders in Tokyo that bilateral ties between the two countries should "thaw in line with dynamic changes elsewhere in the world." In meetings with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, Mr. Yakovlev urged the signing of a peace treaty with Japan.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> "Soviets Seek Thaw in Ties with Japanese." *Globe and Mail*, 14 November 1989, p. A4.

In a speech to the Japan National Press Club on 27 December 1989, the Japanese Foreign Minister reportedly indicated that Japan would continue "to pursue its policy of separating politics and economics in promoting its relations with the Soviet Union."<sup>3</sup>

It was reported on 5 June 1990 that Soviet President Gorbachev, in Washington for meetings with US President Bush, confirmed that he would visit Japan in 1991.<sup>4</sup>

### *East Timor*

East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, declared its independence in 1975 but was subsequently invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces. Guerrilla forces led by the FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente) have continued to resist the Indonesian occupation. The source of the small military aid provided to the FRETILIN is unclear, but the supplies are believed to have reached the resistance movement via Malaysia. An estimated 250,000 out of a population of 650,000 have died over a period of ten years.

While this issue is the subject of debate in Portugal, the Indonesian media have been restricted by its Government from reporting on military activities in East Timor. Several organizations, including the Canada-Asia Working Group, petitioned the UN Decolonization Committee in August 1988 to keep the issue of East Timor on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. In the fall of 1989, on the recommendation of the General Committee, the Forty-fourth Session of the General Assembly decided to include an item entitled "Question of Timor" in the provisional agenda of its Forty-fifth Session.

At its Forty-fourth Session, the General Assembly had before it a progress report of the UN Secretary-General, in which he stated that in the course of his discussions with the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Portugal and with the President and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, he had "obtained a reaffirmation from both sides of their commitment to achieving a comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor." In the report the Secretary-General also stated that he was encouraged by the "increased frequency" of discussions between the two sides in recent months and hoped that a planned visit to East Timor by a delegation from the Portuguese Parliament would create a better atmosphere for achieving a solution to the conflict.<sup>5</sup>

In August 1989, Amnesty International reported to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization that mass arrests, unfair trials, torture and disappearances were continuing.

---

<sup>3</sup> "Japan to Keep Military Status Intact Despite Thaw in East-West Relations." *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 December 1989, p. B6.

<sup>4</sup> David E. Sanger, "Japanese Feel Quite Ready for a Visit from Gorbachev." *New York Times*, 5 June 1990, p. A18.

<sup>5</sup> UN General Assembly, *Annotated Preliminary List of Items to be Included in the Provisional Agenda of the Forty-Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly*, 45/100(A), 15 June 1990, pp. 331-333.

Indonesia did not reply to the report. In October 1989 FRETILIN's representative to the UN called for a referendum among the Timorese people on the group's future.

Pope John Paul II visited East Timor on 12 October 1990 as part of his ten-day Asian tour. In Dili, the provincial capital, the Pope received a "spirited welcome" from approximately 60,000 Catholics. About half of East Timor's population is Roman Catholic, the result of Portuguese colonization. Speaking in Jakarta on 9 October, the Pope had raised the issue of the East Timorese and warned Indonesia against "disregard for fundamental human rights in a misguided search for political unity based on military or economic power alone."

### *North and South Korea*

Despite a series of contacts and proposals, North and South Korea continued to disagree on terms that would result in their first high-level political and military bilateral talks. On 11 September 1989 President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea presented a proposal for a single Korean commonwealth as an interim measure before the creation of a single democratic Korean state. The Koreans have been discussing reunification since the 1970s, but President Roh's plan was reported to be the most detailed South Korean proposal to date. North Korea rejected the proposal on 15 September, stating that it would only perpetuate the division of the peninsula.

Sporadic meetings between North and South Korean legislators have taken place, beginning in August 1988. The eighth, ninth and tenth sessions of preliminary talks on a joint legislative meeting took place on 25 October 1989, 29 November 1989 and 24 January 1990, respectively. The talks ended with little result, however.

North and South Korean Red Cross officials held several rounds of talks, beginning on 16 October 1989, to allow exchange visits by family members divided between the two countries. Talks remained deadlocked through early 1990. Finally, several sessions of sports talks designed to reach agreement on the formation of a single Korean team for the 1990 Asian Games took place in late 1989, but broke down on 29 January 1990.

United States forces are part of a combined South Korean and American command formed under a bilateral treaty and United Nations mandate. On 13 October 1989, President Roh Tae Woo said that South Korea would increase its share of the cost of stationing US military forces as it grows economically, but that a cutback of those forces should not be considered in the immediate future. On 24 October 1989 it was announced that South Korea had agreed to buy one hundred and twenty jet fighter planes valued at US\$2 billion from the USA, to be acquired through a co-production agreement and not purchased directly as some US officials had hoped.

On 8 December 1989, South Korea and the Soviet Union announced the establishment of respective consular departments that would carry out consular services such as issuing visas, but would lack the full status of consulates. The departments will be located in trade offices set up in April 1989 in Seoul and Moscow, but will be run by Foreign Ministry officials and operate autonomously. No formal diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union exist at present.

On 8 January 1990, it was reported that North Korean President Kim Il-Sung had urged South Korea to dismantle a concrete wall along the demilitarized zone between the two countries to allow free passage and pave the way for reunification of the divided peninsula. South Korea denied it had built such a wall and characterized Kim's proposal for reunification as "empty propaganda." On 10 January 1990, however, the South Korean President said that he welcomed the call for free travel between the two countries. He proposed a meeting with Kim Il-Sung in the form of a North-South summit. President Roh also stated that South Korea and the USA had agreed to reduce the magnitude of their joint military exercises ("Team Spirit") that regularly provoke protests from North Korea.

The US embassy in Seoul stated on 11 January 1990 that the USA was considering a withdrawal of up to 5,000 troops from South Korea. Officials explained that an assessment of South Korea's ability to defend itself against North Korea was underway and would be considered in the decision. In talks with US Defence Secretary Richard Cheney on 15 February 1990, the South Korean Defence Minister accepted in principle the gradual withdrawal of about 5,000 soldiers from the US force of more than 43,000 in South Korea. The details of the reduction remain to be worked out. Earlier the USA had announced that it would cease operations at three of its five South Korean air bases (Kwang Ju, Suwon, and Taegu), and withdraw about 2,000 Air Force personnel from the country. The reductions were reported to be part of a three-year, ten to twelve-percent reduction of US forces in South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, coupled with requests that each country spend more on its own defence and contribute more to the cost of maintaining US bases on its soil.

It was reported in mid-March 1990 that South Korean ruling party co-leader Kim Young-sam had held secret talks with Soviet President Gorbachev on the establishment of full diplomatic ties. On 20 April 1990, North Korea's news agency warned the Soviet Union not to establish such ties with South Korea.

In early May 1990, the largest anti-government demonstrations in nearly three years took place in South Korea, with thousands of students marching through the streets of Seoul protesting the economic policies of the Roh Tae Woo Government and its harsh measures against dissent. Many protests against the Government reportedly turned into anti-US actions protesting US military presence in South Korea.

On 4 June 1990, Soviet President Gorbachev and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo met in San Francisco. Mr. Gorbachev welcomed the establishment of economic and cultural relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union and stated that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries "may arise as bilateral ties develop and in the context of the general improvement of the political situation in the region and on the Korean Peninsula."<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>

Francis X. Clines, "No Rush on Ties to Seoul, Moscow Says." *New York Times*, 6 June 1990, p. A3; and Press Office of the USSR Embassy in Canada, *Press Bulletin* No. 43 (6 June 1990), p. 28.

On 29 June 1990, the South Korean President called for the unlimited exchange of merchandise, technology and capital between North and South Korea and the establishment of an economic cooperation fund in order to promote economic cooperation with socialist countries, including North Korea.

### *The Philippines*

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA), was created in 1969 and began fighting the régime of President Ferdinand Marcos. By 1984 the NPA, now 23,000-strong, was active in a large majority of Philippine provinces due to the support of peasants aggrieved by the brutality of the Marcos régime. Corazon Aquino succeeded President Marcos in February 1986 when he fled the country under accusations of election fraud. Mrs. Aquino is the widow of Benigno Aquino, a Marcos opponent who was assassinated upon his return to the Philippines in 1983.

President Aquino set out to reform the economic and social system to meet various rebel group demands. By 1987, the rebel groups comprised the NPA, the Moro National People's Liberation Front (MNLF) and its military wing, the Bagsa Moro Army, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) and some private armies. The combined strength of the rebel groups is approximately 35,000, of which 23,000 are NPA armed fighters, while the Filipino military has an estimated 110,000 soldiers, with an additional 42,000 in paramilitary units, reserves of 50,000 and a Home Civil Defence Force of 65,000. More than 1,500 NPA guerrillas, 1,000 civilians and 1,000 Government soldiers were reportedly killed in NPA-Government clashes during 1988.

Upon taking office Mrs. Aquino introduced tax reforms and dismantled existing tariff laws in an attempt to launch an economic recovery from an empty treasury and a foreign debt of US\$28 billion left behind by ousted President Marcos. These measures were combined with major reforms of the political system, including constitutional guarantees of basic human rights and free elections at every level of government. Implementation of land reform legislation, however, has been effectively blocked by existing landowners. From 1987 to 1989 the Philippine GNP grew by five percent annually, yet this rate remained the lowest in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

President Aquino has also had to deal with six attempted military coups since taking office. Some were mounted by supporters of the deposed President Marcos and others by senior military officers dissatisfied with their role in the new Government. After a serious coup attempt in August 1987, President Aquino addressed some of the grievances of the military by orienting her Government in a more right-wing direction, toughening Government policies against the NPA communist insurgency and increasing pay for soldiers.

An insurgency during the 1970s by Muslim secessionists demanding greater autonomy from the Philippine state caused some 50,000 deaths. In 1988 President Aquino sent a personal emissary, Ramon Mitre, to Saudi Arabia to seek help in blocking an attempt by the Muslim

secessionists to gain recognition among the Islamic states. Mr. Mitre told King Fahd that recognition of the MNLF by the Islamic Conference Organization (OIC) would break up the Philippine Republic. The MNLF had received observer status at the OIC in 1986, but the Government appeal reportedly prevented the MNLF from gaining further status in 1988.

The guerrilla wars being fought by the Philippine Government have alarmed the United States and its armed forces because of the traditional importance of the Philippines in US defence strategy. The naval base at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base are the largest of their kind in the world. The US-Philippine Treaty governing the bases expires in September 1991. Any extending agreement must be ratified by two-thirds of the twenty-four-member Philippine Senate, twelve of whose members signed a resolution in September 1989 opposing any extension.

At the end of October 1989, it was reported that President Aquino had signed a law granting autonomy to the Cordillera region of northern Luzon, site of an on-going secessionist struggle. The law acknowledged the cultural distinctiveness of the Cordilleras but defined them as part of the Philippine polity.

A referendum on the creation of an autonomous region comprising the Philippines' thirteen southern provinces, including Mindanao and its neighbouring islands, was held on 19 November 1989. The MNLF, the principal Muslim secessionist guerrilla group, urged voters to boycott the referendum on the grounds that an agreement signed in Tripoli in 1976 had promised Filipino Muslims a fuller degree of autonomy without a referendum. The turnout for the poll was meagre and the proposals were approved in only three of the thirteen provinces. In response, President Aquino stated that she would review her strategy over the Muslim secessionist question. She also rejected the MNLF's suggestion that peace talks, which had broken down in 1987, should be reopened.

From 1 to 7 December 1989, rebel Army soldiers bombarded the presidential palace and seized Philippine Air Force headquarters and two broadcast stations in an attempt to overthrow the Aquino Government. American President George Bush approved US air cover against the rebel operations. The failed coup attempt, mounted by military officers who charged Aquino's Government with corruption and incompetence, was the most serious rebellion against her Government to date, costing one hundred and nineteen lives.

On 11 January 1990, and again on 12 February 1990, President Aquino warned that the Philippines might not renew its military bases agreement with the USA if talks showed that keeping the bases would not be in the Philippines' interest. On 19 February 1990 demonstrators battled with policemen in front of the US embassy in Manila and at the gate of Clark Air Base as US Defence Secretary Richard Cheney arrived for talks with Philippine officials. President Aquino refused to meet with Secretary Cheney, after the US Congress cut US\$96 million from a US\$481 million pledge to the Philippines as compensation for its military bases in the Philippines for 1990. Mr. Cheney did, however, meet with Defence Minister Fidel Ramos.

On 10 April 1990, US President Bush named Richard Armitage, a former Defence Department official, as chief US negotiator in talks on the future of US bases in the Philippines.

Two US airmen were shot outside Clark Air Base on 13 May 1990 on the eve of high-level "exploratory talks" to decide whether to start formal negotiations to extend the current lease of the military installations. On 18 May 1990, Philippine and US negotiators ended their preliminary talks and agreed to hold further discussions in August 1990.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Ottawa suspended its aid to Vietnam in 1979, following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and in 1982 recognized the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Canada supports peace efforts such as those made by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and once again in late 1989, voted in favour of a UN General Assembly Resolution on the situation in Cambodia. The original Resolution of 1979 had called for an end to hostilities, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia, and a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means. In 1989, Canada continued to support the Coalition headed by Prince Sihanouk, of which the Khmer Rouge is a member, but gave strong indications in the first half of 1990 that its policy toward the Hun Sen Government would be revised.

In April 1989, Vietnam asked Canada to serve on an international peacekeeping body to supervise its troop withdrawal from Cambodia. At that time, the Canadian Government established certain pre-conditions before agreeing to take part in such a mission, including complete support of all parties to the dispute, a clear mandate, a limited period of involvement, manageable resource implications, and - most important - evidence that it was part of a comprehensive and effective settlement of the Cambodian problem. Canada eventually was among many countries that refused to send observers to monitor the 21 to 27 September 1989 troop withdrawal from Cambodia.<sup>7</sup>

External Affairs Minister Clark attended the opening, as well as the Ministerial Session (28 to 30 August), of the International Conference on Cambodia in Paris from 30 July 1989 to 31 August 1989. During the Ministerial Session, Mr. Clark participated in discussions with leaders of the four Cambodian factions, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, ASEAN member states, and eight other countries. With India, Canada co-chaired a special committee charged with developing a framework for the establishment of an International Control Mechanism (ICM).<sup>8</sup> In his opening speech at the Paris Conference on 30 July 1989, Mr. Clark spoke of Canada's position regarding the establishment of such an ICM:

An international control mechanism will be a key element not only in a comprehensive agreement, but also in building confidence that it is honoured by all concerned. Our earlier experience in Indochina

<sup>7</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 175 (26 July 1989); *Commons Debates*, 28 September 1989, pp. 4035-4036; and "No U.N. Monitors for Cambodia." *New York Times*, 23 September 1989, p. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 175 (26 July 1989); and Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 197 (27 August 1989).

[in Cambodia (1954-1969), Laos (1954-1974) and Vietnam (1954-1973)] has taught us what will not work; our experience in over 20 peacekeeping operations elsewhere gives us an appreciation of what does make for success. The mechanism should enjoy the full support and cooperation of all parties, it should have a clear mandate including the necessary freedom of action and movement, it should be charged with reporting responsibilities to a recognized international authority, it should be established on a viable financial basis, and it should be of a limited duration. These criteria are not technical niceties.... If they are overlooked or set aside the result is likely to be an international control mechanism that will only compound the already severe difficulties the Cambodian Parties face in implementing a viable agreement.... [W]e believe the United Nations is, without question, the proper instrument for whatever role or roles an international mechanism is required [to play].... [I]f a comprehensive settlement can be reached, Canada will consider any request from the [C]onference to participate in an international control mechanism.<sup>9</sup>

On 5 August 1989, Mr. Clark announced that Canada had accepted participation in the UN Secretary-General's fact-finding mission to Cambodia, agreed to by the Paris Conference in its first week. An External Affairs news release of the same date stated that Canadian participation was "without prejudice to an eventual Canadian decision on whether or not to participate" in an ICM for Cambodia. It was reported on 8 August 1989 that the fifteen-member mission had arrived a day earlier in Phnom Penh, its main objective being to conduct a technical survey to determine what resources and infrastructure would be available in Cambodia to support an eventual ICM. The Canadian contribution to the mission consisted of a logistics officer, Lt. Col. Jean-Pierre Ducharme.<sup>10</sup>

On 16 November 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a "comprehensive settlement" of the Cambodian war and an interim government headed by Prince Sihanouk. Canada joined one hundred and twenty-three other countries in voting for the resolution. The resolution also called for a "non-return to the universally condemned policies and practices of the recent past," alluding to the Khmer Rouge rule of Cambodia from 1975-1978. Speaking prior to the vote, Canada's UN Ambassador Yves Fortier stated that "under no circumstances can we allow the Cambodian people to face the prospect of a return to power of those who perpetrated such atrocities."<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Speech by...the Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the Paris Conference on Cambodia, Paris, France, July 30, 1989." Department of External Affairs, *Statement* No. 89/36, pp. 3-4.

<sup>10</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 184 (5 August 1989); and "UN Fact-finding Group Begins Cambodia Mission." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 August 1989, p. A7. See also: Chapter 21, **PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVATION**.

<sup>11</sup> Olivia Ward, "U.N. Resolution Backs Cambodian Coalition." *Toronto Star*, 17 November 1989, p. 23.

It was reported on 20 November 1989 that a delegation of three Canadian diplomats, led by Ambassador to Italy Allan Sullivan, had visited Phnom Penh to stress to the government the importance of its accepting a major UN role in any settlement. Ambassador Sullivan had been co-chairman of a subcommittee at the Paris Conference on Cambodia in July-August 1989.<sup>12</sup>

On 18 January 1990, External Affairs Minister Clark welcomed the outcome of the Paris meeting of the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council on the Cambodian problem, saying:

The meeting represents a real step forward in accepting an enhanced role for the United Nations in the resolution of this tragic problem. Canada has consistently seen the U.N. as a central part of any settlement that could bring a durable peace to Cambodia. The recent Australian proposal for a U.N. Interim Administration pending free and fair democratic elections has helped get the dialogue back on track. As we made clear during our participation in the Paris Peace Conference last summer, Canada will continue to play its part in the peace-building process. We will be closely involved in the preparations for the reconvening of the Paris Conference. Canada still serves as co-chair to the Conference's First Committee which is to develop the mandate for an international peace-keeping and control mechanism. We will also be engaged in the full Security Council consideration of the steps which should now be taken. Throughout this process, we will be consulting closely with other key players.<sup>13</sup>

On 25 January 1990, Mr. Clark provided a progress report to the House of Commons on international efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict. Speaking of the early history of the conflict, he noted that the "atrocities perpetrated by the regime of Pol Pot between 1976 and 1979 [had] been condemned by the international community and by Canadians from every walk of life." Turning to the more recent civil war, he went on:

From the beginning of the war, Canada has helped fund the efforts of the United Nations and its agencies to care for the 300,000 Cambodians seeking refuge on the Thai-Cambodian border. Our commitment...this fiscal year...will amount to \$3 million in food and other aid. We also recognize the need to assist the 8 million Cambodians still living in their country whose lives have been disrupted by the armed struggle.... With that in mind, the Government is now in the process of re-establishing the eligibility of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, the three countries of Indochina, for official Canadian development assistance. The exact nature of this aid is now under study by CIDA.... The central problem in the Cambodian conflict remains how to deal with the Khmer Rouge in an eventual settlement process.... Each position we, as a government, have taken on the question of Cambodia has been grounded in a determination never to allow the Khmer Rouge back

12 "Canadian Officials Visit Cambodia." *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 November 1989, p. A7.

13 Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 012 (18 January 1990).

into power. We have called upon the Chinese, Soviet and other military suppliers to the Cambodian parties to cease their support.... In November, the Government of Australia proposed the establishment of a UN interim administration for Cambodia. That proposal has Canada's full support.... It has been welcomed by all the key players in the dispute, with the exception of the Khmer Rouge.... China's decision to agree to the communiqué [issued at the Paris Conference, highlighting an enhanced UN role in the resolution of the Cambodian problem] represents a significant concession and suggests that China may move away from its long-standing insistence that the Khmer Rouge have a major role in the interim government.... Indeed it is becoming increasingly clear that the Khmer Rouge and its two non-communist coalition partners no longer speak with a unified voice. At the same time, Canada and other countries recognize that the current regime in Phnom Penh is more than simply one of the four factions. Over the last few years it appears to have provided adequate government, and its record in most areas is far better than that of the Khmer Rouge Government which preceded it. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of human rights and in basic respect for human life.<sup>14</sup>

On 2 August 1989, as part of a ten-day visit to the Far East, Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins visited a Cambodian displaced persons camp in Thailand and announced that Canada had made a \$1 million cash grant to the United Nations Border Relief Operations (UNBRO) as part of Canada's support for humanitarian relief operations for Cambodian displaced persons. The grant supplemented a \$2 million food aid contribution that Canada had previously promised in support of the UNBRO operation in Thailand.<sup>15</sup>

At the Commonwealth Summit in Malaysia in October 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark disclosed that he had told British Foreign Secretary John Major that Canada viewed with concern Britain's likely plans to forcibly repatriate Vietnamese boat people from Hong Kong. Mr. Clark stated: "It's a difficult question and everyone is watching it but the British are aware of our position." His remark followed a statement by British Prime Minister Thatcher at the Summit that Britain was entitled to expel and return refugees to Vietnam from Hong Kong if it considered them to be undesirables.<sup>16</sup> Following the forced deportation of a first group of fifty-one Vietnamese boat people to Hanoi on 12 December 1989, Mr. Clark told reporters in London that Canada opposed the forced repatriation and wanted guarantees of the safety of the refugees if repatriation did take place. He also defended Canada's record of admitting Vietnamese boat

---

<sup>14</sup> Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, "Statement in the House of Commons... on Canada and Indochina... January 25, 1990." Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* No. 90/05; and Bryan Johnson, "New Stand on Cambodia Pleases Aid Workers." *Globe and Mail*, 5 February 1990, p. A8.

<sup>15</sup> National Defence, *News Release* No. AFN: 40/89 (3 August 1989).

<sup>16</sup> David Todd, "Plan to Repatriate Boat People Worries Canada." *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 October 1989, p. A7.

people and said that it would continue to accept a large annual number of "genuine refugees."<sup>17</sup> On the same day, in Ottawa, Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall was reported to have said that Canada "regretted" the forced repatriation of Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong but would not offer them safe haven in Canada. Previously, in June 1989, Ms. McDougall had announced that over the following three years Canada would resettle 15,000-16,000 Vietnamese from refugee camps in Southeast Asia.<sup>18</sup>

It was reported on 9 January 1990 that under an accord reached in Geneva in June 1989, Canada had agreed not to resettle any boat people not deemed by Hong Kong to be genuine refugees fleeing persecution. It was also reported that 13,000 Vietnamese in Hong Kong refugee camps who had arrived before June 1988, when the colony implemented new screening measures, would still be eligible for resettlement in Canada and elsewhere.<sup>19</sup> During the International Conference on Vietnamese Refugees held in Geneva in January 1990, Canada suggested a compromise to bridge conflicting British and US proposals - namely, a one-year delay in mandatory repatriation of Vietnamese refugees already in Southeast Asian camps but a prompt return for all new arrivals. The proposal was not accepted at the failed conference.<sup>20</sup>

Speaking to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on 24 May 1990, External Affairs Minister Clark indicated that a change in the Cambodian seat at the UN was a possibility:

We have made it clear that we will no longer support a resolution similar to that in previous years [recognizing the CGDK as the holder of the UN seat for Cambodia]. It is likely that Canada, along with most western countries, would support any formula that would have the Cambodian seat declared vacant.

Mr. Clark also told the Committee that the Canadian Government was establishing a small diplomatic office in Hanoi in 1991 that would report to the ambassador in Bangkok.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> "Hong Kong Forcibly Deports 51 Vietnamese Boat People." *Globe and Mail*, 12 December 1989, p. A1.

<sup>18</sup> Joan Bryden, "Canada No Haven: Minister." *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 December 1989, p. B1.

<sup>19</sup> Joan Bryden, "Deal Bars Canada from Taking Vietnamese." *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 January 1990, p. A3.

<sup>20</sup> "Canada Offers Compromise to Help Vietnam Boat People." *Montreal Gazette*, 24 January 1990, p. 12.

<sup>21</sup> House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue No. 51 (24 May 1990), p. 51: 15.

On 18 May 1990, the Canadian Government reportedly agreed to spend approximately \$8 million over the next five years on Canadian aid projects in Cambodia, matching funds put up by Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already operating in the country.<sup>22</sup>

Regarding the plight of the East Timorese, on 19 October 1989 a spokesman for the Department of External Affairs said that officials from the Canadian Embassy in Jakarta regularly travelled to East Timor and believed that the human rights situation was slowly improving there.<sup>23</sup>

Philippine President Aquino began an eight-day visit to Canada and the United States on 5 November 1989. During her visit to Canada, on 7 November, External Affairs Minister Clark and External Relations Minister Monique Landry announced several initiatives between Canada and the Philippines in the areas of development assistance, trade and extradition cooperation. A \$4.9 million Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) contribution was made to provide Canadian expertise in environmental and resource management. A second CIDA project was announced to assist the Philippines in purchasing a variety of commodities, from paper to vaccines and potash, up to a value of \$50 million. In a third contribution Canada was to provide \$30 million to key Canadian non-governmental agencies and their Philippine partners to develop and implement programmes and policies to help the poor. The Canadian Government also pledged \$42.1 million in funding from CIDA and in export financing from the Export Development Corporation (EDC) to permit the Philippines to acquire telecommunications equipment. The EDC also signed a debt rescheduling agreement. In fisheries, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding to ease the entry into Canada of Philippine tuna and shrimp. External Affairs Minister Clark and Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus signed an extradition treaty to facilitate the return to the Philippines of people wanted for non-political crimes.<sup>24</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In the House of Commons on 28 September 1989, Progressive Conservative MP Marie Gibeau referred to the Government's non-participation in monitoring the final withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia on 21 to 27 September 1989:

[The Vietnamese Government] invited foreign observers, including Canadian officials, to watch the operation. Although the withdrawal of the military is heart-warming, we think the Vietnamese authorities can do a lot more to urge Cambodia to agree to come to a compromise during this peace process. Canada's

---

<sup>22</sup> Charlotte Montgomery, "Ottawa to Spend \$8-Million on Cambodian Projects." *Globe and Mail*, 18 May 1990, p. A8.

<sup>23</sup> Christina Spencer, "Horror Tales from Pacific Island Bring Calls for Canadian Help." *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 October 1989, p. E6.

<sup>24</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release No. 276* (7 November 1989); Christina Spencer, "Aquino Means Business with Investment Pitch." *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 November 1989, p. A3; Charlotte Montgomery, "Abuse Charges to Dog Aquino during Visit." *Globe and Mail*, 4 November 1989, p. A7; and Christina Spencer, "Philippines to Get \$100 Million in Aid." *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 November 1989, p. A3.

position on observation or peace-keeping missions in Cambodia is well-known.... [S]ince these requirements have not been met, Canada has not seen fit to send an observer.<sup>25</sup>

A day later in the House, Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy stated that "while western nations have been reluctant to join in...[an observer force to monitor the Vietnamese withdrawal], it does not mean we should stand idly by without making some real effort to find a resolution to the tragic conflict."<sup>26</sup>

On 3 October 1989, Progressive Conservative MP Robert Wenman made the following statement upon his return from a trip to Cambodia:

Canada continues to support the Khmer Rouge at the United Nations, has remained silent as China has resupplied and rearmed the Khmer Rouge, supported the return of the Khmer Rouge to power sharing in Cambodia, and gave \$1 million in aid to resistance forces in Thailand after various NGOs and United Nations officials admitted the United Nations has oversupplied these camps which, in turn, supply the Khmer Rouge soldiers and the black market. While I appreciate that the Secretary of State attended and participated in the Paris Peace Conference, Canada's policy toward Cambodia is at least morally wrong and probably politically wrong as well.<sup>27</sup>

On the same date, Mr. Wenman questioned External Affairs Minister Clark on Canada's non-recognition of the present Government in Cambodia:

The Hun Sen Government...has established a free market system and a Constitution calling for multi-party internationally supervised elections and even including the abolition of the death penalty. The Vietnamese have left Cambodia and the government enjoys the support of the vast majority of Cambodians. What more does the Government of Canada want before it begins moving away from the murderous Khmer Rouge and toward the Hun Sen government?

Mr. Clark replied:

[T]he purpose of the Government of Canada in Cambodia is to contribute to a circumstance in which the Cambodian people themselves can decide their own futures. I listened with interest to the hon. member's personal view that the Hun Sen regime enjoys the widespread support of the people of Cambodia. That is far from clear. There has been a Vietnamese withdrawal. That Vietnamese withdrawal is due in part to the fact that Canada, other

---

<sup>25</sup> *Commons Debates*, 28 September 1989, pp. 4035-4036.

<sup>26</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 September 1989, p. 4096.

<sup>27</sup> *Commons Debates*, 3 October 1989, p. 4244.

western countries, and our allies in ASEAN maintained a very strong position over the last several years. We think this is not the time to break that kind of strong position. No one wants anything to do with Pol Pot or the Pol Pot faction of the Khmer Rouge regime. The reality is that the Khmer Rouge commands authority in Cambodia. When we have been looking, as we did actively through the Paris Peace Conference this summer, for a means by which there could be a coalition government or an interim authority that could speak for all of the Cambodian people we were seeking to minimize the role of the Khmer Rouge. I can assure the hon. member that I have been following this matter with our allies closely....<sup>28</sup>

On 11 December 1989, NDP Member of Parliament Bill Blaikie questioned Canada's long-standing support for the Coalition of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK):

Since the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge have launched a number of attacks and made some territorial gains. Their membership in the opposition coalition, recognized by the UN -thanks ironically to western support - creates a real possibility that they will be participants in a future Cambodian government. I urge the Prime Minister to withdraw Canadian diplomatic support for the coalition and to oppose any new arrangement which would include the Khmer Rouge. Canada must also pressure other nations to follow suit and to act together to have China exercise a more responsible role in that region. It is also time - indeed overdue - that Canada put in place, through non-governmental organizations, a development assistance package for Cambodia. Improved ties with the Hun Sen government might also be in order. Finally, let's look at improving ties with the Vietnamese government. The war in Vietnam is long over. Vietnamese troops have now left Cambodia. Let us try to reintegrate Vietnam into the international community.<sup>29</sup>

Following Mr. Clark's 25 January 1990 statement in the House of Commons, Liberal MP André Ouellet welcomed the Government's decision to re-establish Cambodia's eligibility for Canadian official development assistance, yet questioned how the Government would "be able to meet these pressing needs at a time when...the Minister of Finance...is talking about spending cuts." On behalf of the New Democratic Party MP Bill Blaikie also expressed pleasure at the extending of Canadian development assistance funding to Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Commenting further on Mr. Clark's statement, he said:

We are also heartened today by the Canadian government's acceptance of the Hun Sen government as legitimate and significant participants in the Cambodian political process. The recognition of the dramatically improved human rights situation in Cambodia since Hun Sen took power is also a new and positive step in Canadian policy towards Cambodia.... The New Democratic Party

---

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4254.

<sup>29</sup> *Commons Debates*, 11 December 1989, p. 6741.

is pleased by the recent diplomatic progress internationally regarding Indochina. The Australian proposal is a promising one, China's acceptance of a process which involves the UN is also much welcomed. Perhaps we can replicate the Namibian process - one which has proven to be a major success in terms of UN involvement in bringing about peace and democracy.<sup>30</sup>

Regarding the plight of the Vietnamese boat people, on 12 December 1989 Liberal MP David Walker made the following statement in the House:

Canadians are shocked to learn of the forced repatriation of about 40,000 Vietnamese boat people from Hong Kong back to Hanoi as a result of an agreement struck between Great Britain and the Vietnamese government.... Will the government try to redeem itself by, first, raising this infringement of rights immediately with the UN Human Rights Commission and by, second, taking a leadership role in addressing the international problem of refugees with the international community?<sup>31</sup>

A few days earlier Mr. Walker called upon the government to "work more diligently in helping families with family reunification problems throughout the refugee camps in Asia."<sup>32</sup>

The plight of the East Timorese was brought up in the House on several occasions.<sup>33</sup> On 17 October 1989 NDP Member of Parliament Bill Blaikie called on the Prime Minister, who was attending the Commonwealth Summit at the time, to "change the Canadian policy with respect to the colonization of East Timor by Indonesia, something which happened in the mid-1970s and about which Canada has been embarrassingly silent out of respect for our economic interests in Indonesia."<sup>34</sup>

On 7 December 1989, Liberal MP Christine Stewart<sup>35</sup> and Mr. Bill Blaikie rose in the House to comment on the anniversary of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor (7 December 1975). Mr. Blaikie stated in part:

Sadly the Canadian government refuses to recognize just what the Indonesian occupation of East Timor has meant. It has meant the deaths of almost one-third of the East Timorese population; it means continued growth and systematic abuse of human rights;

---

<sup>30</sup> *Commons Debates*, 25 January 1990, Appendix, "Canada and Indochina," pp. 1-5.

<sup>31</sup> *Commons Debates*, 12 December 1989, pp. 6809-6810.

<sup>32</sup> *Commons Debates*, 8 December 1989, p. 6660.

<sup>33</sup> *Commons Debates*, 17 October 1989, p. 4751; 7 December 1989, pp. 6603-6605; 8 March 1990, p. 8992; 12 March 1990, p. 9087; and 23 March 1990, p. 9691.

<sup>34</sup> *Commons Debates*, 17 October 1989, p. 4751.

<sup>35</sup> *Commons Debates*, 7 December 1989, pp. 6604-6605.

and it means a society kept in isolation by the Indonesian government. The Canadian government's record on East Timor is disgraceful. It has voted against United Nations resolutions calling for the right to self-determination for the people of East Timor. It has lobbied to have the issue removed from the UN Human Rights Commission agenda. It is hardly coincidental that Canada is the third largest foreign investor in Indonesia and that the Canadian government seeks to expand its economic relations with that country.... [W]e can make December 7, 1989 the day the Canadian government adopts the correct, humane policy on East Timor, the day it puts human rights ahead of greed.<sup>36</sup>

The Korean issue was also raised on a number of occasions. On 13 March 1990 Progressive Conservative MP Bill Vankoughnet told the House of a South Korean Defence Ministry announcement that a joint US-South Korean team of engineers had discovered a fourth "infiltration tunnel" constructed by North Korea "to serve as a potential means of mounting a surprise military invasion of the south by passing underneath the demilitarized zone."<sup>37</sup> On 8 February 1990 MP Bill Blaikie (NDP) asked the House to turn its attention from the recent events in Europe to "many other countries which are equally in need of *glasnost*, like...South Korea where we hear too much about economic miracles and too little about continuing oppression...."<sup>38</sup> Finally, on 7 June 1990 PC Member Bill Vankoughnet told the House that the meeting between Soviet President Gorbachev and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo three days earlier had been "another significant step to improved relations on the divided Korean peninsula and relations between South and North Korea."<sup>39</sup>

Liberal MP Rey Pagtakhan rose in the House on 6 November 1989 to welcome President Aquino on her state visit to Canada, the first by a Philippine President. Mr. Pagtakhan called on the Prime Minister to "reaffirm Canada's commitment to assist the Philippines not only through international aid programmes, but also through enhanced trade and investment, and thereby assist her in cementing the pillars of democracy and human dignity in the Philippines, in improving the living conditions of the poorest of the Filipino people, and in bringing peace to them."<sup>40</sup>

#### CURRENT REFERENCES

Bernaldez, Pedro B., "The State in Compromise: The U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines." *Asian Perspective*, vol. 13 no. 2 (Fall-Winter 1989), pp. 89-109.

---

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6603-6604. See also: *Commons Debates*, 16 February 1990, p. 8435.

<sup>37</sup> *Commons Debates*, 13 March 1990, p. 9151.

<sup>38</sup> *Commons Debates*, 8 February 1990, p. 8056.

<sup>39</sup> *Commons Debates*, 7 June 1990, p. 12449.

<sup>40</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 November 1989, pp. 5591-5592.

Bognanno, Mario F. and Yang, Sung Chul, "Modeling Stalemate: The Case of North-South Korean Reunification Negotiations." *Asian Perspective*, vol. 13 no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1989), pp. 131-149.

Boisseau du Rocher, Sophie, "Les négociations sur les bases américaines aux Philippines." *Défense nationale* (May 1990), pp. 117-131.

Chanda, Nayan, "Civil War in Cambodia?" *Foreign Policy* No. 76 (Fall 1989), pp. 26-43.

Garver, John W., "The 'New Type' of Sino-Soviet Relations." *Asian Survey*, vol. 29 no. 12 (December 1989), pp. 1136-1152.

Glaubitz, Joachim, "Rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union - Background and Prospects." *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 40 no. 3 (Third Quarter 1989), pp. 251-263.

Kakizawa, Koji, "Towards New Relations between Japan and the USSR." *International Affairs [Moscow]* No. 3 (March 1990), pp. 74-79.

Koh, Tommy T B, "The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that 'Failed'." *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 6 no. 1 (January 1990), pp. 81-87.

Lee, Chong-Sik, "Political Change, Revolution and the Dialogue in the Two Koreas." *Asian Survey*, vol. 29 no. 11 (November 1989), pp. 1033-1042.

Macdonald, Donald Stone, "Security in Northeast Asia: Two Koreas or One?" *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 12 no. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. 139-153.

Mack, Andrew and O'Hare, Martin, "Moscow - Tokyo and the Northern Territories Dispute." *Asian Survey*, vol. 30 no. 4 (April 1990), pp. 380-394.

McAuliff, John and McDonnell, Mary Byrne, "Ending the Cambodian Stalemate." *World Policy Journal*, vol. 7 no. 1 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 71-105.

Niquet, Valérie, "De nouvelles relations sino-soviétiques." *Problèmes politiques et sociaux* Numéro 619, 10 November 1989 (59 pp.).

Shao, Wenguang, "China's Relations with the Super-Powers: Strategic Shifts and Implications." *Survival*, vol. 32 no. 2 (March/April 1990), pp. 157-172.

Simon, Sheldon W., "The Sino-Soviet Future: Some PRC Perspectives." *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11 no. 3 (July 1989), pp. 85-106.

Stern, Lewis M., "Cambodia: Diplomacy Falters." *Current History*, vol. 89 no. 545 (March 1990), pp. 109-112 and 135-138.

Tonnesson, Stein, "Proposals for a Lasting Peace in Indochina." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 20 no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 265-280.

Vatikiotis, Michael, "Unresolved Tensions: Papal Visit Renews International Focus on East Timor." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 October 1989, pp. 32-33.

Vokey, Richard, *The Philippines: Democracy's Struggle to Prevail*. Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, *Issues*, vol. 3 no. 6, Fall 1989 (8 pp.).

Wanandi, Jusuf, *The Cambodian Conflict*. Tokyo: International Institute for Global Peace, January 1990 (18 pp.).

Webster, David, "East Timor's Pain - and Canada's Complicity." *Peace Magazine*, vol. 5 no. 6 (December 1989/January 1990), p. 9.

Zagoria, Donald S., "Soviet Policy in East Asia: The Quest for Constructive Engagement." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. 11 no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 7-31.

#### FURTHER READING

Bridges, Brian, *Korea and the West*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Chatham House Papers* No. 33, 1986 (101 pp.).

Budiardjo, Carmel and Liong, Liem Soei, *The War Against East Timor*. London: Zed Books, 1984 (253 pp.).

Hervouet, Gérard, *The Return of Vietnam to the International System*. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, *Occasional Paper* No. 6, December 1988 (83 pp.).

Holbrooke, Richard et al., *East Asia in Transition: Challenges for the Trilateral Countries: A Task Force Report to the Trilateral Commission*. New York: The Trilateral Commission, *The Trilateral Papers*: 35, 1988 (80 pp.).

Jones, Gregg R., *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989 (360 pp.).

Joyaux, François, *La nouvelle question d'extrême-orient: l'ère du conflit sino-soviétique, 1959-1978*. Paris: Payot, 1988 (398 pp.).

Kimura, Hiroshi, "The Soviet-Japanese Territorial Dispute." *Harriman Institute Forum*, vol. 2 no. 6, June 1989 (8 pp.).

Macdonald, Donald Stone, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988 (309 pp.).

Robertson, Myles L. C., *Soviet Policy Towards Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (234 pp.).

Roger, Marcel, *Timor Oriental: hier la colonisation portugaise, aujourd'hui la résistance à l'agression indonésienne*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1977 (159 pp.).

Skjelsbaek, Kjell, *Between Self-Determination and Realpolitik: The Role of the United Nations in the Crisis in East Timor, 1974-76*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) Rapport No. 112, October 1987 (32 pp.).

Stromseth, Jonathan, "Unequal Allies: Negotiations over U.S. Bases in the Philippines." *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 43 no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1989), pp. 161-188.

### BACKGROUND

A general rise in the frequency of international terrorist incidents in the early to mid-1980s prompted Western states to place a high priority on adopting policies and measures to counter such acts. Their effectiveness has been evidenced in the relative decrease of overt terrorist incidents, particularly cases of air terrorism, although the problem is far from solved. Bombings continue to comprise over half of all terrorist incidents, while hostage-taking and assassination are the second and third most frequent forms.

International efforts have been generated through the strengthening of existing conventions, such as the Tokyo, Montreal and Hague Conventions created under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and through the creation of new agreements and resolutions. Among the most significant of these is the 1985 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/61, passed by consensus, which condemns outright all acts of terrorism.

The US Bush Administration has pledged to continue the fight against international terrorism and is determined, along with other governments, to see terrorists brought to justice for their actions. Examples include the trial and conviction of the *Achille Lauro* hijackers, and the case of Fawaz Younis who was the first person convicted in March 1989 in the United States under a 1984 law permitting US authorities to apprehend terrorists outside of US borders. Younis was convicted for the hijacking of a Royal Jordanian airliner in 1985.

Other recent developments include the decision of the US Government in late August 1988 not to override a Federal Court ruling allowing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) observer mission to the UN to remain open. Congress had originally approved closing the office on the basis of a 1987 Anti-Terrorist Act. Although the US felt the PLO should not be permitted to operate on American soil because of its purported terrorist affiliations, it was decided that the Anti-Terrorist Act could not be applied to the organization. Many countries, including Canada, had found the US to be in breach of its obligations as host country under the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement.

These same sentiments, however, did not prevent the US from denying PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat a visa entry in November 1988, blocking him from addressing the UN General Assembly in New York. This decision came despite a UN resolution supported by 151 countries "deploring" the American denial and stating that the decision violated its obligations as host country. In December 1988, the Assembly was moved to Geneva for its annual debate on Palestine in order to hear Arafat, and, in an historic move, the Chairman personally renounced terrorism. He also declared that the PLO had rejected terrorism "in all its forms." This move led to an American decision to commence a dialogue with the PLO in December 1988. Similarly, the Canadian Government decided in March 1989 to permit the development of official, high-level talks with the PLO.

Pan American Flight 103 crashed outside of Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, killing all 259 passengers on board, as well as an estimated eleven persons on the ground. Officials have traced the source of the crash to a bomb planted in a radio-cassette player. The organization responsible has not yet been officially determined, but it is thought to be a group from the Middle East.

In response to the Lockerbie disaster, a meeting of the ICAO Council was held at its Montreal Headquarters in February 1989. Transport Ministers from ten countries passed a resolution at the time calling for improved detectability of explosives on board aircraft, and requesting a further development of standards to strengthen aviation security.

In January 1989, the NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral European countries signed an East-West Agreement on Human Rights which includes several articles condemning terrorism and presses for an increase in national and international efforts to combat terrorism and "insure the extradition or prosecution of persons implicated in terrorist acts."

In late June 1989, US and Soviet experts met for the first time in Moscow in order to determine possible areas for bilateral cooperation and coordination in counter-terrorism efforts, including exchanges of information. However, both sides refrained from officially giving any details of the meetings. There was a second meeting of the group in Los Angeles in September 1989, where agreement was reached on approximately thirty recommendations for improving US-Soviet cooperation in this area.

State-sponsored terrorism has become of increasing concern for Western states in recent years. Several events in the past year underscore this, such as the allegation that Libya was building a chemical weapons plant which could have been used to supply several known terrorist organizations, and the Iranian-sponsored death threat against British citizen Salman Rushdie. A joint political declaration issued by the Group of Seven at the Paris Summit in July 1989 reaffirmed the industrialized countries' commitment to fighting terrorism, and stated that "in particular, they condemned state-sponsored terrorism."

On 19 September 1989, a DC-10 of the French airline UTA, en route from Brazzaville to Paris, exploded in mid-air over Niger. All 171 passengers and crew were killed. Traces of explosives found in the wreckage confirmed that the explosion had been the result of a bomb.

The announcement that a French DC-10 had exploded had a profound effect on the proceedings of the 27th Triennial Assembly of the ICAO which began the same day in Montreal. For the first time the Assembly passed a resolution explicitly condemning criminal acts against civil aircraft and the destruction of aircraft in flight with explosives. The Assembly also passed a resolution on the marking of plastic explosives. Under the resolution, the Legal Committee of ICAO will draw up a draft document specifying measures to be taken to require manufacturers to systematically mark plastic explosives, so as to make it easier to detect them in airports. The resolution had been drafted by Britain and Czechoslovakia following the explosion of the Pan Am Boeing. The draft is to be submitted for approval by an international diplomatic conference, with a view to subsequent ratification.

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

A recent publication by the Department of National Defence reports that, in relative terms, there has been a low level of international terrorist incidents directly affecting or involving Canada.<sup>1</sup> A similar conclusion was reached by a Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety in 1987, which nevertheless stated that "terrorism presents one of the principal security threats to Canada today in terms of immediacy, but not severity" and that "international terrorism presents a major challenge to Canada, to Canadian policy, to intelligence and to law enforcement, currently and for the foreseeable future."<sup>2</sup>

Incidents such as the 1985 seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa by Armenian gunmen and the Air India crash over the Atlantic which killed 329 persons, demonstrate that Canada is not invulnerable to terrorist acts. More recently, in April 1989, a Canadian resident of Lebanese origin hijacked a bus and held several people hostage on Parliament Hill in Ottawa. The hijacker, Charles Yakoub, claimed to represent the Front for the Liberation of Christian Lebanon, although the RCMP believe the group to be nonexistent. In April 1990, Charles Yacoub was sentenced to six years in prison.<sup>3</sup>

Canada has consistently condemned acts of terrorism and has in recent years continued to join other nations in doing so. This has included statements issued at various economic summits, the most recent example being at the Paris Summit in July 1989, when the Group of Seven reaffirmed its condemnation of terrorism and its commitment to fight against it.

Canada has also cooperated on an informal basis since 1987 with the Trevi Group, formed by ministers of the European Economic Community to exchange and compile information on, among other areas, counter-terrorism.

In an effort to support existing ICAO principles, Canada and the United States jointly issued a declaration in November 1988 stating that their governments "will not allow hijacked aircraft which have landed in their territory to take off again" and would take measures to regain control of the aircraft and detain the hijackers.<sup>4</sup> Canada and the United States also held a meeting at Meech Lake in October 1989 as part of their Bilateral Consultative Group on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, formed in January 1988 with a view to meeting annually, or more often if required.

---

<sup>1</sup> Anthony Kellett, *Contemporary International Terrorism and Its Impact on Canada*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Report No. R100, February 1988.

<sup>2</sup> William Kelly, *Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, June 1987, pp. 1 and 8-9.

<sup>3</sup> "Bus Hijacker Yacoub Gets Six Years Jail." *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 April 1990, p. A1.

<sup>4</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release No. 235* (2 November 1988).

In February 1989, Liberal Leader John Turner called for Canada to break diplomatic ties with Iran in reply to the death threat issued against Rushdie. He stated that Canadians "do not support terrorism of any kind, and certainly not the style of state-supported or state-sponsored terrorism advocated by Iran."<sup>5</sup> External Affairs Minister Joe Clark responded to the Rushdie affair by summoning a meeting of Islamic states' representatives to Canada in an effort to urge their governments "to engage themselves in a search for a pragmatic solution to the Rushdie affair and the elimination of the threats to the author and his publishers."<sup>6</sup>

On 7 August 1989, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark expressed Canada's "shock and sadness" at the previous day's attack against Israeli tourists travelling in an Egyptian bus to Cairo. Mr. Clark stated that incidents such as this one, which caused the death of twelve people, "contribute to a dangerous cycle of violence."<sup>7</sup>

In December 1989, Canada obtained from Great Britain the extradition of a Canadian resident of Sikh origin suspected of involvement in a bomb attack at Tokyo airport in which two people died. The trial of Mr. Inderjit Singh Reyat was to begin on 17 September 1990.<sup>8</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 16 October 1989, Liberal Member Don Boudria questioned the government on the subject of the Gander air crash of 12 December 1985. He stated:

For four years, members of Parliament have been asking questions on this issue and for four years the government has been telling us that there is not a shred of evidence of any terrorist involvement or anything like that.

For four years the government has been telling us that there was nothing untoward and that it was invisible ice on the wings that caused the Gander aircrash.

Why is it that we were not told until an hour ago that CSIS had conducted an investigation into the Gander aircrash years ago? Why were we not told this in the House of Commons? What does the government have to hide on this issue?<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> "Canada Recalls Envoy from Iran." *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 February 1989, p. A1.

<sup>6</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 040 (25 February 1989).

<sup>7</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No 167, 7 July 1990.

<sup>8</sup> "Court Sets Trial Date for Man Charged with Airport Bombing." *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 January 1990, p. A4.

<sup>9</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 October 1989, pp. 4697-4698. See also "Le reseau ABC prétend que la tragédie aérienne de Gander aurait été causée par des terroristes." *La Presse*, 14 October 1989, p. A6.

Minister of Transport Benoit Bouchard replied that the government had taken all necessary steps with respect to the crash, and that in fact it had done more since it asked a former member of the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Estey, to conduct an investigation to see if another inquiry would be necessary. Mr. Bouchard went on to point out:

I think if you look at the report correctly, you will see what Judge Estey said. He said that it is likely that we will never know exactly what was the cause of the accident. But he said particularly that it is useless to have another inquiry. For that reason he recommended to me and the government to close the file, which is exactly what I did....<sup>10</sup>

On the same day in the House, Liberal Member Sergio Marchi raised the question of the Air India crash of 1985. He stated:

Since the terrible tragedy of the Air India crash four years ago the government has not seen fit to grant a full public investigation into why and how this disaster occurred. I ask the minister since two special investigations have been initiated in both Gander and Air Ontario tragedies, why is it that the government steadfastly refuses to conduct a similar public investigation into an accident which is historic and which claimed the lives of over 300 Canadians probably and certainly through an act of sabotage. Why apply a different set of criteria and a different set of standards, *vis-à-vis* Air India?<sup>11</sup>

Deputy Prime Minister Don Mazankowski replied:

The hon. member asks me why we apply a different set of standards and criteria. The fact is that the two cases are quite different. In the case of Air India, the police investigation is still ongoing. Second, there are attempts to extradite certain suspects in connection with that police investigation. Surely the hon. member would not want the Government of Canada, or anyone else, to take action that may very well impede the investigation process.<sup>12</sup>

On 3 November 1989, Liberal Member Beryl Gaffney presented a petition to the House concerning the Air India accident. In presenting the petition, Mrs. Gaffney made the following statement:

This petition reads that whereas on 23 June 1985, 329 innocent civilians, mostly Canadians, lost their lives as a result of a terrorist bomb explosion aboard an Air India aircraft; and whereas extensive

---

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4698.

<sup>11</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 October 1989, p. 4699.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*.

media research prominently broadcast on TV and radio has shown that this heinous crime was preventable. There were eight warnings, including a test explosion, that pointed to impending disaster; and whereas Canadians have been clamouring for a public inquiry to come up with a recommendation that would prevent similar disasters, but last year an identical terrorist bomb destroyed a Pan American jumbo jet in Britain.

Recommendations from a Canadian investigation could have averted the Pan American tragedy, wherefore the undersigned, your petitioners, humbly pray and call upon Parliament to give Canadians a commitment to hold a royal commission of inquiry into all facts surrounding the Air India disaster of 1985.<sup>13</sup>

Another petition asking the government to take the necessary steps to determine the cause of the attack on the Air India aircraft was presented to the House on 5 December 1989, by Liberal Member Peter Milliken.<sup>14</sup>

On 31 January 1990, Liberal Member Derek Lee also questioned the government concerning the causes of the explosion of the Air India plane. He stated:

The Air India bombing took place over four and a half years ago and hundreds of Canadians were victims and suffered losses as a result of that crime. To date, there has been no public resolution of that crime and a delay of this magnitude constitutes a real affront to the Canadian victims of that crime.

The Solicitor General has to take responsibility for law enforcement delivery mechanisms in this country, and five years is too long. I want to know, and the families of the victims want to know, when will the investigation be completed and when will we have a public commission of inquiry into this matter?<sup>15</sup>

The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Doug Lewis, replied as follows:

I am sure the House is aware that the government takes this to be a very serious matter. That investigation is ongoing, and as soon as we have results which can be made public, they will be made public.<sup>16</sup>

On 6 February 1990, following the attack on Israeli tourists in the Suez region in Egypt, Liberal Member David Berger spoke in the House. He stated:

The murder of at least eight Israeli tourists in Egypt is a reminder of the difficulties of moving beyond hatred and violence toward peace and negotiations.

---

<sup>13</sup> *Commons Debates*, 3 November 1989, p. 5537. See also *Commons Debates*, 8 November 1989, p. 5701.

<sup>14</sup> *Commons Debates*, 5 December 1989, p. 6482.

<sup>15</sup> *Commons Debates*, 31 January 1990, p. 7658.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

It is profoundly distressing that terrorists persist in taking innocent lives in the pursuit of destructive political goals. At a time when negotiations between Israel, Egypt and the United States are gathering momentum in the search for a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, this attack reminds us that there are forces in the region who view peace and negotiations as an obstacle to their goals.

There can be but one response to such an act, that is to intensify and strengthen our support for the peace process. I am sure that all members of this House join me in expressing our condolences to the families of the victims of this senseless attack.<sup>17</sup>

### CURRENT REFERENCES

Charters, David A. (ed.), *Democratic Responses to International Terrorism*. Fredericton: University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict Studies, May 1990.

Colard, Daniel, "La dissension entre alliés occidentaux dans la condamnation du terrorisme." *Ares*, vol. 11 no. 2 (1989), pp. 26-41.

Labayle, Henri, "Terrorisme et opinion publique." *Ares*, vol. 11 no. 2 (1989), pp. 78-92.

Perlstein, Gary R., "Defining International Terrorism." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 12 no. 24 (16 December 1989), p. 1339.

Perlstein, G.R., and Vetter, H.J., "Women and Terrorism: The Need for Research." *Defence Analysis*, vol. 6 no. 1 (March 1990).

Simon, Denys, "Le discours et la politique des Etats-Unis vis-à-vis du terrorisme." *Ares*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1989), pp. 59-77.

Tavernier, Paul, "L'évolution de l'attitude des Nations Unies vis-à-vis terrorisme." *Ares*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1989), pp. 15-25.

"Violence: A Buyer's Market." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 13 no. 19 (12 May 1990), pp. 909-911.

### FURTHER READING

Benchley, Franck, "Vivre avec le terrorisme: le problème de la piraterie aérienne." *Études polémologiques* No. 48 (Winter 1988), pp. 23-44. (See also No. 49 of same publication -- entire volume on terrorism and hostage-taking.)

Bremer, P.L., "Countering Terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s." Washington: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Current Policy* No. 1135 (November 1988).

Canada, Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, *Contemporary International Terrorism and Its Impact on Canada*. Ottawa: ORAE Report No. R100, February 1988 (191 pp.).

Clawson, P., "Terrorism in Decline." *Orbis*, vol. 32 no. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 263-276 (contains a review essay on several books recently published on terrorism).

<sup>17</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 February 1990, p. 7886.

*Conflict Quarterly*, vol. 8 no. 3 (Summer 1988) (entire volume on issues related to international terrorism).

Crawshaw, S., "Anti-Terrorism Networks: Information and Intelligence for Fighting International Terrorism." *The Futurist* (March-April 1989), pp. 12-13.

Kelly, the Honourable William, *The Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, June 1987 (151 pp.).

Kelly, the Honourable William, *The Report of the Second Special Committee of the Senate on Terrorism and Public Safety*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, June 1989 (44 pp.).

Mozaffari, M., "The New Era of Terrorism: Approaches and Typologies." *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 22 no. 4, (December 1988), pp. 179-196.

Oakley, R., "International Terrorism." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 65 no. 3, (Spring 1987), pp. 611-629.

Roy, Jeffrey Ian, "An Events Data Base on Political Terrorism in Canada: Some Conceptual and Methodological Problems." *Conflict Quarterly*, vol. 30 no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 47-60.

Smart, Ian, "International Terrorism." *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 44 no. 3, February 1987, (19 pp.).

United States Government, *Terrorist Group Profiles*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1988 (131 pp.).

Wallock, M., "Terrorism and Compellance." *International Perspectives* (November-December 1987), pp. 13-16.

## SECTION IV: SPECIAL TOPICS

28. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE	355
<i>Background</i>	355
<i>The German Democratic Republic (GDR)</i>	355
<i>German Reunification</i>	359
<i>Hungary</i>	363
<i>Poland</i>	365
<i>Czechoslovakia</i>	369
<i>Romania</i>	371
<i>Bulgaria</i>	375
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	378
<i>German Reunification</i>	380
<i>Hungary</i>	381
<i>Poland</i>	383
<i>Czechoslovakia</i>	384
<i>Romania</i>	385
<i>Bulgaria</i>	387
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	387
<i>German Democratic Republic (GDR)</i>	387
<i>Poland</i>	388
<i>Romania</i>	390
29. BALTIC REPUBLICS	393
<i>Background</i>	393
<i>Estonia</i>	394
<i>Lithuania</i>	397
<i>Latvia</i>	400
<i>Current Canadian Position</i>	402
<i>Parliamentary Comment</i>	405



## IV - SPECIAL TOPICS

### 28. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

#### BACKGROUND

##### Introduction

This section reviews the principal events which took place in Eastern Europe from the late summer of 1989 until the end of June 1990. As the course of change was both rapid and complex, it would be impossible to enumerate every detail in the scope of this summary. Thus, this section aims only to provide a general chronology.

The East German revolution and the question of German reunification have been chosen as the point of departure, not only because of the historic and strategic importance of these issues on the East-West agenda, but also because East Germany assumed a central position in the unfolding of events throughout Eastern Europe. The focus then shifts to Hungary and Poland, two countries already well-advanced in the reform process, and finally to the dramatic and sudden events which transformed Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

##### *The German Democratic Republic (GDR)*

*German Exodus.* Encouraged by such developments as the opening up of Hungary's "Iron Curtain" in May 1989, as well as by Hungary's decision on 11 September of that year to suspend the 1969 bilateral agreement with East Germany under which East Germans travelling without visas faced repatriation, more than 100,000 East Germans fled to the west by the end of October.<sup>1</sup>

Despite promises of amnesty and eventual legal emigration, the GDR was unable to win over the hundreds of East Germans who had taken refuge in West German embassies in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. By the first week of October 1989, the GDR was forced to open its borders to allow passage to the West of some 15,000 East German refugees from Poland and Czechoslovakia.<sup>2</sup>

*Mass Protest.* For those East Germans who remained, the exodus underscored the inadequacies of the repressive Honecker regime. September was marked by a series of public

---

<sup>1</sup> *Keesing's Record of World Events*, September 1989, p. 36894; and October 1989, p. 36962.

<sup>2</sup> *Keesing's*, September 1989, p. 36895; and October 1989, p. 36962.

demonstrations which were held in major centres such as Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin as well as in smaller towns throughout the GDR.<sup>3</sup>

Initially small and spontaneous gatherings, these protests took on greater momentum with the founding of the "New Forum" in mid-September.<sup>4</sup> A self-described "citizen's action group", the New Forum took the lead in coordinating mass protests, such as that of 4 November 1989, when more than 500,000 people marched through the streets of East Berlin demanding immediate and sweeping democratic changes.<sup>5</sup>

*Gorbachev's Visit.* On 6 October 1989, while in Berlin to mark the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev declared that "...matters affecting the GDR are decided not in Moscow but in Berlin". This statement, together with his personal warning to Honecker on the perils of ignoring the popular will, represented the first real confirmation of Gorbachev's earlier pledge to respect the sovereignty of the East European nations.<sup>6</sup>

*Leadership Crisis.* Failing to heed either the rising tide of popular discontent or Gorbachev's advice, the Honecker leadership continued its hard line policies, thereby provoking divisions within the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). Finally, on 18 October, at an emergency session of the SED Central Committee, Honecker "resigned", citing poor health.<sup>7</sup> He was replaced by Egon Krenz, who in addition to his powers as General Secretary was sworn in as Chairman of the Council of State and Commander-in-Chief of the military.<sup>8</sup>

*Partial Concessions.* On 24 October, the Politburo of the SED promised to draft within the year a law allowing virtually free travel abroad. Three days later, all those who had been arrested for attempting to leave the country illegally or for their part in public protests were amnestied. Restrictions on the press and on public assemblies were relaxed. On 26 October, the SED tentatively opened a dialogue with the still "illegal" New Forum.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Keesing's*, September 1989, p. 36895.

<sup>5</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37024.

<sup>6</sup> John Gray, "Change is Vital, Gorbachev Tells Berlin." *Globe and Mail*, 7 October 1989, p. A1.

<sup>7</sup> *Keesing's*, October 1989, p. 36962.

<sup>8</sup> Francine S. Kiefer, "Communists Bow To Calls For Reform." *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 November 1989, p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Keesing's*, October 1989, p. 36963.

*The Wall Dismantled.* Despite his promise to follow the positive example of Gorbachev's perestroika, Krenz's concessions were too little and too late.<sup>10</sup> During the first week of November 1989, massive demonstrations took place outside SED and state buildings in Berlin. There were open demands for the resignation of the government, an end to the activities of the state police and, perhaps most pressing, the opening of the Berlin Wall.<sup>11</sup>

At an emergency meeting of the SED Central Committee held from 7 to 10 November, the Politburo was replaced and a reformer, Hans Modrow, was named head of the Council of State. On 8 November, the New Forum and other informal political groupings were legalized and the SED unveiled its new "Action Programme", in which free elections, constitutionally backed human rights and a transition to a mixed market economy were promised.<sup>12</sup> Finally, having failed to stop the exodus to the West, East Germany's borders, including the Berlin Wall, were declared open on 9 November.<sup>13</sup>

*The Decline of the SED.* Under continued public pressure for democratic reforms, the East German parliament voted on 1 December 1989 to remove the SED's constitutionally guaranteed leading role.<sup>14</sup> At another extraordinary meeting of the SED Central Committee on 8 December, amid accusations of corruption and abuse, Egon Krenz was replaced as General Secretary of the SED by Gregor Gysi. The SED was officially renamed the SED-PDS (Socialist Unity Party of Germany - Party of Democratic Socialism).<sup>15</sup>

At round table talks held on 7 December between the SED, the five National Front parties, New Forum and other opposition parties, the East German Government agreed to schedule free elections on 6 May 1990.<sup>16</sup>

Under the leadership of Hans Modrow, the SED-PDS- led coalition government proved too slow in meeting popular demands for change. On 7 January 1990, the National Front and its opposition allies demanded an end to the communist domination of key government posts and

---

<sup>10</sup> "Krenz se rend à Moscou et s'engage à défendre le communisme en RDA." *Le Devoir*, 1 November 1989, p. A5.

<sup>11</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37024.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*; and Martin Nesirky, "Government of East Germany Resigns." *Globe and Mail*, 8 November 1989, p. A1.

<sup>13</sup> Mark M. Shehan, "Euphoric East Berliners Stream Past Berlin Wall." *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 November 1989, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> *Keesing's*, December, 1989, p. 37107.

<sup>15</sup> John Gray, "Krenz Decides To Quit As East German Leader." *Globe and Mail*, 7 December 1989, p. A1.

<sup>16</sup> *Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37107.

called for the immediate disbanding of the State Security Police, the Stasi.<sup>17</sup> One week later, frustrated by Modrow's insistence on keeping the security apparatus to fight what he called "rightist extremism", an angry crowd stormed and ransacked the Stasi headquarters in Berlin. Popular dissatisfaction was also reflected in a renewed increase in East German emigrés, who numbered 1,600 a day by mid-January.<sup>18</sup>

*Coalition Politics.* On 22 January, Modrow conceded to opposition demands by proposing a coalition in which opposition parties would receive some cabinet posts.<sup>19</sup> Though reluctant to associate themselves with former communists, the opposition accepted the offer on 26 January as necessary to prevent the collapse of the Government.<sup>20</sup> In an effort to restore a modicum of public confidence, Egon Krenz was dismissed from the SED-PDS Politburo on 22 January, and on 29 January, Erich Honecker was placed under arrest.

*Free Elections.* One of the first decisions of Modrow's new coalition was to move the date of the proposed elections from 6 May to 18 March.<sup>21</sup> A key campaign issue was the terms and schedule of German reunification. Although polls showed the Social Democrats in the lead, the election was won by the centre-right coalition "Alliance For Germany". Headed by Lothar de Maizière's Christian Democratic Union, a party which had the visible support of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the Alliance for Germany garnered forty-eight percent of the vote or 192 of the 400 seats in the Volkskammer. The Social Democrats followed with twenty-two percent of the vote and the SED-PDS received sixteen percent.<sup>22</sup>

As the Alliance for Germany did not have the two-thirds majority necessary to make changes to the constitution, a "grand coalition" was forged with the Social Democrats and the League of Free Democrats (formerly the Liberal-Democratic Party) on 4 April 1990.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> "East German Opposition Threatens Strike." *Globe and Mail*, 8 January 1990, p. A1; and "Discord In Berlin On Secret Police." *New York Times*, 9 January 1990, p. A13.

<sup>18</sup> Francine S. Kiefer, "East German Coalition Government Faces Shaky Future." *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 January 1990, p. A7.

<sup>19</sup> Serge Schmemmann, "East German Party Purges Ex-Leaders." *New York Times*, 22 January, 1990, p. A10.

<sup>20</sup> Serge Schmemmann, "East German Opposition Agrees To Join The Communist-Led Cabinet." *New York Times*, 27 January, 1990, pp. A1 and A7.

<sup>21</sup> "RDA: élections avancées au 18 mars at gouvernement d'union nationale." *La Presse*, 29 January 1990, p. A6.

<sup>22</sup> *Keesing's*, March 1990, p. 37300-37301.

<sup>23</sup> "Grande coalition à Berlin-Est incluant les socio-démocrates." *Le Devoir*, 4 April 1990, p. A1.

The establishment of the Christian Democratic Union-led coalition Government represented a triumph for those forces in both the East and the West who favoured free market economics and the rapid reunification of Germany. As the Coalition announced on 12 April 1990, its aim was "...to achieve the unity of Germany swiftly and responsibly for the whole of the German Democratic Republic at one time after negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany..."<sup>24</sup>

*The Price of Unity.* Though plans for a reunified Germany were supported by the vast majority of East Germans, fear about the economic repercussions of the merger gradually became more widespread. On 10 May, several thousand people launched a work stoppage to protest the lack of employment protection under the terms of the proposed treaty of economic, monetary and social union, scheduled to take effect on 2 July 1990.<sup>25</sup> According to a West German study released in June, economic union would increase unemployment in the East from 130,000 to 1,400,000, or some sixteen percent of the workforce.<sup>26</sup>

### *German Reunification*

*After The Wall.* With the fall of the Iron Curtain, the reunification of the two Germanies re-emerged for the first time in several decades as a serious possibility. Buoyed by grassroots support on both sides of the border, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl seized the lead on the issue. On 10 November 1989, in an address to the German people, Kohl declared: "We are and will remain one nation, and we belong together. Step by step we must find the way to our common future."<sup>27</sup>

Two weeks later, on 28 November, Kohl unveiled his three-step plan in which East German exercise of free self-determination in electing a new government would be followed by the creation of new confederal economic and political structures, and finally by eventual merger into a unitary state.<sup>28</sup>

*East German Resistance.* Still struggling to keep a hold on power, and under pressure from their Soviet ally, the reform communist leadership initially refused to discuss the issue, stating on 10 November 1989 that "German reunification is not on the agenda."<sup>29</sup> On 25 November, while conceding that reunification might be possible in the distant future, SED leader Egon Krenz

---

<sup>24</sup> Keesing's, April 1990, p. 37379.

<sup>25</sup> Keesing's, May 1990, p. 37476

<sup>26</sup> Keesing's, June 1990, p. 37536.

<sup>27</sup> Keesing's, November 1989, p. 37025

<sup>28</sup> Ferdinand Protzman, "Kohl Offers An Outline To Create Confederation of Two Germans." *New York Times*, 29 November, 1989, p. A1,A17.

<sup>29</sup> Keesing's, November 1989, p. 37025.

declared that East German sovereignty and pan-European stability depended on the continued existence of the two Germanies.<sup>30</sup>

Still others, such as government leader Hans Modrow, were anxiously searching for an alternative formula by which East German sovereignty and the new reality of East-West cooperation could be reconciled.<sup>31</sup> However, the popular will for unity proved irresistible, and on 19 December the East German Government joined with Kohl to issue a declaration in favour of early reunification.<sup>32</sup>

*The Soviet Response.* In his first comment on the German question on 15 November 1989, Gorbachev echoed the East German leadership in his rejection of reunification.<sup>33</sup> He added that the mere discussion of a united Germany was tantamount to interference in domestic German matters. At the superpower summit meeting in Malta, on 3 December, where the question of German unification was high on the American agenda, Gorbachev declined comment on the Kohl proposal, warning only against any precipitous actions.<sup>34</sup> On 5 December, the Kohl plan was formally rejected by the Soviets and on 11 December, they issued a request for a meeting of the four wartime allies (France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union) to address the issue of European stability.<sup>35</sup>

By the end of December 1989, both the United States and the European Community had declared qualified support for reunification.<sup>36</sup> On 30 January 1990, an embattled Hans Modrow, while on a visit to Moscow, told Gorbachev that popular demands for reunification could no longer be ignored. Gorbachev accepted in principle the imminence of a unified Germany, saying that "...no one casts any doubt upon it now".<sup>37</sup> Finally, on 12 February, Chancellor Kohl received Gorbachev's pledge to respect German self-determination.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> John Gray, "East German Leaders, Intellectuals Dismiss Kohl's Unity Proposal." *Globe and Mail*, 29 November, 1989, p. A5.

<sup>31</sup> Charles Van Der Donckt, *Six mois qui ébranlèrent le monde*, Québec : Université Laval, Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1990, p. 149.

<sup>32</sup> "Chevardnadze met en garde RDA et RFA." *Le Devoir*, 20 December 1989, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Serge Schmemmann, "Gorbachev Clears Way For German Unity." *New York Times*, 17 July 1990, pp. A1-A8.

<sup>34</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 81, p. 152.

<sup>35</sup> *Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37108.

<sup>36</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, pp. 152-153.

<sup>37</sup> Marc Fisher, "West Germans Laud Gorbachev on Unification." *Washington Post*, 1 February 1990, pp. A14 and A17.

<sup>38</sup> Henry Kamm, "No Undue Haste to Unity, Irate East German Urges." *New York Times*, 21 February 1990, p. A1.

*The Question of Frontiers.* The prospect of reunification also provoked anxiety throughout Europe that Germany would reassert a claim to its former territories on the Polish side of the postwar Oder-Neisse line.<sup>39</sup> These fears were particularly aroused by Chancellor Kohl's reluctance to formally accept the permanence of the existing frontiers. On 8 December 1989, in response to a request by the European Community to clarify his government's position, Kohl said only that the Oder-Neisse line "...won't be changed without cause...".<sup>40</sup> Eager to assuage Polish concerns and to forestall any destabilizing German-Polish conflict, the NATO Foreign Ministers issued a statement on 14 December urging Bonn to observe Polish sovereignty.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, facing added pressure from US President George Bush -- who met with the Chancellor on 24 February 1990 in Washington -- Kohl issued an assurance to the Poles on 6 March that Germany would renounce all claims concerning its former territories.<sup>42</sup> This was followed by an invitation to the Polish Government to participate in the relevant sessions of the six-power talks on German reunification and by declarations passed by both German parliaments on 21 and 22 June which formally recognized the inviolability of Poland's borders.<sup>43</sup>

*The NATO Controversy.* Recognizing that German reunification would profoundly affect the strategic interests of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Chancellor Kohl pledged on 11 December 1989 that the question of reunification would not be resolved without their participation.<sup>44</sup> On 11 February 1990, at the Canadian-sponsored "Open Skies" conference in Ottawa, the foreign ministers of the four wartime allies (Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union) and the two Germanies agreed to joint discussions of "...the external aspects of German reunification" (the "Two-plus-Four" talks).<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> "Poland To Be Included In Talks On German Unity." *Globe and Mail*, 15 March 1990, pp. A1 and A2.

<sup>40</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 153.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>42</sup> "Kohl Accepts Polish Border." *Toronto Star*, 7 March 1990, p. A1.

<sup>43</sup> Blaine Harden, "Baker Reassures Poles On Reunification Talks." *Washington Post*, 7 May 1990, p. A18; and John Gray, "Bonn Assures Poland Disputed Border Is Safe." *Globe and Mail*, 22 June 1990, p. A7.

<sup>44</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 153.

<sup>45</sup> Paul Lewis, "Accord in Ottawa: German Membership In Western Alliance An Unsettled Issue." *New York Times*, 14 February 1990, pp. A1 and A10; and "Unification Talks Over In Record Time." *Globe and Mail*, 13 September 1990, p. A7.

West Germany was intent on maintaining German participation in the NATO Alliance beyond reunification. This proposal was actively supported by the United States, the NATO allies and the European Community.<sup>46</sup> As envisaged in a plan unveiled by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 31 January, the continued participation of a unified Germany in NATO would be accompanied by a significant unilateral arms reduction and a promise not to station NATO troops on East German territory.<sup>47</sup>

This proposal proved a major stumbling block to a speedy resolution of the German question. On 1 February, the East German leader, Hans Modrow, reiterated the GDR's desire for an incremental merger and demanded further that neutrality be a condition for unification.<sup>48</sup> At a meeting with US Secretary of State James Baker on 9 February in Moscow, President Gorbachev declared that German membership in NATO would be irreconcilable with Soviet security interests and insisted on a demilitarized and neutral Germany.<sup>49</sup> Both Genscher and Kohl were quick to reject these conditions.<sup>50</sup> On 5 May 1990, at the first session of the "Two-plus-Four" talks, Kohl also rejected the offer of USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to postpone the question until after reunification was effected.<sup>51</sup>

At a 23 May meeting in Geneva, the Soviets indicated for the first time their willingness to negotiate the military and political details of reunification.<sup>52</sup> On 5 June, Shevardnadze proposed that Germany continue participation in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact for a five-year period, as well as continued four-power responsibility for Germany and a German troop ceiling of 200,000.<sup>53</sup> At the second meeting of the "Two-plus-Four" talks on 22 June, this plan was rejected as unworkable. However, in deference to Soviet concerns, a NATO Summit Meeting in London on 5 and 6 July announced a major re-evaluation of NATO's mission, affirming also that

---

<sup>46</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 152.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

<sup>48</sup> Henry Kamm, "Upheaval In The East: East Berlin Chief Presents His Plan To Unite Germany." *New York Times*, 2 February 1990, p. A1.

<sup>49</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 158.

<sup>50</sup> Henry Kamm, "Upheaval In The East: East Berlin Chief Presents His Plan To Unite Germany." *New York Times*, 2 February 1990, p. A1.

<sup>51</sup> "Unification Talks Over In Record Time." *Globe and Mail*, 13 September 1990, p. A7.

<sup>52</sup> Marc Fisher, "Soviet Encourages Bonn On Arms Talks, German Unification." *Washington Post*, 24 May 1990, p. A33.

<sup>53</sup> "Unification Talks Over In Record Time." *Globe and Mail*, 13 September 1990, p. A7. Another figure for residual German force levels suggested by Mr. Shevardnadze was 250,000. See Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Leaders Gather In Search Of A Purpose." *New York Times*, 7 July 1990, pp. 1 and 4.

the Warsaw Pact was no longer an enemy and that nuclear weapons had become a tool of last resort.<sup>54</sup>

*Economic Union.* The economic merger of the two Germanies was considered by both sides as a critical preliminary to reunification. On 15 February 1990, they announced the creation of a new inter-German committee to study the details of monetary, economic and social union.<sup>55</sup>

On 23 April, after an extensive debate in which East German social concerns were paramount, Bonn granted East Germans a 1-1 exchange for savings, pensions and wages up to DM4,000.<sup>56</sup> The following day, Chancellor Kohl and newly elected East German leader Lothar de Maizière announced 2 July 1990 as the date of formal economic union. On 14 May, the Bundestag agreed to set up the German unity fund to raise DM95,000 million over a four-year period in order to help defray the East German budget deficit and to ease the economic dislocations of reunification.<sup>57</sup>

Reflecting the urgency of economic pressures in the GDR, the negotiation process was accelerated. On 18 May, a state treaty on monetary, economic and social union was signed in Bonn. It was ratified by both German parliaments on 21 June.<sup>58</sup> Finally, on 2 July, the economic integration of the two Germanies was formally effected.

## Hungary

*Human Rights.* By the fall of 1989, Hungary was well advanced in the movement for reform. Already in May, Hungary had dismantled its Iron Curtain. The same month, Hungary became the first Warsaw Pact country to adhere to the UN Convention on Refugees, a gesture which was confirmed by Hungary's humanitarian aid to the transiting East Germans in September.<sup>59</sup>

*Moves Toward a Multiparty System.* On 18 September, Hungary moved forward on the path of reform when representatives of the government and the opposition movements agreed to the formation of a specifically Western-style multiparty system. Another important advance was made on 7 October, during the extraordinary conference of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers

---

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Paul Lewis, "Accord In Ottawa: German Membership In Western Alliance An Unsettled Issue." *New York Times*, 14 February 1990, pp. A1 and A10.

<sup>56</sup> "Economic Union Of Two Germanies Is Set For July 2." *Globe and Mail*, 25 April 1990, p. 1.

<sup>57</sup> *Keesing's*, May 1990, p. 37467.

<sup>58</sup> John Gray, "Germanys Take Giant Step Toward Unity, Sign Treaty To Merge Economies By July." *Globe and Mail*, 19 May 1990, pp. A1 and A10.

<sup>59</sup> *Keesing's*, September 1989, p. 36894.

Party (HSWP), when, by an eighty percent vote, the Party adopted a social democratic platform.<sup>60</sup> The HSWP was officially renamed the Party of Democratic Socialism. At the same time, a new interim President, Reszo Nyers, was elected.<sup>61</sup>

Having exonerated the leaders of the Hungarian revolt of 1956 in June 1989 and rehabilitated some 27,000 victims of Stalinist terror on 22 September, the Hungarian parliament voted on 18 October 1989 to abandon the Stalinist-inspired constitution of 1949.<sup>62</sup> On 20 October, a series of constitutional amendments, including a new electoral law, set the framework for a return to parliamentary democracy. On 23 October, the People's Republic of Hungary was renamed the Republic of Hungary.<sup>63</sup>

In response to a series of mass demonstrations, the government moved on 20 October to disband the People's Militia, which had been established in the wake of the 1956 uprising to suppress political dissent. Further, on 5 January 1990, representatives of the Forum of Young Free Democrats and the Alliance of Free Democrats presented documents exposing the corrupt practices of the secret police, thereby forcing Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth to dismiss Interior Minister Istvan Horvath and two other officials.<sup>64</sup>

*Elections.* Popular pressure, in the form of a petition with 200,000 signatures, also compelled the government to grant a referendum on 25 November to let the people determine the date of presidential elections.<sup>65</sup> Fearing that an early election campaign would unfairly favour the more resource-endowed SPD(HSWP), the Opposition had sought the postponement of these elections to coincide with the nation's legislative elections, scheduled for the spring. The referendum ended in their favour and the election date was fixed for 25 March 1990.<sup>66</sup>

Hungary's first free elections in 45 years were held in due course and resulted in a crushing defeat for the formerly Communist SDP.<sup>67</sup> The main victors were two centre-right parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats. Their unwillingness to form a coalition necessitated a run-off election on 8 April 1990. Here the HDF,

---

<sup>60</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 15.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>66</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37048.

<sup>67</sup> Zoltan Barany, "The Hungarian Democratic Forum Wins National Elections Decisively." *Radio Free Europe: Report On Eastern Europe*, vol. 1 no. 17 (April 27 1990), pp. 11-13.

under the leadership of Joseph Antall, secured a majority. Finally, on 2 May, writer Arpad Goencz was elected head of state by the Hungarian parliament.

*Withdrawal of Soviet Troops.* On 10 March 1990, through the mediation of foreign ministers Gyula Horn and Eduard Shevardnadze, Hungary became the first country in Eastern Europe to conclude an accord for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.<sup>68</sup> By its provisions, the Soviet complement of 49,200 soldiers would leave Hungary by 30 June 1991. On 26 June, the Hungarian parliament voted to suspend the country's active participation in the Warsaw Pact and set the end of 1991 as the date for its complete withdrawal from the alliance.<sup>69</sup>

*Economic Integration.* Disengagement from the East was paralleled by efforts to re-integrate Hungary into the European community of nations. On 16 November 1989, the Government issued a formal request for admission into the Council of Europe. A similar request was made to the International Monetary Fund on 1 December. On 1 February 1990, in an effort to meet IMF credit requirements, the Hungarian Government moved to expand the basis of a free-market economy by raising the prices of basic utilities and consumer products to international standards.<sup>70</sup>

## Poland

*Solidarity Victory.* On 4 and 18 June 1989, in the first competitive elections since 1945, Solidarity won 99 of the 100 Senate seats and all of the 161 seats in the Sejm which had been allocated for free voting by the communist regime in the 1988/89 round table talks.<sup>71</sup> Honouring his election promise to retire as Party leader once elected President of Poland, General Jaruzelski relinquished his post to Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski.<sup>72</sup>

*The Coalition Debate.* Against a backdrop of intensified labour unrest in August 1989<sup>73</sup>, the floundering Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) searched for a favourable coalition arrangement with its Solidarity rival. Fearing a situation of shared responsibility without shared

---

<sup>68</sup> "Hungary And Soviet Union Sign Pact On Troop Withdrawal." *Montreal Gazette*, 11 March 1990, p. B1.

<sup>69</sup> "Le Parlement hongrois vote le retrait du Pacte Varsovie." *La Presse*, 27 June 1990, p. B3.

<sup>70</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, pp. 75-77.

<sup>71</sup> Jeff Sallott, "Solidarity Candidates Win Big In Polish Election." *Globe and Mail*, 5 June 1989, p. A1.

<sup>72</sup> John Tagliabue, "Jaruzelski Quits As Party Leader, Premier Gets Post." *New York Times*, 30 July 1989, pp. 1 and 15.

<sup>73</sup> "Strikes Spread As Polish Prime Minister's Crisis Worsens." *Toronto Star*, 11 August 1989, p. A14.

power, Solidarity rejected General Jaruzelski's offer on 27 July.<sup>74</sup> Instead, the trade union movement demanded full control of the levers of government, a position to which Solidarity claimed it was constitutionally entitled by its June election mandate.<sup>75</sup> On 15 August, an uneasy coalition was finally formed. With seven ministerial portfolios, Solidarity and its allies became the dominant partner in the government. While the communists retained the key posts of President and Interior Minister, a long-time Solidarity activist, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, replaced General Czeslaw Kiszczak as Poland's Prime Minister on 25 August.<sup>76</sup>

*Changes Within the PUWP.* The PUWP's election defeat in June 1989 was only the first in a series of crippling blows for the Polish communists. On 3 November, the Sejm voted to remove all government subsidies to the PUWP with a view to putting all political parties on an equal footing.<sup>77</sup> On 29 December, the constitutional clause enshrining the communist party's leading role in society was likewise abolished. The amended article described Poland as a "democratic state where rule of law applies in the regulation of social justice", and The People's Republic of Poland was renamed the Republic of Poland.<sup>78</sup>

In an effort to stave off complete collapse, the PUWP adopted radical internal reforms at its 8th Congress on 29 January 1990. Admitting responsibility for the country's economic morass and lack of political freedom, the Party leadership declared that both its "...sources of strength and ability to regain popular trust have dwindled to the point of exhaustion."<sup>79</sup> With this, the PUWP was formally dissolved and reformed into the Polish Social Democratic Party. Under the new leadership of Leszek Miller, the PDSP adopted a programme favouring parliamentary democracy, freedom of expression, respect for human rights and a market economy.<sup>80</sup> These reforms, however, came too late to preserve the loyalty of the party's rank-and-file, many of whom had already split into their own party, the Social Democratic Union of the Polish Republic.<sup>81</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup> "Walesa Turns Down Coalition Role." *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 July 1989, p. A6.

<sup>75</sup> "Solidarity To Limit Communist Role In Government." *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 August 1989, p. A1.

<sup>76</sup> John Gray, "Polish Leader Plays Cards Cautiously." *Globe and Mail*, 24 August 1989, pp. A1 and A2.

<sup>77</sup> "Poland To End Public Aid For All Political Parties." *Globe and Mail*, 4 November 1989, p. A2.

<sup>78</sup> "Polish Legislators Propose Name Change." *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 December 1989, p. A6; and *Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37130.

<sup>79</sup> Steven Greenhouse, "Calling Party Too Weak To Go On, Poland's Communists Act To Disband." *New York Times*, 28 January 1990, pp. A1 and A14.

<sup>80</sup> "Communists Dissolve Party, Set Up New Social Democratic Group." *Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe*, vol. 1 no. 7 (16 February 1990), pp. 23-27.

<sup>81</sup> Greenhouse, *supra* note 79, pp. A1 and A14.

*Free Elections.* With the first fully free municipal elections on 27 May 1990, the communists' hopes for political revival were thoroughly defeated. Although abstentions were high, Solidarity managed to take the lead, winning 41.4 percent of the municipal council mandate.<sup>82</sup>

*Soviet Troops and the Warsaw Pact.* In September 1989, the new Solidarity Government announced plans to review the legal status of Soviet troops in Poland. It likewise pledged to review Poland's role in COMECON, the Soviet dominated economic alliance. On 18 October 1989, Prime Minister Mazowiecki, stressing the need for East-West cooperation, appealed for an end to the policy of "spheres of influence" that had led to the post-war division of Europe.<sup>83</sup> Pushing still further, Lech Walesa urged the Government on 18 January 1990 to formally demand the withdrawal of all 40,000 Soviet troops by the end of 1991.<sup>84</sup>

Claiming that the renewed prospects of German unity could threaten Polish security, General Jaruzelski rejected Walesa's demand on 5 February.<sup>85</sup> The Soviet Government was more conciliatory. Declaring that the end of the Cold War had made the old Alliance system defunct, the Soviets offered to begin talks for an orderly troop withdrawal as soon as requested by Polish officials.<sup>86</sup> As expressed at a Warsaw Pact meeting in June 1990, however, the Polish authorities were not anxious for an immediate withdrawal from the eastern alliance. Like their Czech and Slovak counterparts, they viewed continued participation in the political alliance of a reformed Warsaw Pact as an opportunity to positively influence East-West cooperation.<sup>87</sup>

*Borders.* The communists and Solidarity were united in their anxiety concerning the prospect of a unified Germany. On 21 February 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki appealed to Bonn to conclude a bilateral "peace treaty" by which all ambiguities concerning Poland's western frontier could be resolved prior to reunification.<sup>88</sup> A seat at the "Two-plus-Four" talks was also

---

<sup>82</sup> Paul-André Comeau, "A Varsovie, un verdict clair; le partie communiste a été laminé aux élections municipales." *Le Devoir*, 30 May 1990, p. 8.

<sup>83</sup> "Poland Calls For End To "Spheres Of Influence"." *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 October 1989, p. A7.

<sup>84</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 120.

<sup>85</sup> Jim Hoagland, "Jaruzelski Rules Out Rapid Withdrawal Of Soviet Troops In Poland." *Washington Post*, 5 February 1990, pp. A13 and A16.

<sup>86</sup> "Moscow Open To Talks On Pullout In Poland." *New York Times*, 12 February 1990, p. A10.

<sup>87</sup> Ruth Gruber, "Poland Revises Defence Strategy." *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 June 1990, p. 3.

<sup>88</sup> "Warsaw Calls For Border Treaty Before Germanys Are Reunited." *New York Times*, 22 February 1990, p. 15.

requested. Although both German parliaments did pass declarations respecting Polish sovereignty<sup>89</sup>, Bonn had not yet agreed to a formal German-Polish treaty by the end of June.

Another significant foreign policy development was the Polish Government's decision on 27 February to restore full diplomatic relations with Israel. These, it said, had been erroneously severed during the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>90</sup>

*Economics.* On 12 October 1989, the Polish Government introduced a radical plan to address the problems of the critically ailing Polish economy. The programme aimed to create a full market system by the end of 1991 by ending state subsidies, privatizing industry and establishing comprehensive systems for banking and taxation. Stringent austerity measures designed to reduce the country's 1,000 percent inflation rate and its massive budget deficit were also passed.<sup>91</sup>

*Foreign Aid.* The Government's new "economic shock therapy" was launched partly to meet IMF requirements for a promised US\$350 million in credits<sup>92</sup>, desperately needed to alleviate Poland's external debt of US\$39 billion.<sup>93</sup> The plan was formally approved by the IMF on 11 December 1989 and, on 7 February 1990, the World Bank granted Poland a three-year loan of US\$2.5 billion.<sup>94</sup> Progress was also achieved in re-integrating Poland into the European market. A trade agreement of 20 September 1989 with the European Community eased import tariffs and expanded Poland's export opportunities.<sup>95</sup> Individually, the Western powers also came to Poland's aid. Most notably, in response to Lech Walesa's personal plea to "invest in liberty, democracy and peace" during his November visit to Washington, the US Government granted \$700 million in emergency aid and \$200 million in guaranteed commercial credits to Poland and Hungary.<sup>96</sup>

*Social Climate.* In assuming the debts incurred by its communist predecessor, the Solidarity-led Government also inherited a degree of popular dissatisfaction. On 12 January 1990, scattered anti-capitalist demonstrations erupted in the capital in which youth gangs stormed the

---

<sup>89</sup> Gray, *supra* note 43, p. A7.

<sup>90</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 89.

<sup>91</sup> "Poland Unveils Program To Create Capitalist Society." *Globe and Mail*, 13 October 1989, pp. A1 and A2; and Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 16.

<sup>92</sup> "World Bank To Hold Off On Credits To Poland." *Globe and Mail*, 8 November 1989, pp. B1 and B6.

<sup>93</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 1.

<sup>94</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 39.

<sup>95</sup> "Poland Signs EC Agreement To Boost Exports." *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 September 1989, p. A7.

<sup>96</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 130.

National Assembly.<sup>97</sup> A week later, 6,000 coal miners went on strike with demands for salary increases to offset the massive price rises affecting basic goods and services.<sup>98</sup> Despite the potential volatility of the situation, however, most Poles were prepared to support the Government and endure the privations associated with its austerity programme.

*Solidarity Movement.* Although the Solidarity Government managed to weather social protest, the movement itself was beset by internal rifts. At the Solidarity conference of 19 to 25 April 1990, Lech Walesa was easily re-elected as leader, but the issue of whether the movement had, since its election victory, outgrown its role as an opposition trade union proved divisive.<sup>99</sup> By the end of June 1990, Solidarity was on the verge of a split. Anxious to maintain worker loyalty, and aspiring to become Poland's President, Lech Walesa began openly to criticize his one-time ally, Prime Minister Mazowiecki, for his alleged slowness in moving towards full democracy.<sup>100</sup>

### *Czechoslovakia*

*The Last Days of the Old Regime.* As revolutionary events swept through Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia's hardline Government became increasingly isolated and uneasy. Despite Gorbachev's warning in early November 1989 that further delay of reform meant danger, the Czechoslovak communists stubbornly refused to establish a political dialogue with opposition groups.<sup>101</sup>

On 17 November, an officially sponsored student march, held to commemorate a Czech student martyred by the Nazis, quickly turned into a bold but peaceful anti-government protest. It was the largest such protest since 1968. The demonstrators, who called for free elections and the dismissal of General Secretary Milos Jakes, were brutally dispersed by attack dogs and police bearing batons. One hundred and forty-three people were arrested and seventeen hospitalized, some with serious injuries.<sup>102</sup> Rather than quell the protests, this act of violence provoked a massive popular revolt which was to spell the regime's demise.

---

<sup>97</sup> "Poles Protests Price Increases." *New York Times*, 13 January 1990, Section I, p. 4.

<sup>98</sup> "Upheaval In The East: Coal Miners In Poland Strike For Higher Pay." *New York Times*, 18 January 1990, p. 10.

<sup>99</sup> "Solidarity Congress Still Solidly Behind Walesa Leadership." *Globe and Mail*, 22 April 1990, p. A4.

<sup>100</sup> "Solidarity Officials Resign:Walesa Accused Of Power Hunger." *Globe and Mail*, 25 June 1990, p. A9.

<sup>101</sup> R.W. Apple, "Kremlin Warns Czechoslovakia To Reform Or Face Serious Problems." *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 November 1989, p. A6.

<sup>102</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37026.

*The Velvet Revolution.* On 19 November 1989, at a meeting held at the initiative of dissident playwright Vaclav Havel, 300 of Czechoslovakia's leading dissidents formed a new independent opposition movement, Civic Forum.<sup>103</sup> On 10 December, the Forum presented its list of demands, foremost among which was the call for Jakes' immediate removal. Besieged by massive demonstrations and work stoppages throughout the week, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) acquiesced on 24 November.

On 28 November, popular pressure again forced the communists formally to relinquish their claims to political monopoly; the constitution was accordingly amended.<sup>104</sup> On 1 December, in an effort to restore public confidence, the communists made two significant gestures: an admission that the 1968 Soviet invasion of the country and the subsequent suppression of the Dubcek Government had been an "inexcusable mistake"; and a decision to open Czechoslovakia's borders.<sup>105</sup>

The regime was less conciliatory in meeting Civic Forum's demands for the full democratization of the government. The new coalition arrangement presented on 3 December 1989 remained overwhelmingly communist, with only five of twenty-one cabinet posts accorded to non-communists.<sup>106</sup> Denouncing this move as a breach of the regime's promise to democratise, Civic Forum threatened to launch a national strike unless its demand for a non-communist, professional government was met within six days.

On 8 December 1989, the unpopular communist Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec was replaced by a reformer, Marian Calfa. On 10 December, the Government of communist President Gustav Husak was dismissed and the first non-communist government since 1948 sworn in.<sup>107</sup> After some stalling, the Communist Party agreed to give up the presidency of the country and on 29 December, Vaclav Havel was sworn in as interim head of state until 8 June 1990, the date scheduled for national elections.<sup>108</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> Keesing's, November 1989, p. 37026.

<sup>104</sup> Paul Koring, "Monopoly Of Power Crumbles In Prague." *Globe and Mail*, 30 November 1989, p. A1.

<sup>105</sup> "La Tchecoslovaquie démontèle aussi son rideau de fer." *Le Devoir*, 1 December 1989, p. 5; and Paul Koring, "1968 Invasion Was Wrong, Prague Admits." *Globe and Mail*, 2 December 1989, p. A1.

<sup>106</sup> Paul Koring, "Opposition Rejects Czechoslovak Coalition." *Globe and Mail*, 4 December 1989, p. A1.

<sup>107</sup> Henry Kamm, "Czech Communists Eclipsed In Cabinet Sworn Into Office:Husak Quits Presidency." *New York Times*, 11 December 1989, pp. A1 and A6

<sup>108</sup> Craig R. Whitney, "Havel Chosen President:Prague Crowd Celebrates." *New York Times*, 30 December 1989, p. A1.

The latter elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the anti-communist coalition led by Civic Forum. Vaclav Havel, with an absolute majority, was re-elected to the post of President; Alexander Dubcek, leader of the Prague Spring of 1968, was accorded the largely symbolic post of parliamentary chairman.

*Troop Withdrawals.* One of the new government's first initiatives was to put an end to the Soviet military presence so visible since the 1968 invasion. On 27 February 1990, negotiations were virtually complete and a Czechoslovak-Soviet entente was signed in Moscow. By its main provisions, the Soviet Union agreed to have all 73,500 troops out of Czechoslovakia no later than 1 July 1991.<sup>109</sup>

*Re-emergence of Ethnic Politics.* As in other East European countries, political change brought with it a revival of historic inter-ethnic rivalries. Among the Slovaks, who constitute one-third of the total population, there emerged new demands for greater political, economic and social autonomy vis-à-vis Prague.<sup>110</sup> Ethnic tensions came to the fore in March 1990, when Slovak representatives demanded that the country be officially renamed to reflect the distinct and equal identity of the two nations. Finally, after a month of sharp debate and public demonstrations, the National Assembly voted through a compromise, and the country was renamed the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic.<sup>111</sup>

### *Romania*

In contrast to neighbouring Hungary, Romania continued to labour under the repressive twenty-six-year regime of Nicolae Ceausescu. On 20 November 1989, in preparation for the 14th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, foreign journalists were expelled and Romania's frontiers with Hungary closed to foreigners without explanation.<sup>112</sup> At the Congress, Ceausescu, who was unanimously "re-elected" General Secretary, lashed out against "anti-socialist" changes in Eastern Europe, thereby confirming the continuation of his hardline rule.<sup>113</sup>

*Timisoara Uprising.* On 15 December 1989, spontaneous mass protests erupted in the mixed Hungarian and Romanian city of Timisoara. The catalyst was the arrest of Hungarian pastor and dissident, Laszlo Tökes, by Ceausescu's *Securitate* forces. Within hours this peaceful defence

---

<sup>109</sup> "Soviet Troops To Start Leaving Czechoslovakia On February 26." *Montreal Gazette*, 16 February 1990, p. A7; and "Gorbachev Sees Havel And Agrees To Speed Withdrawal Of Troops." *New York Times*, 27 February 1990, p. A1.

<sup>110</sup> Paul Koring, "Two Nations, One Country - Dream Or Nightmare?" *Globe and Mail*, 7 June 1990, p. D1.

<sup>111</sup> *Keesing's*, March 1990, p. 37326; and April 1990, 37382.

<sup>112</sup> Alan Riding, "Romanian Strongman Rejects Path To Reform." *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 November 1989, p. A6.

<sup>113</sup> Ceausescu Opposition To Reforms Earns Reappointment To Top Job." *Globe and Mail*, 25 November 1989, p. A4.

of Tökes became a violent anti-Ceausescu riot, in which portraits of the Romanian leader were burned and buildings vandalized.<sup>114</sup> The reaction of the regime was swift and violent. On 17 December, acting on Ceausescu's personal orders, the army opened fire, killing hundreds.<sup>115</sup>

*Ceausescu's Demise.* Despite the state of emergency proclaimed in Timisoara, Ceausescu proceeded with his three-day visit to Iran. Upon his return, on 21 December, a massive pro-Ceausescu rally was staged in Bucharest and televised throughout the country. Having heard confirmed reports of the Timisoara massacre, however, the crowd began to shout anti-Ceausescu slogans, even as the leader was addressing them. Although the ranks of the protesters continued to grow throughout the night, the army was hesitant to intervene. On 22 December, after the announced "suicide" of Defence Minister Vasile Milea<sup>116</sup>, the army crossed over to the side of the demonstrators.<sup>117</sup>

The same day, as mobs stormed the Central Committee building in Bucharest, Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, fled the capital by helicopter. They were captured near the city of Tirgoviste by army units loyal to the revolution and, after a summary trial before a military tribunal, were executed on 25 December.<sup>118</sup>

*The Formation of the National Salvation Front (NSF).* As bloody battles continued between the army and divisions of the *Securitate* still loyal to Ceausescu, a successor government began to take shape. On 22 December 1989, a disparate group of army officers, intellectuals and workers established the National Salvation Front.<sup>119</sup> Under the collective leadership of long-time Communists C. Manescu, P. Roman and I. Iliescu, the Front claimed provisional leadership in the name of the revolution.

---

<sup>114</sup> "Death Toll Estimated At 7,000 Amid New Romanian Clashes." *Globe and Mail*, 20 December 1989, p. A1; and Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 43.

<sup>115</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "Local Police Clash In Rumania Grew To Anti-State Protest." *New York Times*, 17 December 1989, pp. A1 and A16.

<sup>116</sup> In fact, General Milea was assassinated by Ceausescu's bodyguards for having refused the order to fire upon civilians. See: Celestine Bohlen and Clyde Haberman, "How The Ceausescu Fell: Harnessing Popular Rage." *New York Times*, 7 January 1990, pp. A1-A15.

<sup>117</sup> *Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37104.

<sup>118</sup> John Kifner, "Army Executes Ceausescu And Wife For 'Genocide' Role, Bucharest Says." *New York Times*, 26 December 1989, pp. A1 and A16. The official version of these events has since been disputed by some western experts. See: Diana Jean Schemo, "Ceausescu Execution Videotape Called Fake." *Toronto Star*, 30 April 1990, p. 1.

<sup>119</sup> "7000 Died In Romanian Revolution: Western Sources Estimate From Data." *Globe and Mail*, 2 January 1990, p. A1.

Upon assuming power, the Front declared its commitment to genuine democracy and respect for human rights.<sup>120</sup> By mid-January 1990, the Government had introduced a series of measures to ease the deprivations of the Romanian people. These measures included a five-day work week, a reduction of prices on basic goods, an expansion of peasants' private plots and the re-direction of exportable goods to the starved domestic market.<sup>121</sup> On 1 January, the Front disbanded the infamous *Securitate*, arrested its chief Iulian Vlad, and commenced court proceedings against those who had fought against the revolution.<sup>122</sup> On 3 January, the Front announced the arrest of sixty members of the Romanian Communist Party Executive Committee who had been close to Ceausescu<sup>123</sup>, and on 7 January, in response to mass demands, promised to ban the Communist Party altogether.<sup>124</sup> The same day, the Front declared that free elections would be held in late April.

*Rising Opposition to the National Salvation Front.* Within the first two weeks after Ceausescu's overthrow, anti-government protests erupted in Bucharest.<sup>125</sup> Led by students and intellectuals, hundreds of demonstrators demanded the fulfillment of the Front's pledge to ban the Communist Party and a restoration of the death penalty, which the Front had abolished in its efforts to obtain the surrender of *Securitate* holdouts in December. Although the Front leaders had initially promised to hold a referendum on the death penalty, on 13 January 1990, they reversed their position.<sup>126</sup> This equivocation led to renewed demonstrations on 17 January, in which angry mobs temporarily seized the Front's headquarters. On 29 January, the Front repaid its opponents in kind by mobilizing in its defence some 20,000 workers. The latter stormed the offices of the two main Opposition parties, the Liberal Party and the National Peasant's Party, where they destroyed equipment and attacked the staff.<sup>127</sup>

*Formation of the Council for National Reconciliation.* In an effort to subdue opposition protest, the Front dissolved itself on 1 February and established a new provisional coalition

---

<sup>120</sup> "Reforms Usher in 1990 For Romania." *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 January 1990, p. 1.

<sup>121</sup> *Supra* note 119.

<sup>122</sup> David Binder, "Military Trials Of Securitate Forces Begin." *New York Times*, 2 January 1990, p. A12.

<sup>123</sup> Matthew Fisher, "Old Regime's Top Officials Arrested In Romania." *Globe and Mail*, 3 January 1990, p. A6.

<sup>124</sup> "Communist Party Is Outlawed By Romania." *Globe and Mail*, 13 January 1990, p. A4.

<sup>125</sup> Matthew Fisher, "Ex-Communists In Power Anger Two Romanian Parties, Students." *Globe and Mail*, 8 January 1990, p. A4.

<sup>126</sup> David Binder, "Rumanian Leaders Outlaw Ousted Communist Party." *New York Times*, 13 January 1990, p. 7.

<sup>127</sup> Serge Schmemmann, "In Cradle Of Romanian Revolt: Anger Quickly Overcame Fear." *New York Times*, 30 January 1990, p. A1.

Government, the Council for National Reconciliation.<sup>128</sup> A number of political parties were represented. However, the Front reserved for itself one half of the Council seats, together with exclusive control of all government ministries.<sup>129</sup>

*Election Turmoil.* The Front's 3 January reversal of its initial promise not to field its own candidates in the forthcoming national elections also provoked protest from opposition groups. They claimed that the Front's monopoly of the mass media would give it an unfair advantage.<sup>130</sup> On 23 January, therefore, the Front agreed to give its nascent political rivals more time to prepare and the elections were postponed until 20 May 1990.<sup>131</sup>

Despite pledges to provide opposition parties with media access and material resources, the Front continued to manipulate the election campaign. On 2 May, both the Liberal and National Peasant's Parties threatened to boycott the elections to protest a Government-inspired intimidation campaign.<sup>132</sup> On numerous occasions, opposition headquarters were vandalized, their leaders threatened and canvassers beaten.<sup>133</sup> Anti-government rallies continued to intensify. In mid-April 1990, a group of students and intellectuals occupied University Square in central Bucharest and refused to leave until Iliescu and other Communist leaders resigned.<sup>134</sup> In Timisoara, 40,000 took to the streets on 30 April in similar protest.<sup>135</sup> Meanwhile, the Council for National Reconciliation revealed on 15 May that a new Romanian Intelligence Service had been in existence for a month and that it included many ex-*Securitate* members in its ranks.<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>128</sup> Celestine Bohlen, "Rumania's Rulers Agree To Share Power." *New York Times*, 2 February 1990, p. A13.

<sup>129</sup> John Kifner, "Jeering Romanians Seize Offices To Demand Government's Ouster." *New York Times*, 19 February 1990, p. A1.

<sup>130</sup> Matthew Fisher, "Ex-Communists In Power Angers Two Romanian Parties, Students." *Globe and Mail*, 8 January, 1990, p. A4.

<sup>131</sup> David Binder, "Rumanian Leaders Put Off Election." *New York Times*, 24 January 1990, p. A12.

<sup>132</sup> Chris Stephen, "Romanian Opposition Threatens To Pull Out Of Elections." *Globe and Mail*, 2 May 1990, p. A5.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>134</sup> Alan Ferguson, "Romanian Election Protests Erupt." *Toronto Star*, 18 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>135</sup> Dov Lungu, "In Romania, The Revolution Is Unfinished." *Toronto Star*, 7 May 1990, p. 17.

<sup>136</sup> Alan Ferguson, "Romanian Secret Service Resurfaces." *Toronto Star*, 16 May 1990, p. 3.

The national elections of 20 May reflected the chaotic and unstable situation which had prevailed in the country since Ceausescu's ouster. Some 7,000 candidates from seventy-three parties vied for positions in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>137</sup> As predicted, Iliescu and his National Salvation Front won by a significant majority.<sup>138</sup> However, according to independent foreign observers, the elections were plagued by "grave irregularities" such as media manipulation, intimidation and ballot stuffing. The Iliescu Government, they said, had "...failed to establish its democratic credentials."<sup>139</sup>

*Human Rights.* On 21 June 1990, at his inauguration ceremony, President Iliescu reiterated his commitment to defend democracy and fundamental human rights.<sup>140</sup> Only one week before, however, in a manner reminiscent of Ceausescu, Iliescu had sent troops and armed miners to forcibly disperse the fifty-three-day-old anti-communist demonstration in University Square.<sup>141</sup> This brutal action left five dead and hundreds injured. Despite international condemnation, repression continued. On 20 June, forty-five opposition figures were arrested.<sup>142</sup>

*Absence of Reform.* As reflected in the conduct of the election campaign, the new leadership had failed to make substantial progress in its pledge to lead Romania to genuine democracy. In the absence of substantial constitutional and political reform, the centralized structures of government and economy remained intact. Although Iliescu had campaigned in favour of a transition to a mixed economy, no comprehensive programme had been introduced.<sup>143</sup>

## Bulgaria

*Environmental Protests.* The wave of political change in Eastern Europe began to touch Bulgaria in October 1989. During the CSCE International Conference on the Environment, held in Sofia from 16 to 27 October, an unofficial Bulgarian environmental group, *Eco-Glasnost*, staged a series of public meetings to protest not only environmental issues but also to demand broad democratic reforms.<sup>144</sup> Although police did intervene on 26 October, beating several activists, international

---

<sup>137</sup> Paul Koring, "Romanian Electors Face Daunting Task." *Globe and Mail*, 19 May 1990, p. A1.

<sup>138</sup> Paul Koring, "Monitors Query Fairness Of Vote." *Globe and Mail*, 22 May 1990, p. A1.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> George Jahn, "Iliescu Promises To Defend Rights." *Globe and Mail*, 21 June 1990, p. A7.

<sup>141</sup> "Romanian Troops Shoot Demonstrators." *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 June 1990, p. A1.

<sup>142</sup> Jahn, *supra* note 140, p. A7.

<sup>143</sup> Dov Lungu, "In Romania, The Revolution Is Unfinished." *Toronto Star*, 7 May 1990, p. 17.

<sup>144</sup> *Keesing's*, October 1989, p. 36980.

pressure forced the regime to issue an apology. On 4 November, in what was the largest unofficial protest rally since 1947, 4,000 people began to call for an end to the Communist regime.<sup>145</sup>

*The Palace Coup.* In contrast to East Germany, where the regime succumbed to mass revolt, the old guard in Bulgaria was ousted by a "palace coup". On 9 November, while on a visit to Moscow, Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov secured the backing of the Soviet leadership for his plan to end the twenty-six-year rule of Todor Zhivkov.<sup>146</sup> On 10 November, by a close vote of the ruling Politburo, Zhivkov was retired and Mladenov elected new General Secretary.<sup>147</sup> Zhivkov was subsequently deprived of his seats on the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the National Assembly. Finally, he was expelled from the Party and on 29 January 1990, arrested on charges of abuse of power and embezzlement.<sup>148</sup> Zhivkov's ouster was accompanied by a major purge of conservative members of the Party leadership.

*Bulgaria's Perestroika.* On 10 November 1989, in his first speech as Party leader, Mladenov pledged to work towards political pluralism, economic reform and a state based on the rule of law. In a manner reminiscent of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev a few years earlier, Mladenov cautioned that such reforms would be made "...within the unique framework of socialism and in the name of socialism."<sup>149</sup>

On 14 November, Mladenov held a meeting with members of unofficial dissident groups, including *The Club for the Support of Glasnost and Perestroika*, in which he declared his support for freedom of the press and assembly, as well as free elections. Indeed, there was a new tolerance for dissenting views. On 17 November, following the recommendations of the ruling Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo, the National Assembly abolished those articles in the penal code which made criticism of the regime a criminal offence and amnestied all those who had been so prosecuted.<sup>150</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37027.

<sup>146</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37027.

<sup>147</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37027.

<sup>148</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37027, and January 1990, p. 37192; and "Ousted Bulgarian Leader Put Under House Arrest." *Globe and Mail*, 19 January 1990, p. A4.

<sup>149</sup> Van Der Donckt, *supra* note 31, p. 26; and Clyde Haberman, "Bulgaria's Communist Chief Plans To Relax Grip and Hold Elections." *New York Times*, 12 December 1989, p. A1.

<sup>150</sup> *Keesing's*, November 1989, p. 37028.

*Transformation of the Bulgarian Communist Party.* On 13 December 1989, at a plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the new leadership announced that the Party would relinquish its monopoly on power.<sup>151</sup> After some technical delays, on 15 January 1990, the National Assembly repealed Article One of the Bulgarian constitution, under which the Communist Party was accorded a leading role in society.<sup>152</sup> At the 14th Congress of the BCP on 30 January, Mladenov made good his pledge to ensure the separation of Party and state by handing over his title as Party leader to the reformer, Aleksandur Lilov. Mladenov retained his position as head of state. The Congress also endorsed a program of moderate reform based on the principles of multiparty democracy, human rights and a "...socially oriented market economy." However, the Congress rejected proposals to adopt a fully social democratic program and reiterated the BCP's explicit commitment to the ideas of Marx.<sup>153</sup>

*Opposition to the New Regime.* On 7 December 1989, a number of dissident groups joined to form the *Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)*, an umbrella movement for the promotion of political pluralism, rule of law and economic reform. The UDF played an instrumental role in mobilizing popular support behind the reform faction at the 13 December Central Committee plenum. Subsequently, the UDF became increasingly critical of what it described as halfway reforms of the Mladenov leadership and on 14 December, at a rally of some 50,000 people, demanded the resignation of the government and the dissolution of parliament.<sup>154</sup> As strikes and protests intensified, Mladenov finally conceded on 27 December to the UDF's request for round table negotiations to decide the country's future course.<sup>155</sup>

At the first round table meeting of 3 January 1990, the UDF strongly criticized the government's refusal to postpone until November the national elections scheduled for May. The UDF also accused the government of maintaining its former media monopoly, thereby reneging on its promise to give all parties equal media access.<sup>156</sup> In an effort to subdue the opposition, on 30 January the Mladenov leadership offered the UDF a coalition arrangement to rule provisionally until the May elections. The UDF refused to take part, however, fearing that it would be accorded responsibility without power.<sup>157</sup> On 6 February, the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union, long the Communist Party's subservient ally, also rejected the coalition. Ironically, with the formation of

---

<sup>151</sup> *Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37109.

<sup>152</sup> Celestine Bohlen, "Bulgarian Party Loses Dominance." *New York Times*, 16 January 1990, pp. A1 and A11.

<sup>153</sup> *Keesing's*, February 1990, p. 37253.

<sup>154</sup> *Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37110.

<sup>155</sup> *Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37109; and Klas Bergman, "Bulgarians Force Uneasy Change in Country Unused to Democracy." *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 December 1989, p. 1.

<sup>156</sup> Celestine Bohlen, "Bulgaria:Oppositions Talks With Communists In Sofia Off To A Rough Start." *New York Times*, 17 January 1990, p. A9.

<sup>157</sup> Marlise Simmons, "Bulgarian Government Quits in Strife Over Change." *New York Times*, 2 February 1990, p. A13.

the provisional government on 8 February under the new Prime Minister --and still Party leader-- Anatoli Lukanov, for the first time in Bulgarian history the government consisted *entirely* of communists.<sup>158</sup>

*Elections.* After some further negotiations with the UDF, the Mladenov leadership agreed on 29 March 1990 to hold national elections in June. On 10 and 17 June, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (as the BCP was renamed on 3 April) won, as predicted, by a significant majority.<sup>159</sup> Despite the fact that the campaign had been marred by violence and that the ruling socialists maintained an unfair organisational advantage, independent observers declared that the elections were essentially fair, and on 22 June the UDF withdrew its week-old demand for their annulment.<sup>160</sup> The Bulgarian communists found themselves in the unique position of being the only East European communist party to be returned to power by a free vote. However, the BSP still did not have enough seats in the National Assembly to garner the two-thirds majority required for constitutional legislation and the prospects of a more genuine coalition with the opposition UDF were increased.

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

The sudden and dramatic changes which swept through Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 caught Canada, as well as the other western allies, unprepared. Nonetheless, Canada was quick to respond, both to the events as they unfolded and to their more far-reaching implications for the future international order.

On 6 February 1990, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced that a comprehensive review of Canada's European policy was underway.<sup>161</sup> While expressing Canada's satisfaction with the end to Communist domination in Eastern Europe, Mr. Clark stressed the need for a sober and realistic appraisal of the Communist legacy and of the role which Canada could play in promoting stability, prosperity and democratic development in these newly liberated countries:

The reaction there - and the reaction here - to this remarkable revolution has been one of euphoria. But the time of euphoria is over. It is time to consolidate the gains made so far and to render real and enduring what has, until now, been hope and promise. The opportunity is immense, but so too are the challenges.<sup>162</sup>

---

<sup>158</sup> *Keesing's*, February 1990, p. 37254.

<sup>159</sup> Blaine Harden, "Communists Lead Bulgarian Vote." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 June 1990, p. A6; and *Keesing's*, June 1990, p. 37543.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>161</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 90/09 (5 February 1990), p. 1.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

Noting that international interdependence had become an irrefutable reality, Mr. Clark stated that it was incumbent upon Canada to support the East Europeans in their dual struggle to establish democratic structures and rebuild their economies -- not only to ensure regional stability, but also to protect Canada's economic and political future in Europe.

In a companion speech of 26 May 1990, Mr. Clark went further in outlining Canadian initiatives in Eastern Europe. Stressing the critical importance of continued regional stability, he said that a main Canadian priority was to develop an effective security alternative to the clearly outdated dual-alliance system.<sup>163</sup> To this end, he proposed a new, primarily political, role for NATO -- one based on "cooperative security", verification and confidence-building activities.<sup>164</sup>

Similarly, a new mission was envisaged for the thirty-five-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). According to Mr. Clark, the CSCE was uniquely suited to become "the drawing board for a new European architecture" because its membership encompasses nations of both the East and the West.<sup>165</sup> He proposed that the CSCE be formally institutionalized and that ties between member countries be strengthened. Tentatively, he suggested that this could best be accomplished through annual meetings of the member states' foreign ministers and bi-annual summits of their respective heads of state.

As Mr. Clark envisaged, the new CSCE would require an expanded mandate so that contemporary needs -- such as economic integration and environmental action -- could be addressed. Mr. Clark also proposed the establishment of auxiliary institutions such as a CSCE Assembly, a parliamentary-like structure for enhanced political dialogue; and a CSCE Verification Agency, to facilitate and coordinate verification and confidence-building activities. Finally, Mr. Clark also expressed the hope that the CSCE could in future be replaced by a more permanent body, a Council For European Cooperation.

Intensified economic cooperation and integration formed another critical element in Canada's new involvement in Eastern Europe. Already in the fall of 1989, the Canadian government granted Poland and Hungary a total of \$42 million in direct financial aid.<sup>166</sup> Such temporary measures, though necessary to alleviate the immediate economic distress of these

---

<sup>163</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 90/32 (26 May 1990), p. 3.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>166</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/69 (13 December 1989), p. 2.

nations, were only part of Canada's intended assistance programme. As Mr. Clark explained in his speech of 26 May 1990:

Assistance to Eastern Europe is not a question of charity. It is a matter of hard common sense and self-interest. Assistance to Eastern Europe is also not a matter of dumping large amounts of cash into the hands of these new governments. What is more important and more effective is the provision of expertise, the training of managers and decision-makers, the teaching of the tools of democracy and the encouragement of the private sector investment in specific projects and enterprises.<sup>167</sup>

Canada's commitment to promote private sector activity in Eastern Europe was the motive behind two other programme initiatives: the Task Force on East and Central Europe, set up by the Department of External Affairs to encourage Canadian private sector trade and investment in Eastern Europe; and the Canadian government's decision to contribute \$30 million each year for a five-year period to the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, established to provide capital to fund private enterprise within Eastern Europe.<sup>168</sup> In addition, as announced by International Trade Minister John Crosbie on 29 May, Canada was committed to support the new Centre for European Economies in Transition, established by the OECD to promote relations between the OECD and those East European nations engaged in the transformation to free-market systems.<sup>169</sup>

### *German Reunification*

Virtually from the moment the Berlin Wall came down and German reunification became a live issue again, the Canadian approach to this critical issue was to act in concert with the other NATO allies. The NATO countries agreed that it was vitally important for the question of reunification to be decided on the basis of German sovereignty and self-determination. At the same time, they were concerned lest the two Germanies embark on too rapid a course or neglect the legitimate security concerns of their allies on the two sides. For Canada, as for most European nations, the possibility of a united Germany outside the moderating influence of NATO was a source of uneasiness. By the time of a gathering of NATO First Ministers on 4 December 1989, however, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney could report:

We are gratified to hear from Chancellor Kohl that the question of the two Germanies cannot be resolved in isolation and that his government would seek a solution in a European context in conjunction with Germany's membership in NATO and the European Community, and without any preconceptions as to timetable. Canada supports this general approach.<sup>170</sup>

---

<sup>167</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 90/32 (26 May 1990), p. 9.

<sup>168</sup> Department of Finance, *Information* Nos. 90-072 (29 May 1990) and 90-069 (25 May 1990).

<sup>169</sup> Minister for International Trade, *News Release* No. 119, 1990.

<sup>170</sup> Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, "Opening Statement For A Press Conference By The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, NATO," 4 December 1989, p. 2.

In hosting the "Open Skies Conference" in February 1990, Canada helped to bring together senior ministers of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries for the first time since the recent changes in Eastern Europe. On 14 February, informal discussions in Ottawa led to an agreement between the two Germanys and the four wartime allies (Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union) "to discuss the external aspects of the establishment of German unity, including the issues of security of the neighbouring states."<sup>171</sup>

Once the "Two-plus-Four Talks" got underway, the Canadian Government was generally very supportive of their objectives, particularly of the demonstrated commitment of the six powers to begin negotiations only after the 18 March East German elections. These, it was hoped, would enhance the stability of the East German Government and make possible an orderly transition. Together with several other NATO allies, however, Canada quietly expressed its concern that the six-nation formula for effecting German unity essentially excluded Canadian participation in the determination of an issue considered vital to Canadian interests.<sup>172</sup> These concerns were eventually laid to rest on 8 March when Chancellor Kohl, while on a special visit to NATO headquarters, gave an assurance that:

Nobody has to be concerned that Germany would in one way or another want to go it alone. German interests must be taken into account but so also should those of our partners and allies.<sup>173</sup>

Accordingly, a statement was issued by NATO's Secretary General to the effect that consultations between all allies would proceed on a frequent basis and at "all possible forums."<sup>174</sup>

### *Hungary*

As Hungary was the most advanced East European country on the road to democracy and a free-market economy, Canada's main priority was to increase Hungarian access to international trade and financial markets. Accordingly, on 12 October 1989, the Government announced that, effective 1 December 1989, both Hungary and Poland would be granted privileges under the general preferential tariff.<sup>175</sup> Moreover, both countries were given \$20 million in credits to assist the expansion of their exports, and \$10 million in the form of a special fund for private sector

---

<sup>171</sup> "Text of Ottawa Statement." *New York Times*, 14 February 1990, p. A10.

<sup>172</sup> Michel Vastel, "Le Rôle du Canada en Europe remis en question?: Un pas vers la réunification." *Le Droit*, 14 February 1990, p. 4 and "Canada to Get Role in German Unity Debate." *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 February 1990.

<sup>173</sup> Alan Riding, "Kohl Sees Role for Other Nations in Talks on Unity." *New York Times*, 9 March 1990, p. A10.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>175</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *Statement* 89/69 (13 December 1989), p. 2.

development. In like manner, an agreement concerning double taxation was signed with Hungary, as with Poland.<sup>176</sup>

According to External Affairs Minister Clark, increased cooperative efforts on the part of Canadian business were crucial to the creation and continued development of a viable private sector in Hungary. On 4 December 1989, in a speech to the "Group of 24" (a body composed of Poland's creditors that was formed in 1989 by the European Community to coordinate assistance to Poland and Hungary), Mr. Clark noted with satisfaction that Canadian private-sector initiatives in both direct investment and joint ventures already totalled \$50 million. Canadian businesses had also made significant contributions to the internationally backed First Hungary Fund (assets: \$100 million) which began operations in November 1989.<sup>177</sup>

In order to encourage this trend, Mr. Clark announced on 5 June 1990 that the Canadian Government would commit \$450,000 to the new International Management Centre in Budapest.<sup>178</sup> Established in 1988 with the assistance of the Canadian Federation of Deans of Management and Administrative Studies and the Faculty of Business Administration of York University, the Centre's aim has been to train Hungarian managers in western financial and management techniques and to promote entrepreneurship. This contribution was paralleled by funding from the Canadian private sector. As Mr. Clark then observed, "this is an excellent example of how Canadian public and private sectors can work together to support the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe."<sup>179</sup>

During the visit of Hungarian presidential candidate Imre Pozsgay in November 1989, the Canadian Government pledged to continue its efforts at reinforcing multilateral mechanisms such as the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank in support of Hungarian economic development. This pledge was reiterated in February 1990, during the visit of Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn to Ottawa. Mr. Horn and Mr. Clark also held discussions concerning expanded bilateral cooperation in the realm of arms control and security.<sup>180</sup> The prospects for improved Hungarian-Canadian relations in this area had been affirmed on 6 January, when Hungary allowed the Canadian Armed Forces the first "Open Skies" trial flight over its territory. Hungary also agreed to host the second phase of the "Open Skies" talks in April.<sup>181</sup>

---

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>177</sup> Mary Nemeth, "An Economy in Crisis." *Macleans*, 13 November 1989, p. 53.

<sup>178</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 128 (5 June 1990).

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>180</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 023 (6 February 1990).

<sup>181</sup> "On To Budapest." *The Disarmament Bulletin* No. 13 (Spring 1990), p. 1.

## Poland

For the Government of Canada, the troubled Polish economy was of particular concern throughout the year. On 25 August 1989, in a congratulatory statement to the newly elected Solidarity Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Mr. Clark expressed Canada's sympathy for Poland's predicament:

Poland's hopes for democracy must not be allowed to founder because of instability growing out of economic hardship. The Polish people urgently need international understanding and support to overcome their massive foreign debt burden and achieve economic reconstruction.<sup>182</sup>

Because Canada remained Poland's fourth largest creditor, however, the Canadian government was determined to pursue a circumspect strategy, one which could offer the Poles tangible relief without exposing Canada to additional financial burden. In a speech given in honour of Solidarity Leader Lech Walesa's visit to Canada on 13 November 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney pledged to support Poland's bid for IMF and World Bank assistance "at the highest decision-making levels of these bodies."<sup>183</sup> He also indicated Canada's preparedness to reschedule an unspecified amount of the \$2.6 billion which Poland owed Canada, once Poland had successfully concluded a formal agreement with the IMF.

On 13 December 1989, Canada's commitment to Polish economic recovery was reinforced by the formal announcement of a \$30 million contribution to an international fund established to help stabilize Poland's hyper-inflated currency.<sup>184</sup> Together with the \$10 million in food aid and the \$20 million in credits and development funds first announced in October, this brought Canada's total 1989 contribution to Hungary and Poland to \$72 million.

As in the case of Hungary, stimulation of private-sector cooperation was a major element in Canada's assistance program for Poland. On 13 November 1989, the Prime Minister announced the creation of a new agency under the auspices of the Department of External Affairs to coordinate private and public-sector initiatives while providing interested Canadian businesses with information and assistance to aid the expansion of Canadian-Polish joint ventures.<sup>185</sup> In January 1990, the newly established Canadian-Polish Mixed Economic Commission included ground-level enterprise representatives from both countries in the work of its second session, thereby expanding practical contacts between the two countries.<sup>186</sup>

---

<sup>182</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 196 (25 August 1989).

<sup>183</sup> Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, "Toast in Honour of Lech Walesa." 13 November 1990, p. 2.

<sup>184</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 305 (13 December 1990).

<sup>185</sup> Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, *supra* note 183, p. 2.

<sup>186</sup> Government of Canada, *News Release* No. 15 (26 January 1990).

The activity of the Canadian-Polish Mixed Economic Commission was instrumental in the successful conclusion on 6 April 1990 of a Foreign Investment Protection Agreement. Signed in Warsaw by Deputy Prime Minister Don Mazankowski and his Polish counterpart, Leszek Balcerowicz, the agreement provided Most Favoured Nation Status and mutual guarantees of compensation in the event of expropriation or nationalization. Further, until convertibility of the Polish *zloty* could be achieved, this agreement allowed Canadian investors to freely transfer fifteen percent of their annual returns.<sup>187</sup> As Mr. Crosbie observed in a statement of 12 April:

This Agreement will offer greater certainty to Canadian investors in Poland, by creating a more secure environment for their investments. Along with the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation which is now in force, it creates a legal framework of benefit to Canadian investors in Poland.<sup>188</sup>

Private-sector involvement in Poland was also facilitated by the establishment of a \$20 million short-term credit insurance mechanism on 6 April 1990. Operated under the auspices of the Canadian Export Development Corporation, this insurance was designed to assist in the sale of Canadian goods to Poland and offered Canadian businesses up to ninety percent coverage in the event of loss. "The EDC insurance," observed Mr. Crosbie, "will support sales of products badly needed in Poland to improve production and aid the further development of local industries."<sup>189</sup>

### *Czechoslovakia*

On 29 December 1989, the External Affairs Minister issued a statement of congratulations to Vaclav Havel on his election as President of Czechoslovakia. Observing that "Canada has for many years actively supported the fight for greater freedoms in Czechoslovakia, and views the recent events with great encouragement and satisfaction", Mr. Clark expressed Canada's commitment to expanded relations.<sup>190</sup> In the spring of 1990, Canada and Czechoslovakia began negotiations for a mutual investment protection agreement and a double taxation avoidance pact which -- as with Poland and Hungary -- were aimed at enhancing private-sector cooperative initiatives.<sup>191</sup>

During an official visit to Canada on 18 and 19 February 1990, President Havel indicated his interest in securing an arrangement with Canada for increased technical and economic assistance. He

---

<sup>187</sup> Minister for International Trade, *News Release* No. 078 (12 April 1990).

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>189</sup> Minister for International Trade, *News Release* No. 072 (6 April 1990).

<sup>190</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 323 (29 December 1989).

<sup>191</sup> Matthew Horsman, "Czechoslovakia Fit Enough To Bide Time." *Financial Times*, 1 March 1990, p. 6.

expressed support for a new pan-European security alliance to replace the two military blocs and defended the need to guarantee the existing Polish-German and other European frontiers.<sup>192</sup>

In March 1990, a fact-finding delegation from Elections Canada went to Czechoslovakia in an effort to find ways for Canada to assist in the process of democratisation. Subsequently, the Canadian Government confirmed a contribution of \$225,000 in materials badly needed to administer the 8 June elections.<sup>193</sup> Upon announcing this initiative, Mr. Clark observed:

Canada can help the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as they move towards democracy. Different countries will have different needs and we are pleased to be making this concrete contribution to facilitate free and fair elections in a country which moved so many of us in the West in its passionate struggle for democracy.<sup>194</sup>

As preparations for the June elections were going ahead smoothly, the Canadian Government did not feel it necessary to send an observer delegation, as it had to Romania and Bulgaria.

### *Romania*

Throughout 1989, human rights issues occupied a prominent place in Canada's dealings with the repressive Ceaucescu regime. On 24 November, External Affairs Minister Clark issued a formal protest of Romania's treatment of Mr. Dumitru Mazilu, a United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights who had been placed under house arrest for a report he had made to the UN on Romanian human rights abuses. Mr. Clark remarked further that "this is only one in a long list of instances where Romania has flagrantly disregarded its human rights obligations [as a signatory to the 1977 Helsinki Accord]."<sup>195</sup>

In response to the violent repression of peaceful protesters in Timisoara on 17 December 1989, as well as to the arrest of Reverend Laszlo Tokes, Mr. Clark summoned Romania's ambassador to provide an explanation and to communicate to his government Canada's strong condemnation.<sup>196</sup> Two days later, Mr. Clark declared that "the horrors being perpetrated by the Romanian authorities are barbaric by any standard and deserve the harshest international condemnation and action."<sup>197</sup>

---

<sup>192</sup> Dave Todd, "Czech Leader Wants All-European Security Alliance." *Montreal Gazette*, 19 February 1990, p. 1.

<sup>193</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 107 (22 May 1990).

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> Department of External Affairs, *News Release* No. 293 (24 November 1989).

<sup>196</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 311 (17 December 1989).

<sup>197</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 315 (21 December 1989).

Accordingly, Mr. Clark introduced a series of punitive measures including: the recall of Canada's ambassador for consultations; the revocation of the General Preferential Tariff for Romanian exports to Canada; the withdrawal of governmental support for trade and business ventures with Romania; the imposition of export controls; and the termination of Canada's Long Term Economic Agreement with Romania. Mr. Clark also suspended all contacts with Romanian officials and declared his intention to press the UN Security Council for a full condemnation of the Romanian regime.<sup>198</sup>

The External Affairs Minister had intended that these measures remain in effect until the Romanian authorities adopted civilized behaviour. In fact, however, events proceeded so quickly that the sanctions were never acted upon. On 22 December 1989, Mr. Clark "warmly welcomed" the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime and expressed Canada's hopes for democratic reforms and for "the full normalization of relations with a new Romanian government." A pledge was also made to "support the Romanian people in the challenges ahead."<sup>199</sup>

On 24 December 1989, Canada committed \$100,000 in humanitarian aid to Romania to provide emergency relief to casualties of the on-going battles between the *Securitate* and the new provisional government.<sup>200</sup> As the privations of the Romanian people were gradually revealed, Canada stepped up contributions to humanitarian projects. On 10 April 1990, the Departments of External Affairs and Health and Welfare jointly announced that \$500,000 worth of emergency medical supplies had been sent to help fight infant AIDS.<sup>201</sup>

In early January 1990, a report by the New York-based Hungarian Human Rights Federation revealed that the Romanian Government had been using forced labour in the construction of the Cernavoda CANDU nuclear facility.<sup>202</sup> On 5 January, the Department of External Affairs confirmed that the Canadian Government had been aware for some time that army conscripts were being used as labourers but that this was not an unusual practice among the East European Communist regimes. The Canadian Government pledged to undertake a review of conditions at the Cernavoda site to determine what improvements Canada could make.<sup>203</sup>

Canada's concern for the fate of democratic forces in Romania continued to influence the Government's approach to developments in that country. Encouraged by requests from Reverend Laszlo Tokes and the Romanian community in Canada, Mr. Clark announced on 27 March 1990 that

---

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>199</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 316 (22 December 1989).

<sup>200</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 319 (24 December 1989).

<sup>201</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 076 (10 April 1990).

<sup>202</sup> Ian Austen, "Canada Aware Forced Labour Used at Romanian Candu Site." *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 January 1990, p. 1.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*.

the Government would send a parliamentary delegation to monitor the Romanian elections in May.<sup>204</sup> That delegation included representatives of all three parliamentary parties: New Democrat Svend Robinson; Liberal David Walker; and the Progressive Conservatives Jacques Tétrault and Gabrielle Bertrand.<sup>205</sup> International observers, including the Canadian delegation, later indicated that the 20 May elections had been marred by grave irregularities.<sup>206</sup> By the end of June, however, the specific findings of the Canadian team had not yet been made public.

### *Bulgaria*

In view of the continued political instability in Bulgaria, the Canadian government adopted a cautious "wait and see" position and did not launch any major initiatives in the realm of economic assistance. However, in line with his wider policy of support for democratic development in Eastern Europe, External Affairs Minister Clark announced on 8 June 1990 that Canada had sent ten tons of computer paper to the Bulgarian Electoral Commission in order to facilitate the elections to the Bulgarian National Assembly on 10 and 17 June.<sup>207</sup> This donation was made in response to a request by Bulgarian election officials to representatives of Elections Canada, who were in the country as part of an international election advisory commission.

A Canadian delegation consisting of three members of Parliament and a senior official of Elections Canada was sent to Bulgaria as part of an international observer force to monitor the first round of the elections on 10 June. The following day, the observer force issued a statement in which they concluded that the elections appeared to involve "no major or systematic irregularities."<sup>208</sup>

### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

#### *German Democratic Republic (GDR)*

On 3 October 1989, Employment and Immigration Minister Barbara McDougall announced, in response to requests made by representatives of Canada's German community, that the Government was prepared to take action on the question of East German refugees by working out an agreement on private sponsorship to Canada.<sup>209</sup>

---

<sup>204</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 March 1990, p. 9832.

<sup>205</sup> "Quatre observateurs du Canada." *Le Devoir*, 12 May 1990, p. A5.

<sup>206</sup> Paul Koring, "Monitors Query Fairness of Vote." *Globe and Mail*, 22 May 1990, p. A10.

<sup>207</sup> Secretary of State for External Affairs, *News Release* No. 132 (8 June 1990).

<sup>208</sup> Blaine Harden, "Communists lead Bulgarian Vote." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 June 1990, p. A6.

<sup>209</sup> *Commons Debates*, 3 October 1989, p. 4257.

One month later, on 7 November, Opposition MP Sergio Marchi criticized the Government for failing to conclude such an agreement in a meeting with German-Canadian representatives. Ms. McDougall reaffirmed Canada's commitment to easing the refugee crisis. However, she noted that since East Germans who defected were automatically accorded West German citizenship, they did not qualify as refugees under current Canadian regulations. Therefore, she concluded, any sponsorship would have to be pursued on a private and individual basis.<sup>210</sup>

On 8 November 1989, External Affairs Minister Clark informed the House of the West German Government's formal request the day before for Canadian assistance in providing temporary shelter for East German refugees. Mr. Clark continued:

After consultation with my colleague, the Minister of National Defence and our commanding officers in Germany, we have replied today, the day after the request, indicating that Canada is prepared to cooperate, prepared to make barracks space and other help available to help the West German government accommodate the refugees from East Germany.<sup>211</sup>

### *Poland*

The level of the Canadian Government's assistance to Poland and to other East European countries was an issue of considerable controversy throughout the year. On 27 November 1989, Opposition Leader John Turner criticized the Government for not providing Eastern Europe with "our proportionate share." He continued:

Our government has promised only \$42 million to Poland and Hungary, which pales in comparisons with commitments made by other western nations to these countries.<sup>212</sup>

The Prime Minister responded that the \$42 million was a one-year commitment that "compares very favourably on a *per capita* basis with amounts now being considered by the Senate and the Congress of the United States."<sup>213</sup>

---

<sup>210</sup> *Commons Debates*, 7 November 1989, p. 5665.

<sup>211</sup> *Commons Debates*, 8 November 1989, p. 5712.

<sup>212</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6256. In absolute terms, Canada's contribution of emergency economic aid to Poland in 1989 was the smallest of any industrialized nation, except Japan. See: Dave Todd, "Walesa Begins Visit With Call For Investment in Poland." *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 November 1989, p. A16.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6257.

On 16 February 1990, in response to similar criticism, External Affairs Minister Clark confirmed that Poland's debt to Canada was to be rescheduled:

I am pleased to announce that today in Paris a debt rescheduling agreement was concluded between the representatives of the Government of Poland and the representatives of the Paris Club official creditors including Canada.<sup>214</sup>

According to the terms of the agreement, Canada undertook to defer 100 percent of Poland's payments, both principal and interest, due in the fiscal year 1989-1990 and the first quarter of 1991. For Poland this represented \$1.2 billion in hard currency that could be applied to immediate development needs.<sup>215</sup> Mr. Clark assured the Opposition that this agreement confirmed that "Canada is making a major contribution in easing Poland's balance of payments in support of its difficult and important economic stabilization program."<sup>216</sup>

On 27 March 1990, Mr. Clark clarified his Government's position on the question of the German-Polish border dispute. He indicated that the question had been addressed in a recent meeting in Ottawa between the Prime Minister and his Polish counterpart, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. He reported further:

We outlined very clearly the position of the Government of Canada that Poland should be able to live in the secure knowledge that the existing boundaries will be respected and that that reality should be expressed in an international legal instrument to be negotiated as soon as possible. We also discussed practical ways in which Canada might contribute to that turn of events being achieved.<sup>217</sup>

The Government's position on this question was subsequently endorsed by a report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade in June 1990, based on the Committee's observations during a fact-finding tour of the two Germanies. "We declare", said the committee, "that respect for the Polish-German border is, and must remain, a cornerstone of German reunification."<sup>218</sup>

---

<sup>214</sup> *Commons Debates*, 16 February 1990, p. 8451.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>217</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 March 1990, p. 9825.

<sup>218</sup> Standing Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Trade, *Report of The Committee's Visit to The Soviet Union and The Germanies: April 20 - May 5, 1990*. June 1990, p. 23.

*Romania*

On 23 January 1990, Opposition MP Christine Stewart pressed the government to clarify its position on the controversial issue of the CANDU nuclear project in Cernovoda, Romania. Citing reports of forced labour on the project, Mrs. Stewart recommended that the government suspend work at Cernavoda until a full inquiry had been undertaken. External Affairs Minister Clark rejected this proposal, saying further that it would be both premature and unreasonable to "cut off some of the economic development underway now" in Romania "on the basis of reports that we have not been able to confirm or deny."<sup>219</sup> However, Mr. Clark did indicate that his office would investigate the matter further.

As new information emerged concerning Romania's past violations of international and Canadian nuclear safety standards, as well as its illegal diversion of heavy water from the CANDU project to India, criticism of the government's position intensified. As Mrs. Stewart continued on 8 May:

If Canada wants to maintain its reputation as an advocate of human rights, we cannot allow it to support through aid or trade authoritarian regimes, dictatorships and other violators of human rights.<sup>220</sup>

On 14 May, New Democrat MP Bill Blaikie urged the Government to discontinue the programme rather than extend \$500 million in credits through the Export Development Corporation as had been requested by officials of the new Romanian Government. In response, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources Jake Epp assured the House that no credit extension to Romania would be granted until the safety and labour conditions of the project had been comprehensively reviewed and that any future Canadian financial assistance would be predicated on complete Canadian control of site management.<sup>221</sup>

Mr. Epp added further that since the fall of the Ceausescu regime, military conscripts were no longer working at the Cernovoda site. However, on 28 May New Democrat MP Svend Robinson reported that during a recent visit to Romania he had seen firsthand the continued presence of military conscripts. He further criticized both the Department of External Affairs and the AECL for their failure, after four months, to take effective measures to address the safety and labour aspects of Cernovoda and demanded a full parliamentary inquiry into the role of the AECL and the Department of External Affairs in the handling of the matter.<sup>222</sup>

---

<sup>219</sup> *Commons Debates*, 23 January 1990, p. 7388.

<sup>220</sup> *Commons Debates*, 8 May 1990, p. 11126.

<sup>221</sup> *Commons Debates*, 14 May 1990, pp. 11370-11371.

<sup>222</sup> *Commons Debates*, 28 May 1990, p. 11927.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

- Ash, Timothy Garton, "Mitteleuropa?" *Daedalus*, vol. 119 no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 1-21.
- Brown, J. F., "Hope and Uncertainty in Eastern Europe." *SAIS Review*, vol. 110 no. 1 (Winter-Spring 1990), pp. 117-132.
- Davidson, Ian, "The Search for a New Order in Europe." *International Affairs*, vol. 66 no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 275-283.
- Djilas, Milovan, "Eastern Europe After the Revolution." *Global Affairs*, vol. 5 no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 83-94.
- Geremek, Bronislaw, "Postcommunism and Democracy in Poland." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13 no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 125-131.
- Luers, William, "Czechoslovakia: Road to Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69 no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 77-98.
- Morgan, Roger, "Germany in Europe." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13 no. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 147-157.
- Radu, Michael, "The Political and Strategic Significance of Changes in Eastern Europe." *Strategic Review For Southern Africa*, vol. 12 no. 1 (May 1990), pp. 1-13.
- Schopflin, George, "The End of Communism in Eastern Europe." *International Affairs*, vol. 66 no. 1 (January 1990), pp. 3-16.

## FURTHER READING

- Bechtoldt, Heinrich, "A Turning Point for Socialism: Gorbachev's Reforms Press Eastern Europe." *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 40 no. 3 (Autumn 1989), pp. 215-231.
- Larrabee, Stephen, "Perestroika Shakes Eastern Europe." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 45 no. 2 (March 1989), pp. 25-29.
- Maier, Harry, "The German Question and Perestroika." *European Affairs*, vol. 3 no. 2 (Summer 1989), pp. 11-19.
- Staar, Richard, "Poland: Renewal or Stagnation?" *Current History*, vol. 88 (November 1989), pp. 373-376.
- Tismaneanu, Vladimir, "Nascent Civil Society in the German Democratic Republic." *Problems of Communism*, vol. 38 nos. 2-3 (May-June 1989), pp. 90-111.
- Volgyes, Ivan, "Hungary: Dancing in the Shackles of the Past." *Current History*, Vol. 88 (November 1989), pp. 381-384 and 399-400.



*BACKGROUND*

The three Baltic Republics -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- formerly part of the Russian Empire, emerged from World War I as independent states. As part of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, these countries were annexed and incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940. They were incorporated as three of the fifteen Union republics that form the federal structure of the USSR. Each republic, although linked to the others by common histories, is linguistically and ethnically discrete and varies greatly in urban/rural mix. Lithuania is Catholic, the other two republics Lutheran.

Significantly, an influx of Russians since the end of the Second World War has altered the demographic balance of the republics: Latvia is now almost fifty percent Russian, with Russians dominating in the capital of Riga; Estonia -- thirty percent; and Lithuania -- eleven percent Russian and seven percent Polish. Russians accounted for approximately ten percent of the population in each of the pre-war republics. The presence of the Russian populations has played an important motivational role in Baltic nationalism.

After 1985 the populace in the Baltic Republics took readily to Soviet leader Gorbachev's twin messages of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Local government was attacked on economic, political, and especially environmental issues. Through 1985 and 1986, organized public protests were successful, to the great surprise of the protesters. These early successes provided the nascent grassroots organization and training in the politics of protest from which the formal nationalist movements were to evolve.

In all three Baltic Republics, the events arising from this initial impetus of protest followed a similar pattern. Popular fronts emerged with programmes initially based around the language of *perestroika*. This was followed by a remarkable demonstration of political cohesiveness by the ethnic national populations, with support from some Russian nationals, but opposition by others, that rapidly polarized into demands for complete and total independence within a year. The republican communist parties were coopted by nationalist elements, becoming another forum for nationalist expression. This "debolshevization" of the communist parties ended with their split from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

The pattern of Soviet reaction was one of harsh words but compromising actions. President Gorbachev indicated a willingness to negotiate all demands, including complete independence and secession from the Union, as long as republic actions remained consistent with the structures and norms of Soviet federalism. The one case where Soviet federalism was rejected out of hand -- the Lithuanian declaration of independence -- was met with harsh economic measures and demonstrations, but no use, of military force.

At the time, President Gorbachev had to deal with nationalist eruptions in every Republic, even the dominant Russian one. Some of these events were extremely violent and in regions with unstable external borders, as in Nagorno-Karabakh. This may have played a role in Moscow's relatively accommodating and cautious approach to events in the Baltic Republics.

### *Estonia*

Estonia was the first republic to put national autonomy on the agenda with the Proposal of Four, released on 26 September 1987. This proposal, named for the four who signed it, called for long-term economic autonomy to be the means for sovereignty and independence. The proposal came from within the Estonian Communist Party (ECP) and was released in a communist journal, albeit a minor one. Unlike events that were to transpire later in Lithuania, Estonian nationalism from the very first involved factions from within the Communist Party itself.

By May 1988, an entire political platform and nationalist movement had grown up around the Proposal of Four, culminating in the founding of the Estonian Front for *Perestroika* (Rahvarinne) in an inaugural congress on 1 and 2 October of that year. The programme of Rahvarinne was to become the model for the other Baltic republics: free elections; constitutional guarantees for private property; economic autonomy; and the protection of Estonian culture and language. Rahvarinne announced its intention to contest future elections.

In July 1988 a rival popular organization -- the Internationalist Movement -- was set up with aid from the ECP. Its purpose was to counter nationalist tendencies and to counteract Rahvarinne. Made up of Russians, it was apparently led by the directors of large state enterprises.

Meanwhile, public unrest continued. On 23 August 1988, mass rallies to commemorate the signing of the 1939 Non-Aggression Pact were held throughout the Baltic Republics.

The CPSU held its nineteenth party conference in June 1988. It was an extremely important meeting, resulting in the creation of a Congress of People's Deputies as the higher body of state authority in the USSR. The conference caused much discussion and agitation in the Baltic republics, where it was feared it would lead to increased central control. The publication of its constitutional proposals led to mass petitions and demonstrations.

On 16 November 1988, the Estonian Supreme Soviet -- the parliament of Estonia dominated by the Estonian Communist Party -- declared the republic sovereign. Laws passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet were to be subject to approval by the Estonian parliament. Control of economic resources was to be transferred to Estonia. The Presidium (Cabinet) of the USSR Supreme Soviet rejected this act, declaring that it undermined the very basis of Soviet existence. A week later, President Gorbachev publicly denounced Estonian actions as political adventurism, but declined to introduce the matter into the Supreme Soviet or to take other political action. At the same time, changes in the CPSU's constitutional proposals were announced, designed to meet Baltic concerns over their right to secede. In early December, in an apparent compromise gesture, Estonia postponed its plans for economic autonomy. However, it reaffirmed its right to veto

USSR legislation. At the same time, it passed a resolution giving Estonian status as a state language. This was passed into law on 18 January 1989.

The next important event occurred with the March 1989 elections to the newly formed Congress of People's Deputies. Rahvarinne openly fielded or supported candidates (as did the popular fronts in Latvia and Lithuania). These candidates, including the First Secretary of the ECP (who was also the president of Estonia) and the premier of Estonia, were elected. Significantly, four candidates backed by the opposing International Movement were also elected. The success of the two movements indicated the change in the political climate of Estonia.

In the weeks prior to the elections, President Gorbachev made further compromise initiatives. On 15 March he proposed that powers over distribution of industrial materials be devolved to the republics and that they be able to raise their own funds through stock and bond issues. On 24 March, *Pravda* published a draft Communist Party document proposing the transfer of power to the republics in the following areas: agriculture, consumer industries, environmental protection, housing, and social services.

These proposals were behind the pace of Baltic demands. All three popular fronts met in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, for a "Baltic Assembly" in May 1989. It called for Moscow not to obstruct the restoration of state sovereignty, for the freedom of the Baltic States to choose their own socio-economic systems, for total control of the economy by 1990, and for the trial of those responsible for the deportations and killings that had followed their 1940 incorporation into the Soviet Union. A few days later, Estonia rejected the Gorbachev and CPSU proposals, passing a resolution for full control of its economy. Further radicalization of the political scene was evident in a proliferation of popular movements with independence programmes.

In August 1989, Estonia overhauled its electoral law, essentially curtailing the right of non-Estonians to stand for, or vote in, local elections. This measure, discussed since June, was aimed at upcoming elections on 10 December 1989. Soviet reaction was swift, with the Presidium of the USSR declaring the law illegal and stating that it contravened basic human rights embodied in the Soviet constitution. But in a compromise action, instead of declaring the law null and void, it recommended that it be modified to meet these objections by October. Estonia complied with these demands on 5 October, noting that the law would be redesigned once legislation defining Estonian citizenship had been adopted.

Meanwhile, Soviet state and party authorities continued to work on the nationalities problem. In late July 1989, the Supreme Soviet endorsed the Baltic republics' transition to economic autonomy, conceding forms of independence in budgeting, taxation and economic planning one year ahead of similar reforms proposed for the entire Union. Furthermore, first reading was given to an economic independence bill. The vote to enact this bill as law was postponed, however.

September 1989 saw the long-awaited Central Committee of the CPSU plenary session on nationalities policy. At this session, President Gorbachev decried Stalin's "deviations" on nationalities policies and other errors of the past. He called for self-determination not through

secession, but through self-management. Political decentralization was feasible, he said, except for defence, foreign affairs and internal security. He reiterated the benefits of the July Supreme Soviet decree on economic autonomy. However, he also specifically stated that the wartime incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR was beyond reproach. In November, following the lead of the September session, the Baltic republics were granted full control over land and other resources and autonomy in planning and regulations and most financial operations.

By this time, Estonia had stepped even further from the Soviet Union. On 12 November 1989 it declared illegal the 1940 vote to join the USSR, on the grounds that it had been done under military coercion. Unlike Lithuania, Estonia did not call for secession or independence outright, but instead called for this as the basis for negotiating a new relationship between the Soviet Union and Estonia. This call was echoed at a mass rally on 2 February 1990, commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty in which Lenin's Soviet Union had recognized Estonia's independence.

Also in February 1990, Estonia followed the lead of Latvia and Lithuania in endorsing multi-party elections. This was a prologue to the elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet slated for 18 March 1990. Preceding these elections were parallel, private elections, organized by the increasingly powerful Citizens' Committees, for a "Congress of Estonia." A significant percentage of the total population -- 580,000 people -- turned out to vote in the Citizen Committee elections. The Congress constituted itself on 11 and 12 March, claiming to be the constitutional representative of the Estonian people.

In the official Supreme Soviet elections, Rahvarinne won forty-three of 105 seats, the International Movement twenty-seven, and other independence-minded parties thirty-five. The Estonian Communist Party, which ran candidates belonging to all three camps, won fifty-five seats. Arnold Rüütel, President of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, was elected President.

Meanwhile, the Estonian Communist Party voted in principle to split from the CPSU, but to wait for the results of the twenty-eighth CPSU Congress, to be held in July 1990, before finally committing itself.

On 30 March, the new Estonian Supreme Soviet immediately declared itself to be at the beginning of a period of transition towards a new Republic of Estonia. On 2 April, the parliament announced that the Soviet Constitution could not be the basis for realizing independence from the Soviet Union. Soviet President Gorbachev warned Estonia to retract its resolution and not to follow the same path as Lithuania.

Following Latvia's independence resolution of 4 May 1990<sup>1</sup>, the sovereign and independent "Republic of Estonia" was declared four days later. The key articles setting out Estonia's sovereignty were taken from the 1938 constitution. On 16 May, a law was passed to establish a provisional system of government during the period of transition to independence.

The three heads of government of the Baltic Republics had met in Vilnius on 12 April 1990 to sign a ten-year agreement on economic cooperation towards a Baltic Common Market. On 12 May they met again in Tallinn to revive the Baltic Council, a body for Baltic cooperation that was created by treaty in 1934 by the pre-war independent republics. This reconstituted Council was to coordinate the Republics' strategies for independence.

President Gorbachev outlawed the Estonian and the Latvian declarations of independence on 14 May. He maintained that they violated the USSR Constitution and were in contravention of the 3 April law defining procedures for secession.<sup>2</sup> President Gorbachev met with President Rützel of Estonia and President Gorbunovs of Latvia on 22 May. In an "unpleasant" encounter Gorbachev demanded they cancel their independence declarations before any negotiations could begin.

During this period, a pro-Soviet, anti-independence backlash occurred. Coordinated demonstrations took place in Estonia and Latvia on 15 March, one day after President Gorbachev's statements decrying independence for the Baltic republics. In both cases, the parliament buildings were rushed by unarmed crowds -- in the case of Latvia, by unarmed Soviet soldiers. They were rebuffed by civil militia acting under orders from the republic authorities.

In June, the Estonian parliament passed laws ending the Republic's subordination to Soviet government administration and institutions. It further called for Soviet-Estonian relations to be rebuilt on the foundations of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920.

### *Lithuania*

Lithuania's reaction to the activities of the nationalist movement varied from Estonia's. The Lithuanian Restructuring Movement -- Sajudis -- inaugurated itself on 22 and 23 October 1988, although it had been active informally for most of the previous year. Its programme, based upon the models provided by its companion Estonian and Latvian organizations, called for political, economic and cultural autonomy; a separate currency and citizenship; and curbs on immigration from other parts of the USSR.

Unlike the situation in Estonia, in Lithuania the Communist Party and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet initially took a hard-line stance against the nationalist proclamations. The Lithuanian leadership bent to public pressure in the area of symbols of cultural autonomy in order to blunt the effectiveness of the nationalist movement. On 20 August 1988, education reforms to reverse Russification were announced. Also that month, Lithuania was allowed to have the old,

---

<sup>1</sup> See section on Latvia below.

<sup>2</sup> See section on Lithuania below.

pre-war flag and national anthem alongside the Soviet ones. In October, these symbols replaced their Soviet counterparts. On 19 November, a proclamation was issued making the Lithuanian language a mandatory requirement within two years for all state employees. Russian and Polish nationals reacted in a mass rally under the name "Unity" to protest the language laws. In January 1989, the independence day of the 1918 Lithuanian Republic (16 February) was declared a national holiday. Nonetheless, initiatives on economic and political autonomy were conspicuous by their absence.

However, by spring 1989, a change in Party attitudes came about. Much of this can be attributed to the success of Sajudis in the March 1989 elections to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies. Communist Party members also became infected with the nationalism of the previous year. On 18 May, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet finally declared Lithuania sovereign, six months after Estonia had done so.

Lithuania reinforced its new, tougher stance by actions in the Congress of People's Deputies. For example, fifty of the fifty-eight Lithuanian deputies walked out on the voting to establish a Constitutional Commission, fearing that it would encroach upon the sovereignty of the republics. President Gorbachev insisted on the vote, registering the walkout as abstentions. However, after the walkout, a final decision on the commission was deferred.

In June 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party youth declared itself independent of the Soviet youth organization. At the same time, the senior party rewrote its constitution to allow for a multi-party system -- a measure adopted in the Lithuanian constitution in December. In November, the Party organized a Commission to Regain Independence. Then, on 20 December 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party voted to reconstitute itself as a separate party from its Soviet counterpart, the first such break in the monolithic CPSU.

This crisis generated a special CPSU Central Committee meeting in Moscow to deal with the Lithuanian actions. Over the following month, President Gorbachev negotiated personally with Lithuanian leaders, and publicly through the media and by visits to the Republic, but to no avail. Negotiation with the Communist leaders of Lithuania became irrelevant when on 24 February 1990, after the first multi-party elections in post-war Lithuania, Sajudis came to power.

Activities at the all-Union level influenced Sajudis' timetable. The new Lithuanian parliament rushed through a vote of independence, which was passed on 11 March 1990. This was done to pre-empt the Congress of People's Deputies' consideration of a new executive presidency, which could give Gorbachev new, sweeping powers in dealing with the crisis.

The declaration of independence was a new step in Soviet-Republic relations. The new president, Vytautas Landsbergis -- a concert pianist by profession -- declared illegal the 1940 vote of accession to the Union. The 1938 constitution was reinstated as the underpinning of a future "Basic Law." The new name of the country would be the Lithuanian Republic: "Soviet Socialist" was dropped. Refusing to characterize it as a "secession" from the Union, Landsbergis' declaration denied the validity of Lithuania ever having been a part of the USSR; Lithuania could not secede from that to which it had never legitimately belonged. This difference remains a major

sticking point in Lithuanian-Soviet relations. During a visit to Canada, President Gorbachev later denounced the Lithuanians for having acted in a "thief-like fashion", stealing out of the Union.<sup>3</sup>

Soviet reaction was swift and harsh by the standards of the previous two years' experience. The Congress of People's Deputies declared the declaration of independence illegal on 15 March 1989. Four days later, President Gorbachev reemphasised Soviet ownership of Lithuanian state facilities and industries.

There followed a period of much public diplomacy in the media, with Lithuania sticking to the forms of its independence and Gorbachev insisting on negotiations for a new relationship based on the acceptance of Lithuania's current position in the USSR. Ominously, there were Soviet troop movements on the borders of Lithuania, as well as in its capital, in early March. The rounding up of Lithuanians who refused to report for Soviet military conscription added to the tensions. Despite assurances by the Soviets that military force was not an option, the coercive nature of such activities was apparent. It remains unclear whether these manoeuvres were ordered by the Soviet leadership or were mounted independently by some level of the military.

On 3 April 1990, the Soviet government replied with a new law on secession. The law called for a referendum in the republic to be passed by a two-thirds majority, five years of transition to settle matters arising, and a second referendum to confirm the desire to separate. Demographically, Lithuania would appear to have no problem given that eighty percent of its population is Lithuanian, but Estonia (sixty-four percent Estonian) and Latvia (fifty-three percent Latvian) would experience difficulties, given their high proportion of Russians. This law was considered unacceptable in Lithuania, since it does not consider itself ever having been legally incorporated into the USSR.

On 13 April 1990, President Gorbachev issued an ultimatum to Lithuania to rescind its declaration of independence. This was refused and an economic blockade of the Republic was enacted on 18 April. The embargo on energy resources -- natural gas, coal and oil -- and other raw materials in particular put a severe strain on Lithuania's economy.

On 12 May 1990, Lithuania modified its stance, suspending all laws passed since the 11 March declaration, and thereby suggesting a transition period in which to negotiate independence. This offer was rejected as insufficient by President Gorbachev. A few days later he threatened further sanctions. However, in meetings on 24 May, the Soviet president told Lithuanian officials that if they declared a "freeze" on their declaration of independence, sanctions would be lifted immediately and Lithuania could achieve independence within two years.

Support for Lithuania came from an unexpected source at the beginning of June. Newly elected president of the Russian republic Boris Yeltsin met with President Landsbergis and pledged his cooperation. Russia offered to supply raw materials, oil and natural gas of its own

---

<sup>3</sup> Ross Howard, *Globe and Mail*, 31 May 1990, p. A1.

accord to circumvent the Soviet embargo. Needless to say, President Gorbachev expressed his extreme displeasure at this suggestion.

On 13 June, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov met with the prime ministers of all three Baltic republics. He announced that the USSR would ease the energy blockade, allowing up to thirty percent of the normal daily supply into Lithuania. In return, Lithuania intimated that it might freeze its declaration of independence along the lines of the Soviet proposal.

On 16 June, the Lithuanian cabinet proposed a compromise -- a moratorium on the declaration of independence. The declaration would remain valid, but implementation would be frozen while negotiations with the USSR were underway. This proposal was moved slowly through parliament so as not to antagonize the strong nationalist sentiments throughout the country. Furthermore, some Lithuanian officials, including President Landsbergis, believed President Gorbachev to be in a weakened position and felt that more concessions could be wrung from him. However, the moratorium proposal succeeded, passing through the Parliament on 29 June 1990.

### *Latvia*

In general, Latvia has been more cautious in its approach to national self-determination than the other two Baltic republics. Much of this can probably be attributed to the very high percentage of ethnic Russians living in Latvia. For example, Latvia gave official status to the national language and the pre-war republican flag in October 1988, later than Estonia and Lithuania. When a resolution endorsing Latvian as the state language was finally approved in May 1989, the status was postponed to 1992 in order to ease Moscow-Latvian tensions and Latvian-Russian tensions within the republic.

However, Latvians were in contact with their Baltic neighbours, participating in the all-Baltic mass rallies of 23 August 1988 and 1989. There was also strong Latvian participation in the "Baltic Union" congresses, culminating in the Baltic Council.<sup>4</sup> Within the republic there was the familiar pattern of nationalist agitation and public protest.

The Latvian Popular Front held its founding congress on 9 October 1988. Over 100,000 people attended the mass rally preceding this event. The Congress itself was addressed by the First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party, again indicating deep national sentiments within elements of the republican communist ruling elite. The Front's programme followed the lines of the other Baltic demands: greater economic and political autonomy; an end to immigration by non-Latvians; free elections; an independent constitutional court; territorial armed forces; separate diplomatic recognition; and an end to atheistic teaching in schools.

---

<sup>4</sup> See above section on Estonia.

The Latvian International Front was founded in January 1989 in opposition to the elements of the Latvian Popular Front's programme that dealt with restricting immigration and state language requirements. Together with the formation of other national fronts, this indicated some early lack of cohesion in the movement. In spring 1990, a radical Latvian popular front -- the National Independence Movement -- staged its own elections to a "Congress of Latvia." The popular level of participation by ethnic Latvians indicated strong support for independence, whatever the movement, among that constituency.

On 15 February 1990, the Latvian Supreme Soviet condemned the 1940 incorporation of the republic into the Soviet Union. It called for the start of negotiations toward independence and passed laws on the official use of the old flag, state symbols, and the national anthem.

On 18 March 1990, in the first round of elections to the Latvian Supreme Soviet, as with the other republics, those candidates endorsed by the Popular Front won, and ethnic Russian candidates did less well. This pattern was repeated in run-off elections in late April (run-offs were held in ridings where no clear victor emerged in the first round of voting). However, the margin of victory was not quite as decisive as in Estonia or Lithuania.

In an interesting byplay preceding the March elections, Latvian representatives to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies demanded that President Gorbachev meet with them to begin talks on their republic's independence. They revealed that the Soviet president had met quietly with Lithuanian and Estonian representatives to discuss future relations between the individual Baltic republics and the Soviet state while publicly rejecting such negotiations. The Latvians claimed that they had been promised similar meetings in exchange for support for Mr. Gorbachev's bid to be elected by the Congress instead of by direct popular vote.

On 6 and 7 April 1990, the Latvian Communist Party split into pro-Moscow and independent parties. Unlike the case of the other two Baltic republics, in Latvia the independent Communist Party represented the minority side of the split.

On 4 May 1990, the newly elected Latvian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution proclaiming independence. The resolution, drafted by the Popular Front, was more cautious in its approach than Lithuania's. The 1922 Constitution was reinstated, but the bulk of it then immediately suspended in favour of a transitional period during which negotiations for independence would take place. Soviet laws were not rejected outright, providing that they did not conflict with Latvian laws or rights.

Parliament chose Anatoly Gorbunovs, Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet and a member of the majority pro-CPSU faction of the Communist Party, as president. It was hoped that his good standing with Soviet officials would prove a positive influence in negotiations with them.

As noted above,<sup>5</sup> President Gorbachev reacted quickly and negatively to the Latvian and Estonian declarations of independence. He declared them illegal and refused to negotiate -- at least publicly -- with any of the Republics on the issue. This gave way to the more flexible response articulated during his 12 June meeting with the three Baltic presidents, when he promised to enter negotiations if they would "freeze" their current declarations of independence.

President Gorbunovs of Latvia took this proposal to be a *de facto* recognition of Latvia's step-by-step approach to independence. He promised to submit the proposal to the Latvian parliament. Talks could start immediately after its approval.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada's recent policy must be understood in the light of its historical position on the status of the Baltic republics. This has been remarkably consistent since their incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940. Canadian interest in the area stems mainly from the large numbers of people of Baltic background who have made Canada their home. Canada's position has been that the 1940 annexations were illegal according to the norms of international behaviour and should not be recognized:

[T]he position of the Government of Canada has been made clear. It is to continue to ensure *de jure* non-recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states.<sup>6</sup>

This tenet has been repeatedly stressed throughout the current Baltic situation.

At the same time, Canadian officials have traditionally acknowledged Moscow's effective control of the republics. As a result, Canada has generally treated the situation as an internal Soviet affair.

Canada's overall attitude toward the Soviet Union has shifted fundamentally in the recent past. Until spring 1989, Canada viewed the USSR's ideological hostility and military capabilities as the greatest threat to world stability; the changes underway in the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev were not yet rated as significant.<sup>7</sup> A reversal in the policy was signalled in a speech

---

<sup>5</sup> See section on Estonia.

<sup>6</sup> *Commons Debates*, 29 May 1990, p. 12000.

<sup>7</sup> "Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. East-West Relations: the way ahead." Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Canadian Foreign Policy Series* 89/2, 13 January 1989.

by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark in Toronto on 5 May 1990.<sup>8</sup> Canada's position henceforth would be one of cooperation and encouragement.

For its part, the Soviet Union has assiduously cultivated Canadian friendship over the past two years. Prime Minister Mulroney's visit to the USSR in November of 1989 was reciprocated by President Gorbachev at the end of May 1990. Canada has focussed its efforts mainly on economic assistance as a means to encourage the Soviet Union on its current path.<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless Canadian officials found openings for Canada to express its profound concern over events in the Baltic republics.

Prior to his visit to the USSR, the Prime Minister reiterated that Canada has never recognized the legality of Soviet rule in the Baltic and promised to raise the matter with President Gorbachev in "the normal course of [the] visit."<sup>10</sup> The Soviets indicated their willingness to discuss the issue if raised.<sup>11</sup> Mr. Mulroney did express Canada's concerns in his general discussions with the Soviet leader on 22 November 1989.<sup>12</sup>

In discussion the following day with his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, External Affairs Minister Clark expressed concern about the possible suppression of the Baltic nationalist movements. In Mr. Clark's words, he "indicated to him that there would naturally be concern on the part of Canadians, not simply those of Baltic origin, if there was that kind of development."<sup>13</sup>

Shevardnadze assured Clark that neither he nor the police nor the military were expecting a crackdown.

In the five months between the Mulroney visit to the USSR and the Gorbachev visit to Ottawa, the Baltic crisis heightened. Lithuania's declaration of independence and the imposition of the Soviet economic blockade occurred just before Gorbachev's scheduled stopover on 30 May and 1 June 1990. During that time, Mr. Clark and other officials at External Affairs were in contact with Soviet officials to urge moderation and a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

---

<sup>8</sup> "Speech by Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Club...." Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, *Canadian Foreign Policy Series* 89/12, 5 May 1989.

<sup>9</sup> Charlotte Montgomery, *Globe and Mail*, 27 September 1989, p. A5.

<sup>10</sup> Jeff Sallot, *Globe and Mail*, 20 November 1989, p. A1.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. A2.

<sup>12</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 November 1989, p. 6235; and *Globe and Mail*, 22 November 1989, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Julian Beltrame, *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 November 1989, p. A3.

On 27 March, in response to the military manoeuvres in Lithuania, Mr. Clark called in the Soviet ambassador to "express personally his deep concern" over the situation. He presented a formal letter to the Soviets, reminding them that Mr. Shevardnadze had given repeated assurances that there would be no crackdown in the Baltic states. The External Affairs Minister "indicated to Mr. Shevardnadze that further interventions of this kind on the part of the Soviet authorities and military would certainly have regrettable repercussions on relations between Canada and the USSR."<sup>14</sup>

Canadian officials ensured that the Baltic would be on the agenda for the Gorbachev visit, despite hints by Soviet officials that Canada's own domestic situation vis-à-vis Québec would be an equally valid subject for discussion.<sup>15</sup> President Gorbachev exchanged views with Prime Minister Mulroney over the Baltics on 30 May, reiterating that the USSR considered this a domestic issue; no outside interference was to be considered, nor was there to be outright independence for the Baltic republics.<sup>16</sup> During meetings between the two foreign ministers, Mr. Shevardnadze rejected Canadian appeals to lift the blockade at that time.<sup>17</sup>

The Canadian Government was also faced with the delicate issue of direct relations with Baltic representatives throughout this period. During a visit by a Canadian three-party parliamentary committee in late April, Lithuanian officials sought a trade deal involving Canadian oil that would circumvent the Soviet blockade and test the republic's ability to conduct independent trade. This was rejected on the grounds that "For Canada to insert itself in the war of nerves and the war of words would not move the process forward. It may even be unhelpful to Lithuania."<sup>18</sup>

In response to a Lithuanian request for Canadian aid in April, Ottawa offered assistance in establishing a finance ministry and advice on handling customs matters. It also urged concerted action by its allies as the best Western means of addressing the crisis.<sup>19</sup>

Lithuanian officials visiting Canada seeking support for their independence also created some diplomatic difficulties. Mr. Clark did not attend a dinner in honour of visiting Lithuanian Vice-President Bromis Kuzmickas, fearing it could be construed incorrectly by the Soviets as

---

<sup>14</sup> "Clark urges restraint by Soviet in Lithuania." Department of External Affairs, *Communiqué* No. 58 (27 March 1990).

<sup>15</sup> Ross Howard, *Globe and Mail*, 25 May 1990, p. A3.

<sup>16</sup> Ross Howard, *Globe and Mail*, 31 May 1990, p. A1.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1; and *Commons Debates*, 31 May 1990, p. 12114.

<sup>18</sup> Bruce Ward, *Ottawa Citizen*, 24 April 1990, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Santinder Bindra, *Montreal Gazette*, 27 April 1990, p. 11.

formal recognition.<sup>20</sup> The External Affairs Minister did meet with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene during her visit on 30 April and 1 May, but in an unofficial capacity. Mrs. Prunskiene was seeking backing and international guarantees from the West for her country. Mr. Clark, emphasizing the multilateral aspects of resolving the conflict, stated that "Canada was prepared to look at whether or not we could contribute to those guarantees."<sup>21</sup> He also offered the services of Canadian constitutional experts to help bring the crisis closer to a negotiated resolution.<sup>22</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The House of Commons has witnessed some degree of unanimity and all-party cooperation in dealing with this issue. For example, on 12 March, the day after the Lithuanian declaration of independence, an all-party resolution was passed, stating:

Be it resolved that this House recognize the legitimate right of the Lithuanian people, as expressed by their elected representatives on March 11, to declare the independence of the Republic of Lithuania.<sup>23</sup>

Members from all sides of the House introduced petitions or statements supporting all three Baltic Republics.<sup>24</sup>

On 22 November 1989, after reporting to the House on his Moscow trip, the Prime Minister was questioned on discussions regarding the Baltic. He told the House that he had brought up the issue and had received assurances from President Gorbachev that there would be no interference in the upcoming free elections in the Baltics.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Tim Harper, *Toronto Star*, 5 April 1990, p. A3. Minister of Justice Kim Campbell went in his stead.

<sup>21</sup> Bruce Ward, *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 May 1990, p. 1.

<sup>22</sup> Charlotte Montgomery, *Globe and Mail*, 10 May 1990, p. A8.

<sup>23</sup> *Commons Debates*, 12 March 1990, p. 9088.

<sup>24</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 March 1990, p. 8842; 14 March 1990, p. 9269; 27 March 1990, p. 9820; 27 March 1990, p. 9822; 29 March 1990, p. 9935; 3 April 1990, p. 10127; 4 April 1990, p. 10173; 7 May 1990, p. 11039; 30 May 1990, p. 12055; 7 June 1990, p. 12642; 26 June 1990, p. 13090.

<sup>25</sup> *Commons Debates*, 22 November 1989, p. 6262. For the December elections, see above.

During the Lithuanian crisis of spring 1990, the Opposition repeatedly used Question Period to press the government to act in Lithuania's favour,<sup>26</sup> particularly by providing medical assistance to the blockaded republic.<sup>27</sup> It also called for diplomatic recognition of Lithuania<sup>28</sup>, as well as for Canada to raise the issue in international institutions such as the CSCE.<sup>29</sup> External Affairs Minister Joe Clark consulted members of the Canadian Lithuanian community on possible Canadian responses.<sup>30</sup> On 30 April 1990, Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene attended Parliament from the Gallery.<sup>31</sup>

There has also been committee activity on the Baltic issue. A three-party committee visited Lithuania during its March elections, sponsored by the Canadian Lithuanian community.<sup>32</sup> The government later consulted with the group regarding Lithuanian independence.<sup>33</sup>

This committee formed the nucleus of a parliamentary Committee for the Baltic States, comprising Bill Blaikie (NDP), Pauline Browes (PC), Jesse Flis (Liberal), and David Kilgour (PC/Ind), to

serve as a forum for discussion and interaction between Parliamentarians, the Canadian government and the three Baltic communities...[to] act as liaison between concerned Canadians and the Canadian government...[and to] concentrate on urging the Canadian government to take whatever action is [necessary] to facilitate the independence of Lithuania, to urge the Soviet Union to negotiate a just settlement for the independence of Lithuania and to raise public and Parliamentary awareness as [to] the complexities of the Baltic situation.<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> *Commons Debates*, 14 March 1990, p. 9269; 19 March 1990, p. 9456; and 26 March 1990, pp. 9750-9751.

<sup>27</sup> *Commons Debates*, 25 May 1990, p. 11886; and 14 June 1990, p. 12675.

<sup>28</sup> *Commons Debates*, 3 April 1990, p. 10128; and 4 April 1990, p. 10173.

<sup>29</sup> *Commons Debates*, 8 May 1990, p. 1128; and 30 April 1990, p. 10791.

<sup>30</sup> *Commons Debates*, 27 March 1990, pp. 9826-9827.

<sup>31</sup> *Commons Debates*, 30 April 1990, p. 10787.

<sup>32</sup> *Commons Debates*, 6 March 1990, p. 8868.

<sup>33</sup> *Commons Debates*, 22 March 1990, p. 9640.

<sup>34</sup> Jesse Flis, MP. *Press Release*, 3 April 1990.

## CURRENT REFERENCES

Acherson, Neil, "The Trial of Lithuania." *New York Review of Books*, vol. 37 no. 7 (26 April 1990), pp. 3-4 and 6.

Dreifelds, Juris, "Latvian National Rebirth." *Problems of Communism*, vol. 38 (July/August 1989), pp. 77-95.

Mantenieks, M., "The Baltic Dilemma." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69 (Summer 1990), pp. 167-169.

Miljan, Toivo, "Perestroika in the Baltic Republics." *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 47 no. 3 (Spring 1990), pp. 1-19.

Radvanyi, Jean, "Pays Baltes: le prix de l'indépendence." *Politique internationale*, no. 48 (summer 1990), pp. 57-71.

Taagepera, Rein, "Estonia's Road to Independence." *Problems of Communism*, vol. 38 (November/December 1989), pp. 11-26.

Tarpas, Jan Arveds, *Impatient for Freedom? The Baltic Struggle for Independence*. London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1990 (36 pp.).

United States Congress, Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Renewal and Challenge: The Baltic States 1988-1989*. Washington: USGPO, CSCE 101-1-12 March 1990 (120 pp.).

Vardys, V. Stanley, "Lithuanian National Politics." *Problems of Communism*, vol. 38 (July/August 1989), pp. 53-76.



## *APPENDICES*

1. Canadian Treaty Obligations	411
2. Canadian Armed Forces Order of Battle	415
3. Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping	421
4. Public Opinion	425
5. Strategic Nuclear Balance	429
6. Canada and Security at the United Nations	431



## APPENDIX 1

### Canadian Treaty Obligations\*

#### *The Geneva Protocol of 1925*

(Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)

Signed by Canada: 17 June 1925 (Geneva).

Ratified: 6 May 1930.

For Canada the following reservation applies:

The Protocol is binding only as regards states which have both signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

#### *United Nations Charter*

Signed: 26 June 1945.

Ratified: 9 November 1945.

Entered into force for Canada: 9 November 1945.

#### *North Atlantic Treaty*

Signed: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.

Ratified: 3 May 1949.

Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

#### *Partial Test Ban Treaty*

(Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.) Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

Signed: 8 August 1963.

Ratified: 28 January 1964.

Entered into force: 10 October 1963.

#### *Outer Space Treaty*

(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies).

Signed: 27 January 1967.

Ratified: 10 October 1967.

Entered into force: 10 October 1967.

\* in the arms control, disarmament and defence fields.

*Non-Proliferation Treaty*

Prohibits non-nuclear weapon signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon signatories from giving nuclear weapons or their technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 12 June 1968. Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Canada also has a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by the NPT.

Signed: 23 July 1968.

Ratified: 8 January 1969.

Entered into force for Canada: 5 March 1970.

*Seabed Arms Control Treaty*

(Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof). Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 7 December 1970.

Signed: 11 February 1971.

Ratified: 17 May 1972.

Entered into force: 18 May 1972.

*Biological Weapons Convention*

(Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction).

Signed: 10 April 1972, London, Moscow, Washington.

Ratified: 18 September 1972.

Entered into force for Canada: 26 March 1975.

*ENMOD Convention*

(Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques).

Signed: 18 May 1977, Geneva.

Ratified: 11 June 1981.

Entered into force: 5 October 1978.

Entered into force for Canada: 11 June 1981

*Inhumane Weapons Convention*

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects).

Signed: 10 April 1981.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

*Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident*

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: 19 January 1990.

Entered into force for Canada: 18 February 1990.

*Assistance for Nuclear Accidents*

(Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency).

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

*Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material*

(Intended to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic storage and transport).

Signed: 22 September 1980.

Ratified: 21 March 1986.

Entered into force for Canada: 8 February 1987.

*The Antarctic Treaty*

(Guarantees the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibits any activities of a military nature, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material).

Acceded: 4 May 1988.

Entered into force: 4 May 1988.

**INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE 1990**

Source: External Affairs and International Trade Canada. Legal Affairs Bureau, Treaty section.



## APPENDIX 2

### The Canadian Armed Forces

#### 1. Personnel (31 July 1990)

Regular Forces	88,293
Primary Reserve	26,118
Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructors List	33,448
Civilian Strength	39,288
	<hr/> 187,147

<u>Command</u> <sup>1</sup>	<u>Regulars</u>	<u>Reserves</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>
Maritime	11,634	3,931	7,164	22,729
Mobile	19,739	22,000	5,500	47,239
Air	22,883	1,350	6,868	31,101

INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE JULY 1990

<sup>1</sup>Major commands only; totals do not correspond to personnel strength listed above.

## 2. Functional and Regional Commands

<u>Command</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Maritime	Halifax, Nova Scotia
Mobile	St.-Hubert, Quebec
Air	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canadian Forces Europe	Lahr, F. R. Germany
Canadian Forces Communication Command	Ottawa, Ontario
Canadian Forces Training System	Trenton, Ontario
Northern Region	Yellowknife, NW Territories

## 3. Naval Forces - Maritime Command, Fleet Strength

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Patrol Submarines	3
Destroyers	18
Operational Support Vessels	3
Tanker, Small	1
Research Vessels	3
Patrol Vessels/Training Ships	12
Gate Vessels	5
Reserve Tenders	14
Tugs	14
Auxiliaries	25
MCMA's	2
	<hr/> 100

#### 4. Land Forces - Mobile Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tanks	114 Leopard C-1
Armoured Fighting Vehicles - Reconnaissance	174 Lynx
Armoured Fighting Vehicles (Cougar)	195 Cougar
Armoured Personnel Carriers	1,058 M-113 269 Grizzly
Artillery (Howitzer)	12 Model 44 [L-5] (pack 105 mm) 179 towed 105 mm 76 M-109 Self-Propelled (155 mm)
Anti-tank Weapons Recoilless Rifles	787 Carl Gustav 84 mm
Anti-tank Guided Weapons	151 TOW
Air Defence Guns Surface-to-air Missiles	57 L-40/60 40 mm 111 Blowpipe

INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE JULY 1990

**5. Air Forces - Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe, Major Equipment<sup>4</sup>**

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>
Fighter	29 CF-5 (Freedom Fighter) 120 CF-18D (F/A-18A/B Hornet)
Electronic Countermeasures	7 CC-117 (Mystère-Falcon 20) 16 CC-144 Challenger
Maritime Reconnaissance	18 CP-140 Aurora 29 CP-121 Tracker
Transport	28 CC-130E/H/MT Hercules 5 CC-137 (Boeing 707) 7 CC-109 Cosmopolitan 8 CC-138 Twin Otter 11 CC-115 Buffalo 50 CT-133 Silver Star 108 CT-114 Tutor 21 CT-134/134 A Musketeer 2 CC-142 Dash 8 2 CC-129 Search and Rescue
<u>Type (Helicopters)</u>	
Anti-Submarine Warfare	35 CH-124 Sea King
Observation	66 CH-136 Kiowa
Transport	30 CH-135 Twin Huey 7 CH-147 Chinook
Search and Rescue	13 CH-113/A Labrador/Voyageur 9 CH-118 Iroquois
Training	14 CH-139 (Bell 206)

**INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE JULY 1990**<sup>4</sup>Includes storage, instructional, and repair.

## **6. Canadian Forces Europe**

Headquarters Canadian Forces Europe, CFB Lahr, Federal Republic of Germany

### **Bases**

Lahr  
Baden-Soellingen

### **Formations**

1st Canadian Division Headquarters Detachment, Lahr

### **4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group**

4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group Headquarters and Signal Squadron, Lahr  
8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's), Lahr  
3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, Baden-Soellingen  
1<sup>er</sup> Bataillon, Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment, Lahr  
1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, Lahr  
4 Combat Engineer Regiment, Lahr  
4 Service Battalion, Lahr  
4 Field Ambulance, Lahr  
4 Military Police Platoon, Lahr  
444 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, Lahr

### **1 Canadian Air Division**

Headquarters 1 Canadian Air Division, Lahr  
3 Fighter Wing, Lahr  
4 Fighter Wing, Baden-Soellingen  
409 Tactical Fighter Squadron, Baden-Soellingen  
421 Tactical Fighter Squadron, Baden-Soellingen  
439 Tactical Fighter Squadron, Baden-Soellingen  
1 Air Maintenance Squadron, Baden-Soellingen

### **Units**

#### **Canadian Support Group**

Forward Mobile Support Unit, Lahr

#### **Canadian Medical Group**

313 Field Hospital, Lahr and Baden-Soellingen  
319 Forward Medical Depot, Lahr

#### **CFE Communication Group Headquarters, Lahr**

Communication Squadron, Lahr  
Communication Squadron, Baden-Soellingen

**4 Air Defence Regiment, Lahr and Baden-Soellingen**

127 Air Defence Battery, Lahr  
128 Air Defence Battery, Baden-Soellingen  
129 Air Defence Battery, Lahr  
4 Air Defence Workshop, Lahr  
5 Air Movements Unit, Lahr  
35 Dental Unit, CFB Lahr  
Canadian Forces Europe Postal Unit, CFB Lahr

**INFORMATION CORRECT EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1989**

**Sources:** Director General Public Affairs, National Defence Headquarters; and National Defence, *Defence 89*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1990.

## APPENDIX 3

### Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to Present

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria	1948-	22	79	298
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Kashmir	1949-1979	27	Yes <sup>1</sup>	102-39
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK) <sup>2</sup>	Korea	1950-1954	8,000	-	
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) <sup>2</sup>	Korea	1953-	2	1	
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Cambodia Laos Vietnam	1954-1974	133	-	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1)	Egypt	1956-1967	1,007	-	6,373-3,378
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-1959	77	-	591-375

(1) Airlift of Group, twice annually (Rawalpindi-Srinagar)

(2) UN operations in Korea, 1950-1953, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to the present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this *Guide*.

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution
Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Congo (Zaire)	1960-1964	421	-	19,828
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	West New Guinea	1962-1963	13	-	15,761
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Yemen	1963-1964	36	-	189-25
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	575	6,411-2,345
Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Dominican Republic	1965-1966	1	-	3
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	India-Pakistan Border	1965-1966	112	-	96-78
Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968-1969	2	-	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 2)	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-1979	1,145	-	6,973-4,031
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	South Vietnam	1973-	278	-	
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel-Syria (Golan)	1974-	227	227	1,450
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	1978-	117	-	7,000-5,773
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Egypt-Israel	1982-(1986)	140	25	2,700

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution	Total UN Troop Contribution
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	Afghanistan-Pakistan	1988-1990	5	-	50-40
United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Iran-Iraq	1988-	540	15	408-955
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Namibia	1989-1990	301	-	4650
Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) <sup>3</sup>	Pakistan	1989-	14	-	70
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	Central America	1989-	179	179	380
Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) <sup>4</sup>	Afghanistan-Pakistan	1990	1	1	10

(3) The Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) for the training of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 1989, falls outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this *Guide*. It is a humanitarian relief assistance programme. The Canadian contribution to the MACTP ended in July 1990.

(4) Following the termination of UNGOMAP's mandate on 15 March 1990, the UN Secretary-General established OSGAP which includes a small Military Planning Unit to assist the Secretary-General's Representative in his efforts to bring about a political settlement. It is, however, not considered a peacekeeping mission by definition.

**Source:** National Defence, Canada, Directorate Peacekeeping Operations.



## APPENDIX 4

### Public Opinion

Several polls conducted between July 1989 and July 1990 surveyed Canadians' opinions on arms control, defence, foreign policy and regional conflicts. The following is a summary of some of these opinion poll results, organized in the categories of Canadian defence policy, Canadian foreign policy and international affairs.<sup>1</sup>

#### *Canadian Defence Policy*

During the period July-September 1989, Gallup conducted an opinion poll in Canada and eleven other member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Asked whether the Atlantic alliance should be maintained, 78 percent of the 1,041 Canadians polled said yes, while 8 percent said NATO is no longer necessary. Fourteen percent had no opinion. Only in the Netherlands, where 81 percent said they favoured maintaining the alliance, was support for NATO greater than that expressed in the Canadian survey.

In August 1989, Gallup Canada polled 1,013 Canadians on their attitudes towards federal Government defence spending. Thirty-one percent of respondents said the federal Government devotes too much of its budget to defence and the armed forces, and 23 percent believed the Government spends too little, while 31 percent said it spends about the right amount on defence. Fifteen percent had no opinion.

In a poll conducted for the *Toronto Star* and CTV News in January 1990, Insight Canada Research of Toronto asked 1,002 Canadians if the Government should modify its military spending as a result of changes in Eastern Europe. Sixty-six percent of those surveyed said Canada should reduce its military spending, 16 percent said there should be no change, 13 percent believed military spending should be increased and six percent had no opinion.

In January 1990, Gallup surveyed 1,051 Canadians on their attitudes towards the presence of Canadian troops in Europe. Fifty-five percent of those polled favoured maintaining a military contingent in Europe, 26 percent said Canadian troops stationed in Europe should be brought home and 19 percent had no opinion.

---

<sup>1</sup> In 1989, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) conducted its third annual survey of Canadian public opinion on peace and international security. Given the length and scope of the survey, it should be noted that only certain questions and responses are included in this summary. For a more detailed analysis of the poll, see Michael Driedger and Don Munton, *Security, Arms Control and Defence in Canada: Canadian Public Attitudes*. Ottawa: CIIPS, December 1989; and Don Munton, "Uncommon Threats and Common Security." *Peace & Security*, vol. 4 no. 4, (Winter 1989/1990), pp.2-5.

In another Gallup poll conducted in February 1990, 35 percent of 1,003 respondents said they support Ottawa's agreement to allow the United States to continue testing cruise missiles over Canadian territory, while 57 percent said this permission should be withdrawn. Eight percent had no opinion on the subject.

### *Canadian Foreign Policy*

The first question in the CIIPS 1989 opinion poll asked Canadians whether they followed news on international affairs and foreign policy. Nineteen percent of survey respondents said they followed such international news very closely, 49 percent said they followed it quite closely, 29 percent said they did not follow it very much and four percent said they did not follow it at all.

Asked about Prime Minister Mulroney's visit to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1989, 90 percent of those polled said they thought it would be a good thing if Canada and the Soviet Union cooperated more closely. When respondents were asked to select areas in which closer cooperation should take place, 34 percent chose the improvement of East-West relations, 28 percent chose cultural, scientific and educational exchanges, 27 percent selected the increase of trade, 8 percent said the furthering of East-West arms control and 3 percent pointed to the undertaking of joint research in the Arctic.

Asked whether the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow would contribute to international peace, 55 percent of respondents said it would make a contribution, but not a major one. Thirty-nine percent said the visit would make no contribution toward international peace, while 6 percent said it would be a very significant contribution.

Asked about Government decisions on foreign aid and defence spending in the February 1989 federal budget, 24 percent of those polled said foreign aid should have been reduced rather than defence, while 21 percent favoured the opposite. Twenty-nine percent said spending should have been reduced by even more for both, 10 percent said both should have been cut by less and 16 percent said reductions should have been made to other than either foreign aid or defence.

In the CIIPS poll, respondents were also asked to classify in order of importance three types of international problems that could pose a threat to Canada's security at present. Forty-three percent of those polled said economic threats were the most serious, 51 percent pointed to environmental threats as most serious and 6 percent indicated military threats. Asked to specify the relative importance of these three types of threats over the next ten years, 28 percent said the economy was the most important, 66 percent indicated environmental threats as most important and 7 percent chose military threats.

In November 1989, the weekly magazine *Maclean's* and Decima Research conducted an opinion poll of 1,500 respondents. They were asked if the changes in Eastern Europe should prompt Canada to offer significant economic assistance to encourage reform and economic stability there. Sixty-six percent of Canadians surveyed said that the political and economic changes in Eastern

Europe were of no direct concern to Canada and that to offer financial assistance would be a waste of Canadian taxpayers' money. Thirty-one percent of respondents were of the opinion that Canada should offer financial assistance even if this meant an increase in taxes.

### *International Affairs*

In the CIIPS 1989 poll, respondents were asked several questions on threats to world peace and the use of nuclear weapons. Asked which situation posed the greatest threat to world peace, 5 percent of Canadians surveyed identified Soviet actions on the international scene, 9 percent pointed to American actions, 21 percent cited the arms race between the superpowers, 25 percent said regional conflicts elsewhere in the world were the greatest threat, and 40 percent said acquisition of nuclear weapons by small countries posed the greatest threat.

Four percent of survey respondents believed that nuclear war is very likely in the next ten years, 15 percent said it is likely, 56 percent considered it unlikely and 25 percent said it is very unlikely.

On the question of how nuclear arms might be used, 75 percent of respondents said their use by terrorists or a madman is likely or very likely. About 70 percent of respondents also believed it likely that the United States or the Soviet Union would use nuclear weapons in a regional conflict. Nine percent of Canadians surveyed believed that a nuclear explosion following an accident or human error is very likely, 36 percent believed it is likely, 38 percent thought it unlikely and 17 percent considered it very unlikely.

In December 1989, Gallup Canada conducted a survey of 1,431 Canadians for the United Nations. Forty-seven percent of those polled said the United Nations is doing good work, while 17 percent held the opposite view.

In a Gallup poll of 1,051 respondents conducted in January 1990, 24 percent of Canadians believed that the Cold War has ended, while 59 percent held the opposite opinion. Seventeen percent had no opinion.

In May 1990, Southam News and Novosti News Agency asked the Angus Reid firm to conduct simultaneous opinion surveys in Moscow, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. Asked how they perceived the unification of the two Germanys, 82 percent of the 999 Canadian respondents said that it would be a good thing or that it would make no difference, while 13 percent said it would be a bad thing. In Moscow, 63 percent of 1,137 Soviet respondents said German unification would be a good thing or that it would make no difference, while 25 percent held the opposite opinion.



## APPENDIX 5

### Strategic Nuclear Balance

#### UNITED STATES

	Launchers	Warheads	Yield (megatons)	Total Warheads
<b>ICBMs</b>				
Minuteman II	450	1	1.200	450
Minuteman III				
MK-12	200	3	0.170	600
MK-12A	300	3	0.335	900
MX	50	10	0.300	500
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,000</b>			<b>2,450</b>
<b>SLBMs</b>				
Poseidon C3	208	10	0.050	2,080
Trident I C4	384	8	0.100	3,072
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>592</b>			<b>5,152</b>
<b>Bombers</b>				
B-52 G/H	173	* [	0.170	1,100
B-1B	90		0.050-0.150	1,600
FB-111A	48		0.500	1,800
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>311</b>			<b>4,500</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>1,903</b>			<b>12,100</b>

\*Bombers are loaded in a variety of ways depending on mission, but most aircraft carry SRAMs and bombs. B-1Bs and FB-111s do not carry ALCMs.

**Source:** Robert Norris and William Arkin, "Nuclear Notebook." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 46 no. 1 (January/February 1990).

## Strategic Nuclear Balance (cont'd)

## SOVIET UNION

	Launchers	Warheads	Yield (megatons)	Total Warheads
<b>ICBMs</b>				
SS-11				
M2	150	1	1.1	150
M3	210	3(MRV)*	0.350	210
SS-13 M2	60	1	0.750	60
SS-17 M3	100	4	0.750	400
SS-18 M4/M5	296/12	10	0.550/0.750	3,080
SS-19 M3	300	6	0.550	1,800
SS-24 M1/M2	18/40	10	0.550	580
SS-25	170	1	0.550	170
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,356</b>			<b>6,450</b>
<b>SLBMs</b>				
SS-N-6 M3	192	2(MRV)*	1.000	192
SS-N-8 M1/M2	286	1	1.500	286
SS-N-17	12	1	1.000	12
SS-N-18 M1-3	224	7	0.500	1,568
SS-N-20	120	10	0.200	1,200
SS-N-23	96	4	0.100	384
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>930</b>			<b>3,642</b>
<b>Bombers</b>				
Tu-95 Bear B/C	20	4 bombs or 1 AS-3		80
Tu-95 Bear G	45	4 bombs or 2 AS-4		270
Tu-142 Bear H	80	8 AS-15 ALCMs or bombs		640
Tu-160 Blackjack	17	6 AS-15 ALCMs, 4 AS-16 SRAMs and 4 bombs		238
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>162</b>			<b>1,228</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>2,448</b>			<b>11,320</b>

**Source:** Robert Norris and William Arkin, "Nuclear Notebook." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 46 no. 2 (March 1990).

\*Multiple re-entry vehicles; counted as one warhead.

ALCM - air-launched cruise missile; AS - air-to-surface missile; ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM - submarine-launched ballistic missile; SRAM - short-range attack missile.

## APPENDIX 6

### Canada and Security at the United Nations

The United Nations deals with arms control, disarmament and regional conflict issues in the following different fora:

- a) the Plenary of the General Assembly
- b) the Security Council
- c) the First (Political and Security) Committee
- d) the Special Political Committee
- e) the United Nations Disarmament Commission
- f) various *Ad-Hoc* committees and organizations
- g) various study groups
- h) the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

#### a) *The Plenary of the General Assembly*

For the most part, the General Assembly has a mandate to discuss all issues or problems falling within the purview of the United Nations Charter. One of its principal tasks, however, is to refer agenda items to the seven Main Committees, including the First and Special Political Committees. All UN members have the right to be represented on the Main Committees. Once the Committees have completed their discussions on these items, draft resolutions are voted upon and, in turn, referred back to the General Assembly. The resolutions are then passed or rejected by a vote taken in the Plenary.

#### b) *The Security Council*

The Security Council has the primary responsibility within the UN system for maintenance of international peace and security. Its main functions include peaceful settlement of disputes and action taken to ensure and encourage peace. The Council reacts to events as they arise and, as in the case of peacekeeping operations, implements measures to prevent or reduce the intensity of conflicts. The Security Council consists of fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States), and ten members elected on a regional basis by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Decisions on procedural questions require the support of nine members. All other decisions require an affirmative vote by nine members, including the five permanent members, each of whom has a veto. In October 1988, Canada was elected to

the Security Council for a two-year term for the fifth time since 1946. In 1989, the non-permanent members of the Security Council were Algeria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and Yugoslavia. In 1990, the non-permanent Council members were Canada, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen and Zaire.

c) *The First Committee*

The First Committee deals with arms control, disarmament and international security matters. It is a forum for debate and discussion rather than negotiation. In recent years, it has dealt with as many as eighty resolutions per year. Among the major issues of interest to Canada dealt with by the First Committee in 1989 were the following: prevention of an arms race in outer space, a total ban on nuclear testing and chemical weapons, a ban on fissionable materials intended for use in weapons, and streamlining of the Committee's work. Members of the Committee try to reach a consensus on all resolutions, but many are put to a vote.

d) *The Special Political Committee*

This Committee considers a wide variety of issues not dealt with by any of the other six Main Committees. During the 43rd Session, these included the effects of atomic radiation, international cooperation for the peaceful uses of outer space, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories, peacekeeping, information, the Malagasy Islands and, finally, apartheid.

e) *The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)*

The UNDC is another deliberating body whose work on arms control and disarmament is limited to certain aspects. In 1990, the UNDC dealt with the following subjects: nuclear disarmament, naval armaments and disarmament, South Africa's nuclear capability, the role of the UN in disarmament, conventional disarmament, the Third Disarmament Decade and objective information on military questions. During the 43rd Session held in 1988, the UNDC reached unanimously on two items, namely verification and confidence-building measures, both of which were removed from the agenda as a result. The Commission meets in May of every year for about a month, during which all member-states are entitled to participate. Unlike the First Committee, its work is conducted solely by consensus.

f) *Various Ad Hoc Committees and Bodies*

These are generally bodies which function on a General Assembly mandate. They are of both long and short duration, depending on the nature of their work and objectives. They include such bodies as the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),

the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT PrepCom), the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, and the Conference on Disarmament (see below). During the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament, Canada presided over the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

*g) Various Study Groups*

Occasionally, the General Assembly calls for special studies to be conducted on various issues relating to arms control, disarmament and international conflict. Four Study Groups worked on various questions in 1989, namely the role of the UN in verification, nuclear weapons, effective and verifiable measures to allow the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and, finally, promotion of transparency in the international transfer of conventional weapons. Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister of External Affairs for Political and International Security Affairs, presided over the Study Group on Verification. Canada is not involved in the other three Study Groups.

*h) Conference on Disarmament (CD)*

The Conference on Disarmament is a forty-nation Committee separate from, but mandated by, the United Nations. Canada has been a member from its earliest beginnings. It is the world's only global multilateral forum for negotiation in the field of disarmament. It meets twice a year in Geneva to negotiate on the following issues: nuclear test-ban; cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; chemical weapons; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; and a comprehensive disarmament programme. The CD also creates Ad Hoc working groups and committees to consider various issues. Decisions at the CD are made by consensus.

# Security Council Voting Record (1 July 1989 to 31 July 1990)

Canada voted YES to each of the following Resolutions passed by the Council:

S/RES/636 (6 July 1989)	Re: Reaffirming that the Geneva Convention applies to the Palestinian territories.
S/RES/637 (27 July 1989)	Re: Peace efforts in Central America.
S/RES/638 (31 July 1989)	Re: Hostage-taking and abduction.
S/RES/639 (31 July 1989)	Re: Extension of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
S/RES/640 (29 August 1989)	Re: The situation in Namibia before the holding of free elections.
S/RES/641 (30 August 1989)	Re: Reaffirming that the Geneva Convention applies to the Palestinian territories.
S/RES/642 (29 September 1989)	Re: Renewal of mandate of United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group.
S/RES/643 (31 October 1989)	Re: The situation in Namibia before the holding of free elections.
S/RES/644 (7 November 1989)	Re: Creation of a United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA).
S/RES/645 (29 November 1989)	Re: Renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.
S/RES/646 (14 December 1989)	Re: Extending Resolution 186 (1964) regarding stationing of UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus.
S/RES/647 (11 January 1990)	Re: Extending the temporary operations of UN officers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
S/RES/648 (31 January 1990)	Re: Extending the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon.
S/RES/649 (12 March 1990)	Re: Efforts to resolve the problem in Cyprus.

S/RES/650 (27 March 1990)	Re: Expanding the mandate of the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA).
S/RES/651 (29 March 1990)	Re: Renewal of mandate of the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group.
S/RES/652 (17 April 1990)	Re: Request for admission of Namibia to the United Nations.
S/RES/653 (20 April 1990)	Re: Adding new tasks to the mandate of the ONUCA.
S/RES/654 (4 May 1990)	Re: Extending the mandate of the UN Observer Group in Central America.
S/RES/655 (31 May 1990)	Re: Renewal of mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force.
S/RES/656 (8 June 1990)	Re: Prolonging mandate of responsibilities incumbent on ONUCA.
S/RES/657 (15 June 1990)	Re: Prolonging stationing of UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus.
S/RES/658 (27 June 1990)	Re: Efforts to resolve the issue of West Sahara.

During this period, four provisional resolutions were rejected. The first, supported by Canada, asked Israel to lift its siege of the Occupied Territories. The United States was alone in voting against it. The second, opposed by Canada, deplored the United States' intervention in Panama and demanded an immediate end to that intervention and withdrawal of American forces from Panama. The United States, France and the United Kingdom also voted against this resolution, while Finland abstained.

Canada supported two other provisional resolutions on which the United States was alone in exercising its veto. The first deplored the events of 29 December 1989 at the residence of the Ambassador of Nicaragua in Panama, declaring that these events constituted a violation of diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities recognized by international law and the Vienna Convention. The second called for the establishment of a Committee to examine the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Territories.

Source for the Security Council Voting Record: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa.

**Resolutions on Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security adopted by the 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly following First Committee Deliberations**

<b>Resolution and Lead Sponsor</b>	<b>Resolution (supported by Canada)</b>	<b>Vote (Ycs/No/Ab)</b>
(*Canada co-sponsor)		
44/104 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	147-0
44/107 (NZ)*	Urgency of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	145-2
44/108 (Egypt)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East	Consen
44/109 (Pakistan)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	116-3-
44/110 (Bulgaria)	Guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states against the use of nuclear arms	131-0-
44/111 (Pakistan)	Assurances against use of nuclear arms	151-0-
44/112 (Egypt)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	153-1-
44/113A (Kenya)	Denuclearization of Africa	147-0-
44/114B (FRG)	Military budgets	127-0-
44/115A (Canada/Poland)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consen
44/115B (Australia)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons: measures to maintain the authority of the Geneva Protocol	Consen
44/115C (Australia)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consen
44/116B (UK)*	Bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms	91-0-
44/116C (China)	Conventional weapons' disarmament	Consen
44/116D (China)	Nuclear disarmament	Consen
44/116E (UK)*	Objective information on military questions	132-0-
44/116F (Denmark)	Conventional weapons' disarmament	Consen
44/116H (Canada)*	Ban on production of fissionable materials	147-1-
44/116I (France)	Confidence-and security-building measures and conventional weapons' disarmament in Europe	Consen

44/116J (Bulgaria)	Conversion of military resources	153-0-1
44/116L (Yugoslavia)	Disarmament and development	Consensus
44/116M (Sweden)	Naval armaments and disarmament	154-1-0
44/116N (Colombia)*	International arms transfers	143-0-12
44/116O (Brazil)	Seabed Treaty Review Conference	Consensus
44/116Q (Cameroon)	Report of the UN Disarmament Commission	Consensus
44/116R (Kenya)	Hostile dumping of radioactive materials	150-0-4
44/116T (USSR)	Radiological weapons	Consensus
44/116U (FRG)*	Contribution of confidence- and security-building measures	Consensus
44/117B (Belgium)*	Regional disarmament	Consensus
44/117E (Nigeria)	UN scholarship programme on disarmament	Consensus
44/117F (Nepal/Peru/ Togo)	UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Asia, Africa and Latin America	153-1-1
44/118B (GDR)	Science and technology for disarmament	154-0-1
44/119A (Mexico)	Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament	154-0-1
44/119C (Zaire)	Report of the UN Disarmament Commission	Consensus
44/119F (NZ)	Treaty on establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific	151-0-4
44/119G (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	Consensus
44/119H (Nigeria)	Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade	Consensus
44/122 (Chairman)	Compliance with arms control agreements	Consensus
44/123 (Costa Rica)	Education for disarmament	149-0-5
44/125 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean	Consensus

**Draft Decisions**

(Sweden)	Conventional weapons deemed excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	Consen
(Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	Consen

**Opposed by Canada**

44/114A (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	116-10-1
44/117C (India)	Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	134-17-4
44/117D (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	136-13-5
44/119B (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	129-17-7
44/119E (GDR)	Cessation of nuclear arms race and prevention of nuclear war	138-11-6

**On Which Canada Abstained**

44/20 (Brazil)	Zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic	146-1-1
44/105 (Mexico)	Halt to all nuclear testing	136-3-1
44/106 (Mexico)	Partial Test Ban Treaty Amending Conference	127-2-2
44/113B (Kenya)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	137-4-1
44/116A (Iraq)	Prohibition of development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	124-2-2
44/116G (USSR)	Implementation of UN General Assembly Resolutions	129-1-2
44/116K (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms	134-0-1
44/116P (GDR)	Defensive security concepts	131-0-1
44/116S (Peru)	Conventional weapons' disarmament on a regional scale	119-1-3
44/117A (Mexico/ Sri Lanka)	World Disarmament Campaign	144-0-1
44/118A (India)	Impact of scientific and technical developments	137-3-1
44/119D (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	138-8-5

44/120 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean - Zone of Peace	137-4-14
44/121 (Jordan)	Israeli nuclear arms	104-2-43
44/126 (Yugoslavia)	Strengthening of international security	128-1-24

**Totals:**

Canada in favour	40 (20 consensus)
Canada opposed	5
Canada abstained	15

**Source** for UN General Assembly resolutions: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Disarmament Bulletin* No. 12 (Winter 1989-90), pp. 15-16.















CAI  
IPS  
-G71

360 Albert Street,  
Suite 900  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1R 7X7

Government of Canada  
Publications



# The Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution

# The Guide

# 1991



*THE GUIDE*  
*TO CANADIAN POLICIES*  
*ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT,*  
*DEFENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION*  
*1991*

by  
Jane Boulden  
David Cox

THE NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA HAS  
CATALOGUED THIS PUBLICATION AS FOLLOWS:

*Main entry under title:*

*The Guide to Canadian policies on arms control,  
disarmament, defence and conflict resolution*

*Annual  
1985/86-*

*Issued also in French under title: Guide sur les  
politiques canadiennes relatives à la limitation  
des armements, au désarmement, à la défense et à  
la solution des conflits.*

*ISSN 0834-1427*

- 1. Arms control -- Government policy -- Canada.*
- 2. Disarmament -- Government policy -- Canada.*
- 3. Canada -- Defences. 4. Pacific settlement of  
international disputes -- Government policy --  
Canada. I. Canadian Institute for International  
Peace and Security.*

*JX1974                      327.1'74'0971                      C87-030428-3*

October 1991  
ISBN 0-662-19192-7  
CC 291-2/1991 E

For further information on any of the topics  
included in *The Guide*, please contact  
the Institute Library.

**Think Recycling!**



**Pensez à recycler !**

## *TABLE OF CONTENTS*

### *PREFACE*

### *INTRODUCTION*

### *SECTION I -- ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT*

1.	ARMS TRANSFERS .....	1
2.	CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS .....	13
3.	CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE .....	23
4.	CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES .....	31
5.	MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL .....	35
6.	MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR) .....	41
7.	NAVAL ARMS CONTROL .....	45
8.	NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)-- THE FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE .....	51
9.	NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING -- PTBT AMENDMENT CONFERENCE .....	59
10.	NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES .....	67
11.	PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE .....	73
12.	STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START) .....	79
13.	VERIFICATION .....	85

### *SECTION II -- DEFENCE*

14.	ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND DEFENCE .....	91
15.	CRUISE MISSILE TESTING .....	101
16.	DEFENCE BUDGET AND POLICY .....	105
17.	NATO .....	117
18.	NORAD .....	125



### **SECTION III -- CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

19.	CAMBODIA .....	133
20.	CENTRAL AMERICA .....	139
21.	CONFLICT IN THE SOVIET UNION .....	147
22.	HAITI .....	157
23.	HORN OF AFRICA: ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, THE SUDAN .....	163
24.	INDIA-PAKISTAN .....	171
25.	ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES .....	177
26.	KOREA .....	191
27.	LEBANON .....	197
28.	MYANMAR .....	205
29.	THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS .....	211
30.	SOUTH AFRICA .....	243
31.	SOUTHERN AFRICA: ANGOLA, NAMIBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE .....	253
32.	YUGOSLAVIA .....	259
33.	WESTERN SAHARA .....	267

### **SECTION IV -- INSTITUTIONS**

34.	CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE .....	271
35.	NORTH PACIFIC .....	279
36.	ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) .....	285
37.	UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING .....	291

### **SECTION V -- FACTS AND FIGURES**

1.	CANADA AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY .....	299
2.	CANADA AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL .....	307
3.	CANADIAN ARMED FORCES .....	309
4.	CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1948 TO PRESENT .....	313
5.	CANADIAN TREATY OBLIGATIONS .....	317
6.	TREATY ON REDUCING CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE .....	321
7.	KEY PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT AND THE EMERGENCIES ACT .....	323
8.	STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE .....	325
9.	SUMMARY OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF .....	329



## PREFACE

*The Guide 1991* reviews major developments in the field of international peace and security from August 1990 to mid-August 1991, and surveys Canadian political statements and parliamentary debates on these issues.

This annual *Guide* is intended to be a user-friendly reference book for students, speakers, commentators and analysts who require reliable, factual information on recent Canadian participation and debate in the turbulent field of international affairs. This is the sixth annual issue of this publication and some of the material has been cumulative in previous years. This year, our writers have reduced the size of *The Guide 1991*, and refer readers to last year's edition if more background information is required.

*The Guide 1991* contains a lengthy entry on the second Persian Gulf War which broke out as last year's *Guide* went to press. There is also a new entry dealing with arms control in the Middle East at a time when hopes have been raised for a Middle East peace conference. Section III of *The Guide*, dealing with conflict resolution, also contains an entry on Israel and the occupied territories as the whole Middle East region boomeranged back into the headlines in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. An entry on Yugoslavia gives an account of the tumultuous events taking place in its six republics.

A new section in *The Guide* deals with institutions reflecting the importance for Canada internationally of the CSCE, and Canada's involvements with its Pacific neighbours and those to the south.

While there is obvious value to an annual review and reference source, the whirlwind pace of international change in recent years inevitably means that its coverage must be interrupted at some crucial point. This year at the time of writing, the Soviet Union is in turmoil after an attempted coup, and the direction of the Union and its constituent parts hangs in the balance. These events and their sequel will be covered in next year's edition of *The Guide*.

Canadian interests and values are deeply engaged in the changes of this volatile world. Moreover, instantaneous global communication has brought such events to the living rooms of every Canadian and has increased broad public interest in them. We believe that this may deepen and widen reflection about effective Canadian roles in strengthening international peace and security. This *Guide* can contribute by enabling readers to set a clear context for recent events in international affairs, trace their evolution, and look critically at Canada's participation and potential roles.



Bernard Wood  
Chief Executive Officer



## INTRODUCTION

*The Guide* is designed as a reference to current Canadian policies in the field of international peace and security. It is divided into four sections: *ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT*, *DEFENCE*, *CONFLICT RESOLUTION*, and *INSTITUTIONS*. Within these sections, individual entries are organized under the headings *BACKGROUND*, *CURRENT CANADIAN POLICY*, and *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*. A final section, *FACTS AND FIGURES*, provides basic data related to Canadian policy.

The *BACKGROUND* section provides the international context for Canadian policy, and may also incorporate Canadian policy prior to the year under review where this is appropriate. *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION* is based on statements by Ministers and responsible officials. *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT* is intended primarily to reflect the responses of the opposition parties, and, for the most part, draws upon statements by designated party spokespersons. At the end of each entry, a selected list of current references and background readings is provided. This list is not comprehensive: in conjunction with the footnoted references to Canadian policy statements and documents, it is intended to guide the interested reader to further sources of information.

Some of the individual entries necessarily overlap. For this reason, and in order to avoid duplication, the *CROSS REFERENCES* at the end of each section may provide important additional information on the entry in question. In particular, readers may wish to be aware that, in addition to the data on peacekeeping in *FACTS AND FIGURES*, Canadian policies on peacekeeping operations are described in the individual entries of the *CONFLICT RESOLUTION* section. The lengthy entry on the Gulf War is also complemented by the entry on Israel and the Occupied Territories.

The 1991 *Guide* covers the period from the beginning of August 1990 to the middle of August 1991. It begins, therefore, with the international crisis triggered by the invasion of Kuwait, and ends before the tumultuous events caused by the aborted coup in the Soviet Union seemed set to dominate the international agenda of the coming year.

It would not be possible to cover such a great span of events and to complete *The Guide* in a timely manner without the concerted support of the staff of the Institute. In particular, we wish to thank the library staff for their unfailing assistance, and Veronica Baruffati for managing the publication. Institute staff members read individual entries and provided useful and timely comments and suggestions. Veronica Baruffati and Hélène Samson respectively copy-edited the English and French versions of *The Guide*. Veronica Suarez was responsible for the final inputting and formatting of *The Guide* entries.

Jane Boulden and David Cox  
Kingston, Ontario  
August 1991



## SECTION I -- ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

### 1. ARMS TRANSFERS

#### BACKGROUND

Post-war efforts to seek agreement on the limitation or regulation of arms transfers have been limited. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which consists of the NATO countries minus Iceland plus Japan and Australia, has been effective in controlling exports to communist countries. Broader efforts to create regional or multilateral controls on arms transfers, however, have until recently received little support. After a number of unsuccessful resolutions in the UN General Assembly, in 1988, a Colombian initiative co-sponsored by Canada, requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of members on the question of international arms transfers, and thereafter to carry out a study, with the assistance of governmental experts, on means of promoting transparency in international arms transfers. As a consequence of this resolution, the Secretary-General established the Group of Governmental Experts on Arms Transfer Transparency, which is expected to submit its report to the Secretary-General during the fall 1991 session of the General Assembly.

According to figures published in May 1991 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the global value of trade in major conventional weapons fell in 1990, declining approximately 35 percent from 1989 levels to an aggregate value of approximately US \$21.7 billion. According to the SIPRI Yearbook, 55 percent of arms deliveries were to Third World countries. The United States and the Soviet Union accounted for 69 percent of the value of the total trade, with the United States increasing its share from 34 percent in 1989 to 40 percent on 1990, while the Soviet share dropped from 37 percent in 1989 to 29 percent in 1990. In June 1991, a study released by the Office of Technology Assessment, an agency created to undertake independent studies for the US Congress, found that in 1988 (the last year in which figures were available), the United States exported US \$14.3 billion worth of weapons, three times more than the combined total of all other NATO countries. In the same year, the United States transferred to foreign countries production technology for seventy major weapons systems. According to Ruth Leger Sivard's *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*, from 1969 to 1988, five of the top ten arms importers were countries in the Middle East.

These figures, which might otherwise have passed with little political notice, were thrown into sharp relief by the Gulf War. The 1991 SIPRI Yearbook calculated that during the 1980s, Iraq imported US \$27.369 billion worth of weapons, 55 percent of which came from the USSR, 19 percent from France, and 8 percent from China. Although the United States was not a leading arms supplier to Iraq, a report presented to Congress by the Commerce Department on 11 March 1991 listed licences approved for sales to Iraq by the US Administration between 1985 and 1990. The total value of the

goods licensed was US \$1.5 billion, of which US \$500 million were delivered. Despite this comparatively small amount, in the aftermath of the war, the militarily high-tech character of many of these transactions has led Congressional critics to charge that the Bush Administration adopted a permissive weapons export policy towards Iraq until just before Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.

Together, the five permanent members of the Security Council supply approximately 90 percent of the arms trade. With the partial exception of China, since the Gulf War, all have made or supported proposals for curbs on arms transfers. Several weeks after the Canadian Government proposed a summit meeting on weapons of mass destruction and the arms trade, at a news conference in Ottawa, President Bush gave only faint support to this proposal and emphasized that the United States did not intend to cease weapons sales to Middle East countries. Four days later, on 19 March 1991, in prepared testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney spoke of the need, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, "for tighter arms transfer and proliferation controls. Those responsible for violations of such control should be held strictly accountable."<sup>1</sup> At the same time, he and other Administration spokesmen made clear that controls on transfers would not preclude arms sales to US allies in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Shortly after these somewhat ambivalent statements from the Bush Administration, on 8 April 1991, British Prime Minister John Major called for the establishment of a universal register of arms sales to be supervised by the United Nations. Major received the support of the European Community for this proposal, and promised to pursue the initiative with other members of the Security Council. The British Government also indicated that it would seek to place the initiative on the agenda of the G-7 London meeting of the leading industrialized countries.

On 29 May 1991, in a noticeable change of emphasis, President Bush made a series of proposals for halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the Middle East which included a request to the major weapons suppliers to exercise "collective self restraint." Bush called for "a general code of responsible arms transfers" to include avoiding the transfer of "destabilizing" weapons and "effective domestic export controls on the end-use of arms or other items to be transferred." The suppliers would establish a mechanism for consultation to notify one another in advance of "certain arms sales," provide one another with annual reports on transfers, and meet regularly for consultative purposes.<sup>2</sup> He then proposed that the Permanent Members of the Security Council, Britain, China, France the Soviet Union and the United States, meet in Paris to discuss the

---

<sup>1</sup>US Embassy. "Tighter Arms Transfer, Proliferation Controls Needed," *Text*, 91-20, 21 March 1991: 5.

<sup>2</sup>US Embassy. "Middle East Arms Control Initiative," *Backgrounder*, 91-39, 30 May 1991.

subject, including which weapons should be limited. Despite this more positive response to arms transfer transparency, the Bush Administration maintained its position that arms sales to allies and friendly states would continue as normal. In the weeks following the Bush speech of 29 May, the Administration announced the transfer of US \$2.5 billion in weapons and technical assistance to Middle East countries.

Immediately following President Bush's speech, at the close of a bilateral Franco-German summit in Lille on 31 May 1991, President Mitterrand proposed a sweeping new global arms control and disarmament programme which would include curbs on arms transfers and measures to create transparency. Mitterrand also said that the proposals would be presented to the permanent members of the Security Council. With the London meeting of the industrialized countries now emerging as an important venue for the discussions of arms transfers, in late May, Japan also called for greater transparency in the conventional arms trade. Speaking to a UN Disarmament meeting in Kyoto, Prime Minister Kaifu promised to submit a draft resolution to the autumn 1991 meeting of the UN General Assembly calling for improved levels of candour in the international trade in conventional arms. Kaifu said that Japan would cooperate fully with the UN to develop a framework which would allow the largest possible number of states to submit data concerning the arms trade to the UN.

Meeting in Paris on 8 and 9 July 1991, representatives of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council agreed that a comprehensive programme of arms control should be implemented in the Middle East. In addition to a number of measures relating to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the five declared their intention to observe rules of restraint in conventional weapons transfers using national control procedures and developing guidelines on this basis. They also agreed to develop procedures for consultation and the exchange of information. A group of experts will meet in September 1991 and a second plenary meeting will take place in London in October 1991.

At the end of the London Summit of the G-7, held from 15 to 17 July 1991, the participating countries published a "Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-Proliferation." The Declaration noted that many states depend on arms imports, but distinguished this from the threat to international stability caused by the accumulation of "a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of self defence." The Declaration asserted that this could be prevented by the application of the three principles of transparency, consultation and action.

The principle of *transparency* should be extended to international transfers of conventional weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction we support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations, and will work for its early adoption. Such a register would alert the international community to an attempt by a state to build up holdings of conventional weapons beyond a reasonable level. Information should be provided by all states on a regular basis after transfers have taken place. We also urge greater

openness about overall holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking clarification, would be a valuable confidence- and security-building measure.

The principle of *consultation* should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading exporters with the aim of agreeing on a common approach to the guidelines which are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons....

The principle of *action* requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilising or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons....<sup>3</sup>

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada is not a leading exporter of armaments, being a distant eighth largest in exports to the industrialized countries (with \$25 million in sales in 1990 out of a total US \$9,885 million in total sales to industrialized countries), and outside the top ten in sales to Third World countries. In a position paper released in September 1990, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs restated the basic Canadian position on arms exports. Canada exercises governmental controls over arms sales to all countries except the United States. Under the 1986 Export Controls Policy, the export of military goods and technology is "generally" denied to the following:

- countries that pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
- countries involved in or under the imminent threat of hostilities;
- countries under Security Council sanctions; and
- countries whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of human rights, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.

While generally not breaking any new ground, the September 1990 paper did mark an apparent shift in the Canadian approach. Previously, as for example in response to the 1986 recommendation by the Hockin-Simard Parliamentary Committee for an arms control register, the Department of External Affairs had expressed skepticism about the value of transparency and its effect on limiting transfers. The September paper commented that "[w]e believe that issues of arms transfer transparency are best addressed before issues of arms transfer control," thus appearing to envisage transparency as

---

<sup>3</sup>London Economic Summit 1991. *Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-Proliferation*, 15-17 July 1991.

a confidence-building measure intended as a stepping-stone to measures of actual control of international arms transfers.<sup>4</sup>

Towards the end of the Gulf War, on 8 February 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney and then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark announced a major Canadian arms control initiative. Speaking in Quebec City, Clark reviewed the events of the Gulf War and the importance of enhancing security in the area after its conclusion. He concluded:

In this belief, Canada plans to promote a world summit on instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction in the coming months. This summit would become a showcase for a new political consultation. It would aim to develop a strict plan of action that would result in the adoption by 1995 of an integrated framework of systems of non-proliferation and control of weapons, including conventional weapons.<sup>5</sup>

As subsequently elaborated, this ambitious proposal dealt with nuclear proliferation, the strengthening of the Missile Technology Control Regime, biological and chemical weapons and conventional arms. In respect to conventional arms, the "Programme of Action" declared:

We will urge a meeting of the major arms exporters to encourage a formal commitment to greater sensitivity to the export of conventional arms (i.e., greater transparency; constraint; consultations in situations where unusual build-ups seem to be developing).

We will advocate early action on an information exchange system regarding arms transfers, including serious examination by all states of the recommendations of the United Nations Experts Group now studying the question of transparency in arms transfers.

We will propose a commitment by the 22 signatories of the CFE Treaty to ensure that arms affected by the accord are not exported to regions of tension.<sup>6</sup>

The response to the Canadian proposal did not at first appear encouraging. The choice of 1995, for example, attracted negative comment since there were fears that this would entangle the renewal of the NPT in a broader and more complex set of arms control objectives. Specifically, there appeared to be little enthusiasm in Washington for the Canadian proposal. This was still the case when President Bush visited Ottawa. Asked at a joint press conference whether he supported the Canadian proposal for a world summit, Bush responded: "I'm not sure exactly what the proper structure is, but clearly

---

<sup>4</sup>Ernie Regehr. "Canada Prods United States on Arms Sales," *Arms Control Today*, June 1991: 16.

<sup>5</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period in the Gulf," *Statement*, 91/10, 8 February 1991: 7.

<sup>6</sup>External Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Proposal for a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Background*, 8 February 1991.

that idea might have some merit.... He [Mulroney] has not asked me to endorse that proposal, and again, I would like to talk to him before I commit ourselves further on it." Later in the news conference, however, after Bush had repeated the US position that it would proceed with arms sales to the Middle East which it considered appropriate, Prime Minister Mulroney interjected:

No one can fail to be struck by the irony of the fact that most of the hardware deployed in the Middle East was sold to the various factions by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This doesn't make a whole lot of sense if, on the one hand, you're trying to prevent war, on the other hand there is the propagation of war through policies in the past that have led to this kind of development. That's why Canada believes very strongly in the policies that we have put forward in regard to the control and, possibly, the elimination of these instruments of mass destruction.<sup>7</sup>

Speaking to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1990, Joe Clark announced that henceforth Canada would release an annual report on its exports of military goods. On 6 March 1991, the Government tabled the *First Annual Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada* in the House of Commons, emphasizing again the importance of making arms transfers and procurement as transparent as possible. The statistics in the report are based on reports of actual exports made against permits issued under the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). These are then classified according to the description of munitions used in the Group Two of the Export Control List, which breaks down "munitions" into twenty-six categories ranging from small arms and machine guns to directed energy weapons systems and components. The principal limitation in this approach is that exports to the United States, which constitute approximately 75 percent of Canadian exports of military goods, are not included because export permits for Group Two (Munitions) on the Export Control List are not required for the United States.<sup>8</sup>

Some of the complexities involved in seeking to regulate the arms trade while supporting permitted arms exports were revealed in June 1991 when the Government introduced Bill C-6, a bill to amend the EIPA. Bill C-6 was triggered by the situation of two Canadian companies, General Motors of Canada and Diemaco Inc. of Kitchener, Ontario. Saudi Arabia had indicated that it would like to buy 1,117 light armoured vehicles from General Motors, stipulating that they be equipped with 25mm automatic cannon. Diemaco, which supplies C-7 and C-8 automatic rifles to the Canadian Armed Forces, wished to respond to an anticipated request for proposals by the Netherlands to supply the Dutch armed forces with automatic rifles, a contract valued at \$120 million. In both cases, the companies would have been prohibited from making such sales by a 1977 amendment to the Criminal

---

<sup>7</sup>United States Embassy. "U.S. Arms Sales to Israel, Saudi Arabia to Continue," (Transcript of joint new conference), *Text*, 91-19, Ottawa, 15 March 1991: 1,6.

<sup>8</sup>Department of External Affairs. *First Annual Report, Export of Military Goods From Canada 1990*. Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1991.

Code, which forbids the sale of automatic weapons except to the Canadian military and police forces. In contrast to other arms systems and components, therefore, which may be exported subject to the provisions of the EIPA, the Criminal Code imposed an outright ban on the export of automatic weapons.

Arguing that a complete ban on the export of automatic weapons was an anomaly, since the Group Two munitions list contained weapons far more lethal than automatic weapons, and emphasizing that Canadian companies would not be able to compete if they were completely excluded for all foreign markets, the Government proposed to amend the EIPA by creating an Automatic Weapons Firearms Country Control List which would set out the names of those countries to which Canadian manufacturers could sell. In introducing the amendments to C-6, Michael Wilson, Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, declared that the amendments

...will help place our defence industrial base on a competitive footing. They will also help Canada's overall defence capability. Canadian companies, only able to rely on domestic orders, are in danger of losing their viability.<sup>9</sup>

He also stated that the amendment was "fully consistent with Canada's program of action to bring greater transparency and consultation to the international trade in conventional weapons."<sup>10</sup>

The new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, commented:

I join the debate on Bill C-6 with a particular purpose in mind, and that is to respond to the suggestions that the proposed amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act are inconsistent with the arms control proposals made in February by the Prime Minister and Mr. Clark. No such inconsistency exists. Under the proposed amendments, exports of automatic weapons will be subject to the same stringent controls that have long been applied to the export of other military goods from Canada. These controls fully reflect Canada's arms control and disarmament policies.

Mrs. McDougall went on to note that:

...we are not proposing to put an end to the arms trade per se. Nor are we proposing to constrain any countries' ability to acquire arms for legitimate defence purposes. We have never suggested that defence needs should be left unmet.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup>Minister for International Trade, "Amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act," *News Release*, no. 123, 23 May 1991.

<sup>10</sup>Minister for International Trade, "Notes for an Address to the House of Commons Debate on Second Reading, Bill C-6," *Statement*, 91/25, 30 May 1991.

<sup>11</sup>Department of External Affairs, "Statement by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on Amendments to the Export and Import Act," *Statement*, 91/27, 30 May 1991:1.

After considerable Parliamentary opposition to the amendments was voiced, in exchange for the passage thereof, the Government promised in mid-June to suspend all further export of automatic weapons to the Middle East for a period of six months. It also undertook to support public hearings by a Commons committee in the autumn of 1991, and not to proceed with any further sales while the committee was at work. This compromise permitted both General Motors and Diemaco to pursue their respective contracts.

On 19 June 1991, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall addressed the Berlin meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As promised in the February "Programme of Action," she made a strong appeal for a declaration on arms transfers:

I believe we all agree that this meeting in Berlin provides a timely and appropriate opportunity for us to make a political declaration on arms transfers. I am confident that we all recognize the importance of the issues and its relevance to the CSCE countries. States which are party to the CFE agreement have a special responsibility not to contribute, by transfer of armaments, to excessive build-ups of conventional arms outside the CFE area of application.<sup>12</sup>

In its closing statement, the Council of Ministers adopted the Canadian proposal to limit massive weapons build-ups by urging countries to make public their arms sales.

In the light of the recent experience in the Gulf region...this should be a priority of CSCE governments, and...ministers agreed to maintain a dialogue on these issues.<sup>13</sup>

On a number of occasions the Government expressed its keen interest in the report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Arms Transfer Transparency, due to be completed by the autumn of 1991. Canada is one of the few countries which is represented on the Group by a non-governmental specialist, Mr. Ernie Regehr, editor of the *Project Ploughshares Monitor*.

---

<sup>12</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for Remarks by the Honourable Barbara McDougall at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Council of Ministers Meeting," *Statement*, 91/32, 19 June 1991: 5.

<sup>13</sup>*Globe and Mail*, 21 June 1991: A8.

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 14 March 1991, NDP critic John Brewin questioned the Prime Minister on his exchange with President Bush, suggesting that Bush had thrown "cold water" on the idea of a global summit, and asking: "Is the global summit dead? Are there alternatives that the government would have in mind if in fact the idea is a goner?" In response, Mulroney rejected this interpretation of the President's attitude, and commented:

...we began the process of examining [the global summit] last night. The Secretary of State for External Affairs met with eight heads of government, I believe, throughout the region in the last number of days. All of them believe that it had some merit. The President is going to examine it today with President Mitterrand and over the weekend with Prime Minister Major, and slowly but surely, hopefully, the idea will advance.<sup>14</sup>

On 27 March 1991, the Standing Committee on National Defence tabled its report on "The World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction." Broadly supportive of the Government's initiative, the Report recommended, *inter alia*, that an international arms transfer register be established under United Nations auspices. It then commented:

While the focus of the summit is global, the Committee wishes to suggest that the pursuit of this overarching interest might well be served by an initial emphasis on regional agreements. It is here that Canada has comparative advantages that should be put to good use.... Canada is now a member of the Organization of American States and has participated in the peace process in Central America. It should also be possible for us to play a major role in sub-Saharan Africa, where we could put our links with the Commonwealth and the Francophonie to good use. We are also a Pacific nation and our interest in maintaining stability in the North Pacific should not be ignored. [The Committee recommended, therefore, that] Canada should concentrate its efforts on helping to establish regional systems of arms transfer transparency, and these efforts should be targeted toward areas of Canadian diplomatic advantage.<sup>15</sup>

The strong Parliamentary support for the Government's conventional arms initiative did not extend to the amendment to the EIPA, which was sharply criticized, in particular by the NDP. The Liberal Party did not outrightly oppose the prospective sales, but took the view that the proposed amendment was too permissive. Liberal MPs indicated that they would seek specific sub-amendments in Committee "to put limits on the list of countries that can buy weapons from Canada and to oblige that list and any addition to the list to be sent to a committee of this House for examination and approval."<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>*Commons Debates*. 14 March 1991: 18468.

<sup>15</sup>Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, no. 63, 25-26 March 1991: 3-6.

<sup>16</sup>*Commons Debates*. 30 May 1991: 837.

NDP spokesman John Brewin explained that, notwithstanding the economic benefits of the proposed contracts, his Party opposed changes "permitting the import and export of automatic weapons anywhere in the world." He continued:

...the Liberal Party wants this bill moved quickly to second reading where it can receive technical amendments. The issue before the House today is the principle of this bill. We in the New Democratic Party are firmly and unalterably opposed to this bill which will permit the export of automatic weapons anywhere in the world and runs completely counter to every effort to restrain arms sales: the bane of the existence of humanity in this century.

Just as the government begins an effort or said it was beginning an effort to try to restrain sales, what is one of the first pieces of legislation it brings before the House in this session? It is a bill to permit further export of weapons around the world by Canada.<sup>17</sup>

During the course of the Commons debates, Michael Wilson clarified the status of Saudi Arabia in relation to the proposed amendments. In introducing the Bill he noted that the new Automatic Firearms Country Control List would include only countries with which Canada has "an intergovernmental defence research development and production agreement." Asked whether such an agreement existed with Saudi Arabia, he replied: "...we have not completed an arrangement with Saudi Arabia. That would have to be completed before exports would be provided for."<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup>*Commons Debates*. 30 May 1991: 793.

<sup>18</sup>*Commons Debates*. 30 May 1991: 792.

*RECENT LITERATURE*

- Arms Control Today*, June 1991. Entire issue entitled "Reining in the Arms Trade." Includes article by Ernie Regehr, "Canada Prods United States on Arms Sales."
- Catrina, Christian et al. "International Arms Transfers," *Disarmament* 13, no. 4, 1990.
- Daffron, Stephen C. "US Arms Transfers: New Rules, New Reasons," *Parameters* 21, no. 1, Spring 1991: 77-91.
- Hartung, William D. "Breaking the Arms-Sales Addiction," *World Policy Journal* 8, no. 1, Winter 1990-91.
- Krause, Keith. "Constructing Regional Security Regimes and the Control of Arms Transfers," *International Journal*, Spring 1990.
- Nolan, Janne E. "The Global Arms Market After the Gulf War," *Washington Quarterly* 14, no. 3, 1991.
- Regehr, Ernie. "Owning Up to Canadian Arms Sales," *Ploughshares Monitor*, December 1990: 11-12.
- United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs. *Transparency in International Arms Transfers*. Topical Papers no. 3. New York: United Nations, 1990.
- Zukrowska, Katarzyna. *Organization of Arms Exports in Eastern Europe and Prospects for Limitation of Arms Transfers*. Occasional Paper no. 15. Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1990.

*FURTHER READING*

- Christian, Catrina. *Arms Transfer and Dependence*. New York: Taylor and Francis, 1988.
- Ohlson, Thomas, ed. *Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security*. London: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Regehr, Ernie. *Arms Canada*. Toronto: Lorimer, 1987.
- SIPRI. *SIPRI Yearbook 1991 World Armaments and Disarmament*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Sivard, Ruth Leger. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*. Washington D.C.: World Priorities, 1991.



## 2. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

### *BACKGROUND*

The use of chemical weapons during World War I led the international community to develop ways of prohibiting their use and development. In the period after World War I, these efforts took place at the League of Nations. In 1925, at a meeting intended to develop ways of controlling the international arms trade, a US proposal to ban exports of chemical weapons led to the creation of the Geneva Protocol<sup>1</sup> which banned the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. As of 1 January 1990, there were 125 parties to the Geneva Protocol.

The Geneva Protocol remains the primary international legislation on chemical weapons. However, its limitations have been clear since it was first signed. While the Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war, it does nothing to prohibit the development, production, transfer or stockpiling of such weapons. Efforts at the League of Nations after 1925 to expand chemical weapons limitations collapsed with the failure of the League in the 1930s. In the wake of the use of nuclear weapons, after World War II efforts to limit chemical weapons took a back seat to negotiations on atomic weapons.

It was not until 1968 that official international efforts began again, this time under the auspices of the United Nations. At that time, the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons was placed on the agenda of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC). In 1971, a shift in the position of the Soviet Union opened the way for consideration of chemical weapons separately from biological weapons. Britain had originally proposed this separation in 1968, but the idea was strongly opposed by the Soviet Union. By 10 April 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was open for signature.<sup>2</sup> The BWC prohibits the use, development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. As of 1 January 1991, 125 countries were parties to the Convention.

There have been two review conferences of the BWC, in 1980 and 1986. The conferences discussed ways of enhancing the convention. Issues of concern included developments made possible by new technologies such as recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the absence of provisions restricting research on biological and toxin agents, and problems in verifying the convention. The second review conference in 1986 established a new arrangement which allows any signatory state to call for a meeting of an advisory group of experts if a problem arises concerning the application of the BWC. As well, signatories were required to begin work to reduce ambiguities and improve

---

<sup>1</sup>The 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, May 1925.

<sup>2</sup>The Convention on the Prohibition, Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 26 March 1972.

international cooperation. Following this, an exchange of information on research facilities, biological products and the occurrence of rare diseases began in the autumn of 1987 and has continued annually. A third review conference is scheduled for the autumn of 1991.

The early success of the Biological Weapons Convention did not influence the negotiations on chemical weapons. In spite of continued work through the 1970s at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it was not until the early to mid-1980s that the goal of a convention completely banning chemical weapons appeared within reach. In 1982 and 1984, the Soviet Union and the US respectively, tabled draft treaties for a chemical weapons convention.

In 1985, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to initiate bilateral discussions on chemical weapons limits, in addition to the ongoing work at the CD. Since then, considerable progress towards a complete treaty has been made. However, while important advances have been achieved, there have been worrying developments on the international scene, including allegations that chemical weapons have been used. Since 1980, the UN Secretary-General has conducted several inquiries to ascertain the truth of such charges. A series of UN reports, beginning in 1984, confirmed that chemical weapons had been used in the Gulf War by Iraq against Iran. On 1 March 1988, Iraq was again reported to have used chemical weapons -- this time against its own Kurdish population. On 26 April 1988, the UN Secretary-General presented a report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war to the Security Council. Although the report indicated the use of both mustard and nerve gas in the conflict, it did not identify the countries responsible for such action. Both Iran and Iraq are signatories of the Geneva Protocol.

Allegations have also been made about the intentions of Libya. In 1988, the US announced that Libya was building a chemical warfare complex at Rabta, about eighty kilometres southwest of Tripoli. Although Libya denied the charges, US accusations and presentation of evidence continued. It also became clear that the technology used by Libya had been obtained from companies in West Germany and Japan. The issue arose again in March 1990 when a US Government spokesman announced that there was now evidence that Libya was actually producing chemical weapons. The US refused to rule out the possibility that it might undertake a military operation in order to destroy the facility in question.

Prompted by the negative impact of such events, an international conference of 149 states was held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989. During the conference, twelve more states announced that they would sign the Protocol. The Final Declaration of the Conference incorporated four points: the commitment of the participants not to use chemical weapons (reaffirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol); the necessity and urgency of concluding a chemical weapons ban; the need for states to exercise self-restraint and act responsibly until a comprehensive ban comes into force; and full

support for the UN as a forum for exercising vigilance with regard to the prohibition on chemical weapons use and, in particular, for the role of the Secretary-General in investigating alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol.

Canada was an active participant in the conference. Canada's former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, reiterated that Canada has a firm policy of non-production of chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, acquire or stockpile chemical weapons unless they are used against the military forces or civilian population of Canada or its allies.

Although the conference was considered a success, some countries charged Western nations with maintaining a double standard by trying to halt the proliferation of chemical weapons in the Third World, while at the same time maintaining, and continuing to develop chemical weapons themselves. Some Arab states maintained that as long as Israel possessed a presumed nuclear capability, they had the right to possess chemical weapons.

In June 1990, the bilateral discussions between the US and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons resulted in an agreement to begin exchanging and verifying data on their respective chemical weapons capabilities prior to the completion of the chemical weapons convention. As well, on 1 June 1990, the two completed a formal agreement which requires them to cease production of chemical weapons and destroy their chemical weapons stocks over a ten-year period, reaching an agreed level of 5,000 agent tonnes by the end of 2002. Destruction must begin by the end of 1992. Within eight years after a convention enters into force, the two pledge to have reached a level of 500 tonnes each (destroying 98 percent of their stocks).

Perhaps most important has been the effect of the Persian Gulf war. The war against Iraq by the UN multinational coalition raised, for the first time in many years, the spectre of wide-scale use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. As UN sanctions and then war began, it was known that Iraq had a chemical weapons capability and possibly biological weapons. It was also known that Iraq had used chemical weapons in its war against Iran as well as against its own population. These factors made clear both the need to complete and implement a global chemical weapons ban and the fragile nature of the process.

During the war, chemical and biological weapons facilities in Iraq were high on the priority list of targets bombed in the air campaign. In the end, chemical and biological weapons were not used

by Iraq. However, in the aftermath of the war it was reported that Iraq used chemical weapons against segments of Iraqi population which were rising against the government.<sup>3</sup>

During 1990-1991, work on the chemical weapons convention at the CD continued. Two main obstacles to a complete agreement faced negotiators at the CD when they began their autumn 1990 session: the longstanding question of the degree of intrusiveness of inspection provisions and the desirability of maintaining a "security stockpile."

The draft treaty presented to the CD by the US in 1984 had called for "anytime-anywhere" inspection. Since then, the US and other countries have moved away from that position because of its high level of intrusiveness. It is thought that inspections on that scale might expose highly sensitive non-chemical weapon-related technology or facilities. The UK has proposed a form of "managed access" inspection which would allow inspections to go ahead but also allow the state being inspected to protect sensitive information. However, the US has been reluctant to agree to even this degree of inspection. In March 1991, the US shifted its position somewhat, bringing it more in line with the British idea, but still some distance from final agreement.

With respect to the second issue, the US had maintained that it would need to maintain a small quantity of chemical weapons (the two percent remaining after its agreed reductions, as set out in the agreement with the Soviet Union) as a security stockpile, pending a decision at that time about whether all chemical weapons-capable states had signed the convention. The US was alone in this position, unsupported by other states, and only weakly supported by the Soviet Union by virtue of their bilateral agreement.

However, on 13 May 1991, President Bush announced a major shift in the US position. According to Bush, the US was now ready to forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including in retaliation to the use of chemical weapons, once the convention enters into force. Bush also proposed that a provision stating that chemical weapons should not be used for any purpose, be included in the convention. Furthermore, the US would completely eliminate its chemical weapons within ten years after the convention enters into force, thus removing one of the most important obstacles to further progress.

The CD began a new session on 15 May 1991, and on 16 May, the US Ambassador reiterated Bush's announcement and called for the CD to go into continuous session with a goal of completing a treaty by 1992. With the removal of the security stockpile issue, the major questions still facing the

---

<sup>3</sup>Lardner, George Jr. and Al Kamen. "US Urged to Investigate Reports of Iraqi Gas Use," *Washington Post*, 5 April 1991: A14.

CD are primarily related to verification issues and include the degree of intrusiveness of challenge inspections and the composition of the Executive Committee. In July, the US presented a new proposal for challenge inspections. Rather than moving any closer to the British idea of managed access, the new US position provided for even less intrusive inspection than its own previous position. The new US proposal generated a regrouping of positions by other delegations.

The Persian Gulf crisis, as well as earlier events, had prompted efforts by a number of states to tighten controls on exports of chemical weapons material and technology. In December, the US approved a list of fifty chemical precursors that would be subject to controls when exported to countries where there was a proliferation concern. This list was adopted by the Australia Group, an informal group of twenty states which have sought to strengthen controls on the export of chemical weapons.

#### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has signed and ratified both the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention and has a long tradition of supporting efforts to limit chemical and biological weapons. It has participated in the negotiations at the United Nations since they began, and over the years, the government has made a large number of important submissions to the negotiations. Canada's special interest has been in the area of verification. In 1985, it produced a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*. (For further information see *The Guide 1990* and *The Guide 1989*.)

In 1988, in response to concerns raised by Canadians about research on nerve gas being undertaken at Canadian Forces Base Suffield in Alberta, the Government asked Mr. William Barton to carry out a study of the activities at Suffield. Mr. Barton's report, released in December 1988, concluded that all research, development and training activities undertaken at Suffield were for the purposes of self-defence, that this constituted the most prudent course for Canada, and that it was consistent with the international obligations undertaken by the Canadian Government.<sup>4</sup> One of the products of the Barton report was the Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee, made up of members of the scientific community. The Committee issued its first report on 15 August 1991, concluding that Canadian biological and chemical self-defence programmes posed no threat to public or environmental safety.

---

<sup>4</sup>William H. Barton. *Research, Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: A Review*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 31 December 1988.

In an opening speech to the First Committee at the United Nations, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason welcomed the agreement between the US and the Soviet Union, achieved in June 1990, but noted that there was still a long way to go to achieve a comprehensive chemical weapons ban.<sup>5</sup>

A three-part resolution on chemical and biological weapons was adopted by consensus at the UN General Assembly. Resolution 45/57A urged the CD and all states to work towards completing the chemical weapons convention. Resolution 45/57B relates to preparations for the BWC review conference and calls on states which have not ratified or acceded to the convention to do so. Resolution 45/57C calls on all states to maintain strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol and endorses the Secretary-General's role in investigating any allegations of chemical weapons use.<sup>6</sup>

In recent years, Canada has undertaken a number of working papers, meetings and experiments to investigate verification issues relating to the chemical weapons convention. In August, Canada reported to the CD on a trial inspection it had carried out in July at the Merck Frosst Canada Inc. plant in Pointe-Claire, Quebec, to investigate the value and implications of procedures relating to chemical industries.<sup>7</sup> Also in August, the Canadian delegation submitted a study on the size and costs of the international inspectorate that would be necessary to implement the convention.<sup>8</sup>

From 25 to 28 November 1990, a joint Canada-Netherlands trial challenge inspection was carried out in a Canadian Forces Base Lahr in Germany. One of the conclusions of the experiment was that sensitive information could be protected while providing inspectors with sufficient access to facilities to enable them to successfully complete their tasks.<sup>9</sup>

At a plenary session of the CD in August 1990, Canada's Ambassador to the negotiations, Mr. Gerald Shannon, outlined Canada's views. Ambassador Shannon stated that Canada's goal remains a "global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable" convention. However, he expressed disappointment at the lack of progress achieved during the summer and noted that a number of major

---

<sup>5</sup>Ambassador Peggy Mason. "Canadian Statement to the First Committee," *Disarmament Bulletin* 15, Winter 1990/91: 16-18.

<sup>6</sup>United Nations. *Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons*. Resolution 45/57, 4 December 1990.

<sup>7</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Preparing for a Ban on Chemical Weapons," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 23-24.

<sup>8</sup>Canada. *The Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Inspectorate: A Quantitative Study*. Ottawa: August 1991.

<sup>9</sup>Canada. CD/1052, 31 January 1991. Also: Department of External Affairs. "Canada-Netherlands Trial CW Inspection: Exercise ACID BREW," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 21.

crucial issues and difficult technical details remained to be resolved. In an implicit reference to the US position, Ambassador Shannon stated that Canada feels it is crucial to ensure the elimination of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. "To us, this implies an undertaking at the outset of the Convention to pursue these destruction processes to their completion."<sup>10</sup>

In addition, for Canada effective verification means a regime that includes

...the means and authority to investigate, inspect and pursue any activity that might be related to non-compliance.... We are convinced that if we can develop a full effective verification regime -- one that incorporates both a rigorous challenge inspection component and an ad hoc verification component -- we will have leapt over perhaps the biggest remaining hurdle to the realization of the Convention.<sup>11</sup>

With respect to the threats of possible use of chemical weapons in the Middle East, Ambassador Shannon said:

We call upon all countries to refrain from such potentially inflammatory statements. ...Canada firmly believes that chemical weapons should have no place in the armouries of modern nations,...<sup>12</sup>

As a member of the Australia Group, Canada is also controlling the export of fifty chemical precursors on the list proposed by the US,<sup>13</sup> and has introduced legislation to this end. Not all of the chemicals on the list are produced in Canada but the new legislation will mean that those chemicals may not be exported to Canada en route to a third country.

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, Canada proposed that a global summit of world leaders be held, under UN auspices, to issue a statement of political will on proliferation. This would be followed up by a summit in 1995 to mark the completion of the programme of action established at the first summit. As part of its initiative, Canada has made specific proposals on both chemical and biological weapons. For biological weapons, the Government notes that progress in genetic engineering has facilitated the development of biological weapons and that the BWC lacks meaningful verification provisions. Canada therefore proposes that confidence-building measures and conflict resolution

---

<sup>10</sup>Ambassador Gerald Shannon. "Canada Assesses CD's Progress Towards a CW Convention," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 25.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*: 26.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*: 25.

<sup>13</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Increases Chemical Controls," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 16, Spring 1991: 8.

provisions be developed at the next review conference. In addition, a special conference in 1993 should be convened to develop verification provisions.<sup>14</sup>

With respect to chemical weapons, Canada proposes that all CD member states commit themselves to completing the convention by the end of 1992, a goal later accepted by the US with its proposal that the CD enter into continuous session. Canada also proposed that the membership of the Australia Group be expanded.<sup>15</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on this question during 1990-1991.

---

<sup>14</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Post-Hostilities Activities," *Backgrounder*, 8 February 1991: 4.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*: 5.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Arms Control Today. "Closing in on a Chemical Weapons Ban," *Arms Control Today* 21, no. 4, May 1991: 3-7.
- Compagnon, Jean. "L'arme chimique: interdiction et licéité," *Défense nationale*, May 1991: 89-98.
- Cooper, Graham. "Inspections on Request: Coming to Terms with Their Scope," *Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin*, no. 10, December 1990: 1-3.
- Department of National Defence. *Canada's Chemical and Biological Defence Program Meeting Canada's Defence and Civil Emergency Needs*, Ottawa, 1990.
- Department of National Defence. *Review of the Chemical and Biological Defence Program*. Ottawa, 1990.
- Findlay, Trevor. "Chemical Disarmament and the Environment," *Arms Control Today*, September 1990: 12-16.
- Goldblat, Jozef and Thomas Bernauer. *The Third Review of the Biological Weapons Convention: Issues and Proposals*. UNIDIR Research Paper, no. 9. New York: United Nations, 1991.
- Goldblat, Jozef and Thomas Bernauer. "The US-Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreement of June 1990: Its Advantages and Shortcomings," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 21, no. 4: 355-362.
- Jensen, Kenneth M. and David Wurmser, eds. *Is it Feasible to Negotiate Chemical and Biological Weapons Control?* Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1990.
- Meselson, Matthew. "The myth of chemical superweapons," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 3, April 1991: 12-15.
- Sims, Nicholas. *Reinforcing Biological Disarmament: Issues in the 1991 Review*. Faraday Discussion Paper no. 16. Washington: The Council for Arms Control, 1991.
- White, Terence and Kathleen White. "Biological Weapons, How Big a Threat?" *International Defense Review*, August 1990: 843-846.

## FURTHER READING

- Barton, William H. *Research Development and Training in Chemical and Biological Defence within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 31 December 1988.
- Bernauer, Thomas. *The Projected Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament*. New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1990.
- Boulden, Jane. *Towards a Chemical Weapons Convention: Proceedings of a Conference entitled "Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention"*. Aurora Paper no. 9. Ottawa: CCACD, January 1989.
- Canonne, Pierre. "La vérification du désarmement chimique et ses aspects techniques," *Ares* 11, no. 1, 1989: 50-72.

## 2. Chemical and Biological Weapons

DeMille, Dianne. *The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW): Strengthening International Verification and Compliance*. Working Paper 25, CIIPS: Ottawa, July 1990.

Department of External Affairs. *Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment of Unusual Events in Relation to Allegations of the use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents*. Ottawa, March 1990.

Gizewski, Peter. *Biological Weapons Control*, Issue Brief no. 5. Ottawa: CCACD, February 1987.

Goldblat, Jozef. *Chemical Disarmament: From the Ban on Use to a Ban on Possession*. Background Paper no. 17. Ottawa: CIIPS, February 1988.

Keeley, James F. *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention*. Arms Control and Disarmament Occasional Papers, no. 1. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, September 1988.

Sims, Nicholas. *The Diplomacy of Biological Disarmament*. London: St. Martin's Press, 1988.

### 3. CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

#### BACKGROUND

On 19 November 1990 in Paris, twenty European states along with Canada and the US signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). The Treaty places limits on five categories of conventional weapons in Europe. It is a treaty of historic importance as it provides the first ever limits on the large numbers of weapons deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact along the East-West dividing line between the two alliances in Europe. It is also symbolic of the end to a long period of fear and mistrust between the two alliances.

Negotiations on the Treaty began on 9 March 1989 and culminated just prior to the signing of the Treaty in November. This remarkably short negotiation time reflects the degree of political change that occurred in Europe during that same period. Changes in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev led to new independence and new governments in most member states of the Warsaw Pact and, on 3 October 1990, East and West Germany united. With these changes came announcements of ongoing and planned withdrawals of Soviet forces and equipment from Eastern European countries. Negotiations on the CFE Treaty, therefore, worked to codify changes already in progress, as well as to establish new limits.

However, the negotiations also drew on the experience of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks which began in 1973 and continued without success until February 1989. The MBFR talks also sought to place limits on conventional forces but in a more limited geographical zone comprising East and West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The talks were plagued by a lack of political will and problems created by a fundamental difference in the approach of the two sides (see *The Guide 1986, 1987, 1988*).

The CFE Treaty consists of twenty-three articles along with eight protocols. The Treaty seeks not just to establish limits on certain categories of equipment and arms, but by doing so to reduce the capability for surprise attacks or offensive military action.

Under Article IV of the Treaty, each side is bound to an upper limit of armaments as follows:

Tanks . . . . .	20,000
Artillery. . . . .	20,000
Armoured combat vehicles . . . . .	30,000
Aircraft . . . . .	6,800
Helicopters . . . . .	2,000

These limits refer to the entire area of application of the treaty which includes all of the European territory of states party to the treaty, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union. US and Canadian territory is not affected. Separate regional sub-limits are established for specified zones within the area of application.

In order to guard against any one state having a preponderance of the arms limited by the Treaty, no one state may possess more than approximately one third of the total arms permitted in a given category. Specific maximum levels are outlined for each category. For example, no individual state, including the US and the Soviet Union, can possess more than 13,300 tanks, 20,000 armoured combat vehicles or 13,700 artillery pieces within the zone (Article VI).

These limits will require only modest cuts in NATO tanks and helicopters, and no NATO cuts at all in the other categories. Warsaw Pact countries, however, traditionally relying on quantity to counter the qualitative advantage of NATO forces, will have to make significant cuts across the board (see Section V: FACTS AND FIGURES for details).

All reductions must be completed forty months after the treaty enters into force. The reductions are to occur in three phases. After sixteen months, twenty-five percent of the reductions must be completed, twelve months later, or twenty-eight months after the treaty enters into force, sixty percent of the reductions must be completed, and twelve months later, or forty months after the treaty enters into force, all reductions must be completed [Article VIII(4)].

The Treaty will enter into force ten days after all of the signatories to the Treaty have deposited instruments of ratification in the Netherlands. So, although the Treaty has been signed and some elements of the Treaty will be implemented (such as information exchanges), reductions will not officially begin until all states have ratified the Treaty.

Extensive verification measures have been developed to ensure compliance with the CFE Treaty. For example, detailed exchanges of information and notifications are required. The first official exchange of information occurred on 18 November, one day prior to signature of the Treaty by the heads of state. Further exchanges of information will be required thirty days after the Treaty enters into force, on 15 December every year after the Treaty enters into force, and at the end of the forty-month period of reductions.<sup>1</sup> The information required includes the structure and peacetime location of the command organization of land, air and air defence forces, designation and location of

---

<sup>1</sup>Section VII, Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information.

units holding specified conventional armaments and equipment, and the location of designated permanent storage sites and reduction sites, all within the zone affected by the Treaty.

The Treaty outlines specific measures for the destruction of each category of weapon. With respect to aircraft and helicopters, states have the option of disarming and reconfiguring the equipment for training purposes rather than simply destroying it. Methods outlined in the Treaty must be used and the process will be monitored by inspectors.

A number of different types of inspection are available as verification methods. Inspections will be carried out to verify information exchanges and compliance with the limits established in the Treaty. Inspections will also be used to monitor the destruction of equipment and arms, and the processes used to convert aircraft and helicopters. A state cannot refuse an inspection of a declared site but a system of quotas is established in the Protocol on Inspection to ensure that no one state will be subject to an excessive number of inspections. Challenge inspections of specified areas (non-declared sites) are permitted but, in this case, the state to be inspected has the right to refuse the inspection.

A Joint Consultative Group (JCG) is established by the Treaty to provide a framework for all the states party to the Treaty to discuss ambiguous issues, questions of compliance and other questions relating to the Treaty. The JCG will meet twice each year and extra sessions will be held at the request of individual states.

The Treaty does not place limits on personnel levels or the number of troops deployed in the European area. In February 1989, the US and the Soviet Union had agreed to limit personnel to 195,000 troops each. However, this commitment was overtaken by planned Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and proposed US budget cuts calling for far fewer than 195,000 US troops in Europe. Rather than begin negotiations on new levels, in September 1990, the negotiators agreed to postpone this question in order to complete the Treaty by the November deadline. A commitment to proceed with negotiations on personnel levels and aerial inspection methods as the next stage in the CFE negotiations (known as CFE IA) is part of the CFE Treaty. Aerial inspection is considered very important to the verification procedures for the Treaty. However, as with troop limitations, the effort to complete a treaty by November led negotiators to postpone the question. It is hoped that an agreement on these two questions will be ready for a planned summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1992. The first round of the CFE IA negotiations began ten days after the Treaty was signed, on 29 November 1990.

In a declaration issued on the day the Treaty was signed, Germany reaffirmed its commitment to reduce its armed forces levels to 370,000. These reductions will begin once the Treaty enters into force. In a separate declaration, all of the signatories to the Treaty agree that they will not increase their peacetime authorized conventional personnel strength until the CFE 1A negotiations on the issue have been completed.

One day prior to the signing of the Treaty, the Soviet Union announced a ten-year draft plan for reductions and restructuring in Soviet armed forces, the first stage of which will involve a complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia and Germany by 1994.

Soon after the signing of the Treaty, NATO countries expressed concern about Soviet movements of large numbers of tanks and artillery out of the European zone, and therefore outside the limits of the Treaty, prior to its signing. Questions have also been raised about the validity of the data supplied by the Soviet Union in the first information exchange. In response, the Soviet Union explained that in a number of cases, the movement of equipment beyond the Ural mountains was related to unilateral Soviet reductions announced in December 1988 and still being implemented. Some of the equipment that has been moved has already been destroyed. The Soviet Union invited US experts to come to the Soviet Union to discuss this question. On the question of data, the figures supplied by the Soviet Union were much lower in some categories than had been expected by the US. Under the terms of the Treaty, there is a ninety-day grace period in which states may correct the information they submitted in the initial information exchange.

In March, a second issue became of considerable concern. The Soviet Union re-categorized three motorized rifle divisions, previously under the jurisdiction of the army, as naval "coastal defence" units and claimed that the equipment associated with these units was not limited by the Treaty. Similarly, the Soviet Union claimed that equipment held by the Strategic Rocket Forces was not subject to the terms of the Treaty. This indicated a fundamental difference in interpretation of the Treaty's terms between the Soviet Union and the other signatories. The problem prompted President Bush to send a letter to Gorbachev in an effort to find a compromise which maintained the terms of the Treaty. The question of interpretation was of such significance that it put all other arms control negotiations, especially the strategic arms negotiations on hold. After considerable high-level diplomacy throughout the month of May, US Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Secretary Bessmertnykh reached a compromise agreement on 1 June 1991.

On 14 June, in an extraordinary meeting of the Treaty signatories in Vienna, the compromise was made formal and official. In a binding statement in which the Soviet Union pledged its full compliance with the Treaty's terms, the Soviet Union also agreed to destroy or convert 14,500 of the

57,000 weapon systems that it had moved out of the Treaty zone prior to November 1990. It was agreed that the Soviet Union would maintain its disputed coastal defence and naval infantry units on the condition that these units not be expanded. It was also agreed that the equipment of the Strategic Rocket Forces would be exempt from the Treaty limits by considering them internal security forces. The other signatories gave binding declarations which accepted the Soviet pledges.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

At the signing ceremony in Paris, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the CFE Treaty on behalf of Canada. Canada has consistently supported the pursuit of an agreement limiting conventional armed forces in Europe and strongly supports the CFE Treaty. In negotiating and completing the Treaty, the Canadian delegation made a particular contribution in developing the verification and monitoring procedures.

A Government news release issued on the day the Treaty was signed stated:

The arms control provisions of CFE are unprecedented in scope. CFE makes a historically significant contribution to security and stability in Europe, to which Europeans and North Americans have aspired since the end of World War II.<sup>2</sup>

The agreement to postpone negotiation on aerial inspection measures left open the question of how such measures might complement or be complemented by an Open Skies regime (see *The Guide*, 1990). David Peel, the head of the Canadian delegation to the CFE negotiations, suggested in a statement to the CFE negotiations that Open Skies remain separate from aerial inspection measures for the CFE Treaty.<sup>3</sup> He noted that Open Skies fulfils a confidence-building role while aerial inspection measures should be geared specifically to verifying the terms of the CFE Treaty. However, Mr. Peel went on to suggest that the order of negotiation be reversed so that Open Skies could be coordinated with the CFE aims. He stated:

Although we originally preferred parallel development of Open Skies and aerial inspection regimes, we now see a definite advantage in a sequential approach with priority being given to Open Skies.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Government of Canada. "Canada Signs Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," *News Release*, 19 November 1990.

<sup>3</sup>David Peel. "CFE and Open Skies," excerpts, *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 10-11.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*: 11.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On the day the Treaty was signed, Liberal member Warren Allmand asked the Government how the CFE Treaty would affect Canadian forces deployed in Europe. Mary Collins, the Associate Minister of National Defence, responded that most of the reductions required would be undertaken by Warsaw Pact members. Very few reductions would be required by NATO and "[a]lthough all the details are not known, we do not expect that it will actually affect our Canadian troops in Europe."<sup>5</sup>

However, Ms. Collins also stated that Canada had already made a decision to reduce its armed forces in Europe by 1,400 as part of reductions relating to cuts in the Canadian defence budget.

On 18 December 1990, Mr. Allmand pursued the question again. He also noted that the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the signing of the CFE Treaty, called into question the need for arrangements such as NORAD (see Chapter 18, NORAD). Mr. Allmand stated, as he had previously, that these developments suggested the great need for a new White Paper on Canadian defence policy.

Mr. Jean-Guy Hudon, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, responded:

Canada welcomes the signing of the CFE Treaty. Canada will play an active role in verifying the CFE agreement. A Canadian military verification organization has been established to deal with all aspects of the Treaty. This verification regime could well become the most enduring element of a CFE Treaty and the cornerstone of a new European military security framework.<sup>6</sup>

During hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence on Canada's role in confidence-building and verification procedures in Europe, the CFE Treaty was occasionally discussed.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>*Commons Debates*, 19 November 1990: 15391.

<sup>6</sup>*Commons Debates*, 18 December 1990: 16933.

<sup>7</sup>See: Standing Committee on National Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 32-35, 12 and 13 December 1990.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Arms Control Association. "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: Analysis, Summary, Text," *Arms Control Today*, Jan/Feb 1991, Supplement: 1-16.
- Department of External Affairs. "The CFE Treaty: A Summary," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 3-8.
- Department of External Affairs. "Success in Vienna: CFE Treaty Signed," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 1-3.
- Graham, Thomas. "The CFE story: Tales From the Negotiations Table," *Arms Control Today*, Jan/Feb 1991: 9-11.
- Holst, Johan J. *Arms Control in the Nineties: A European Perspective*. NUPI Report no. 151. NUPI, October 1990.
- Institut français des relations internationales. *Désarmement classique en Europe: problèmes et perspectives*. Paris: Masson, 1990.
- Leavitt, Robert. "Next Steps For European Conventional Arms Reduction," *Arms Control Today*, Jan/Feb 1991: 12-16.
- Mann, Paul. "CFE Treaty Slashes Weapons but Huge Armories Remain," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 26 November 1990: 24-27.
- Speight, John. *CFE 1990: Achievements and Prospects*. The Council for Arms Control, Faraday Discussion Paper no. 15, 1990.
- US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services. *The Fading Threat: Soviet Conventional Military Power in Decline*. Report of the Defense Policy Panel. Washington D.C.: GPO, 9 July 1990.

FURTHER READING

- Blechman, Barry, et al. *Regaining the High Ground: NATO's Stake in the New Talks on Conventional Forces in Europe*. Washington D.C.: Defense Forecasts Inc., April 1989.
- Dean, Jonathan. "Defining Long-term Western Objectives in CFE," *Washington Quarterly* 13, no. 1, Winter 1990: 169-184.
- . *Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987.
- Hamlin, Doug. *Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament in Europe: Canadian Objectives*. Ottawa: CIIPS, Working Paper no. 20, January 1990.
- Keliher, J.G. *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe*. New York: Pergamon, 1980.
- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (Treaty text). US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington D.C.: USIA, 1990.

*CROSS REFERENCES*

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures  
Verification

#### 4. CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

##### BACKGROUND

At an important summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)<sup>1</sup> on 19 November 1990, in Paris, the thirty-four members of the CSCE signed the *Vienna Document 1990*, a new agreement on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe. On the same day, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed by the twenty-two members of the CSCE, who are also members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The development of CSBMs began in Helsinki in 1973 when the then thirty-five members of the CSCE began negotiations on what became the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975. The Final Act dealt with three "baskets" of issues: security questions in Europe; cooperation in economics, science and technology, and the environment; and cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. In the security basket, states agreed to provide twenty-one days notice of all major military manoeuvres involving 25,000 or more troops. States also agreed that observers from other states could be invited to observe military manoeuvres. Provisions were included to enable the further development of "Confidence-Building Measures" such as these. A review conference was held in Belgrade from autumn 1977 to spring 1978 but no significant advances were made.

At the second review conference of the Helsinki Final Act, held in Madrid from November 1980 to September 1983, states agreed on a mandate for negotiations on CSBMs. The resulting negotiations were held in Stockholm between January 1984 and September 1986, under the cumbersome title of Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE). In its shortened version, the talks were also known as Conference on Disarmament in Europe, or CDE.<sup>2</sup>

These negotiations resulted in what is known as the Stockholm Document,<sup>3</sup> in September 1986. It was concluded just as the changes in the Soviet Union were beginning to appear. Soviet agreement to a number of the provisions, and the extent of the provisions themselves, were considered an important step forward. The Stockholm Document reflects agreement in six principal areas:

---

<sup>1</sup>The members include: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, San Marino, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia.

<sup>2</sup>See previous issues of *The Guide*, especially 1987, for a more detailed examination of these negotiations.

<sup>3</sup>Formally, *Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, 1986.

declaratory measures; notification measures; observation; exchange of annual calendars; constraining provisions; and compliance and verification. *Inter alia*, the measures agreed to in the Stockholm Document include: forty-two days advance notice of military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks; and a requirement that other signatories be invited to observe military manoeuvres exceeding 17,000 troops. Military activities which may not comply with Document provisions can be subjected to a challenge on-site inspection. States have the right to observe the exercise in question by ground and/or air, but no state will be required to accept more than three such inspections in one year. Each year on 15 November, states exchange calendars of military exercises planned for the next year. A one-year warning must be given of exercises involving 40,000 troops and exercises with 75,000 men or more require two years notice. Finally, states agree to refrain from the threat or use of force.

The Vienna Document builds on the Stockholm Document. The mandate for this set of CSBMs came from the third review of the CSCE in Vienna which concluded in January 1989. During the review, the idea that negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe, traditionally involving only the twenty-two members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, should be combined with CSBM negotiations involving all thirty-five members of the CSCE, was the subject of considerable discussion. In the end, it was agreed that the negotiations would remain separate but the two groups would meet periodically to keep each other informed.

The Vienna Document came into force on 1 January 1991. It is intended to build on the Stockholm Document and consequently restates its provisions. The new or improved measures included in the Vienna Document include:

- Annual exchanges of military information -- this information will be exchanged on 15 December each year and will include command organization, troop and major weapon system numbers in Europe for air, air defence, land and naval forces permanently stationed on land. In addition, information on military budgets will also be exchanged using the system established by the UN for standardized reporting of military expenditures.
- Risk reduction -- states may request explanations about unusual or unscheduled military activity, plus hazardous incidents. An explanation is required within forty-eight hours.
- Improved contacts -- exchanges, visits and contacts between military personnel, military institutions and academics are to be encouraged and facilitated. Once every five years, states with air combat units will invite other states to observe activity at an active peacetime air base.

- Information exchanges are now subject to an "evaluation visit" to ensure that the information provided was correct. One visit for every sixty military units is permitted, up to a maximum of fifteen.
- A network of direct communications between the states will be established to facilitate the transmission of messages relating to the agreement and to act as a supplement to diplomatic channels.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada has been an active participant in the negotiations on CSBMs and is very supportive of the new agreement. Canada used its expertise in verification and communications to play an important role in developing provisions of the agreement relating to those questions.

At the 45th Session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored three resolutions on CSBMs. All three resolutions were passed by the General Assembly without a vote. Resolution 45/58I, co-sponsored with France, called upon states to evaluate the success of the negotiations on CSBMs in Europe. Resolution 45/58M, co-sponsored with Belgium, called upon states to consider the value of CSBMs. Resolution 45/62F, co-sponsored with Germany commended the guidelines on types of CSBMs established earlier in the year by the UN Disarmament Commission.

In speaking to the UN First Committee, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason, spoke of Canada's support for CSBMs and indicated that Canada believed CSBMs should be encouraged on other areas of tension.<sup>4</sup>

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

The Standing Committee on National Defence held hearings during November and December 1990 on Canada's role in confidence-building and verification in Europe.<sup>5</sup> During Ambassador Mason's testimony, discussion focussed on the role of CBMs at the UN and at the CSCE.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Ambassador P. Mason. "Canadian Statement to First Committee," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 17.

<sup>5</sup>See: Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 30-35, 1990.

<sup>6</sup>Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 35, 13 December 1990.

RECENT LITERATURE

Department of External Affairs. "Vienna Document on CSBMs Adopted at Paris Summit," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15 Winter 1990/91: 9.

George, Bruce. "The Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. The Vienna Agreement and Beyond," *NATO Review* 39, no. 1, February 1991: 15-20.

Gheballi, Victor-Yves and Benoît Junod, eds. *La Conférence de Stockholm sur le désarmement en Europe: les résultats de la première phase*. Geneva: Geneva International Peace Research Institute, 1990.

Holst, J.J. *Confidence and Security Building in Europe*. NUPI Paper no. 436. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, October 1990.

*Negotiations on CSBMs*. United States Embassy Backgrounder: 90-103, 13 November 1990:

Peters, Ingo. "CSBM Policy after the Cold War," *Aussen Politik* 42, no. 2: 128-136.

*Vienna Document 1990*. Paris, 19 November 1990.

FURTHER READING

Borawski, John. *From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference*. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988.

Braun, Aurel. "Confidence Building Measures, Security and Disarmament," In *Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, edited by R. Spencer. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984: 202-227.

Byers, Rod et al., eds. *Confidence-Building Measures and International Security*. East-West Monograph Series, no. 4. New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987.

Holmes, Michael. *Compliance with Confidence-Building Measures: From Helsinki to Stockholm*. Background Paper no. 30. Ottawa: CIIPS, February 1990.

Macintosh, James. *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*. Arms Control and Disarmament Studies, no. 1. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1985.

Magill, W.K. and Andrew P. Rasiulus. "The Vienna Negotiations: Establishing a New Security Order for Europe." *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 4: 34-38.

Namiesniowski, C.A. *The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence Building*. Background Paper no. 14. Ottawa: CIIPS, September 1987.

CROSS REFERENCES

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

## 5. MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL

### *BACKGROUND*

Since the crisis in the Persian Gulf there has been considerable interest in developing a regional arms control plan for the Middle East which would limit conventional arms transfers and weapons of mass destruction. In the past there have been various proposals for arms control in the Middle East including a proposal for making the region a nuclear weapon-free zone (see Chapter 10, NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES) but they have met with little success. New interest in Middle East arms control has been driven as much by the war itself as by the realization that the coalition was faced with many weapons that had been sold to Iraq by coalition members. As a result a number of the proposals that have been put forward for Middle East arms control have centered on controlling conventional arms transfers to the region (see Chapter 1, ARMS TRANSFERS).

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, Canada was the first country to propose new arms control measures. While the situation in the Middle East was key to the Canadian proposals, the proposals themselves have a global focus and do not seek to deal solely with the Middle East. Canada proposed that a world summit be held at the United Nations (UN) to establish a wide-ranging programme of arms control to be completed in time for a second summit to be held in 1995.

The Canadian proposals for the arms control programme encompass both conventional arms transfers controls and limits on weapons of mass destruction. They call for an early commitment to extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995, an expansion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention at the next review conference and a commitment to conclude the chemical weapons convention by 1992. As part of the plan, Canada also urged the major arms exporting countries to undertake a formal commitment to greater sensitivity and transparency in arms exports and proposed that the signatories to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe agree not to export their surplus arms to areas of tension.

During March and April 1991, there were increasing calls for arms control in the Middle East from countries in the region, as well as from the US and France. On 29 May 1991, after consultations with governments in the region, the US unveiled its proposal for Middle East arms control. The US proposal would involve an agreement among the five major suppliers of conventional arms, Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the US, on guidelines which would control the export of destabilizing weapons to the region while allowing exports for legitimate defence needs. Middle East states would agree to refrain from further acquisition, production and testing of surface-to-surface missiles as a first step towards eliminating these missiles. The initiative also calls for a regional ban on the production and acquisition of weapon-capable nuclear material such as enriched uranium; calls on all states in the region to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and supports a nuclear weapon-free

zone as a long term goal. Similarly, all states in the region are urged to commit to joining the chemical weapons convention currently under negotiation, once it is completed. The Biological Weapons Convention will be holding a review conference in September 1991. The US proposal calls for the conference to use the opportunity to strengthen the conventions provisions.

Two days later, France announced its initiative in Middle East arms control. The French plan included similar goals on limiting weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms transfers and also included proposals for confidence-building measures intended to enhance regional security.

On 9 July 1991, after a two day meeting in Paris, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the main arms suppliers to the Middle East, agreed to seek the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and to observe rules of restraint in exporting conventional arms to the region. Their final statement also encouraged countries in the region to develop their own proposals for arms control. The five countries will meet again in September and October to develop concrete measures to this end.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada supports regional arms control initiatives and is in favour of arms control in the Middle East. (For Canadian policy on arms transfers to the region see Chapter 1, ARMS TRANSFERS.) As discussed above, Canada has put forward a proposal which deals with Middle East arms control concerns, as they have been articulated since the Persian Gulf crisis, as part of a global initiative on weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms transfers. In announcing the Government's plan for a world summit, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark explained the rationale behind the Government initiative:

Over the years, ...we have all helped to create a military apparatus in this region, especially in Iraq, that is beyond human comprehension. Military assistance in the region has exceeded economic assistance. This must stop. ... To be credible, any peace plan must include strict measures to check the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the stockpiling of conventional weapons in the region. Multilateral negotiations have already begun regarding these crucial issues.... However, their success has been limited owing to the lack of political will or the conflicting interests of the various parties involved. It is urgent that we make further efforts to display a strong political will. In this belief, Canada plans to promote a world summit on instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction in the coming months.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period in the Gulf," *Statement*, 91/10, 8 February 1991: 7-8.

In a speech to the Calgary Chamber of Commerce on 1 March 1991, Mr. Clark spoke of the difficulties inherent in trying to develop controls on arm transfers. He noted the contribution arms sales from coalition countries had made to Iraq's arsenal and the worrying trend of new supplier states.

For 45 years the search for security in the Middle East has been pursued largely through the avenue of arms. That search has failed. ...Despite billions and billions of dollars spent on arms -- what have we seen? We have seen five wars between Israel and her neighbours. We have seen Lebanon reduced to rubble. And we have this war,....[Canada's] initiatives will not, in and of themselves, address the arms trade challenge.... Action -- concerted action -- is required by others, ...but [the proposals] contribute -- and I believe they indicate our firm commitment to moving from hope to action...<sup>2</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In response to a question from Conservative member Jean-Guy Guilbault at a hearing before the Standing Committee on External Affairs, Mr. Clark said that he was encouraged by international response to the Government initiative and said that Canada would now seek to develop a working group of states to continue planning.

...it is very important to have a number of countries of the South, that is to say, developing countries, so that such a conference is not perceived as something arranged by the rich nations...<sup>3</sup>

At the conclusion of its hearings on the question of a world summit, the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND) issued a report on its findings. The Committee was encouraged by the Government proposal for a world summit. The Committee noted however, that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were the subject of ongoing negotiations and treaties while the trade in conventional arms was not. Given the connections between regional instability and the conventional arms trade, the Committee recommended that "...conventional weapons transfers should be a focus of particular concern for Summit participants" and stated that:

---

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark: We Have an Obligation to End the Mid-East Arms Race," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 16, Spring 1991: 6.

<sup>3</sup>Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 105, 21 March 1991: 37.

It is not unrealistic to hope that the Summit may provide the catalyst for a broadened version of the Conventional Arms Transfers Talks (CATT) held between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1977-78.<sup>4</sup>

The Committee went on to recommend further that one of the aims of the summit should be a formal system of arms transfer transparency, that an arms transfer registry should be established under UN auspices and that Canada should concentrate its efforts on helping to establish regional systems of arms transfer transparency.<sup>5</sup> (See Chapter 1 for more details.)

---

<sup>4</sup>Standing Committee on National Defence. "Fourth Report, The World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 63, 26 March 1991: 4.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*: 5-6.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Barnaby, Frank. *Arms Control After the Gulf War*. Conflict Studies 240. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991.
- Federation of American Scientists. "Middle East Arms Control: A Five Point Plan," *FAS Public Interest Report* 44, no. 2, March/April 1991.
- Gold, Dore, ed. *Arms Control in the Middle East*. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Study no. 15. Tel Aviv, 1991.
- Klare, Michael T. "Fueling the Fire: How we armed the Middle East," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1, January/February 1991: 19-26.
- Taylor, Trevor. *The Arms Trade, Including the Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Missile Technology, with Special Reference to the Middle East*. Ditchley Conference Report no. D91/3. Oxfordshire: Ditchley Foundation, 1991.

CROSS REFERENCES

Arms Transfers  
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones



## 6. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

### *BACKGROUND*

In April 1987, Canada, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the US announced that they had agreed on a coordinated policy for limiting exports of missiles and related technologies. The seven countries had been secretly negotiating the agreement, initially established through an exchange of letters, since 1983. Known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the agreement is not a formal treaty. It was prompted by growing concern about weapons proliferation in general and the proliferation of ballistic missiles in regions of tension and instability, in particular. It seeks to control technological transfers which may contribute to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems while permitting exports associated with civilian space programmes.

The MTCR affects exports of materials and technology related to missiles capable of carrying a 500 kilogramme payload over a distance of 300 kilometres. The range was considered to be the shortest militarily useful within a given region, and the payload represented the smallest considered possible for a nuclear warhead. Each state is responsible for its own implementation of the controls.

Two categories of technologies are controlled. Category I items include complete rocket and missile systems, production facilities for such systems, individual rocket stages, re-entry vehicles and rocket engines. This category represents the systems of greatest risk and states are required to exercise restraint and maintain a "strong presumption" to deny such exports. When items in this category are exported, the state undertaking the export must ensure that the item or technology is used only for the stated purpose once it reaches its destination.

Category II includes less sensitive items such as sub-systems and components. Many of the items in Category II have a number of possible uses, not all of them military. Thus, less restraint is called for in Category II although restraint must be exercised. Exports are to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

The MTCR has been criticized because it does not include important supplier countries such as China, North Korea and the Soviet Union. It is also very difficult to ensure that technology exported for civilian purposes is in fact used for those purposes after it reaches its destination. However, since 1987, MTCR members have sought to strengthen the regime. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Spain have all joined the MTCR since 1987, bringing the current total to sixteen.

The Soviet Union has indicated that it is willing to adhere to the terms of the MTCR and it has been holding bilateral discussions with the US about cooperation in limiting ballistic missile

proliferation. After a summit meeting in Washington D.C. in June 1990, President Bush and President Gorbachev issued a communique which expressed their support for the MTCR, noted that they would continue bilateral consultations, pointed out their intention to seek regional methods for reducing proliferation and called on all countries to exercise restraint.

The concerns about ballistic missile proliferation that prompted the MTCR were given particular poignancy in the Persian Gulf crisis because of Iraq's possession and use of SCUD missiles and the possibility that they might be armed with chemical or biological warheads. The crisis has prompted stronger efforts at regional and international levels to develop more effective proliferation controls.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

As one of the original members of the MTCR, Canada has been a strong supporter of the regime and of controls on ballistic missile proliferation generally. Canada acted as the host for an MTCR meeting in July 1990 in Ottawa.<sup>1</sup>

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, as part of an overall plan for post-hostility actions, Canada proposed that there be a world summit on the instruments of war and mass destruction.<sup>2</sup> The plan calls for efforts on various multilateral arms control issues with a view to taking further steps to control proliferation. A global conference under UN auspices would issue a statement of intent to this end, and a condemnation of proliferation. A second summit would be held in 1995 to mark the development of the new measures.

As part of its proposed programme, the Canadian Government has said that it will encourage expanded participation in the MTCR and will propose more stringent controls.<sup>3</sup> With this end in view, at a MTCR meeting in Tokyo 18 to 20 March 1991, Canada proposed that the meeting review the Equipment and Technology Annex to the MTCR in order to consider ways of making the Annex's scope more stringent.<sup>4</sup> The Tokyo meeting led to agreement on a plan for revising the Annex and expanding participation in the regime.

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Hosts MTCR Meeting," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 27.

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Post-Hostilities Activities," *Backgrounder*, 8 February 1991.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "MTCR Partners Meet in Tokyo," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 16, Spring 1991: 10.

In a statement released after the Tokyo meeting, former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

The Gulf War showed us the tragic impact of uncontrolled trade in missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. The Missile Technology Control Regime is an important forum for addressing these issues, but it would be stronger and more effective if more exporting countries were involved.<sup>5</sup>

In discussing proliferation concerns, the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason noted that:

Perhaps even more destabilizing, ...has been the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. This is having two main effects: it compounds the danger presented by nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation and it is extending the reach of new powers into the developed world. International efforts...have come too late to do anything but slow down and hinder the development of ballistic missiles in a number of countries in the next few years.<sup>6</sup>

In discussing the Government's broad-based initiative on a world summit and proliferation, Ambassador Mason spoke of the need for proliferation to be dealt with as an issue related to regional stability as well as arms control.

...unilateral and multilateral controls on the part of suppliers alone cannot provide permanent answers. Proliferation, as a process, will be largely inevitable as long as the underlying factors that motivate weapons acquisition remain in play. To be effective, approaches to proliferation must form part of a broader security policy that aims at involving regional powers in stabilizing structures.<sup>7</sup>

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue.

---

<sup>5</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Supports Stronger Controls on Missile Technology Transfers," *News Release*, no. 78, 25 March 1991.

<sup>6</sup>Ambassador Peggy Mason. "A New Security Agenda, Speech to the Conference on the Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World," 28 November 1990: 7.

<sup>7</sup>Ambassador Peggy Mason. "Opening Remarks to the Meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs," Montreal, 20 March 1991: 7.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Arnett, Eric H., ed. "The Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles: Policy Options for the Future," Proceedings from an American Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting Symposium, 1990.
- Bailey, Kathleen C. "Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Can it be Reversed?" *Orbis* 35, no. 1, Winter 1991: 5-14.
- Carus, W. Seth. *Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, Threat and Response*. The Washington Papers. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990.
- Heller, Mark A. "Coping with Missile Proliferation in the Middle East," *Orbis* 35, no. 1, Winter 1991: 15-28.
- Mahnken, Thomas G. and Timothy D. Hoyt. "The Spread of Missile Technology to the Third World," *Comparative Strategy* 9, no. 3, 1990: 245-264.
- Nordeen, Lon. "Missile Proliferation: A New Threat to Peace," *National Defense* 75, no. 461, October 1990: 28-32.
- Ru'an, Ye. *Ballistic Missile Proliferation -- How to Control It?* CIIS Paper. Beijing: China Institute of International Studies, May 1990.

FURTHER READING

- Desjardins, Marie-France. *Ballistic Missile Proliferation*. Background Paper, no. 34. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, September 1990.
- Karp, Aaron. "The Commercialization of Space Technology and the Spread of Ballistic Missiles." In *International Space Policy*, edited by Daniel S. Papp, John McIntyre. New York: Quorum Books, 1987.
- Navias, Martin. *Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World*. Adelphi Papers 252. London: IISS, Summer 1990.
- Spector, Leonard S. with Jacqueline R. Smith. *Nuclear Exports: The Challenge of Control*. Special Report. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 1990.

CROSS REFERENCES

Arms Transfers  
Middle East Arms Control  
Non-Proliferation Treaty

### BACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II, there have been few attempts to develop arms control agreements which deal specifically or exclusively with naval weapons. Prior to 1945, there were extensive bilateral and multilateral efforts to develop treaties limiting naval arms. During the 1920s and 1930s, multilateral efforts resulted in three treaties: the Washington Treaty on Limiting Naval Armament in 1922; the London Treaty of 1930; and a follow-on to the London Treaty, the London Protocol in 1936. These treaties placed limits on the types and numbers of warships maintained by Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the US. The limits also extended to the types and numbers of weapons deployed on the ships.

This emphasis on limiting naval arms was not carried over into the post-World War II period. In fact, the post-World War II period has been in sharp contrast to the 1920s and 1930s with little in the way of effort or achievement in naval arms control. In 1972, the US and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, which seeks to reduce and prevent potentially dangerous incidents between the navies of the two countries. It does not limit naval arms. Similar agreements have also been signed by the Soviet Union with a number of NATO countries, including Canada.

Since World War II, a number of agreements which seek to ban nuclear weapons from a given zone or place limits on nuclear weapons themselves have been developed. As such, they may affect naval activity but do not constitute naval arms control. Of particular interest is the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty which *inter alia*, prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons under water.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed in 1972, prohibits the US and the Soviet Union from, *inter alia*, developing, testing or deploying an anti-ballistic missile system or component which is sea-based. The SALT II Treaty, signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1976, placed upper limits on the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and ballistic missile submarines that could be maintained by the two countries. More recently, the proposed START agreement will require the US and the Soviet Union to reduce their numbers of SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines. A political agreement that will accompany the START Treaty will require the two to exchange information about their planned deployments of sea-launched cruise missiles on an annual basis. Negotiations on confidence-building measures in Europe have included discussions of measures relating to naval arms.

Still, there have been no negotiations or agreements since 1945 which seek to deal exclusively with naval weapons, especially the large numbers of conventional naval weapons. The large size of the superpower navies and the proliferation of weapons at sea, especially tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships has prompted some countries to propose that naval arms control measures be pursued. For a number of years, the Soviet Union has proposed a variety of measures relating to naval activities. These have included confidence-building measures in certain regions such as the North Atlantic and the Arctic, bilateral confidence-building measures between the US and the Soviet Union such as declarations of which naval ships are carrying nuclear weapons, and a separate forum for discussing naval limits. In 1988, the Soviet Union made public details of its naval force deployments as a confidence-building measure. The US has been consistently opposed to naval arms control and has not responded positively to any of the Soviet or other international proposals. Other members of NATO, particularly the UK, have supported the US position.

At the United Nations, the question of naval arms control was before the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) from 1987 to 1990. Work at the UNDC included discussion of possible confidence-building measures, regulations for nuclear-powered ships, and strengthening existing multilateral agreements. A Secretary-General's Group of Experts report on naval arms control in 1985 outlined two objectives for further action. First, effective measures of reducing nuclear weapons at sea and second, developing measures which reduce conventional arms at sea.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of an unchanging negative attitude towards naval arms control on the part of the US administration, there has been discussion of naval arms control within the US government. In April 1988, Paul Nitze, then an advisor to the President on arms control, proposed that the US and the Soviet Union agree to a complete ban on all nuclear weapons based on surface ships. This proposal, however, did not become part of the formal US position.

In response to a Congressional request, in April 1991, the US Department of Defense submitted a report to Congress on naval arms control prospects. The report concluded that naval arms control would restrict the US ability to carry out its global commitments and would be difficult to verify. The Pentagon report did note that confidence-building measures were the most promising naval arms control option, although it came out against a ban on tactical nuclear weapons and limits on submarines. Specific support was given to unilateral measures such as a proposal for the publication of data on the procurement and production of naval weapons.

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of Disarmament Affairs, Report for the Secretary-General. *The Naval Arms Race*. Study Series 16. New York: United Nations, 1986.

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada is party to one of the oldest naval arms agreement, the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817. The Treaty limits US and Canadian naval activity on the Great Lakes. While Canada is willing to consider some forms of naval arms control, it is against any measure which might infringe on the basic freedoms of the high seas. Canada has supported UN resolutions on naval arms control and was active in the discussions at the UNDC. Canada has favoured limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and welcomed the US-Soviet agreement on annual information exchanges and the acceptance of the principle of constraint and the commitment to continue to seek further measures.<sup>2</sup>

Canada's strongest support for the concept of naval arms control comes in relation to confidence-building measures. In a speech before a conference on naval arms control, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason, reiterated Canada's support for such measures. However, Ambassador Mason noted that a growing expectation that naval measures might be added to the mandate of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) negotiations under the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would raise a number of difficult questions which need careful attention. These include the question of whether such CSBMs would detract from maritime security policy and whether the CSCE is the appropriate forum for such discussions.<sup>3</sup>

In outlining Canada's position Ambassador Mason said:

...Canada has actively promoted discussion within NATO on confidence-building in the maritime environment. Preliminary consideration on naval security and arms control has been undertaken, both in Brussels and in Ottawa. I believe that, despite the difficulties, we must continue to pursue such studies. Canada favours, in principle, consideration of measures that would promote mutual trust through transparency, enhance personal contact, and build upon the seafaring traditions of fairness and courtesy.<sup>4</sup>

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no comment on naval arms control during debates in the House of Commons. However, in hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

---

<sup>2</sup>Ambassador Peggy Mason, "The Canadian Position on Naval Arms Control," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 11-12.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.: 11.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.: 12.

on confidence-building and verification measures relating to Europe, the issue was raised by Committee members.

Liberal member Bill Rompkey asked officials from the Department of External Affairs about Canada's role in advocating naval arms control measures, pointing out that there appeared to have been little work done on the question within NATO.

...surely we could simply have an exchange of information that could start confidence-building measures that could eventually lead to some form of naval arms control. Has Canada put any ideas forward like that? Surely we could play a mediation role between the United States and the Soviet Union in that regard.<sup>5</sup>

In response, Mark Moher, the Director General for International Security and Arms Control stated:

...Canada was one of the first countries within the NATO group to suggest that at an appropriate time we will have to move to address the question of naval arms control and naval confidence-building measures. It has, however, been recognized that there are enough issues on the table at this stage,...<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Rompkey raised the question again when Ambassador Mason was appearing before the Committee, noting that little progress on naval issues was occurring within NATO. Ambassador Mason reiterated that Canada believed that confidence-building should be the starting-point. With reference to NATO activities she stated:

Essentially, the whole NATO focus on naval arms control has been in the context of the CFE and CSBM negotiations. It has therefore been within the Madrid mandate, ...which very strictly limits naval questions. Essentially they cannot be independent naval questions; they have to be functionally related to ground force activity. ...That is the context in which it has been going on, and Canada has been one of the countries that, ...wanted us to go as far as it was possible to go within the Madrid mandate.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* [hereafter SCND. Minutes of Proceedings], no. 30, 6 November 1990: 8.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.: 9.

<sup>7</sup>SCND. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 35, 13 December 1990: 22-23.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Blechman, Barry M., William J. Durch et al. *The US Stake in Naval Arms Control*. Washington, DC: the Henry L. Stimson Center, 1991.
- Brodeur, Nigel. "Naval Arms Control," *National Network News* 1, no. 11, 15 April 1991: 10.
- Cronin, Patrick M. and Adam B. Siegel. "Prospects for Naval Arms Control." In *Science and International Security*, edited by Eric H. Arnett. Washington D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990: 373-389.
- Federation of American Scientists. "Talks on Naval Arms Urged," *Public Interest Report* 44, no. 3, May/June 1991.
- George, James L. "Naval Arms Control: Mediums and Messages," *Naval War College Review* 43, no. 3, Summer 1990: 32-42.
- Olmstead, David Lieut. Commander. "Don't Ban the SLCM," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 117, January 1991: 57-58.
- Tritten, James J. "'Naval Arms Control: A Poor Choice of Words and an Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come,'" *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 2, 1990: 65-86.
- United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. *Naval Confidence-Building Measures*. Topical Papers 4. New York: United Nations, 1990.

FURTHER READING

- United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs. *The Naval Arms Race*. Study Series 16. New York: United Nations, 1986.
- United States Department of Defense. *Report on Naval Arms Control*. Washington D.C.: GPO, 5 April 1991.



## 8. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) -- THE FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

### *BACKGROUND*

The Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) convened in Geneva on 20 August 1990. The Conference was scheduled to conclude on Friday 14 September, but continued through the night of the 14th, finally adjourning at about 6 a.m. on Saturday the 15th. Article VIII of the Treaty, which came into force in 1970, required that a conference "to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized" be called at the end of five years. Thereafter, also under Article VIII, a majority of the signatories may request further conferences at five year intervals. Article X of the Treaty, however, requires that in 1995, twenty-five years after its entry into force, a conference be convened "to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." The 1990 Review Conference, therefore, was the last before the 1995 date for renewal.

### *The Elements of the Treaty*

The NPT was negotiated between 1965 and 1968. During the negotiations, disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union centred on the prospect that the United States might transfer nuclear weapons to West Germany under a NATO agreement. A second significant disagreement occurred between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-possessing states. The latter argued that if the proposed treaty was to weigh equally on the parties, there should be a linkage established between horizontal and vertical proliferation.

The NWS resisted specific linkage, but in the end were obliged to compromise. Article VI of the NPT requires the parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." In addition, the Preamble to the Treaty recalled the determination of the parties to the 1963 Partial Test Treaty "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

With these general attempts to balance obligations between nuclear-possessing and non-possessing states, the NPT signatories undertook the following commitments:

- nuclear weapon states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states, or to assist them to acquire nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear weapons states undertook not to receive nuclear weapons and not to manufacture them (Articles I and II);
- non-nuclear states agreed to accept safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) to ensure that nuclear materials were not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapon development (Article III), in exchange for which they were promised the right to participate fully in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including peaceful nuclear explosions (Articles IV and V).

#### *Previous Review Conferences*

At the 1975 Review Conference, discussion centred on proposals by non-possessing states to add several protocols to the Treaty. The first of these dealt with the achievement of a comprehensive test ban, and the second with reductions in the nuclear weapon capabilities of the NWS. The third called upon the NWS to provide guarantees that they would not use nuclear weapons against non-possessing states. The Conference, however, was unable to agree on the language of the three protocols, and narrowly averted breaking up in disagreement. At the last minute, the Conference president produced a personal assessment of the issues which was accepted as the Conference Report.

The 1980 Review Conference took place at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the decision by President Carter to withdraw the SALT II Treaty from the Senate ratification process. The conference was valuable in reviewing a number of key issues, including the Israeli and South African nuclear programmes, and their application and scope of the safeguards programme. As in 1975, however, the non-possessing states were dissatisfied with the progress (or lack of it) made by the NWS in reducing their nuclear arsenals. Primarily because of this issue, the Conference was unable to agree on a final document.

The 1985 Review Conference exhibited a comparable pattern of achievement and failure, but was able to agree on a Final Document. It strongly endorsed the objectives of the Treaty and the role of the IAEA, and found compromise language on issues such as nuclear assistance and the Israeli-South African nuclear programmes. However, the Conference was divided on the issues of a comprehensive test ban and progress towards nuclear disarmament. In the outcome, a Final Document was made possible by the use of a formula in which "the Conference except for certain states" deeply regretted the failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban and called upon the states concerned to resume negotiations in 1985. The "certain states" -- the United States and the United Kingdom -- asserted that they remained committed to the ultimate goal of a comprehensive test ban, but claimed that deep and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapon arsenals were the highest priority in terms of nuclear disarmament.

*Issues at the 1990 Review Conference*

Under the presidency of Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru, the 1990 Review Conference followed the procedures developed at previous conferences. The Conference created three Main Committees. The first dealt with issues arising from Articles I, II and VI of the Treaty. For many of the non-possessing states, especially the Third World countries, the key question before Main Committee I was the extent to which the NWS had met their obligation to achieve "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...." In addition, this Committee also dealt with the Nigerian proposal for a treaty providing "negative security assurances" to non-nuclear states, and issues arising from the potential proliferation of nuclear weapon states.

Main Committee II dealt with issues concerning the safeguard programme administered by the IAEA, and with the potential to expand the scope of safeguards. Main Committee III dealt with the provisions of the Treaty providing access to all aspects of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to non-possessing states, especially those in the Third World. In addition to these three committees, the Drafting Committee also played a key role at the Conference. In the final week, when the Main Committee reports are submitted, it is the drafting committee which is responsible for producing a Final Document for approval by the plenary meeting of the Conference.

During the four weeks of the Review Conference a great deal of positive work was accomplished in the Main Committees. In brief, some of the key elements were:

- promising discussions in Main Committee III in which several supplier states, including Belgium, Italy and the Soviet Union, associated themselves with drafting language which would have made all of their exports of nuclear materials conditional on the acceptance of the recipient of "full scope safeguards;"
- agreement on measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards;
- agreed draft formulations concerning armed attacks on nuclear facilities, the desirability of nuclear weapon-free zones, technical assistance to developing countries, a demand that Israel and South Africa submit all of their nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, and a variety of other issues of importance to the reinforcement of the NPT regime;
- an agreement that the nuclear weapon states, while submitting unilateral negative security assurances as they had done in the past, would consult on the draft treaty proposed by Nigeria and other states.

These agreements were overshadowed, however, by a continuing dispute at the Review Conference about the fulfilment of the obligations of the NWS under Article VI. Throughout the Conference, the United States and the United Kingdom, strongly supported by the Western group, argued that the five years past had produced great progress in arms control. They pointed to the

1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, and to the high hopes that a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) would be signed shortly. They also emphasized the progress in negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe, and the relaxation of tensions between East and West.

Led by Mexico, however, a number of non-aligned countries argued that, at the centre of the nuclear disarmament provisions referred to in the Preamble and Article VI of the Treaty, lay the obligation of the NWS to make progress towards a comprehensive test ban. The furthest that the United States was willing to go in accepting this linkage was to propose a sentence in the Final Document which would "note" the negotiations under way between the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on verification measures in order to permit the ratification of two existing treaties -- the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.

Despite efforts to find compromise language, the deadlock on this issue persisted to the end of the Conference. A dramatic last-ditch effort by the President sought to use essentially the same formula as that used in 1985 -- that is, acknowledging in the final draft differing views on the fulfilment of obligations under Article VI. The President's compromise draft failed to achieve the approval of Mexico and Iran when it was presented to the plenary meeting in the final hour of the Conference. There was, therefore, no Final Document.

In the aftermath of the Review Conference, a number of states, including the United States, chose to emphasize the constructive work of the Conference and to minimize the significance of the failure to agree on a Final Document. On the other hand, the absence of a Final Document appeared to nullify some of the work of the Conference. For example, supplier states such as the Soviet Union, Belgium and Italy, which had accepted draft agreements calling for full scope safeguards as a condition of supply, indicated afterwards that, in the absence of a Final Document, they no longer considered themselves bound by the negotiations.

Finally, the Review Conference was widely regarded as setting the scene for the 1995 Extension Conference. Insofar as progress towards a comprehensive test ban continues to be the principal criterion used by leading non-aligned states, such as Mexico, to measure NWS compliance with Article VI, the conclusion of the 1990 Conference suggested that the outcome of the 1995 Extension Conference would be uncertain. More immediately, the debate about nuclear testing pointed ahead to the Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment conference, scheduled to convene in New York at the beginning of January 1991.

In the spring and summer of 1991, the non-proliferation regime was both reinforced and threatened. On 30 May, France, which did not sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the NPT, announced

that in principle it was ready to sign the NPT. Some weeks later, in mid-June, South Africa declared that it was ready to accede to the Treaty, and signed it in July. In doing so, however, South Africa did not explicitly declare that it was a non-nuclear weapon state. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, it became clear that Iraq had developed facilities for the enrichment of uranium which lay entirely outside the IAEA inspection system, and had also clearly sought to deceive IAEA inspection teams. Amidst growing concerns that the IAEA and other controls against proliferation were inadequate, in August reports circulated that North Korea, which, like Iraq, is a party to the NPT, had acquired sufficient weapons grade enriched uranium to build atomic weapons.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada approached the Review Conference on the basis of its historic support for the NPT as the centrepiece of efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup> The Canadian delegation to the Conference played a vigorous part in the discussions, particularly with regard to Main Committees II and III, reflecting Canada's commercial interests and expertise in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, as deputy Chair of the Drafting Committee, Canadian Ambassador Peggy Mason played a key role in the final days of the Conference in the search for a consensus document.

Canada's positions on the principal issues at the Conference were set down in formal statements to the opening plenary session of the Conference, and to the Main Committees. In regard to Articles I and II, Canada expressed confidence that the NWS were complying with their obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons, components or technology to non-possessors, but noted its concern about possible violations, at least in spirit, by non-possessing states. Without naming specific states, Canada noted that:

Statements by any party about the need to develop such weapons, clandestine procurement of nuclear sensitive items, evidence of unsafeguarded nuclear activity can raise concerns about less than full compliance with Article II.... It should be emphasized in the final document that states party should refrain from any word or deed that would raise questions about compliance.<sup>2</sup>

In regard to the fulfilment of disarmament obligations incurred by the NWS under Article VI, Canada's position was similar to that of other countries in the Western group. Ambassador Mason noted that "since 1985, progress of an unprecedented nature has been made toward halting and reversing the

---

<sup>1</sup>See: Department of External Affairs. "Canada Supports Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *News Release*, no. 44, 5 March 1990.

<sup>2</sup>Statement of Articles I and II to Committee I, 29 August 1990.

nuclear arms race.... This progress is facilitated by the NPT and represents a significant advance towards fulfilling the Article VI goals."<sup>3</sup> The statement noted the INF Treaty, favourable progress in the START negotiations, the CFE agreement and the prospects for a chemical weapons convention as matters which should be included in a "fair and balanced assessment" of progress on Article V.

In its assessment of progress towards a comprehensive test ban -- as noted above, the issue seen by the neutral and non-aligned countries as the litmus test of progress on Article VI -- Canada also supported the general position of the Western group while noting the importance of continued negotiations. Ambassador Mason commented:

However, even on this difficult issue, I believe there is justification for optimism. After a long hiatus, the Committee on Disarmament has this summer established an ad hoc committee on the item entitled "Nuclear Test Ban".... Canada actively participated in the recent meetings of this ad hoc committee and looks forward to the continuation of this body's work in next year's session of the CD.

Equally encouraging is the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties which can now be ratified. Canada looks forward to the early resumption of bilateral superpower negotiations on further restrictions on nuclear testing.<sup>4</sup>

In regard to the obligation under Article IV to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, Canada responded to a Conference request for national statements on bilateral exchange programmes. In reviewing its bilateral activities, Canada noted, *inter alia*, that it cooperated in peaceful nuclear activities with twenty-eight countries (of which four -- Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia and the Philippines -- would be considered Third World countries). Canada's safeguards policy was restated in this submission in the following terms:

Canada will only undertake full nuclear cooperation with those non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that have made a commitment to non-proliferation, by either adherence to the NPT, or by taking an equivalent binding step and accepted NPT-type safeguards on all their nuclear activities.<sup>5</sup>

In a separate statement to Main Committee III, it was noted:

---

<sup>3</sup>Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament. *Statement to the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. Geneva, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 24 August 1990: 9.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*: 10. The ad hoc committee of the CD was given a "non-negotiating mandate" which expired at the end of 1990 and has not to this point been renewed.

<sup>5</sup>Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva. *Canadian Bilateral Nuclear Policies and Cooperation Activities in Support of Article IV of the NPT*. Geneva, August 1990.

Canada is prepared to provide limited assistance for safe and efficient operation of Canadian-supplied CANDU reactors in Argentina, India and Pakistan, but will not consider the resumption of full nuclear cooperation with those countries until they accept the NPT and full-scope safeguards.<sup>6</sup>

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall congratulated South Africa on its decision to join the NPT, noting also the earlier signatures of Zambia and Tanzania. She noted that Canada supports the proposal for a nuclear weapons-free zone in Southern Africa as a regional confidence-building measure and as a contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup>

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

Parliament was not in session during the NPT Review Conference. However, Canadian Parliamentarian Warren Allmand, in his capacity as International President of Parliamentarians for Global Action, issued a statement expressing disappointment with the failure to achieve a Final Document. The statement said in part:

The Review Conference failed because many states believe the nuclear powers have fallen short of their Treaty obligations under Article VI. The nuclear powers, or some of them, tend to think otherwise. They claim a need to continue testing into the indefinite future.... A comprehensive test ban and the NPT are of equal importance. A CTB would greatly enhance the prospects of a significant extension of the NPT in 1995 when the time comes for its renewal.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>*Statement to Committee III*, 28 August 1990.

<sup>7</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. Canada Congratulates South Africa on Signing the NPT," *News Release*, no. 164, 19 July 1991.

<sup>8</sup>Parliamentarians for Global Action. "Parliamentarians Disappointed With NPT Conference," *Press Release*, 19 September 1990.

*RECENT LITERATURE*

Albright, David and Tom Zamora. "South Africa Flirts with the NPT," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Jan/Feb 1991: 27-31.

Cox, David. "To New York, A Message from Geneva," *Peace and Security* 5, no. 4, Winter 1990/91: 8-9.

Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation. *Newsbrief*, no. 11, Autumn 1990: 1-2.

Rauf, Tariq. "Blocking the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Fourth Review Conference of the NPT," *The Barometer*, Fall 1990: 1.

Sanders, Ben. "The Fourth Review Conference of the NPT: Some Impressions of an Interested Outsider," *The Barometer*, Fall 1990: 2.

*FURTHER READING*

Department of External Affairs. *Canada's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy*. Ottawa, 1985.

Department of External Affairs. *Canada and International Safeguards: Verifying Nuclear Non-Proliferation*. Verification Brochure no. 5. Ottawa, 1990.

Goldblat, J. *Twenty Years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Implementation and Prospects*. Oslo: Peace Research Institute of Oslo, 1990.

Muller, H. and R. Kokowski. *The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Political and Technological Prospects and Danger in 1990*. Stockholm: SIPRI, 1990.

Scheinman, Laurence. *The International Atomic Agency and World Nuclear Order*. Washington D.C.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1987.

Spector, Leonard with Jacqueline Smith. *Nuclear Ambitions*. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1990.

*CROSS REFERENCES*

Nuclear Weapons Testing -- The Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference

## 9. NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING: THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

### *BACKGROUND*

In 1958 the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom initiated negotiations on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Despite some progress in these negotiations, the prospects of an agreement diminished after the U-2 affair and the failure of the 1960 summit, and the conference adjourned in 1961 having failed to reach agreement. However, drawing upon the experience of the negotiations, after the Cuban missile crisis in 1963, the three parties negotiated and signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT).

The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear weapon tests in all environments except underground. It is open to signature for all states and, as of January 1991, has been signed by 118 states including Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and India. Neither China nor France have acceded to the Treaty but, over time, both have restricted nuclear weapon testing to the underground environment.

The PTBT is of unlimited duration. However, the Preamble notes that the "Original Parties" (the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom) sought "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and were "determined to continue negotiations to this end." This intent was recalled in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which came into force in 1970. The Preamble to the NPT recalled the determination of the PTBT parties "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

Two further treaties were negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States which imposed further limits on underground testing. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) limited the size of underground tests to 150 kilotons while reaffirming once again the goal of a comprehensive test ban, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) established a similar limit on non-weapon nuclear explosions. These treaties, which came into force in 1976, were not open to signature by other states.

In 1979, during the latter stages of the Carter Administration, trilateral negotiations on a CTB appeared close to agreement, but faltered in face of increasing domestic opposition in the United States and the weakening position of the Carter Administration. In 1982, President Reagan decided not to resume negotiations on a CTB until improved verification procedures had been developed to monitor the 1976 Treaties.

At the Third Review Conference of the NPT in 1985, debate centred on the failure of the nuclear weapon states to pursue a comprehensive test ban. Similarly, in the United States, the 1982 Reagan decision not to resume negotiations led to considerable congressional criticism and calls for a moratorium on testing. Meanwhile, in August 1985, the Soviet Union declared a moratorium on testing and called for other testing states to follow suit. While the Reagan Administration successfully resisted these pressures, it pursued negotiations with the Soviet Union on improved verification measures to monitor the 150 kiloton threshold. These negotiations finally produced agreed procedures which were presented to Congress in 1990 as verification protocols to serve as the basis for ratification of the TTBT and PNET.

In 1985, Parliamentarians for Global Action, an international organization of parliamentarians, began exploring the possibility that the Partial Test Ban Treaty could be amended to make it comprehensive. Based on a legal opinion from Abram Chayes, a former legal advisor to the State Department, Parliamentarians for Global Action urged key signatory states to petition for a conference to amend the PTBT. On 18 November 1986, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of a resolution calling on the PTBT signatories to "undertake practical steps leading to the convening of a conference to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty."

Article II of the PTBT states that any party may propose amendments to the Treaty. They do so by submitting the proposed amendment to the depository states, who are required to circulate it to all signatories. Thereafter, if required to do so by one third of the signatories, the depository states must convene a conference to consider the amendment. However, while only a simple majority of the signatories is required for the amendment to succeed, the majority must include the concurring votes of the original parties. In August 1988, India, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted an amendment which had received the support of one third of the signatories by March 1989. Essentially, the amendment added a protocol to the PTBT banning all nuclear explosions underground, "or in any other environment."

While declaring its opposition to the amendment (and thereby effectively giving notice that the conference could not succeed), the United States agreed to the convening of the Amendment Conference in New York on 7 January 1991. Before the presentation of the amendment, the US delegate stated that the United States "will not participate in, or provide any financial support to, any continuation of this Conference in any manner beyond the scheduled -- and agreed two-week session.... We urge other parties to join in bringing this process to a close." After the presentation of the amendment by Mexico, the supporters of the amendment chose not to force a vote. Instead, discussion centred on the further steps that might be taken, including the transfer of the CTB issue to the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

In 1983, the Conference on Disarmament sought to establish an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test ban, but was unable to agree on a mandate. Specifically, the major point of contention was whether an ad hoc committee should have a mandate to negotiate a CTB as opposed to analysis and recommendations to member states. In 1986, a Group of Scientific Experts was created to work in association with the CD, but not as a committee of the CD. The Group of Scientific Experts has concentrated on the technical requirements needed for a global seismic data exchange to support a comprehensive test ban. In 1990, the CD was finally able to create an ad hoc committee on a CTB. Agreement on a "non-negotiating" mandate led to four meetings of the Ad Hoc committee in 1990 and appeared to strengthen the otherwise tenuous base for the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

At the New York Amendment Conference, a number of states, including some such as Sweden who were in favour of amendment, argued that the documents from the Conference should be referred to the CD. Others, such as Nigeria and Mexico, argued that the CD had failed to deal with the CTB issue, and that the Conference should remain seized of the issue and reconvene at a specified date.

Despite the opposition of the United States, the final declaration of the Conference held out the prospect of a further meeting, but at an unspecified date. The brief final statement read:

Acknowledging the complex and complicated nature of certain aspects of a comprehensive test ban, especially those with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, the State parties were of the view that further work needed to be undertaken. Accordingly, they agreed to mandate the President of the Conference to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and resuming the work of the Conference at the appropriate time.<sup>1</sup>

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

A comprehensive test ban is one of six key arms control objectives identified by the Canadian Government. Since 1976, Canada has played a prominent role in the Group of Scientific Experts, and has upgraded the Yellowknife seismic array station as a contribution towards test ban verification. Nevertheless, its position on the Amendment Conference has been persistently critical. In particular, various Government spokespersons have argued that it was irresponsible to convene a meeting which had no chance of success, and dangerous to seek to link progress on a CTB to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In an early forthright comment to this effect, a spokesman for the Department of External Affairs commented:

---

<sup>1</sup>Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies. *Arms Control Reporter*, 1991: 601,B30.

To threaten to bring down the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the quest for an amendment which, however well-intentioned, in reality gives no promise of producing a global, comprehensive and verifiable test ban is, quite simply, irresponsible.<sup>2</sup>

In the lead-up to the Amendment Conference, this continued to be the Canadian position. In his speech to the 45th United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 1990, Secretary of State Clark commented on the linkage to the NPT in the following terms:

...we have been deeply disturbed by a tendency among some others to adopt positions which can only act to undermine the vital consensus which underlies the existing treaties on non-proliferation and nuclear testing... the pursuit of other objectives should not be allowed to threaten those existing agreements which have become so vital...it is Canada's firm view that both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty are too important for international peace and security to be held hostage one to the other.<sup>3</sup>

Once the convening of the Conference was determined, however, Canadian policy focussed on the prospect that the meeting might offer a constructive opportunity for an exchange of views on the problems involved in a CTB. Speaking to the organizational meeting of the Amendment Conference in June 1990, Disarmament Ambassador Peggy Mason commented:

Canada believes that the Amendment Conference has the potential to build on common ground among parties and provide a fresh impetus to work toward the CTB goal, particularly at the Conference on Disarmament.<sup>4</sup>

In accordance with this view, Canada submitted a working paper to the Amendment Conference on verification requirements. The limited duration of the Conference, however, and the failure to establish working committees, prevented any comprehensive discussion of verification issues.

While offering only limited support to the proponents of the Amendment Conference, Canadian statements both before and at the Amendment Conference appeared to signal impatience with the slow pace of the negotiations on the ratification of the threshold treaties. At the 1990 United Nations General Assembly, Canada again co-sponsored (with Australia and New Zealand) a resolution

---

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. *Disarmament Bulletin*, Spring-Summer 1989: 30.

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Forty-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, 90/55, 26 September 1990: 6.

<sup>4</sup>Ambassador Peggy Mason, Head of the Canadian Delegation. *Statement*, 4 June 1990.

entitled "Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."<sup>5</sup> Speaking to the First Committee on 16 October 1990, Ambassador Mason appeared to underline the need for faster progress:

On nuclear testing, Canada welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties and that these two treaties will soon be ratified. While this step, in the eyes of many, was overdue, we believe that it represents an important basis upon which further restrictions on nuclear testing can be negotiated. In his plenary statement, [Secretary of State Joe Clark] welcomed the joint American and Soviet statement to a step-by-step approach to further restrictions on nuclear testing. He then went on to state Canada's belief that that commitment should be followed up immediately.<sup>6</sup>

Addressing the Amendment Conference, Ambassador Mason again reiterated:

Canada's belief that the United States and the Soviet Union should immediately follow up their commitment to negotiate further restrictions on nuclear testing with the final goal of a comprehensive ban...

In what appeared to signal a slight shift in Canadian policy, she continued:

Canada urges the two states concerned to negotiate further limitations on their respective nuclear testing programs, that could include both limits on the number and yield of tests as intermediary measures on the road to a conclusion of an effective and verifiable CTBT at an early date.<sup>7</sup>

On 18 January 1990, the Amendment Conference concluded its work, making a decision by recorded vote on the declaration quoted above. Seventy-four countries voted for the declaration, while the United States and United Kingdom voted against. Along with eighteen other countries, Canada abstained.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On Wednesday 16 January 1991, Liberal MP Warren Allmand, Chairman of Parliamentarians for Global Action, made a Statement in the House calling attention to the Amendment Conference. He commented:

---

<sup>5</sup>UN Resolution 45/51, 4 December 1990. The resolution passed with a vote of 140-2-6, France and the US voted against.

<sup>6</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canadian Statement to First Committee," *Disarmament Bulletin*, Winter 1990/91: 16-17.

<sup>7</sup>"Statement by Ambassador Peggy Mason to the Amendment Conference," *Press Release*, no. 1. New York, 10 January 1990.

Unfortunately, the United States and the United Kingdom are opposing this conference and Canada is not supportive. This is hard to understand since some of the states involved in the Middle East crisis are pressing to develop nuclear weapons and a comprehensive test ban would retard this development.

Before this conference ends on Friday, I would ask the Canadian government to support the continuation of the conference and a comprehensive test ban. Stop the development of nuclear weapons.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup>*Commons Debates*. 16 January 1991: 17105.

RECENT LITERATURE

Arms Control Association. *Arms Control Today* 20, Special Issue on the Comprehensive Test Ban, no. 9. Washington, November 1990.

Fenstermacher, Dan. "The Effects of Nuclear Weapon Test-Ban Regimes on Third-Generation Weapon Innovation," *Science and Global Security* 1, no. 3-4, 1990.

---. "Arms Race: The Next Generation," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 2, March 1991: 29-33.

Lerager, James. "Kazakhs Stop Soviet Testing," *Nuclear Times* 8, no. 3, Autumn 1990: 11-16.

The Verification Technology Information Centre. "Partial Test Ban Treaty Remains Partial," *Trust and Verify*, no. 17, February 1991.

FURTHER READING

Basham, Peter W. and Ola Dahlman. "International Seismic Verification." In *Nuclear Weapon Tests: Prohibition or Limitation?* Edited by Jozef Goldblat and David Cox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Department of External Affairs. *Seismic Verification*. Verification Brochure no. 1, Ottawa, 1986.

Fetter, Steve. "Stockpile Confidence Under a Nuclear Test Ban," *International Security* 12, no. 3, Winter 1987: 132-167.

Robinson, C. "The Joint Verification Experiment: A Unique Approach to Developing Verification Agreements," *Disarmament* 12, no. 2, Summer 1989: 90-95.

US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. *Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties*. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1988.

Von Hippel, Frank, Harold A. Feiveson and Christopher E. Paine. "A Low-Threshold Nuclear Test Ban," *International Security* 12, no. 2, Fall 1987: 135-151.



## 10. NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

### *BACKGROUND*

Nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) are geographic areas, defined by treaty or agreement within which the presence of nuclear weapons, their manufacture and testing are banned. NWFZs differ in their specific aspects with some maintaining more stringent or different restrictions than others. Treaties establishing such zones often have protocols which are open to signature by nuclear weapon states and which require such states to respect the provisions of the zone. In establishing NWFZs, states hope to fend off or eliminate nuclear weapon-related activity in their region, limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, use the zone as a confidence-building measure which will promote regional security and contribute to the progressive "denuclearization" of the planet.

The first NWFZ was proposed at the United Nations by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957. The Rapacki Plan would have prohibited the manufacturing, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany. While the Rapacki Plan had Soviet support, it was opposed by NATO and subsequently dropped. The Plan did, however, succeed in generating widespread interest in the establishment of regional denuclearized zones.

Since the 1950s, a wide variety of NWFZs have been proposed and implemented. In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco established Latin America as the first NWFZ in a populated area. Parties to this treaty are required to use nuclear materials for peaceful purposes only, and to prevent the testing, storage or acquisition of nuclear weapons on their territories. As of 1 January 1991, twenty-three states were party to the Treaty.

In 1985, a NWFZ was established in the South Pacific by the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty bans the stationing, manufacture and testing of nuclear explosive devices within the zone and also prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste. The question of transit and visiting rights for ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in the zone has been left open for signatory nations to decide independently. As of 1 January 1991, eleven states had signed the Treaty. China and the Soviet Union have signed and ratified the Protocols to the Treaty. The US, UK and France have refused to sign.

The success of these two zones, the only ones to be established in populated areas, has been mixed. Within the Latin American zone, not all of the signatories have completed safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required. In the South Pacific, the most serious drawback to the success of the zone has been the continued unwillingness of the US, the UK and France to consider signing the Protocols. In particular, France continues to maintain a very active nuclear programme in the Pacific and continues to carry out underground tests there. However, both zones continue to act as valuable precedents and confidence-building measures.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the Seabed Treaty (1970) are also considered to be NWFZ treaties although their provisions extend to weapon systems other than nuclear as well.

Proposals have also been made to establish NWFZs in Africa, Northern Europe or the Arctic, the Balkan states, Central Europe, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the South Atlantic, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and Southeast Asia. Most of these efforts have been made at the United Nations and some have been discussed at regional fora.

As a result of the Persian Gulf war, there has been renewed interest in the possibility of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The first proposals for such a zone were made in 1974 by the Shah of Iran. Since then, the idea has been discussed at the United Nations each year, with the effort intensifying after Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981. However, the idea has never been the subject of formal negotiations.

Former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed, in December 1990, that after the Persian Gulf crisis was resolved, negotiations begin to turn the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear and chemical arms. This proposal was echoed by Britain in the aftermath of the war (see Chapter 5, MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL). Britain advocated the inclusion of provisions establishing the Persian Gulf region as a zone free of biological, chemical, and nuclear arms in the larger Security Council resolution establishing the terms of the ceasefire with Iraq. In the end, the Security Council resolution establishing the ceasefire conditions required the complete elimination of Iraq's capability in biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

Within Canada, approximately 170 municipalities have declared their areas nuclear-free. Manitoba, Ontario and the Northwest Territories have declared themselves to be NWFZs. As a result of these declarations, approximately sixty percent of the Canadian population resides in locally declared NWFZs.

In February 1990, NDP Member Svend Robinson asked the Government to respect the 1983 declaration by the Vancouver City Council establishing Vancouver as a NWFZ and refuse to give nuclear weapons-equipped ships access to Vancouver harbour. In March 1990, NDP Member Robert Skelly tabled a petition in the House of Commons asking the government to establish a NWFZ in British Columbia which would prohibit port visits by ships with nuclear weapons (see 1990 edition of *The Guide*). The Government has not taken any action on this issue.

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada supports the principle of nuclear weapon-free zones wherever they are feasible and promote stability in an area. NWFZ proposals must meet certain requirements: they must have the support of countries in the area in question; they must promote regional and international stability.

Canada has never supported NWFZs in Central or Northern Europe or the Balkans because of its membership in NATO. The Government believes that NWFZs in these areas would be inconsistent with NATO policy which has a defensive policy including a nuclear deterrent. Similarly, the Government has never supported the declaration of Canada as a NWFZ for the same reasons. Canada does not possess nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons are not stationed on Canadian territory. Canada is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (see Chapter 8, THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY) which requires it "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons...."

A number of resolutions relating to NWFZ were put forward at the forty-fifth meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. A resolution which called for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East<sup>1</sup> was adopted without a vote. The resolution, *inter alia*, calls on parties to take steps towards a NWFZ in the area, and pending the establishment of such a zone, to refrain from developing, producing, testing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. Canada voted yes to a similar resolution which supported a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia.<sup>2</sup>

As it has done consistently in the past, Canada voted in favour of a resolution which called on France to ratify Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it signed in 1979. Canada also supported a resolution calling upon states to respect Africa as a nuclear weapon-free zone and condemning South Africa's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.<sup>3</sup> However, Canada abstained on Part B of the same resolution which, in part, termed South Africa's acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability a threat to international peace and security. The resolution demanded that South Africa submit its nuclear facilities to inspection by the IAEA and requested that the Secretary-General closely monitor South Africa's nuclear development.

---

<sup>1</sup>UN Resolution 45/52, 4 December 1990.

<sup>2</sup>UN Resolution 45/53, 4 December 1990.

<sup>3</sup>UN Resolution 45/56A, 4 December 1990.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On a related issue, on 22 October 1990, Liberal MP Warren Allmand drew attention to the large numbers of nuclear weapons present in the Persian Gulf as a result of the Gulf crisis. He asked then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark to:

...take action through the United Nations to have the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union remove all nuclear weapons from the region immediately.<sup>4</sup>

In response, Mr. Clark spoke of the need to continue attempts to extend the United Nations mandate in the area in the hopes that a peaceful solution to the crisis would be found. Once Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was secured:

...[w]e can then get on to the serious question relating to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the region, that is to try to have some means in which the stores of Iraq and those of other countries can be gradually controlled and eliminated.<sup>5</sup>

When pressed again on the question by Mr. Allmand, Mr. Clark responded that:

...a call by Canada...for some kind of unilateral action on nuclear weapons, on some nuclear weapons,...could well have a counterproductive effect.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>*Commons Debates*. 22 October 1990: 14501.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*: 14502.

RECENT LITERATURE

"A Nuclear-Free Canada?" *Connexions*, August 1990: 4.

Hamel-Green, M. *The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: A Critical Assessment*. Canberra: Australian National University, 1990.

Leonard, J. *Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East*. Document A/45/435. New York: United Nations, 10 October 1990.

Nordic Study Group on Port Call Policies. "The Port Call Issue: Nordic Considerations." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 21, no. 3, 1990: 337-352.

FURTHER READING

Bennett, G.C. *The New Abolitionists: The Story of Nuclear-Free-Zones*. Elgin, Illinois: Brethren Press, 1987.

Broadhurst, A.I. *Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: A Comparative Analysis of Theory and Practice*. Aurora Papers no. 5. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, June 1987.

*International Meeting for Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: A Documentary Account*. Berlin: Liaison Office of the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zones, 1988.

Mogami, Toshiki. "The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone: A Fettered Leap Forward." *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 4, December 1988: 411-430.

Regehr, E. et al. *Making Canada a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone*. Working Paper no. 1. Waterloo: Project Ploughshares, April 1987.

Selin, Shannon. *Canada as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: A Critical Analysis*. Issue Brief no. 10. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, August 1988.



## 11. PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

### *BACKGROUND*

In 1961, a resolution passed by consensus in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) identified the principles by which states should be guided in their exploration and use of outer space. It was established that international law, including the UN Charter, applied to outer space, and that outer space and all celestial bodies were free for all states to explore. In 1963, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. One hundred and nineteen countries have now signed the Treaty.

In December 1966, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Canada ratified this Treaty in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty, as it is known, states that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all. It bans the stationing of any nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction anywhere in space. Military bases, installations or fortifications, as well as weapons testing of any kind and military manoeuvres are prohibited on the moon and other celestial bodies. The use of the moon for solely peaceful purposes was reaffirmed in July 1984, with the coming into force of the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the number of anti-ballistic missile sites, interceptor missiles and associated radars the two states may maintain. Under Article V of the Treaty, the two parties also undertake "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile-land based." The ABM Treaty, therefore, acts as a barrier to the extension of the arms race in outer space.

Bilateral discussions between the US and the Soviet Union on possible limitations on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have been occurring on and off since 1979, when negotiations ended after a year of inconclusive discussion. One of the primary areas of disagreement about ASAT weapons is whether they are inherently offensive or defensive weapons. Repeated calls by the Soviet Union for a renewal of negotiations have proved unsuccessful. In 1983, the Soviet Union announced that it was unilaterally halting all ASAT testing. Two years later, the US Congress imposed a moratorium on tests of the US F-15 ASAT in space. In 1987, the US Air Force cancelled all funding for the weapon. In 1988, an effort to impose a more permanent ban on ASAT testing was launched by some members of Congress. Congressional supporters of ASAT not only succeeded in blocking a ban, but also in ending the moratorium imposed in 1985. The Soviet Union has continued to call for

discussions on ASATs and on outer space generally, and advocates establishing an international organization to inspect satellites before they are launched into space to ensure that they are for peaceful purposes only.

Another issue of concern for the maintenance of outer space as a peaceful environment has been the progress of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The US programme, commonly referred to as the "Star Wars" programme envisages placing systems in space which would shoot down enemy nuclear missiles, thus protecting the US against attack and limiting the effects of such an attack. While the final goal of the SDI programme remains several years away, and deployment plans are neither firm nor anticipated in the immediate future, the programme has significant implications for the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. Several countries, especially the Soviet Union, have raised these issues with the US in a variety of fora. However, SDI remains at present a research programme. As such, it is permitted under both treaties and the US has been reluctant to discuss whether SDI might eventually violate arms control treaties (see Chapter 12, START).

At the multilateral level, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is the primary forum for discussion of outer space. The CD involves thirty-nine countries, including Canada. The "prevention of an arms race in outer space" has been an agenda item at the CD since 1985. In 1985, after three years of debate, the CD was able to agree on a mandate for an ad hoc committee. The Ad Hoc Committee has been renewed annually since then by the UN General Assembly.

After studying the relevant international law relating to outer space, in April 1988, the Ad Hoc Committee presented a special report to the CD. The report concluded that the legal regime that applied to outer space, did not by itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that the legal regime should be consolidated and reinforced to enhance its effectiveness.

The Ad Hoc committee has continued to meet each year since 1985, but has not been able to develop a mandate for negotiations. In 1990, the UN General Assembly again re-established the Ad Hoc Committee, with the usual mandate "with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects."

During meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee in July and August 1990, a variety of topics were discussed. These included an Argentinean proposal that the Convention for the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space be updated and strengthened. Poland proposed that work be undertaken to develop confidence-building measures which would promote greater openness. The US continued to maintain that a bilateral framework must be established first, before multilateral negotiations can usefully begin. The Ad Hoc Committee ended its session on 16 August 1990, with little in the way of progress towards a negotiating mandate.

Canada is a long time supporter of a stronger peaceful regime in outer space. In 1982, at the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament, the then Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Trudeau, called for efforts to prohibit the militarization of outer space. Since 1982, when the CD first began considering discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Canada has submitted a number of important working papers to the CD. In 1985, Canada submitted a working paper entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space at the CD."<sup>1</sup> In 1988, Canada presented three working papers. The papers dealt with terminology, a proposal for strengthening state practice under the 1975 Registration Convention, and a retrospective view of significant recent political, technical and military developments in outer space.<sup>2</sup>

As part of its programme on verification, Canada has conducted a research project known as PAXSAT A. The PAXSAT A study examined the feasibility of developing a system of satellites which could be used to verify arms control agreements in outer space. A similar project, PAXSAT B, examines the feasibility of verifying conventional arms agreements by using satellites for space-to-ground remote sensing. Canada presented its analysis of the PAXSAT study to the CD in 1987.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canadian support for efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space continues to be strong, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space remains one of Canada's six arms control priorities.

As part of the summer session at the CD, two Canadian experts spoke to the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space at the CD in July 1990. Jeff Tracey from the Verification Research Programme at Canada's Department of External Affairs, spoke about the past, present and future capabilities of commercial satellites with respect to arms control verification. Peter Stibrany, of Spar Aerospace, spoke about the ambiguities that might arise in space programmes in the next twenty years. In particular, he discussed the difficulty inherent in distinguishing between weapon and non-weapon activities.<sup>3</sup>

Two resolutions on outer space were put forward at the United Nations General Assembly in December 1990, Canada voted in favour of both resolutions. Canada and Egypt co-sponsored

---

<sup>1</sup>CD/618, CD/OS/WP. 6, 23 July 1985.

<sup>2</sup>Canada. *Working Paper on the Use of Certain Terms Relating to Arms Control and Outer Space*, CD/OS/WP. 27, 8 August 1988; Australia and Canada. *Strengthening State Practice under the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space*. CD/OS/WP. 25, 18 August 1988, Canada. *Arms Control and Outer Space: A Retrospective Review: 1982-1987*. CD/OS/WP 26, 8 August 1988.

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canadians Address Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space," *Disarmament Bulletin*. Fall 1990: 15.

Resolution 45/55A, titled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space." The resolution calls for the CD to intensify its work on outer space, and requests the CD to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space, with the same mandate as in 1990. The resolution passed by a vote of 149-0-1, with the US abstaining. Resolution 45/55B "Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space," requests the Secretary-General to carry out a study on confidence-building measures that could be applied to outer space, and to examine the technologies that might be used and the mechanisms that might be developed. The Resolution calls for the report to be submitted to the General Assembly in 1993. This resolution also passed by a vote of 149-0-1, with the US again as the only abstainer.

In February 1991, the US proposed changing the principles on the use of nuclear power sources in outer space. The US wants to change the standards so that it will be able to display a nuclear reactor it has designed. Canada has spoken out against these changes at meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee.

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue during 1990-1991.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Department of External Affairs. "Canadians Address Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space," *Disarmament Bulletin* 14, Fall 1990: 15.
- Finnegan, Philip. "Army Designs Weapon to Crush Satellites," *Defense News*, 29 October 1990: 1.
- Finnegan, Philip and Vincent Kiernan. "After \$1.8 Billion, Pentagon Kills ASAT Effort," *Defense News*, 7 January 1991: 4.
- Krepon, Michael, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector and Mary Umberger. *Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.
- US Congress. *Military Space Programs: An Unclassified Overview of Defense Satellite and Launch Activities*. GAO/NSIAD-90-154FS. Washington D.C.: GAO, June 1990.

## FURTHER READING

- Beesley, J. Alan, et al. "L'apport du Canada au droit spatial et au contrôle des armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique," *Études internationales* 19, September 1988: 501-517.
- Carter, Ashton. "Testing Weapons in Space," *Scientific American* 261, no. 1, July 1989: 33-41.
- Centre for Research of Air & Space Law. *Arms Control and Disarmament in Outer Space* 2. Montreal: McGill University, 1987.
- Coulon, Jocelyn. "In Search of a Space Policy for Canada," *Peace&Security* 3, no. 3, Autumn 1989: 8-9.
- Department of External Affairs. *PAXSAT Concept: The Application of Space-Based Remote Sensing for Arms Control Verification*. Verification Brochure, no. 2. Ottawa, December 1986.
- Department of External Affairs. *Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space - Final Records and Working Papers 1989*. Ottawa. 1990.
- Department of External Affairs. *Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space*. UN Document CD/OS/WP. 6. Ottawa, 23 July 1985.
- Horgan, John. "Ivan's Eyes: A Ban Ends and Antisatellite Weapons Make a Comeback," *Scientific American* 260, no. 6, June 1989: 19-22.
- Kirton, John. "Une coquille vide: le Canada, puissance spatiale internationale, 1945-1988," *Études internationales* 19, no. 3, September 1988: 477-491.
- Lindsey, George. "L'espace: rôle auxiliaire ou quatrième armée," *Études internationales* 19, no. 3, September 1988: 451-466.
- Richelson, Jeffrey. *America's Secret Eyes in Space*. New York: Harper & Row, 1990.
- Weston, William C. "L'importance stratégique de l'espace pour les besoins militaires futurs du Canada," *Études internationales* 19, no. 3, September 1988: 493-499.

## CROSS REFERENCES

Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START)



## 12. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START)

### *BACKGROUND*

On 31 July 1991, in Moscow, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US President George Bush signed the Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty. The strategic arms reduction talks (START) took place under the umbrella negotiations on nuclear and space arms talks (NST), which began in January 1985. Talks on strategic arms had also occurred in 1982 and 1983 but ended when the Soviet Union refused to set a date for their resumption. The NST negotiations resulted in a treaty in 1987 which provided for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles (the INF Treaty) with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometres. This entire category of weapon system had been eliminated as of 1 June 1991.

Two treaties on strategic nuclear weapons were completed prior to the START Treaty. In 1972, the two superpowers signed the SALT I agreement and in 1979, they signed the SALT II agreement. These two agreements established upper limits or ceilings on the numbers of strategic intercontinental nuclear weapons that each side could maintain. Intercontinental range refers to the ability of a missile to travel between continents from one superpower to the other; this is considered to be 5,500 kilometres and above.

It had been hoped that the START Treaty would be completed sooner. However, final agreement was delayed by problems associated with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Persian Gulf crisis and difficulties in resolving the final sticking points. Final agreement between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev was reached at the G-7 meeting in London on 17 July 1991. The START Treaty affects intercontinental ballistic missiles based on the ground (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons.

The new START Treaty represents a significant step forward from the SALT treaties because, for the first time, the US and the Soviet Union have agreed to reduce their nuclear weapons rather than simply limit them. The Treaty limits the two sides to 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Within this limit, there is a sub-limit of 154 on deployed "heavy" ICBMs (ICBMs above a defined size). This provision will require the Soviet Union to cut its SS-18 missile force in half. Strict limits on this ten-warhead missile was one of the US' primary goals in the negotiations. The US does not have any heavy missiles. In a separate letter associated with the Treaty, the Soviet Union has agreed to destroy twenty-two SS-18 launchers each year over the seven-year reduction period to reach the required level.

Each side is permitted a total of 6,000 "accountable" deployed warheads. This means that 6,000 is not a firm limit on all warheads in their possession, but limits those warheads deemed accountable

by the Treaty. Within this upper limit, there is a sub-limit of 4,900 on warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs. No more than 1,540 warheads may be deployed on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1,100 on mobile ICBMs.

Under the terms of the Treaty, new types of heavy ICBMs are banned, as are heavy SLBMs and their launchers, and mobile launchers for heavy ICBMs. New ICBMs and SLBMs which have more than ten warheads are also prohibited. As part of a general trend towards having fewer warheads on strategic missiles, both sides will be permitted to "download" warheads from existing deployed missiles so that missiles which previously had ten warheads might now be deployed with only six or eight. Determining an upper limit of 1,250 on the number of free spaces that could be created this way was one of the final issues to be resolved in the negotiations. Placing an upper limit was considered very important because the possibility always remains that these warheads could be replaced (or uploaded) quickly.

The reductions the US and the Soviet Union will need to make to reach these levels amounts to approximately one-third of their presently deployed arsenals. (See STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE in the FACTS AND FIGURES section.)

Reductions will occur in three phases over a seven year period. The Treaty itself will last for fifteen years, with the option of renewal for five-year periods after that. Under a separate political agreement, both sides agree not to exceed 880 nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with ranges above 600 kilometres. Since neither side is anywhere near that upper limit, this is a very minimal constraint. Annual declarations of policy and planned deployments of SLCMs will also be given. Confidential data exchanges about nuclear-armed SLCMs with ranges between 300 and 600 kilometres will occur.

Under the counting rules established for strategic bombers, bombers loaded with nuclear bombs and short-range missiles will count as one launcher against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 warhead ceiling, regardless of the number of weapons actually carried. The US bombers carry a maximum of twenty air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), but only ten warheads will be counted against the 6,000 ceiling. One hundred and fifty US bombers can be counted in this way. Bombers with ALCMs in excess of this 150 limit will be counted with the actual number of warheads deployed on them. The Soviet bombers can carry a maximum of sixteen ALCMs and will be counted as eight warheads against the 6,000 ceiling. The Soviet Union is permitted to count 180 bombers this way.

The START Treaty is also important for its extensive verification provisions. These include information exchanges, a consultative commission and twelve types of on-site inspection. On-site inspection provisions include suspect site inspections, continuous perimeter portal monitoring of

mobile ICBM production facilities on both sides, and elimination inspections. Cooperative measures for keeping track of deployed mobile ICBMs have been developed and there is a ban on denying each side full access to telemetry during missile flight tests. For the first time, the two sides have also agreed to exchange telemetry tapes.

Although the Treaty represents a step forward, it has been criticized for not going far enough at a time when the new relationship between the US and the Soviet Union may have allowed much deeper cuts. While reductions on the order of about one-third will occur, (to approximately the level of arms the US and the Soviet Union had in 1982) the agreement is significant for what it fails to cover. As indicated above, the limits established in the Treaty apply to "accountable" warheads, not all warheads. With the exception of limits on non-deployed missiles for mobile launchers, there are no limits on the numbers of non-deployed launchers and missiles. Perhaps most importantly, while there is a ban on some new types of heavy missiles and launchers, there is really no constraint on modernization and production of new missiles.

On 1 June 1990, at a summit meeting in Washington, the US and the Soviet Union issued a joint outline for a set of negotiations to follow the completion of the START Treaty. The START II negotiations will seek to develop a framework which removes the incentive for a first strike and concentrates on encouraging more survivable systems. This will probably translate into an effort to move away from multiple warhead missiles.

Negotiations on defence and space arms had been occurring concurrently with the START negotiations, in Geneva. At these negotiations the two sides have been discussing the relationship between strategic offences and defences. In the first few years of the negotiations, the Soviet Union sought to tie agreement on these issues to agreement on reductions in strategic arms. In September 1989, the Soviet Union removed this condition, opening the way for separate agreement on strategic reductions. Negotiations on space and defence arms will continue after the signing of the START Treaty.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada supports the START negotiating process and welcomes the completion of the START Treaty. In a speech to the United Nations First Committee, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason outlined Canada's position:

Canada commends the perseverance demonstrated by the United States and the Soviet Union in negotiating a START Treaty that will substantially reduce their arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons. The forthcoming signing and implementation of this Treaty will represent a significant achievement in the process towards nuclear disarmament.

Canada welcomes the commitment of both sides to follow up the START I Treaty with negotiations on a START II Treaty that would further cut the superpowers' nuclear arsenals.<sup>1</sup>

*PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

During hearings before the Standing Committee on National Defence (SCND), Liberal member Fred Mifflin asked Ambassador Mason about what appeared to be slow progress on the START Treaty in contrast with the rapid changes at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and what this might indicate for START II. Ambassador Mason replied that to some degree, progress was dependent on eliminating the conventional asymmetries in Europe and discussed some of the difficulties associated with strategic arms control.

Whereas START I is getting rid of things they now recognize they do not need, START II will partly have to deal with identifying directions they have not gone in yet, directions they do not want to go in.... There is one other problem. The other problem has been that on both sides,...the top level has to be involved, ultimately, in all of this.... There is a limit to how much they can do at any one time,...<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canadian Statement to First Committee," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 16.

<sup>2</sup>Standing Committee on National Defence. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 35, 13 December 1990: 16-17.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Albright, David, Peter Gray, and Tom Zamora. "A Smaller, Safer Weapons Complex Through Arms Reduction," *Arms Control Today* 21, no. 6, July/August 1991: 3-10.
- Bunn, Matthew. "SS-18 Modernization: The Satan and START," *Arms Control Today*, July/August 1990: 13-17.
- Chernoff, F. "START or Finish? The Future of Strategic Arms Control and Profound Force Reductions," *Defence Analysis* 6, no. 3, September 1990: 235-254.
- Einhorn, Robert. "Revising the START Process," *Survival* 32, no. 6, November/December 1990: 497-506.
- Lockwood, Dunbar. "Verifying START: From Satellites to Suspect Sites," *Arms Control Today*, October 1990: 13-19.
- MacDonald, Bruce W. "The Emerging Consensus on Strategic Modernization," *Arms Control Today* 21, no. 6, July/August 1991: 11-15.
- Villars, Jean. "La négociation Start: état des lieux," *Défense nationale*, January 1991: 43-54.

FURTHER READING

- Barral, Graham. *START, Stability and Arms Control*. Peace Research Report no. 25. Bradford, England: University of Bradford, June 1990.
- Boulden, Jane. *Cruise Missiles and Strategic Arms Control*. Background Paper no. 24. Ottawa: CIIPS, January 1989.
- Boyer, Yves. "La conclusion prochaine des START: Triomphe de raison, ou essoufflement des champions?" *Défense nationale*, December 1989: 11-19.
- Cox, David. "Arms Control Magic: Less is More," *Peace & Security* 3, no. 2, Summer 1988: 2-3.
- . *A Review of the Geneva Negotiations*. Background Paper no. 32. Ottawa: CIIPS, May 1990.
- Smith, Gerard. *Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1980.
- Talbott, Strobe. *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*. New York: Random House, 1985.
- . *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II*. New York: Harpar's, 1980.



#### BACKGROUND

Verification is a key factor in all areas of disarmament and arms control. It is at the heart of the negotiations on nuclear missiles, arms in outer space, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. The issue of compliance often generates controversy and makes it difficult to reach agreement in any of these sectors. In the early days of arms control, the US and the Soviet Union relied on national technical means of verification to monitor compliance with the SALT treaties. Since then, arms control provisions have required more stringent measures of verification and states have become more willing to accept more intrusive measures of verification.

In November 1987, the US and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to eliminate ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) (see *The Guide 1988*). The INF Treaty contained new provisions for verification, including on-site inspection, which have provided an important precedent for other negotiations such as the negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe which resulted in the CFE Treaty in November 1990 (see Chapter 3, CFE). Also of recent importance is the completion of new verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) which resulted in both treaties being ratified by the US and the Soviet Union and officially entering into force in December 1990.

Canada has developed a very solid and respected expertise in verification, in the recognition that an arms control and disarmament agreement must be accompanied by provisions designed to ensure compliance and build confidence. In 1983, Canada launched the Arms Control Research Programme which has an annual budget of \$1 million. This Department of External Affairs programme involves the Government, the academic community and the commercial sector, and includes such projects as the study of problems that arise in international negotiations, the creation of specialized technical training programmes and the organization of international symposia of experts.

The Arms Control Research Programme is managed by the Verification and Research Section of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division at the Department of External Affairs. It focusses on certain Canadian arms control priorities: the achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons; negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; the development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space; and the pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.

The Government's activities have included a \$3.2 million upgrading of the seismic array station in Yellowknife, which was officially opened on 11 September 1989. It has also undertaken a variety

### 13. Verification

of studies on chemical weapons verification, including two reports on operational procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapon abuses which were submitted to the UN Secretary-General, and two recent reports on trial chemical weapon inspections. Canada has also considered the possibility of using space-based remote sensing for the verification of multilateral arms control agreements under a system known as PAXSAT. Canada's PAXSAT A project investigated the possible use of space-based remote sensing for arms control in outer space and the PAXSAT B project examined the possible use of the technology for verifying conventional arms control agreements (for other projects see previous editions of *The Guide*).

In 1985, at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada initiated and sponsored Resolution 40/152 on verification, which was passed by consensus. The Resolution called on member states "to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures," and urged them to "communicate to the Secretary-General ... their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques ... and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." This was the first time that a resolution on verification had proceeded beyond the negotiating stage.

Carrying out the requirements of this Resolution, in April 1986, Canada submitted to the Secretary-General a report entitled, *Verification in All Its Aspects: A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification*. This report, in addition to describing the relevant principles, procedures and techniques used in verification, also foresees an important role for the United Nations in the application and interpretation of arms control agreements, although bilateral negotiations between the superpowers will continue to be of paramount importance in this context.

In 1987 and 1988, Canada chaired the UN Disarmament Commission's Verification Working Group. The Working Group held discussions on verification procedures and techniques and on the role the UN might play in verification. The Group completed its work in May 1988, approving a consensus document listing sixteen principles of verification.

At the forty-third session of the UN General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored a resolution (Resolution 43/81B) calling on the Secretary-General to initiate a study by a group of experts to examine the role of the UN in verification. The Group of Experts was charged with the task of reviewing existing UN activity in the area, assessing the need for improvements or new activities and providing recommendations for further action. The resolution passed by a vote of 150-1-0, with the United States opposing the motion.

After a year and a half of work, the Group of Experts submitted its study to the Secretary-General in July 1990. It was then forwarded to the First Committee and later to the General

Assembly (see below). The final report presents two general views on a possible greater role for the UN in verification, reflecting an acceptance by the group to "agree to differ." However, there was complete agreement that a "fact finding" role did exist for the UN through the Secretary-General and it was recommended that this be strengthened.<sup>1</sup> The Group also recommended that a data bank of verification research material be established from data provided by states on a voluntary basis. To facilitate easy access to the data, it was recommended that the UN publish lists of additions to the data bank and that the UN take an active role in facilitating the international exchange of data.

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In 1990-1991, Canada has continued to play a strong role in the verification field. Mr. Fred Bild, the then Assistant Deputy Minister for the Political and International Security Branch at the Department of External Affairs, was chosen as chairman of the group of experts in recognition of Canada's role in bringing the study into being. As a result, Canada, as well as France and the Netherlands, sponsored the General Assembly resolution calling for the Group's report to be adopted and implemented. The resolution was adopted by consensus.<sup>2</sup>

In announcing that Canada would be presenting the final report to the First Committee, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason stated:

In Canada's view, the study provided an excellent opportunity to exchange views on a number of proposals.... We were particularly pleased that the Group succeeded in reaching a consensus final report that included a number of specific recommendations for further action.<sup>3</sup>

In speaking about a recently established coordination committee within NATO, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated that:

Canada, which has shared with allies the results of its own longstanding verification research programme sees this Coordination Committee and its supporting staff playing an increasingly key role in the verification efforts of Alliance members. In addition, dedicated multinational teams might be deployed for verification operations, and the

---

<sup>1</sup>For a full description see: "UN Verification Study Completed," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 13.

<sup>2</sup>"Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification." UN Resolution 45/65, 4 December 1990.

<sup>3</sup>"Canadian Statement to the First Committee," *The Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 17-18.

Alliance should begin giving serious thought to the development of shared verification tools - what might be called 'Alliance technical means'.<sup>4</sup>

As a signatory to the CFE Treaty (see Chapter 3, CFE), Canada has verification responsibilities to fulfill in the implementation of the agreement. In response to these new tasks, the Directorate of Arms Control Verification Operations (DACVO) at the Department of National Defence began a series of courses to train CFE inspectors. The course consists of a week on theory in Ottawa and a week of practical work in Europe. It is planned to develop a core group of fifty inspectors.

DACVO has a staff of thirteen at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and will be supported by a twelve member team which will handle data, as well as augmented National Defence intelligence staff. As of 5 October 1990, a seven member on-site inspection team is based at Lahr in Germany. They will conduct all on-site inspections and host inspections at Canadian facilities. It is expected that the organization will be able to handle twelve inspections per year.

Other activities carried out by Canada this year include ongoing work by an Expert Group on verification with the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The expert group includes sixteen participants from eight countries. The first meeting of the expert group was held at Montebello in October 1990 where the participants outlined the objectives of the research project. From 25 to 28 November 1990, Canadian officials participated in a joint trial chemical weapons inspection with the Netherlands. A similar trial CFE inspection involving the two countries is planned for 1991.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The issue was not discussed in the House of Commons this year. The Standing Committee on National defence held hearings on Canada's role on verification procedures in Europe during November and December 1990, at which verification was discussed extensively. In particular, discussion focussed on Canadian initiatives, possible future Canadian action and the current state of arms control.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Joe Clark. "Canada's Stake in European Security," *NATO Review* 38, no. 5, October 1990: 6.

<sup>5</sup>Standing Committee on National Defence. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 30-35, see especially no. 30, 6 November 1990 and no. 35, 13 December 1990.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Coulon, Jocelyn. "Les militaires canadiens deviennent les polices du désarmement," *Le Devoir*, 21 November 1990: B6.
- Dunn, Lewis A. and Amy E. Gordon. *Arms Control Verification & the New Role of On-Site Inspection*. Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990.
- Kokoski, Richard and Sergey Koulik, eds. *Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Technological Constraints and Opportunities*. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press for SIPRI, 1990.
- MacDonald, Brian S. *Integrating Arms Control Verification Proposals with Operations Research Methodologies*. Toronto: Atlantic Council of Canada, 1990.
- Moore, James, W. *Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament in Europe: A Model of Verification System Effectiveness*. Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers, no. 4. Ottawa: External Affairs, March 1990.
- Morris, Ellis, ed. *International Verification Organizations*. Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1991.
- The Markland Policy Group. *Disarmament's Missing Dimension*. Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens, 1990.

## FURTHER READING

- Buckingham, R. *Satellite Surveillance and Canadian Capabilities*. Background Paper, no. 7. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, September 1986.
- Cleminson, F.R. and E. Gilman. *A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification*. Arms Control Verification Series no. 1. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, January 1986.
- Department of External Affairs. *Compendium of Verbatim Statements on Verification*. Ottawa: May 1988.
- Department of External Affairs. *Verification Research: Canadian Verification Research Program*. Verification Brochure, no. 3. Ottawa, 1987.
- Keeley, J.F. *International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention*. Arms Control and Disarmament Occasional Papers no. 1. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, September 1988.
- Krass, A.S. *Verification: How Much is Enough?* London: Taylor & Francis, 1985.
- Tsipis, K. et al., eds. *Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Make it Possible*. London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986.



## SECTION II -- DEFENCE

### 14. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND DEFENCE

#### BACKGROUND

The Canadian Arctic became strategically important during the Second World War when Canada gave permission to the United States to build a chain of weather stations and airfields in the Arctic in order to ferry aircraft to the Soviet Union. After a brief lull in the post-war period, the strategic significance of the Arctic became apparent again in the early 1950s, when elements in the Eisenhower Administration became increasingly concerned about the possibility of an attack on North America by Soviet heavy bombers armed with atomic weapons. The Soviet detonation of a hydrogen bomb in 1953 dramatically increased this concern, and was soon followed by the construction of the Pinetree Line across southern Canada and the United States. After further studies of air defence requirements, the United States asked Canada to join in the construction of a radar early-warning line in the far North. An agreement was signed in 1955, and during the following two summer construction seasons the Distant Early Warning(DEW) Line was built roughly along the 70th parallel.

Although the DEW line stations were manned primarily by the United States, Canada was able to use a clause in the agreement to increase the number of Canadian personnel operating the DEW line stations. Nevertheless, US personnel continued to play the major role in DEW line operations. In 1985, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding to replace the DEW line by the North Warning System (NWS). The North Warning System has been built mainly on the old DEW line sites, but combines modern, minimally attended long-range radars with unmanned gap-fillers. The Canadian section of the NWS, which, like the DEW line, transmits data to the NORAD Combat Operations Centre in Colorado Springs and the Canadian Regional Operations Control Centre at North Bay, Ontario, will be manned and operated entirely by Canadians.

Despite this change, after the Memorandum of Agreement was signed in 1985, the NWS was criticized by former senior members of the Canadian military on the grounds that it does not provide surveillance of the northernmost areas of the Canadian archipelago. (This would have required a relocation of the radar sites which, the Canadian Government argued, would have made the system prohibitively expensive.) Surveillance of the northernmost areas of the Canadian archipelago, therefore, is carried out on a random basis by US airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS). By agreement, AWACS on patrol over the Canadian north carry a Canadian crew member. In addition, on 30 June 1989, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced the purchase of three Arctic and Maritime Surveillance aircraft, to be called Arcturus. The aircraft, Lockheed P-3s, are to be used for military, environmental, and maritime patrols in the Arctic, for fisheries patrols, and as supplementary search and rescue aircraft. The Arcturus will not be equipped with the expensive

submarine detection sensors and data processing installed on the Aurora aircraft, which are also Lockheed P-3s. McKnight explained the purchase as "a cost-effective measure to address the need to effectively patrol Canada's coastline and enforce Canadian sovereignty."<sup>1</sup>

The most serious challenge to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is posed by the disputed legal status of the waters of the Canadian archipelago, specifically the Northwest Passage. In 1969, the tanker *Manhattan* traversed the Passage seeking to explore the feasibility of a commercial tanker route from Prudhoe Bay to the eastern seaboard. In response to this potential development, in 1970, the Trudeau Government enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which unilaterally established Canadian environmental jurisdiction up to 100 miles from the Canadian Arctic coast. Since 1973, the Canadian Government has maintained the position that the waters of the Arctic archipelago are internal, with no right of innocent passage.

In August 1985, the US icebreaker *Polar Sea* transited the Northwest Passage from east to west, again without requesting formal permission from the Canadian Government. The Mulroney Government responded, on 10 September 1985, by affirming its claim to full sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago, and establishing, by Order-in-Council, a straight baseline around the archipelago, thereby sealing off the Northwest Passage as an internal waterway. A number of other measures were also announced to strengthen the Canadian claim to sovereignty, including the construction of a Class 8 icebreaker and an increase in the number of surveillance flights. Shortly after these announcements, the Canadian and US governments began negotiations to resolve their differences on the status of the Northwest Passage. Two years later, on 11 January 1988, the parties signed the Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement, which establishes cooperative procedures to facilitate navigation by icebreakers in the Arctic. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States undertook to seek Canadian consent for all transits by US icebreakers of waters considered by Canada to be internal. The Agreement also noted, however, that the respective positions of the two parties concerning the legal status of the Northwest Passage are not affected by the terms of the Agreement or any practice thereunder.

US concern about the status of the Northwest Passage reflects the global interest of the US Navy in preventing any attempts to close off waters considered to be international straits. In the case of the Northwest Passage, the specific concern is that the acceptance of the Canadian claim would prevent the submerged passage of nuclear submarines through the waters of the Canadian archipelago. Although such transits are unlikely to occur more than two or three times per year, the United States clearly seeks to retain the right to use waters of the archipelago without notification to the Canadian Government.

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of National Defence. *News Release*, 30 June 1989.

In June 1987, the Canadian Defence White Paper listed a number of additional measures to support Canadian sovereignty, including upgrading of five northern airfields to serve as austere operating bases for interceptors, an increase in air surveillance, and the intent to deploy fixed sonar systems for submarine detection in Arctic waters. Most importantly, the White Paper announced the Government's decision to purchase ten to twelve nuclear submarines, in part to provide an under-ice capability so that Canada could assert its presence in the waters of the archipelago. In the 1989 budget, however, the procurement programmes of the Defence Department were severely curtailed, and the nuclear submarine programme was cancelled. In February 1990, Finance Minister Michael Wilson also announced the cancellation of the Class 8 icebreaker, citing the need to control the deficit, the changing international environment, and the Canada-United States Arctic Cooperation Agreement.

In a speech in Murmansk in 1987, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev listed a number of Arctic arms control initiatives, calling on the circumpolar states to make the Arctic a "zone of peace." These proposals were generally received coolly by the Western powers, including Canada. In a speech in Tromsø, Norway on 9 December 1987, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark emphasized that it was the Soviet Union, not the other Arctic states, which had based large naval forces, including stockpiles of nuclear weapons, on the Kola peninsula. Moreover, he argued, the military issues in the Arctic, especially those concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons, were global not regional in their effect, and should be negotiated in established East-West fora. Despite this unenthusiastic response, issues arising from the Murmansk initiative remained on the political agenda. In the autumn of 1989, a panel report sponsored by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament proposed a series of arms control measures, as a response to Murmansk. These included a central Arctic demilitarized zone, Arctic "open skies," other aerial confidence-building measures, naval arms control measures, the establishment of a permanent Conference on Arctic Security and Cooperation, the recommendation that the Canadian Government seek from the Soviets an end to nuclear weapon testing at Novaya Zemlya in the Soviet Arctic, and a unilateral Soviet statement that its submarines would not transit the waters of the Canadian archipelago.

Despite the sceptical response to the Murmansk initiative, Soviet officials renewed the call for Arctic arms control at a bilateral meeting in Ottawa in October 1989, some weeks before the planned visit of Prime Minister Mulroney to the Soviet Union. The principal outcome of Mulroney's visit to Moscow in November 1989 was a Canada-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North. The agreement was intended to facilitate bilateral cooperation and exchanges in scientific, economic, social and cultural matters. Speaking in Leningrad, Prime Minister Mulroney proposed the creation of an Arctic Council as a political body of the eight circumpolar countries to coordinate and promote cooperation amongst them. His speech did not offer further details on the nature of the proposed Council.

Although the Canadian delegation sought to avoid giving prominence to security issues, on the final day of the visit, it was revealed that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had told Clark in private that the Soviet Union undertook not to send nuclear submarines into the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. This statement was subsequently reiterated in a newspaper interview with Shevardnadze. Although Prime Minister Mulroney reaffirmed the Canadian position that the appropriate avenues for the discussion of arms control issues were "the current ongoing arms control negotiations between the two superpowers and the two alliances,"<sup>2</sup> Clark noted that President Gorbachev had suggested that arms control issues be kept under regular review by the two foreign ministers. Clark commented: "We agreed to that immediately because we think that that will provide us with the opportunity to make proposals and provide an occasion for them to be looked at on a very high level."<sup>3</sup> The first bilateral Soviet-Canadian government meeting on Arctic issues, including security matters, took place in Ottawa in June 1990.

#### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

In September 1990, the US icebreaker *Polar Sea* -- the same ship which had transited the Northwest Passage in 1985 -- embarked on a ten-day voyage to undertake scientific research in Arctic waters. It was the third icebreaker since 1985 to cross the Passage. In accordance with the 1988 Agreement, the US Coast Guard sought permission from Canada for the voyage. By a Cabinet order dated 28 August 1990, the Canadian Government also exempted the *Polar Sea* from the strict regulations of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The Act contains provisions which permit an exemption if the vessel meets equivalent standards. However, no public explanation of the exemption was offered.<sup>4</sup>

In May 1991, the new Defence Minister Marcel Masse announced a number of cuts in defence programmes, including the proposed purchase of 820 all-terrain vehicles intended for use in the Arctic. The procurement of the tracked vehicles had been part of the package of military decisions intended to reinforce Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

In late August 1990, the founding meeting of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was held at Resolute Bay, Northwest Territories. IASC is a non-governmental organization of scientists from Canada, the United States, the USSR, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland.

---

<sup>2</sup>*Commons Debates*. 27 November 1989:6237.

<sup>3</sup>*Commons Debates*. 27 November 1989: 6261.

<sup>4</sup>Dennis Bueckert. "Canada Drops Arctic Rules for U.S. Ship," *Ottawa Citizen*. 6 September 1990: A12.

It is intended to promote scientific cooperation throughout the Arctic. Commenting on the event, Joe Clark stated:

Negotiations were difficult and lengthy.... Our representatives helped find ways to accommodate the different interests of the founding members and to allow for future participation by non-Arctic countries.... This is the latest in a series of initiatives by our Government, including the introduction of legislation to establish the Canadian Polar Commission, which will advise the Government on Arctic issues and provide a focus for Arctic science in Canada.<sup>5</sup>

Continuing the emphasis on non-security aspects of Canada's Arctic policy, in November 1990, Joe Clark announced at a conference in Ottawa that Canada would formally propose the creation of an Arctic Council to the circumpolar states when they met in Finland in the spring of 1991. He added that Canada would be prepared to provide the secretariat for such a body. Subsequently, in January 1991, officials from several Government departments met with a private group, the Arctic Council Panel, to discuss the initiative. Officials again made it clear that the Council would not have a mandate to discuss security issues. In a background paper issued at about the same time, the Department of External Affairs described Canada's position:

Canada is interested in developing realistic measures aimed at enhancing peace and security in all areas, including the Arctic. Given the limited scope of military activity in the Arctic and this activity's fundamentally defensive nature, we see little point in Arctic-specific arms control negotiations.... Arctic security is not a special case and should not be treated in isolation from broader East-West military security issues.<sup>6</sup>

In regard to the proposed Council, the paper commented:

An Arctic Council would provide a forum for the circumpolar states to meet regularly and discuss issues of common interest related to the protection of the common environment, the development of Arctic economies and the interests of the Arctic peoples. Canada believes that the agenda of an Arctic Council should be flexible, allowing for growth as confidence increases. While we see no need to put formal limitations on the Council's mandate, we do not envision the Council addressing military security issues, which are more appropriately dealt with in other forums.<sup>7</sup>

Appearing before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs, Disarmament Ambassador Peggy Mason repeated this position, noting again that Canada would raise

---

<sup>5</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Helps Create a New Arctic Research Group," *News Release*, no. 177, 24 August 1990.

<sup>6</sup>Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs and International Trade. "Arctic Security," January 1991: 5.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*: 6.

the proposal for an Arctic Council at the forthcoming meeting on the environment sponsored by Finland in the summer of 1991.

This meeting took place at Rovaniemi in June 1991, and resulted in a Ministerial communiqué signed by all eight participating Arctic states, on the protection of the Arctic environment. The Canadian representative, Indian and Northern Affairs Minister Tom Siddon, subsequently commented:

This signing has brought to a culmination what has come to be known as the Finnish Initiative and has committed our eight nations to work together in pursuit of a common Arctic environmental protection strategy.

The importance of the Rovaniemi Declaration should not be underestimated. It represents the first time that the circumpolar nations have committed themselves at the ministerial level to a concerted plan of action to protect the Arctic environment. It opens the way to more extensive cooperation amongst us on a multilateral and bilateral basis. And it will enable our group to speak more forcefully and in a unified way in the United Nations and other international bodies about our concerns for the integrity of the world's Arctic lands and waters.

On the subject of the Arctic Council, the Minister commented:

It is important that we maintain the momentum that has been built by the Finnish Initiative. To this end, the Canadian Government has proposed that the eight Arctic nations explore seriously the idea of establishing a permanent Arctic Council. This body would, in effect, institutionalize the Finnish Initiative and create a common forum at which a larger set of common circumpolar concerns might be discussed on a regular basis.

Achieving a permanent Arctic Council among a group of nations with widely differing geographic, economic and strategic interests will not be a simple task. But we believe it is a goal worth pursuing.

To move the process along, Prime Minister Mulroney will be writing to the heads of Government of the seven other nations inviting them to send representatives to Canada later this year. Together they can begin exploring how such a Council might be constructed and what its mandate and responsibilities might be.<sup>8</sup>

Although the Ottawa June 1990 bilateral meeting between Canada and the Soviet Union was private, subsequent comment indicated that Clark had raised the issue of Soviet nuclear weapon tests in the Arctic. The Department of External Affairs reported:

Canada expressed these concerns directly to Mr. Shevardnadze, as have Canadian officials to their Soviet counterparts. Canada intends to monitor the issue closely and to explore the possibility of multilateral cooperation in assessing the environmental

---

<sup>8</sup>Tom Siddon. *Speech to the International Meeting of Aboriginal Northern Leaders*, Copenhagen, Denmark, 18 June 1991.

impact. We will continue to seek the assurances of Soviet authorities that stringent environmental safeguards are imposed on all testing. In Canada's view, nuclear testing in the Arctic appears contrary to the common aim of Canada and the USSR to protect the Arctic environment. It also calls into question the proclaimed Soviet desire for a denuclearized North.<sup>9</sup>

In April 1991, a meeting was held in Ottawa to assess the procedures used at the Novaya Zemlya test site and to examine the environmental consequences of nuclear weapon testing there. The conference was privately organized, but supported and attended by a number of the circumpolar states, including Canada. Senior Soviet officials provided, for the first time, detailed analyses of the geology of the Novaya Zemlya test site, the procedures used in burial of the explosive devices, permitted radiation levels and instances of serious venting. No official Canadian comment on this data has been made to date.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In November 1990, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs produced a report entitled *Maritime Sovereignty*. In discussing the Arctic, the Report commented:

At some point, resource development in the region will increase and it is important that we be able to exercise effective control. Having clear legal title to the Northwest Passage would help to ensure this, as would an enhanced surveillance capability.<sup>10</sup>

The Committee recommended, therefore, that the government "reconsider the cancellation of the *Polar 8* icebreaker and examine the possibility of acquiring long-range patrol aircraft."<sup>11</sup> It also recommended continued negotiation over the status of the Northwest Passage and asked the government to "examine the possibility of unilaterally obtaining an International Court of Justice ruling on Canadian sovereignty over the Passage."<sup>12</sup>

The Committee also recommended the installation of fixed acoustic sensors in the Arctic which would be capable of detecting intrusions "from all directions." It noted that while conventional submarines could operate on the fringes of the ice cap receiving information from the sensors, the

---

<sup>9</sup>Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division. *Arctic Sovereignty*, January 1991: 6.

<sup>10</sup>Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Maritime Sovereignty*, November 1990: 9-10.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

decline of Canada's submarine capabilities was a serious issue, and it recommended that a decision on the purchase of conventionally powered submarines be taken without delay.<sup>13</sup>

In questioning witnesses appearing before the National Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee, MPs raised a series of issues related to the Arctic. These involved confidence-building measures, the cancellation of the *Polar 8* icebreaker, naval arms control, and nuclear submarines. Specifically, Marc Ferland raised the possibility of leasing nuclear submarines:

What do you think of the idea of Canada, not purchasing, but leasing 1, 2, or 3 nuclear propelled submarines so that we are able to inspect ourselves what is actually taking place under the ice in our territory and are thus in a position to enforce the observance by all parties of any demilitarization agreement relating to the Arctic?<sup>14</sup>

There has been no official comment on this matter.

---

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.: 27-28.

<sup>14</sup>For Mr. Ferland's comments, see: Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 31, 22 November 1990: 17.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Arctic Council Panel. *To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report*. (chaired by Franklyn Griffiths and Rosemarie Kuptana) Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, May 1991.
- Boulden, Jane. *Canadian-Soviet Cooperation in the Arctic: Proceedings of a Conference Held in Ottawa, October 23-26, 1989*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control, 1991.
- Fowlow, R. and Fred W. Crickard, eds. *The NIOBE Papers, Maritime Defence Strategy and Resource Development in Canada's Arctic*. Naval Officers Association of Canada, Ottawa: 1990.
- Green, K.W. and A.W.M. McLean. *An Arctic Policy Bibliography*. CentrePiece 18. Aberdeen University: Centre for Defence Studies, Winter 1990-91.
- Keith, R.E. *Arctic Borderlands: Environment and Development Issues in Canadian-American Relations*. Behind the Headlines 48. Toronto: CIIA, Winter 1990-91.
- Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. *Maritime Sovereignty*, Report. November 1990.
- The Arms Control Centre. "A Canadian Perspective on Changing Arctic Security Relations," *The Barometer*. Fall 1990: 6.
- Tucker, C.M. *Environmentalism and Environmental Change as it Affects Canadian Defence Policy and Operations: Part III, Arctic Issues*. ORAE Report R 106. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, September 1990.

## FURTHER READING

- Cox, David and Tariq Rauf. *Security Cooperation in the Arctic: A Canadian Response to Murmansk*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1989.
- Dosman, Edgar, ed. *Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic*. London: Routledge, 1989.
- Frederick, Michel. "La politique arctique des États-Unis et le cas de la souveraineté du Canada dans le Nord," *Études internationales* 19, no. 4, December 1988: 673-691.
- Jockel, Joseph J. "The US Navy, Maritime Command and the Arctic," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 3, December 1989: 23-27, 30-32.
- Lindsey, George. *Strategic Stability in the Arctic*. Adelphi Paper no. 241. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1990.
- Purver, Ronald P. "Aspects of Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic." In Donald McRae and Gordon Munro, eds. *Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989.
- . "The North in Canada's International Relations." In M.A. Molot and F.O. Hampson, eds. *Canada Among Nations 1989*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1990: 105-118.

*CROSS REFERENCES*

NORAD

Defence Budget and Policy

## 15. CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

### *BACKGROUND*

On 10 February 1983, Canada and the United States signed an agreement to establish the procedures whereby US military systems might be tested in Canada. Entitled the "Canada-U.S. Test and Evaluation Programme," the agreement was for a five-year period and contained renewal provisions such that, if neither side exercised its right of withdrawal on twelve months notice, the Agreement could be extended for a further five-year period. The Agreement was so extended on 28 February 1988 for five-years. In principle, the Government of Canada would need to give notice of its intent to withdraw on or before 28 February 1992 should it wish to discontinue the arrangement in 1993.

The Agreement allows the United States to request the testing of artillery, helicopters, surveillance and identification systems, and the guidance system on unarmed cruise missiles. It specifically prohibits bringing into Canada biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, and the Canadian Government has the right to refuse any specific request to test a weapon system.

Although a number of systems have been tested under the Agreement, the most prominent has been the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). On 15 July 1983, the Government announced that it had agreed to allow tests of the AGM-86B cruise missile, which was then designed to be carried by the B-52 bomber and used as a stand-off strategic nuclear warhead against the Soviet Union. With a range of up to 1,500 kilometres, the cruise missile is released from the bomber and, powered by a small jet engine, flies aerodynamically to its target, if necessary at very low altitudes.

The guidance system of the AGM-86B is based on terrain-contour matching, which requires an on-board computer map of the attack route which is then compared with the actual terrain below. The missile also uses a radar altimeter to maintain low-altitude flight in a variety of topographical conditions. Since 1983, most tests in Canada have been in the winter months, since the cold-weather terrain is similar to that of the attack routes across the northern areas of the Soviet Union.

On 17 January 1989, the United States requested and obtained an amendment to the specific agreement on the testing of the AGM-86B to include the AGM 129-A Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), which incorporates certain elements of "stealth" technology and may have both a longer range and a higher speed than the ALCM. Whereas the ALCM/B-52 combination was generally seen by military analysts as a second strike, retaliatory weapon, the stealth potential of the ACM, combined with the superior performance of the B1-B bomber, raised public concerns in Canada that the ACM might constitute a first-strike weapon.

However, on 1 February 1989, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced that Canada would allow testing of the ACM. Both he and then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark stressed the increasing capabilities of Soviet cruise missile forces, and argued that the US cruise missile programme contributed to stable deterrence and the prospects for balanced arms control agreements. The first test of the ACM in Canada took place on 2 March 1989. A second "captive carry" test took place on 24 March 1990. Following a typical cruise missile test flight path, the B-52 flew over the Beaufort Sea and the Mackenzie River Valley, east over the area intersecting the Northwest Territories, Alberta and British Columbia, and south to the area of the Primrose Lake weapons testing range near the Canadian base at Cold Lake, Alberta.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In a departure from the previous pattern of tests, a further test of the ACM took place over northern Canada on 30 October 1990. The first and only test in the winter months of 1991 took place in late January. Both tests appeared to be uneventful, although in the second case, DND statements made clear that the test had been planned before the Gulf crisis, and was in no way connected to the deployment of cruise missiles in the Persian Gulf. The Government did not comment further on the rationale for testing.

### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

Cruise missile testing was not debated in Parliament during the period under review. However, MPs from both opposition parties made statements in connection with the test conducted at the end of October 1990. On 29 October, Warren Allmand commented:

It is now 1990 and we have seen a major change in east-west relations with detente, cooperation, and arms reductions. Yet, today, another U.S. cruise missile will be tested in northern Canada.

We are now in the post cold-war era, with a treaty on intermediate nuclear weapons already signed and treaties on conventional arms, chemical weapons, and strategic missiles well advanced. What then is the purpose of continued testing of U.S. Cruise missiles in Canada?...Canada...should put an immediate end to Cruise missile testing in Canada.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>*Commons Debates*. 29 October 1990: 14800.

On 30 October, Dan Heap commented:

...two years ago the government said it would continue testing Cruise missiles in Canada until progress is made on disarmament.

Two years later the Cold War is over. Gorbachev is reducing Soviet arms and dissolving the Warsaw Pact. He has offered to make the Soviet Union a non-nuclear weapons state if NATO will do the same.

Why is the government promoting war fever by testing the Cruise missile over northern Canada today? When will the government contribute to peace by ending the testing of the Cruise missile in Canada?<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>*Commons Debates*. 30 October 1990: 14875.

FURTHER READING

Arkin, William. "Stealth Cruise Missile Sneaks into Canada," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 45, no. 4, May 1989: 6-7.

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. "Testing the Advanced Cruise Missile: Starting on a Slippery Slope," *Arms Control Communique* 60, 2 February 1989.

Cox, David. "Testing the Advanced Cruise Missile," *Peace&Security* 4, no. 1, Spring 1989: 16.

Rosenblum, Simon and Bill Robinson. "Modernizing the Cruise," *International Perspectives* 18, no. 4, July-August 1989: 13-15.

Sorenson, D.S. "Stealth Bombers, Advanced Cruise Missiles and Superpower Deterrence Stability," *Armed Forces and Society* 16, no. 3, Spring 1990: 405-420.

Welch, Jasper. "Assessing the Value of Stealthy Aircraft and Cruise Missiles," *International Security* 14, no. 2, Autumn 1989: 47-63.

## BACKGROUND

In its 1984 election campaign, the Progressive Conservative Party drew attention to the underfunding of Canada's military forces, and promised to increase defence spending at an annual rate of 6 percent over and above inflation. After achieving office, the Mulroney Government delayed announcing a long-term policy on defence, pending the publication of a new Defence White Paper. On 5 June 1987, the Government tabled its White Paper, entitled *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* in the House of Commons.

In regard to defence budgets, *Challenge and Commitment* drew attention to the low level of funding of defence over the previous twenty-five years. Inevitably, the portion of the defence budget that suffered most from this neglect was that used to buy new equipment. In 1962-63, more than 20 percent of the budget was spent on capital projects. This level generally declined throughout the 1960s, until it reached a low point of about 9 percent in 1972-73. It began to increase thereafter, but it was not until about 1982-83 that it went above 20 percent again. In 1985, NATO countries spent, on average, about 25 percent of their defence budgets on equipment acquisition.<sup>1</sup>

The White Paper set out an ambitious weapons acquisition programme over a fifteen-year period. This included the purchase of nuclear attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, a new main battle tank for the planned divisional commitment to NATO's Central Region, and associated communications equipment. In explaining the funding of this programme, the White Paper noted that major weapons programmes require long-term planning to produce results, and continued:

To provide a planning framework in which equipment decisions respond to, rather than lead policy, the Government has developed a new long-term planning and funding process. A rolling five-year funding plan will be introduced within a fifteen-year planning framework. An annual Cabinet review, each autumn, will establish firm budgets for the following five-year period, and planning guidance for the remaining ten years.<sup>2</sup>

In regard to the funding requirements of the acquisition programme, the White Paper announced that the Government was committed to "a base rate of annual real growth in the defence budget of two percent per year after inflation, for the fifteen year planning period." Above this two percent, additional funds would be added as necessary when major projects were introduced into the programme.

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of National Defence. *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*. Ottawa, June 1987: 43.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*: 67.

In the 1988 budget, the first after the White Paper, the budget estimates provided \$11.2 billion for defence, which constituted a real increase after inflation of 2.7 percent. About 26 percent of the total budget was allocated to capital expenditures. In 1989, however, planned expenditures for defence were held at \$11.34 billion, effectively marking a decline in expenditures after inflation as compared to the White Paper commitment of a minimum of 2 percent increase after inflation. Amongst other capital acquisition cancellations and cutbacks, the 1989 budget statement also cancelled the nuclear attack submarine programme. This severe reduction in the defence budget was a part of the Government's deficit reduction programme. Of a total expenditure reduction programme of \$1.545 billion in the 1989 budget, the defence share was \$575 million, or 37.2 percent of the total. The 1989 budget also forecast that over the following five years a total of \$2.7 billion would be saved through cuts in defence expenditures.

The 1990 federal budget did not cut defence expenditures to the extent anticipated in the five-year forecast. Although planned expenditures did not meet the White Paper commitment to a real annual increase of 2 percent, DND was allocated a 5 percent nominal increase -- that is, including inflation -- for the fiscal years 1990 and 1991. In 1990, therefore, the total defence budget was estimated at \$12.005 billion.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 23 November 1990, Supplementary Estimates, tabled in the House of Commons included \$350 million for the Department of National Defence. In explaining the increase, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight stated:

The Canadian Government's decision to deploy Canadian Forces to the Persian Gulf, together with its response to Quebec's request for assistance at Oka and Chateauguay, have imposed dramatic, unforeseen pressures on the national defence budget. Additional funds are therefore required to continue supporting Canadian Forces (CF) operations in the Gulf in their current role and to maintain an acceptable level of general military preparedness for our forces in Canada.<sup>1</sup>

The \$350 million Supplementary Estimate included \$16 million to help offset the cost of operations at Oka, with the balance going towards various activities related to the Persian Gulf deployment.

---

<sup>1</sup>National Defence. "Statement by the Minister of National Defence the Honourable Bill McKnight on Supplemental Funding," *News Release*, 69/90, 23 November 1990: 1.

*Oka and Chateauguay*

The total cost of the Canadian Forces operations were calculated to be \$83 million, of which \$6 million were for the deployment and return to base of CF personnel, and \$77 million for the cost of operations to 31 October 1990. The cost of operations included pay and allowances, the operating costs of vehicles and other equipment, rental of the equipment, rations and similar expenses. Costs other than the supplementary \$16 million were absorbed in the regular defence budget.

*The Persian Gulf*

In the Supplementary Estimates, the net operating expenditures of the Canadian Forces in the Gulf were estimated to be \$646 million to 31 March 1991, including approximately \$90 million per month, or \$525 million in total for "sustainment," comprising pay and allowances, the operating costs of all ships, aircraft and other equipment, rations and quarters, and other miscellaneous expenditures. Of this amount, \$81 million was provided in the Supplementary Estimate, while an unspecified amount was absorbed through scaling down operational training and exercises elsewhere.

In addition to these items, the supplementary estimates contained two further items. First, \$132 million was allocated for "military preparedness in Canada," which included \$17 million in contingencies for the continuance of the Gulf commitment after 31 March 1991. Second, \$121 million was allocated for re-equipping ships and aircraft for operations in the Gulf, and "to advance acquisitions of capital equipment which were originally planned for future years in the Defence Services Program." On 13 December 1990, then Defence Minister McKnight announced the acquisition of five CC-130 Hercules transport aircraft at a total cost of approximately \$220 million. \$100 million of this amount came from the sum set aside in the Supplementary Estimate.<sup>2</sup>

*The 1991-1992 Estimates*

In describing the external factors which influenced the budget, the National Defence Estimates concluded:

A principal priority of the Government is easing the federal deficit problem. Canada's security depends on a healthy economy, which, among other things, provides the resources needed to mount a defence of Canada and Canadian interests. Aside from the

---

<sup>2</sup>National Defence. "Acquisition of Five New Hercules Aircraft," *News Release*, 76/90, 13 December 1990: 1.

special funding demands created by the situation in the Persian Gulf, the growth in defence spending in 1991-92 will be at a nominal rate of five percent of the previous year's Main Estimates, exclusive of statutory costs.<sup>3</sup>

In accordance with the 1990 Budget, therefore, the 1991-92 defence budget provided for a nominal growth of 5 percent, or \$550.4 million, over the 1990-1991 budget. When certain other adjustments were made, the final increase was 5.6 percent, giving a total defence budget of \$12.83 billion. Of this amount, 21.1 percent is committed to capital expenditures as compared to approximately 24 percent in 1990.

Figures 1, 2 and 3 on the next page show Canadian defence expenditures in relation to other NATO countries, defence personnel as a percentage of the labour force in NATO countries, and Defence Expenditures in relation to other government expenditure envelopes.

In addition, \$600 million was included in the main estimates to fund the cost of activities in the Gulf after 1 April 1991 which could not be absorbed in the main budget. These resources are held within a controlled allotment. To the extent that the funds are not required for commitments emanating from activities in the Gulf, the allocation will lapse and the funds revert to the Treasury Board.

### *Defence Policy*

After the collapse of the 1987 Defence White Paper, throughout 1990 Government spokespersons indicated on various occasions that a new statement of policy on defence was in preparation. Although there were general expectations that the statement would be released before the end of 1990, in December 1990, official comment indicated that it would be placed before Cabinet in the spring of 1991. Towards the end of April, it became evident that the long-awaited statement had indeed been presented to the Cabinet, but not yet approved. On 24 April, Vice-Admiral Charles Thomas, head of Maritime Command and Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, submitted his resignation some months in advance of his planned retirement. In a letter to Defence Chief General de Chastelain, and in subsequent press conferences, Thomas took issue with the fifteen-year defence plan apparently submitted to the Cabinet in February.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>National Defence. *1991-1992 Estimates*, Part III: 21.

<sup>4</sup>For Admiral Thomas' letter of resignation, and the reply by General de Chastelain, see: Department of National Defence. "Resignation of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff," *News Release*, 26 April 1991, AFN: 17/91.


**Figure 1:**  
Defence Expenditures as a % of  
GDP (1989)

USA	5.9
Greece	5.6
Turkey	4.4
UK	4.2
France	3.7
NATO Average	3.2
Portugal	3.2
Norway	3.0
Netherlands	3.0
Germany	2.8
Belgium	2.7
Italy	2.3
Denmark	2.2
Spain	2.1
Canada	2.0
Luxembourg	1.2

**Figure 2:**  
Defence Personnel as a % of  
Labour Force (1989)

Greece	5.6
Turkey	4.5
Belgium	2.8
France	2.8
USA	2.7
Portugal	2.6
NATO Average	2.5
Netherlands	2.5
Italy	2.4
Norway	2.4
Germany	2.3
Spain	2.1
UK	1.7
Denmark	1.4
Canada	1.0
Luxembourg	0.9

**Figure 3: Major Government Expenditures by Envelope**



Thomas' principal objections to the proposed policy centred on its affordability and on the structure and roles of the Canadian Navy envisaged in the statement. In regard to affordability, Thomas wrote:

I must admit that I did not believe that another defence policy which proposes an unaffordable programme and promises capability which cannot be delivered would actually be proposed to government.<sup>5</sup>

Thomas did not elaborate on the funding basis of the statement, or his claim that it was unaffordable. In regard to the future of the Canadian Navy, Thomas was specifically opposed to the apparent intention to buy corvettes instead of future batches of the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF), and to the delay in replacing the existing force of Oberon-class submarines. He wrote:

I would agree that the centre of day to day activity may be in Canadian coastal waters (east and west). That is why we must progress and buy the MCDV [mine counter-measures] vessels. However, inshore requirements alone cannot determine the kinds of ships and submarines required for the future. It is a fact that blue water mid-ocean combat capable warships, in combination with the MCDV, can do any work Canada needs done at sea. They can be employed in the Persian Gulf or the offshore of Newfoundland. Corvettes can't. They have neither the reach nor the seakeeping...they are the wrong ships and won't be cheap. In my judgement the next most affordable and widely employable naval surface ship is likely to be a variant of CPF type vessels for which design and infrastructure cost have already been paid.<sup>6</sup>

Admiral Thomas went on to deplore the delay in replacing the conventional submarines, arguing that it would lead to the surrender of sovereignty "over the undersea water space surrounding our country," and strongly opposed the apparent priority in the statement presented to the Cabinet on the re-equipment of an expeditionary brigade group.

In his reply, which was supported by new Defence Minister Marcel Masse, Chief of the Defence Staff General de Chastelain took strong exception to Thomas' dismissal of the proposed new brigade group. Acknowledging that the 1987 White Paper was "out of step with changing geopolitical circumstances and unaffordable," he argued that "we must offer the Government the broadest possible range of military options" to meet future security requirements. Specifically, de Chastelain noted that the Navy would receive 40 percent of capital expenditures over the fifteen-year period (as compared to 33 percent for the Air Force and 27 percent for the Army).<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.: 1/4.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.: 3.

On the question of future defence budgets, de Chastelain wrote:

...affordability is the very point on which we have focussed our attention most closely. Indeed, the principal point we have made to Government is that we should accept, as a given, the reduced funding levels which three years of severe fiscal restraint have imposed on us, and plan the future in light of realistic expectations.<sup>8</sup>

De Chastelain went on to note that 95 percent of the equipment funding requirements over the fifteen-year planning period had been identified. On the question of the expeditionary brigade group, he wrote:

The implication that the retention of an expeditionary brigade group capability denies needed money to the navy is only one point of view. The proposition that Canada should not maintain the ability to deploy even one brigade group abroad is to my mind short-sighted and unprofessional; and, as you are well aware, attracted no support in the departmental resource group over which you have presided these past two years.<sup>9</sup>

De Chastelain's response, therefore, strongly implied that the funding base for the fifteen-year programme would follow the defence budgets of the past several years, suggesting, therefore, that planning was based on a constant defence budget with no after-inflation increases in defence spending. As indicated above, the 1991-92 defence budget published in the Main Estimates released in February 1991 essentially indicated a zero growth defence budget.

Thomas' letter of resignation, and de Chastelain's reply, referred so frequently to the proposal before Cabinet that even though de Chastelain wrote that he could not "engage in public debate," it appeared that the proposal to Cabinet contained the following recommendations:

- the re-equipping of "an expeditionary force brigade group" as a priority investment;
- by indirect references in Thomas' letter and the response from de Chastelain, the long-term development of naval forces to comprise the currently authorized twelve new Canadian Patrol Frigates, four modernized Tribal class destroyers, and an unspecified number of corvettes as a substitute for future batches of the frigates;
- the twelve mine-sweepers promised to the Navy Reserve;
- a "modest" conventional submarine replacement programme "within a few years."

---

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.: 2.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.: 5.

On 14 June 1991, speaking in Berlin, Prime Minister Mulroney commented:

In the course of 1991, in keeping with decisions announced in the 1990 budget, Canada will reduce its personnel in Germany by 1,400 people. And, after consultations with our allies, we will be reducing the size of our forces stationed in Germany further. My Cabinet colleagues and I will meet soon to determine the nature, scale and timing of these reductions. But Canada will not be withdrawing completely from Europe. Canadian forces will remain as long as there is a residual threat to European and Canadian security here and as long as we are needed and welcome.<sup>10</sup>

During the course of the year the prospect that one or more Canadian bases in Germany might be closed became part of a broader discussion of base closings. In general, despite frequent questioning by regional MPs, government spokespersons declined to comment specifically on which Canadian bases might be closed, with the exception of Goose Bay. According to official documents obtained by the *St. John's Sunday Express*, in February 1989, the Canadian Government announced new fees for all foreign users of Goose Bay, amounting to a doubling of the charges for the US Air Force to \$12.1 million. The latter resisted, but in May 1990, the Canadian Government repeated its position that the United States must pay the increased fees. In July 1990, the United States announced that it would withdraw from the base in July 1991.<sup>11</sup> Noting that a ten-year agreement with the German, British and Dutch air forces expires in 1996, Defence Minister Marcel Masse was quoted as commenting:

It's not in our mandate to pay for things we don't need. If the allies don't need Goose Bay, its sure we don't need all that heavy infrastructure. If the need disappears, the base disappears.<sup>12</sup>

In regard to announcements about other base closings, the Minister, and Associate Minister Mary Collins, indicated that the entire Cabinet would be involved in the eventual decision, leaving little doubt that the issue of base closings was closely linked to the promised revision of defence policy.

---

<sup>10</sup>Office of the Prime Minister. "Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister Mulroney, Berlin, Germany," 14 June 1991: 3.

<sup>11</sup>"Ottawa lost Goose Bay duel," *Globe and Mail*, 9 July 1991: 4.

<sup>12</sup>"Goose Bay may shut in '96, Masse warns," *Toronto Star*, 15 July 1991: A9.

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In late October 1990, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs issued its Third Report to the House dealing with Canada's Maritime Sovereignty.<sup>13</sup> The Committee recommended that the Government revive the Polar 8 icebreaker project, and acquire more long-range patrol aircraft for Arctic surveillance and the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. It also called for more helicopters to support search and rescue operations, and urged rationalization of activities among the seven departments of government which are involved in maritime activities, arguing that DND is best equipped to perform most tasks even though overfishing, smuggling and pollution are becoming more important than the traditional East-West confrontation. In its conclusion the Report commented:

All Committee members share the belief that the government should undertake a major re-examination of Canadian security policy. A new review ought to be extensive, and culminate in the publication of policy recommendations by 1 January 1992.<sup>14</sup>

A great deal of Parliamentary comment focussed on details of the budget, and on base closings. In both cases, however, opposition critics pointed to the absence of an overall policy. William Rompkey, for example, speaking for the Liberals, commented on the request for supplementary estimates for the military action in the Gulf:

We are talking about supplementary estimates and a defence budget in the complete absence of policy, as far as I can tell. The White Paper is gone. There is no White Paper to replace it, in spite of the fact that we have asked for that. We have also asked if we as a committee can participate in a public way to help put that new policy together, and that has not happened.... We are being asked as Parliament to approve supplementary estimates in a policy vacuum, and I cannot see how any responsible parliamentarian can be expected to do that.<sup>15</sup>

NDP critic John Brewin asked what public consultation was being undertaken by DND in the development of the review, and Louis Delvoie, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) responded:

There are ongoing contacts with centres of military and strategic studies that exist across the country in 14 different universities, with a whole host of think tanks and associations that take an interest in defence questions, and so on. Moreover, the

---

<sup>13</sup>Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs [hereafter SCND Hearings], *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 28, 30 October 1990.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*: 67.

<sup>15</sup>SCND Hearings, no. 36, 13 December 1990: 10.

Minister has invited the public generally to write to him with their views on defence issues.<sup>16</sup>

There was no indication, however, that the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs would be consulted in advance of the Cabinet decision on the new defence policy. The same appeared true of base closings. In response to many interventions by MPs representing constituencies in which base closings appeared possible, Government spokespersons uniformly declined to discuss specific bases. In response to a question concerning the Long Point military base in Montreal, for example, in October 1990, Defence Minister Bill McKnight commented:

...there has been a preliminary study of depots throughout Canada...because of budgetary restrictions, because of the need for operational efficiency, and because of the changing geopolitical situation around the world, I cannot guarantee bases in any place in Canada or abroad.<sup>17</sup>

In Committee discussions, Associate Minister Mary Collins noted the relationship between equipment procurement and infrastructure in a time of tight budgets. In 1988-89, 26.2 percent of the budget went to equipment purchase and maintenance, whereas Collins predicted that 22.2 percent would be allocated in 1991-92. She commented:

...we are again going through the process of trying to come to the best mix of numbers of people and appropriate infrastructure to accomplish our job and hopefully be able to increase the percentage of our budget for equipment so the three can be more in line than they have been in the past. Equipment was down as low as 8 percent in the mid-1970s. Now we are looking at about 22 percent.... The percentage on equipment has naturally fallen back, because we have not reduced our personnel and infrastructure proportionately.<sup>18</sup>

Committee discussions with Collins also indicated that the total armed forces personnel would drop in 1991-92 from just under 87,000 to 85,000.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.: 22.

<sup>17</sup>*Commons Debates*. 25 October 1990: 14700.

<sup>18</sup>*SCND Hearings*, no. 62, 21 March 1991: 24.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.: 16.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Axworthy, Lloyd. "Tooling up for Peace," *Policy Options* 11, no. 10, December 1990: 28-31.
- Bland, Douglas Lt. Col. "A Defence White Paper for Canada," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20, no. 3, Winter 1990: 22-31.
- "Canada's Peace Dividend," special section in *Policy Options*, 11, No. 7, September 1990: 3-14.
- Crickard, Fred W., Peter T. Haydon, Douglas A. Ross. *Canadian Perspectives on Maritime Strategy*. Issue Brief 11. Ottawa: the Arms Control Centre, 1991.
- Hill, Roger. *Framework for a New Canadian Defence Policy*, Working Paper 35. Ottawa: CIIPS, June 1991.
- Morton, Desmond. "Defence Policy for a Nice Country," *Peace and Security* 6, no. 3, Autumn, 1991: 2-3.

FURTHER READING

- Bland, Douglas L. "Controlling the Defence Policy Process in Canada: White Papers on Defence and Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of National Defence," *Defence Analysis* 5, no. 1, March 1989: 3-18.
- Byers, Rod. *Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and Challenges*. Adelphi Paper no. 214. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1986.
- de Chastelain, A.J.G.D. "The Art of Prudent Wing Walking," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19, no. 6, June 1990: 11-14.
- Department of National Defence. *Challenge and Commitment*. Ottawa, June 1987.
- Government of Canada, *Expenditure Plan. 1991-1992 Estimates, National Defence, Part III*, Ottawa, February 1991.
- Halstead, John. *A Defence Policy for Canada: The White Paper Two Years On*. Behind the Headlines 47, no. 2. Toronto: CIIA, Winter 1989-1990.
- Middlemiss, Danford W. and Joel J. Sokolsky. *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*. Toronto: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1989.
- United States General Accounting Office, *U.S.-NATO Burden Sharing: Allies' Contributions to Common Defense During the 1980s*, GAO/NSIAD-91-32, October 1990.



## 17. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

### *BACKGROUND*

Canada is an original member of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington, D.C. on 4 April 1949. Article 5 of the Treaty defined the obligation of the members to collective defence:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Article 6 of the Treaty defined more precisely the area covered by the collective defence agreement:

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America...on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

In regard to Article 5, during the bilateral negotiations on the 1958 North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD), the Canadian Government sought US agreement to establish NORAD as a part of the North Atlantic Treaty framework. This arrangement was not supported by the United States. There is, however, a Canada-United States Regional Planning Group which reports to the NATO Council. In regard to Article 6, this continues to define territorially the Treaty obligation assumed by the signatories. The problem of dealing with "out of area" conflicts has been a recurring issue in NATO, of which the most recent major example was the conflict in the Gulf.

During the negotiation of the Treaty, Canada also placed great emphasis on Article 2, which calls upon the Parties to promote peace "by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being." Although rarely invoked in the cold war years that followed, Article 2 has become of much greater interest in the past year as NATO has sought to adapt to a more political role.

After the onset of the Korean War, the United States began to station large numbers of ground and air forces in NATO Europe. On a smaller scale, Canada followed suit. Canada based an armoured

brigade group in Germany under the former, under the sector command of the British Army of the Rhine, and an RCAF division at bases in Germany and France. Canada has since participated fully in both the military and political institutions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Responding to increasing public debate about the value of maintaining forces in Europe, in 1967 both the Liberal and Conservative Parties promised to review Canada's role in NATO, while the NDP supported withdrawal. On becoming Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau initiated a major review of Canadian foreign and defence policies. One outcome of the defence review, first announced in 1969 and confirmed in the 1971 White Paper, was a reduction of Canadian forces in Europe and changes in tasking. The land element was reduced from 10,000 troops to 5,000, and co-located at the existing RCAF bases at Lahr and Baden Soellingen in the NATO Central Region of southern Germany as a reserve force to US and German armoured divisions. The air element was reduced from six to three squadrons and assigned a conventional ground attack role. Canadian maritime forces operating in the western Atlantic are also committed to the maritime defence of the NATO area, but are based in Canada.

When these commitments were revised in the 1971 White Paper, Canada also retained a battalion group commitment to Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force Land (AMF/L), which was designed, according to the 1971 Defence White Paper, as "a multi-national, quick reaction, air-transportable force designed to act as a demonstration of allied solidarity in times of tension on the flanks of the Treaty area." The further commitment to send a combined air-sea transportable (CAST) combat group from Canada to north Norway was also retained, and appeared to gain in importance as a consequence of the reduction in the land and air forces permanently stationed in Europe.

After assuming office in 1984, on 11 March 1985, the Mulroney Progressive Conservative Government announced an increase of 1,220 military personnel in the strength of the Canadian forces stationed at Lahr in southern Germany. The object, according to then Defence Minister Erik Nielsen, was "to meet fully our commitments to NATO." The 1987 White Paper announced further changes in Canada's European NATO commitments. First, the Government declared its intention to withdraw from the CAST commitment to northern Norway. The commitment was officially terminated on 30 November 1989. As a replacement, on 24 June 1988, NATO announced the creation of a composite force for the northern flank, consisting of units from the United States, West Germany, Norway and Canada. The Canadian contribution consisted of a battalion comprising 1,200 personnel previously committed to the AMF/L, but now committed exclusively to the defence of northern Norway.

Second, the White Paper announced that the brigade group in southern Germany would be reinforced to division strength. This was to be accomplished by adding additional personnel and equipment to the brigade in Europe, and reinforcing the existing brigade group (4 CMBG) in times

of crisis with the equivalent of a second brigade normally based in Canada. Following the 1989 budget, it became clear that the new equipment planned for the division would not be forthcoming in the foreseeable future, but senior Department of National Defence (DND) officials affirmed that the plan for a division-sized commitment to NATO remained in place.

In addition to these commitments, Canada also provides training facilities for NATO forces on Canadian territory. Shilo, Manitoba, is used by German troops for tank training, while the British Army uses facilities at Suffield and Wainwright, Alberta. German, British, Dutch and US Air Forces use facilities at Goose Bay, Labrador, for training in low-level flying. From 1984 until May 1989, the Goose Bay facility was a candidate, along with Konya, Turkey, in the NATO competition for a new Tactical Fighting and Weapons Training Centre. In May 1989, the NATO defence ministers announced the indefinite deferment of plans to establish a new centre, citing, amongst other things, the changed international environment and pressures on defence budgets. The bilateral agreements between Canada and those countries currently using Goose Bay were not affected by the NATO decision.

#### *Changes in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the NATO Alliance*

In 1990, the changes in Europe triggered by the new policies of the Soviet Union continued apace, posing new challenges to NATO doctrine and policy. In July 1990, the London Declaration of a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance recognized that NATO "must and will adapt" to the changing political map of Europe. Taking due note of the unification of Germany, the transformation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the potential of the CSCE to become "more prominent" in Europe's future, the London Declaration reaffirmed the position of NATO:

We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these last four decades. Yet our alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united Europe, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.<sup>1</sup>

Since the London Declaration of July 1990, the political need to reassess NATO's role has been underlined by several further developments. First, on 12 September 1990, a Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany was signed in Moscow by the two Germanies and the four

---

<sup>1</sup>NATO. "London Declaration on a Transformed Alliance." *Press Release S-1(90)36*, London, 5-6 July, 1990: 1.

former occupying powers. The Treaty provides, *inter alia*, for the right of a unified Germany to belong to alliances. In Article 2, the two German governments "reaffirm their declarations that only peace will emanate from German soil." In Article 3, they renounced the manufacture and possession of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and declared that a unified Germany would adhere to the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Federal Republic also declared that it would reduce its armed forces to 370,000 over a period of four years, beginning with the entry into force of the first agreement on reducing conventional forces in Europe (CFE).

The reunification of Germany took place on 3 October 1990. In an address to the NATO Council, Secretary General Manfred Worner commented: "We now include the whole of Germany in our alliance as we reassess our strategy and our force posture. I do not doubt that we will rapidly succeed in this endeavour."

In a second major development, in early 1991, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) effectively disbanded. Following Soviet decisions to withdraw its troops from eastern Europe, representatives of the Warsaw Treaty countries met in Budapest to formalize the end of the alliance as a military structure. Following a Soviet proposal for early elimination of the military structure of the alliance while leaving in place other WTO structures until March 1992, on 31 March 1991, Soviet military commanders in the eastern European countries formally acknowledged the termination of their military role.

Finally, in November 1990, the CFE agreement was presented to the Paris summit meeting of the CSCE. There is broad agreement amongst military planners and analysts that adherence to the force reductions established in the CFE agreement, combined with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Europe, makes it impossible for the Soviet Union to achieve a decisive victory in the early stages of a European conflict. In sum, as NATO addressed questions concerning its future force structure in the spring of 1991, there was broad agreement that there was no longer a direct threat to alliance security posed by a massive, standing-start Soviet offensive across what was, prior to 3 October 1990, the inner German border.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POLICY*

On 20 September 1990, former Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced that 1,400 military personnel would be brought home from Europe. The Minister added that the move was brought about by cuts in the defence budget over the two previous years. In response to questions from the press, McKnight was reported as saying that the cuts were in line with those of the allies:

The UK is reducing by two full divisions. The United States has announced a reduction of 190,000. The French are reducing. We have said that as the political situation and the security situation changes in Europe, we also will be making reductions.<sup>2</sup>

In a brief reference to NATO while addressing the CSCE summit meeting in Paris on 19 November 1990, Prime Minister Mulroney commented:

NATO continues to provide much-needed stability in a rapidly changing world; but we believe that stability can be assured at much lower levels of conventional and nuclear strength.<sup>3</sup>

However, the major elements of evolving Canadian policy towards NATO and the changes in eastern Europe were set down in an article written for a NATO publication by then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark. Clark began by noting Canada's links to eastern Europe:

The remarkable events in Eastern and Central Europe are intensely personal for millions of Canadians whose roots are there. Many have ties of language and family. Some were forced to flee by the very regimes that have now collapsed. Most have family or friends whose hopes were thwarted, or lives diminished, by those old regimes, but who have the prospect now of building new lives and new societies in old homelands. Virtually no other nation possesses the web of intense personal connections to Eastern and Central Europe that we have in Canada.<sup>4</sup>

In emphasising this linkage, Clark went on to note the establishment by Canada of a task force on Eastern and Central Europe which was developing a three-pronged programme:

The first element will focus on economic development, including technical assistance and management training in areas such as agriculture, law, taxation, privatization, environment, finance and telecommunications. The second element will be a political cooperation programme focusing on the mechanisms of democracy. Its priorities will be to provide expertise in the areas of elections, law reform, a free media, the development of a professional public service, human rights and the democratic political process. Finally, the Task Force will look into the best ways in which to support Canadian business in the pursuit of mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities with Eastern European partners.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>*Toronto Star*, 21 September 1990.

<sup>3</sup>Office of the Prime Minister. "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to the CSCE Summit," 19 November 1990: 2.

<sup>4</sup>Joe Clark. "Canada's stake in European Security," *NATO Review* 38, no. 5 October 1990: 2.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*: 7.

On military matters, Clark affirmed that "a strong military mandate for NATO continues to be valid and the North American commitment to Europe represented by the presence of Canadian and American troops there remains crucial." While recognizing the historic significance of Canada's military presence, he nevertheless, at another point in the article, warned that the "military contribution is however bound to change over time." In contrast, Clark strongly endorsed a more political role for NATO:

Such a change meets long-standing Canadian interests. In fact, Article 2...which provides for active political cooperation and the promotion of free institutions, has often been called the Canadian clause in recognition of the role played by Prime Minister Lester Pearson in its creation.<sup>6</sup>

In regard to issues outside Europe, Canada joined with other members of the NATO Council in condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In particular, a Council statement on the Gulf issued on 18 December 1990 read in part:

We note that the crisis in the Gulf poses a potential threat to one of our Allies having common borders with Iraq, and we reaffirm our determination to fulfill the commitments stipulated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty whereby an armed attack against one of our states shall be considered an attack against them all. We reiterate our firm commitment to the security of the entire southern Region, the strategic importance of which is highlighted by this crisis.<sup>7</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Most comment in Parliament tended to focus on the CSCE and conventional force reductions rather than NATO policies as such. However, in speaking to the debate on the Paris meeting of the CSCE in November 1990, NDP Defence critic John Brewin appeared to reaffirm his Party's long-standing position on Canadian withdrawal from Europe. In addressing the role of NATO military forces, he commented:

The target has gone. There is no military requirement for Canadian and American troops in Europe. The only remaining argument is a political one, that is that somehow American and Canadian troops are required to counter-balance some development in Germany.... We spend \$1.2 billion a year on maintaining a contingent in Europe. Everyone in this house can consider other more valuable and useful expenditures.... I suggest in the circumstances that is frankly immoral...we

---

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.: 3.

<sup>7</sup>NATO Council. *Statement on the Gulf*. Brussels: NATO Headquarters, 18 December 1990.

should continue to have a place at the table in view of our long historic relationship with Europe, but we do not need NATO to do that.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup>*Commons Debates*. 8 November 1990: 15311-15312.

RECENT LITERATURE

Clark, Joe. "Canada's Stake in European Security," *NATO Review*, no. 5, October 1990: 2-7.

Delvoie, L.A. "Proclaiming the End of the Cold War: The Declaration of Twenty-Two States," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20, no. 4, Winter 1991.

Sens, Allen. "Canada, NATO and the Widening Atlantic: Canadian Defence Policy in the 1990s," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20, no. 4, Winter 1991.

FURTHER READING

Holden, G. *The End of an Alliance: Soviet Policy and the Warsaw Pact*. Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt, Report no. 16, December 1990.

Holst, J.J. *European Security: A View from the North*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, November 1990.

Sabin, P.A.G. *British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s*. Adelphi Paper no. 254. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1990.

United States General Accounting Office. *U.S. - NATO Burden Sharing: Allied Contributions to Common Defense during the 1980s*. GAO/NSIAD-91-32, October 1990.

Van Evera, S. "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 3, Winter 1990/91: 7-57.

## 18. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE AGREEMENT (NORAD)

### *BACKGROUND*

During the 1950s, Canada and the United States entered into a series of agreements concerning the air defence of North America. The purpose was to provide early radar warning of a Soviet bomber attack against North America following attack routes across the Arctic. The first of these radar networks was the Pinetree Line, built in 1951 at latitude 50°, followed by the Mid-Canada Line, an all-Canadian project completed in 1954 at 55° latitude. Still seeking greater warning time to ensure the ability of its bomber fleet to leave their bases on warning of a Soviet attack, Washington sought Canadian cooperation in the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line across the 70th parallel, which was completed and opened in 1957.

During the same period, the Royal Canadian Air Forces (RCAF) and the United States Air Force (USAF) cooperated closely in the effort to provide an active air defence against the Soviet bomber threat, developing arrangements and operational procedures which treated Canadian and US air space as a single theatre for planning purposes. In 1957, an informal North American Air Defence Command was established, which, after surviving the transition from the Liberal to Conservative Governments in Canada in 1957, was formally established by executive agreement on 12 May 1958. The NORAD Agreement created a single command for the control of US and Canadian interceptors, the headquarters of which were located at Colorado Springs. Since the Agreement came into force, a Canadian officer has been Deputy Commander of NORAD, which was established in the first instance for a ten-year period.

From 1958 to 1962, great efforts were made to perfect continental air defences. The United States developed an advanced Semi Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) command and control system using state-of-the-art computers to help analyze incoming tracks and direct interceptors, a series of new interceptors (the F-101, F-102 and F-106) was developed, and air-to-air nuclear weapons were designed and deployed by USAF. This effort was overtaken, however, by the growing perception that the emerging strategic nuclear threat was the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), not the manned bomber. After 1962, the deployment of active air defences was halted, the number of interceptors reduced, and further modernization was restrained.

At the same time, NORAD assumed an increasing role in strategic warning of a ballistic missile attack. In 1958, a crash programme was developed to build the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), and to develop a network of sensors, which came to be called the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS), to keep track of objects in space. In the United States, efforts intensified to develop an effective anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system which could be deployed in the late 1960s, at which time, it was believed, the Soviet ICBM threat would be at its peak. NORAD

was heavily involved in this transition from air to aerospace defences, but the Canadian role in space surveillance was considerably more limited than that in air defence, since BMEWS radars were not based on Canadian territory and Canada contributed only two Baker-Nunn deep space cameras to the SPADATS network.

As the initial period of the Agreement approached its end in 1968, therefore, there was a considerable difference of approach between the two parties. The United States was in the throes of a debate about the feasibility and wisdom of deploying an ABM defence, and would have liked, in any event, to reflect the shift to aerospace in the title of the joint command. The Pearson Government in Canada was leery of involvement in ballistic missile defences, wished to place greater emphasis on strategic arms control, and accordingly resisted any change in the NORAD Agreement which would emphasize the increasing role of NORAD in "aerospace" defence rather than "air defence." Accordingly, in the negotiations prior to the 1968 renewal, Canada sought and obtained a clause stating that the agreement would "not involve in any way a Canadian commitment to participate in an active ballistic missile defence." The title of the Command also remained the same despite the US desire to change it to North American Aerospace Defence Command. .

Thereafter, air defence was consistently accorded a low priority in US strategic planning, primarily because of superpower agreement on the ABM Treaty and SALT I, and the relatively minor role of the manned bomber in Soviet strategic offensive forces. The NORAD renewals in 1973, 1975 and 1980 (for one year only because of the imminent Canadian election) were relatively uneventful, and marked the emerging role of NORAD as a "coastguard of the air" rather than the hub of an extensive air defence system. In March 1981, the Agreement was again extended for a five-year period, but with two significant changes. First, the ABM clause was deleted on the grounds that, since the United States was a signatory to the ABM Treaty, it was inappropriate to imply that only Canada was committed to avoiding the deployment of an ABM system. Second, Canada agreed to change "Air" to "Aerospace" in the name of the joint command, thereby recognizing the fundamental changes in the roles of NORAD which had taken place after 1963.

In 1985, one year before the formal expiry of the Agreement, President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney met in Quebec City, and announced, *inter alia*, an agreement on North American Air Defence Modernization. The Agreement covered the following:

- four long-range Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars, one of which was to be located in Alaska and the others in the continental United States;
- a North Warning System (NWS) to replace the DEW Line;

- use of Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS) to supplement the DEW Line in times of alert and to include Canadian officers in the crews;
- the upgrading of forward operating locations (FOLS) and dispersed operating bases to accommodate interceptor and AWACS aircraft;
- improvements to command and control and communications elements in the warning system.

The NWS, originally planned to be completed by 1993, will comprise fifteen minimally attended long-range radars, eleven of which are in northern Canada, and thirty-nine short-range, unmanned radars, thirty-six of which are in Canada. The NWS utilizes many of the prepared DEW Line sites, and cannot, therefore, provide surveillance of the most northerly Canadian Arctic territories. However, for the first time, all radar stations in the Canadian north will be staffed by, and under the operational control of Canada. On 29 September 1990, at an official ceremony at Hall Beach, Canada took formal responsibility for the operation of the Canadian elements of the NWS. The eleven long-range Canadian radars were completed in 1988, while the short-range radars sites in Phase Two of the NWS were planned for completion in 1993. The cost of the NWS is \$1.3 billion, of which Canada will pay forty percent, a cost-sharing ratio which applies also to the operation and maintenance of the system.

In regard to other elements of the 1986 Agreement, in 1987, Canada identified five forward-operating locations for the use of NORAD forces at Rankin Inlet, Inuvik, Yellowknife and Iqaluit in the Northwest Territories, and at Kuujjuaq in Quebec. In late 1990, the United States Air Force decided to scrap two OTH-B radars planned for a northward-looking facility in Alaska, and a southward-looking site in North Dakota, but took occupancy of two sites on the east and west coasts. However, in April 1991, the decision was taken to operate the east coast site in Maine, which has the ability to scan an area from Greenland to Cuba, for only forty hours each week, while USAF intends to turn off the west coast facility, but to maintain it with a skeleton crew. This decision did not appear to have any immediate impact on the Canadian plan to develop a Canadian Coastal Radar system, comprising three radars on the east coast and one on the west coast, which was intended to fill gaps left by the OTH-B system.

The 1987 Canadian Defence White Paper also indicated two additional programmes relevant to NORAD. First, Canada decided to participate in the US Air Defence Initiative (ADI), which is intended to investigate the application of new technologies to the detection, tracking and interception of bombers and cruise missiles, including those with "stealth" characteristics. The ADI programme, which is very small in comparison with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), has focussed primarily on detection of cruise

missiles. Second, Canada is pursuing an independent \$50 million research and development programme intended to explore the feasibility of space-based radar able to detect small, low-flying objects such as cruise missiles. The research is intended to continue for a seven-year period.

During 1990, a slight shift in emphasis in NORAD became evident. Major General J.D. O'Brien, Commander of the Fighter Group, Canadian NORAD Region, released an analysis which indicated a significant drop in Soviet bomber activities off the Canadian coasts, while cautioning that the Soviets still maintained a major capability to threaten Canadian territory. Second, in May 1990, then Defence Minister McKnight announced that the Canadian NORAD region would "implement a policy of directing all unidentified aircraft which enter the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ) to land at a recognized point of entry." This announcement followed a government decision in August 1989 which authorized the use of Canadian NORAD forces in support of drug interdiction activities, and was intended to support the counter-drug activities of the RCMP and other government departments.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 19 April 1991, former External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Defence Minister Bill McKnight jointly announced that the two governments had agreed to renew the NORAD agreement for a further five years. The Agreement was signed in Washington before the end of the expiry of the current agreement on 12 May. In announcing the renewal, the two ministers commented:

NORAD has been and continues to be an efficient and cost-effective means for Canada to protect its sovereignty and national security by providing prompt, reliable information on possible or reported incursions and threats to Canada's air and aerospace. Together with NATO, NORAD continues to play a vital role in safeguarding Canada's defence and security interests.

In agreeing to the renewal, both governments have also acknowledged that with respect to their common interest in maintaining effective surveillance and control of North American aerospace, such control includes the monitoring of aircraft suspected of smuggling illegal drugs into North America. This reflects the important counter-narcotics mission which both governments assigned to NORAD since the Agreement was last renewed.<sup>1</sup>

The agreement to accord NORAD a role in counter-narcotics was not incorporated in the text of the NORAD Agreement, which remained unchanged from 1986, but was recognized in

---

<sup>1</sup>Government of Canada. "Canada and United States to Renew NORAD Agreement," *News Release*, 19 April 1991.

an exchange of notes, dated 30 April 1991, which formally extended the Agreement for a five-year period.

The 1991-92 Estimates confirmed the ongoing commitment to three programmes under the North American Air Defence Modernization agreement. First, construction continues on thirty-six short-range radars in northern Canada, with completion of the sites and their communications facilities expected in 1992-93. The NWS short-range radars in Alaska are planned for installation in 1993 and expected to be completely operational in 1994.

Second, construction is underway at the four FOL sites in the Northwest Territories, with work on the site at Kuujjuaq, Quebec to begin following an environmental assessment. Two sites for AWACS dispersed operating bases at Edmonton and Bagotville will be completed during the current fiscal year. Third, plans continued to contract for the construction of four new, long-range microwave Canadian Coastal Radars to be fully operational by the mid-1990s. The total cost of the three programmes is currently estimated at \$1.25 billion.<sup>2</sup>

In April 1991, press reports from Washington suggested that, as part of a broad attempt to rationalize commands and resources, the Pentagon was considering a proposal to create a new Strategic Command which would include the offensive strategic forces of the US Navy and Air Force, and the strategic surveillance and air defence forces of NORAD. Responding to editorial comment which raised questions about Canada's involvement, through NORAD, in this suggested Strategic Command, Lieutenant-General R.W. Morton, Canadian Deputy Commander of NORAD, commented that it is

...incorrect to allege that a new organizational structure would merge NORAD, Space Command, Strategic Air Command, and the US Navy's ballistic missile submarine force. The NORAD agreement is a government-to-government document with clearly stated purposes. They are: to provide vital early warning of aerospace attack; to provide appropriate response to air attack; and to protect the air sovereignty of Canada and the US. This is a full-time job, functionally and organizationally distinct from the mission of the strategic offensive forces of the United States. While the US Department of Defense is looking at several organizational options as it reduces force structure, it is simply not true that NORAD will be merged with any other commands.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Government of Canada. *National Defence 1991-92 Estimates*. February 1991: 100.

<sup>3</sup>Lieut.-General R.W. Morton. "No expansion of Canada's NORAD Role," Letter to the Editor. *The Toronto Star*, 16 May 1991: A26.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In September 1990, The House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) appointed a Sub-Committee to consider the NORAD renewal. The Sub-Committee commissioned a report from a panel of experts, which was later presented in SCEAIT Hearings, along with the written submissions of a number of public interest groups, Canadian industry comments, and a lengthy brief from the Dene Nation.<sup>4</sup> The intention was to produce a report which would be tabled in the House of Commons by the full Committee.

Neither the Sub-Committee nor the full Committee, however, was able to reach agreement on a report. Noting that "unresolvable difference arose over the period and terms of a 1991 renewal of the Agreement," the Committee was nevertheless able to agree on the following:

Given the extraordinary changes in East-West relations and the ending of the cold war, the Government should carry out, in the first two years of any NORAD renewal period, a comprehensive public review of Canada-United States defence cooperation and the future surveillance needs of Canada, the United States and their northern neighbours.

As part of the review process, there should be a full and frank Canada-United States political dialogue about NORAD's future; about Canada-United States defence cooperation; and about the future surveillance needs of Canada, the United States and their northern neighbours. To that end, Parliament should initiate an exchange of views and information between Canadian and American legislators, with the first of the meetings for this purpose taking place before the termination of the NORAD agreement on May 12, 1991.<sup>5</sup>

In its announcement of the intention to renew the Agreement, the Government supported the proposal to carry out a public review of defence cooperation. However, no bilateral meeting of legislators took place before the formal renewal of the Agreement.

---

<sup>4</sup>Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence*, no. 77, 18 and 19 December 1990.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 77A: 1-2.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Hill, Roger, ed. *The NORAD Renewal Issue, Report of the Special Panel to the Sub-Committee of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade*, Working Paper 33, Ottawa: CIIPS, March 1991.
- Lindsey, George and Gordon Sharpe. *Surveillance over Canada*. Working Paper 31, Ottawa: CIIPS, December 1990.

FURTHER READING

- Charo, Arthur. *Continental Air Defence: A Neglected Dimension of Strategic Defence*. CSIA Occasional Paper no. 7. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs with the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990.
- Hayward, Daniel. *The Air Defence Initiative*. Issue Brief no. 9. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. August 1988.
- O'Blenis, J.D. *Air Defence*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1990.
- Piotrowski, J.L. "The Future of NORAD," *Forum* 5, no. 2, April 1990: 14-16.



### *SECTION III -- CONFLICT RESOLUTION*

#### **19. CAMBODIA**

##### *BACKGROUND*

The current situation in Cambodia has its immediate origins in the Vietnamese invasion in 1978, which resulted in the installation of a pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh. Canada, along with other western governments, suspended aid to Vietnam and, in 1982, recognized a coalition headed by Prince Sihanouk rather than the Phnom Penh Government of Hun Sen. Although the issue was brought before both the General Assembly and the Security Council, great power disagreement prevented action. China supported the Khmer Rouge faction of the opposition coalition, the Soviet Union supported the Vietnamese-installed government of Hun Sen, and the United States supported the two non-communist factions led by Prince Sihanouk and former prime minister Sonn Sann. In the case of the United States and its allies, this was not without its embarrassment since Sihanouk insisted that the Khmer Rouge, who are alleged to have killed one in every five Cambodians when they held power in Cambodia, should play a part in a post-settlement government.

Following a General Assembly recommendation that the Secretary-General should exercise his good offices in assisting the parties to arrive at a solution, after 1982, a Special Representative of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar sought to reconcile the viewpoints of the parties. Despite continued efforts in the following years, little progress was made until April 1989, when Vietnam announced that it proposed to withdraw its estimated 50,000 troops from Cambodia by the end of September. On 30 July 1989, nineteen nations, including Canada, together with the four Cambodian factions, participated in the Paris International Conference on Cambodia under the chairmanship of France. As co-chair with India of one of the main committees, Canada was involved in particular in drawing up ceasefire terms and defining an effective "international control mechanism" to assist in the implementation of a settlement. While the Conference was underway, a UN fact-finding mission, which included a Canadian representative, visited Cambodia, and returned to report that the effective monitoring of a ceasefire would require a peacekeeping force of 6,000 personnel.

The Paris Conference made considerable progress, but could not resolve all of the issues relating to power-sharing, or the role of the United Nations, which was distrusted by the Hun Sen government since the General Assembly recognized the opposition coalition and not the Phnom Penh government. Shortly afterwards, a number of governments, including Canada, declined a Phnom Penh invitation to participate in an observation mission to witness the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, which appeared to conclude on schedule at the end of September 1989. In December 1989, further progress seemed possible when Prince Sihanouk accepted an Australian proposal that called for the replacement of the Hun Sen government by a temporary UN trusteeship which,

accompanied by the UN peacekeeping force, would administer the country on an interim basis while training Cambodians to take over. In return for Hun Sen stepping down, Sihanouk promised to abandon his claim to the Cambodian seat at the United Nations. The proposal also called for the Cambodian parties to form a National Council in which Cambodian sovereignty would be vested.

In January 1990, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council endorsed a settlement along the lines of the Australian plan. Subsequently, Canada, along with other western countries, indicated that they would support a formula which would leave vacant the Cambodian seat at the United Nations. Further negotiations with and amongst the Cambodian factions and government followed, but without reaching agreement on the phasing and details of a settlement process. Within the opposition coalition, the Khmer Rouge in particular resisted the provisions of the Australian proposal. In late May 1990, the Permanent Members met again, and spelled out the conditions for UN participation in a peace plan. The political settlement, they declared, must include specific provisions for United Nations control over a ceasefire, an end to foreign military aid, free and fair elections under UN auspices, guarantees of human rights, and an agreement to guarantee the territorial integrity and unity of Cambodia.

Despite the ongoing disagreements between the non-communist members of the coalition and the Khmer Rouge, the Permanent Members continued to meet to develop a comprehensive plan for Cambodia. The search for consensus was greatly strengthened in July 1990 when the United States withdrew its recognition of the opposition coalition, and began talks with Vietnam on a solution to the Cambodian conflict. On 27 August 1990, the Permanent Members concluded a detailed agreement on the transition in Cambodia, marking the first time that they had been able to agree on all aspects of a settlement blueprint, which according to diplomatic sources, might involve as many 10,000 UN peacekeepers and 10,000 UN civilian administrators. On 10 September 1990, the four Cambodian parties met in Jakarta and apparently committed themselves to the UN framework for a comprehensive peace plan. They agreed to form a Supreme National Council composed of representatives from all four groups. The Council would represent Cambodian sovereignty, hold the Cambodian seat at the United Nations, and develop peace plans for submission to the Paris Conference.

Subsequently, however, further disputes between the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen government, particularly on the issue of representation on the proposed Supreme National Council, again thwarted agreement on the peace plan. Despite continued attempts to adjust the plan to gain the support of the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen government, during the winter and spring of 1991, the agreement of the four Cambodian parties continued to elude diplomatic efforts. In the same period, renewed fighting took place in Cambodia, giving rise to fears that the Khmer Rouge might be able to impose a solution by force. On 17 July, to the accompaniment of continued high levels of fighting in Cambodia, the Permanent Members held their fifth 1991 meeting on Cambodia. After a private,

two-day meeting they announced that a further round of negotiation would be held in late August 1991, but gave no indication that the four Cambodian parties were any closer to agreement.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Basic Canadian policies on the Cambodian conflict were articulated in 1989-1990. Specifically, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark had identified Canadian views on the prerequisites for an effective international control mechanism:

The mechanism should enjoy the full support and cooperation of all the parties, it should have a clear mandate including the necessary freedom of action and movement, it should be charged with reporting responsibilities to a recognized international authority, it should be established on a viable financial basis, and it should be of limited duration.<sup>1</sup>

On 25 January 1990, Clark spoke of the Canadian position towards the Khmer Rouge:

The central problem in the Cambodian conflict remains how to deal with the Khmer Rouge in an eventual settlement process. ...Each position we, as a government, have taken on the question of Cambodia has been grounded in a determination never to allow the Khmer Rouge back into power.<sup>2</sup>

In the same speech, Clark also recognized that the Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh "appears to have provided adequate government, and its record in most areas is far better than the Khmer Rouge Government which preceded it."<sup>3</sup>

During 1990-91, there was little change in the Canadian position, while it awaited the results of the efforts of the Permanent Members to obtain consensus on a comprehensive peace plan. Following the meeting of the four Cambodian parties in Jakarta in early September 1990, Clark expressed full support for the agreement reached by the parties. Clark announced that Ambassador Alan Sullivan, as co-chair of the First Committee of the Paris Conference dealing with the international control mechanism, would visit the capitals to determine what further work should be done, and complimented the Permanent Members:

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Speech to the Paris International Conference on Cambodia, 30 July 1989," *Statement* 89/36: 3. For further details on the Canadian position on Cambodia in 1989-90, see *The Guide* 1990: 333-338.

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, on Canada and Indochina," *Statement* 90/05, 25 January 1990.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

The agreement could not have occurred without the impetus provided by the Permanent Five. Their hard work over the past eight months in hammering out a framework document provides further evidence of the capacity of the UN to devise practical ways to resolve difficult world problems.<sup>4</sup>

On 18 June 1991, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall announced that Canada would open a diplomatic office in Hanoi, Vietnam on 1 July 1991. She commented:

By establishing a diplomatic presence in Vietnam, Canada will be in a better position to encourage ongoing reforms, monitor the human rights situation and implement our new aid program. It allows Canada to be an even more active player in the Cambodian peace process.<sup>5</sup>

On 22 July, speaking to the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur, McDougall again supported the continuing efforts of the Permanent Members, and added:

At the same time, we believe that, in the end, it is of fundamental importance that any settlement be "made in Cambodia," for without the complete co-operation of all factions we cannot hope to have a durable peace.

We wish to thank publicly our Indonesian colleagues for their relentless efforts in support of the peace process. The efforts of those others involved, those within the permanent five, Thailand and Australia, have, at one time or another, kept alive the prospect for peace in Cambodia.<sup>6</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue in 1990-1991.

---

<sup>4</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 201, 11 September 1990.

<sup>5</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 144, 18 June 1991.

<sup>6</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. *Statement*, 91/35, 22 July 1991.

# RECENT LITERATURE

- Begum, Anika. "The UN Peace Plan and Prospect for Peace in Cambodia," *BISS Journal* 12, no. 1, January 1991.
- Hemery, Daniel. *Vietnam, Laos, Cambodge: L'incertitude indochinoise*. Université de Paris VII, Problèmes politiques et sociaux, no. 647-648, Série Extrême-Orient no. 101-102, 14-18 January 1991.
- Hervouet, Gérard. "Cambodia Still in Year Zero?" *Peace and Security* 6, no. 1, Spring 1991: 8-9.
- Hood, Steven J. "Beijing's Cambodia Gamble and Prospects for Peace in Indochina: The Khmer Rouge of Sihanouk," *Asian Survey* 30, no. 10, October 1990.
- Peang-Meth, Abdulgaffar. "A Study of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea," *Contemporary South East Asia* 12, no. 3, December 1990.
- Turley, William S. "The Khmer War: Cambodia after Paris," *Survival* 32, no. 5, September/October 1990.
- United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *Hearings on Cambodian Peace Negotiations: Prospects for A Settlement*. S. Hrg 101-1118. Washington D.C.: GPO, 20 July, 19 September 1990.

# FURTHER READING

- Koh, Tommy T.B. "The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that Failed," *Negotiation Journal* 6, no. 11, January 1990.
- Tonnesson, Stein. "Proposals for a Lasting Peace in Indochina," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 20, no. 3, September 1989.
- Wanandi, Jusuf. *The Cambodian Conflict*. Tokyo: International Institute for Global Peace, January 1990.



## BACKGROUND

In 1987, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias proposed a peace plan for the five Central American states which called for each country to begin a process of national reconciliation, ceasefires within existing constitutional frameworks, an end to the support of insurgents in other countries, free and democratic elections, measures to help the repatriation of refugees, and cooperative efforts to seek international economic aid. The Arias Plan, also known as the Esquipulas II Accord, was noteworthy because for the first time, all five Central American countries -- Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua -- signed the Accord.

In March 1988, direct talks began in Nicaragua between the Sandinista government and representatives of the Contras, and between opposition factions and governments in Guatemala and El Salvador. Little progress was achieved in 1988, but in February 1989, the governments of Nicaragua and Honduras reached an agreement in which the Sandinistas agreed to a democratic election in February 1990 in return for a promise from Honduras that the Contra bands operating within its borders would be disbanded. Immediately after this agreement, the five presidents met again and agreed, *inter alia*, to invite UN observers into the region. On 24 February 1989, the five governments wrote to the UN Secretary-General requesting a team of unarmed military observers from Spain, West Germany, Canada, and an unspecified country from South America. The main tasks of the observers would be to verify that none of the countries involved in the Accord supported subversive activities across borders, to report on guerilla movements across borders, and to observe the 1990 Nicaraguan elections.

On 27 July 1989, the Security Council, including the principal backer of the Contras, the United States, adopted Resolution 637 which urged the Secretary-General to support the objectives of the Esquipulas II Accord. The five Central American governments reached further agreement at a meeting in Tela, Honduras, on 7 August 1989, when they agreed to the disbandment and repatriation of the Contras by the end of the year under the joint supervision of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). The Tela agreement also called for a "constructive dialogue" between the government and FMLN opposition forces in El Salvador. Immediately after this agreement, the United Nations moved to establish three verification teams. The International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) was established jointly by the United Nations and the OAS to oversee the disbandment and resettlement of the Contra forces. A second body, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), comprising Canada, Germany, Spain, Venezuela and Ireland, was established to verify compliance with the provisions of Esquipulas II concerning prohibition on transborder military activities. Finally, the United Nations Observer Mission for the

Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) was set up to monitor the Nicaraguan elections scheduled for 25 February 1990.

As an active supporter of the UN role in the Central American peace process, Canadian specialists participated in the reconnaissance mission to define the operational requirements of ONUCA. Canada also sent eight official representatives to the UN team verifying the Nicaraguan elections. In those elections, on 25 February 1990, the National Opposition Union defeated the incumbent Sandinista government. Shortly afterwards, on 23 March, new President Violeta Chamorro announced that the Contras already based in Nicaragua had agreed to report to internationally supervised zones to surrender their weapons by 20 April 1990. On 19 April 1990, the Chamorro government and Contra leaders signed a further agreement providing for an end to the ten-year war and the disbandment and disarmament of all Contra groups by 10 June 1990. Despite delays and further disputes, on 27 June 1990, the remaining Contra leaders surrendered their weapons to President Chamorro in the presence of ONUCA and OAS military representatives.

In El Salvador, progress towards peace has been considerably more difficult. After two rounds of unsuccessful negotiations between the government of President Cristiani and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in autumn 1989, in late October fighting broke out again between the opposing sides. On 16 November 1989, regular forces of the Salvadoran army entered the University of Central America and shot six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter. Internationally, the murders resulted in urgent demands for a full investigation by the Cristiani Government, and drew attention to the need for an international presence in El Salvador to monitor the human rights record of the government. A subsequent US Congressional investigation found that senior officers had resisted investigation of their role in the crime and the ensuing cover-up, but there was little indication in 1990-91 that those responsible for the crime would ever be brought to justice.

Second, on 25 November 1989, an aircraft from Nicaragua carrying missiles and other weapons was shot down over El Salvador, leading Cristiani to suspend diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and casting doubt on compliance with the Esquipulas II agreement not to transfer military equipment across borders. Subsequently, the five presidents requested that the ONUCA mandate be expanded to include prevention of the supply of weapons to both the Contras and the FMLN.

During 1990, progress towards a settlement in El Salvador was extremely slow. In late August, Alvaro de Soto, special representative of UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, acknowledged that, after six rounds of negotiations under the auspices of the UN, plans for a September ceasefire were no longer realistic. It was widely believed that without such a ceasefire, the FMLN and other opposition parties would boycott the municipal and national elections planned for March 1991. There was, however, an exception to the general lack of progress. In July 1990, the Cristiani Government

and the FMLN were able to reach a formal agreement on human rights. The parties agreed to allow the United Nations to establish an unprecedented, nationwide, long-term human rights verification mission. In principle, the mission was to be established after the signing of a ceasefire. In April 1991, however, the Secretary-General proposed that the human rights mission, which would be the first part of a larger operation officially titled the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), could be established ahead of a ceasefire and a political settlement. The Secretary-General proposed that the human rights component of ONUSAL could be on the ground beginning in June 1991.<sup>1</sup>

The role of the armed forces remained at the centre of efforts to find a political solution in El Salvador. Although not publicly released, in November 1990, reports indicated that a UN peace plan contained provisions for an independent commission to investigate and dismiss military officers guilty of human rights violations, and to dismantle a large part of the country's security forces. In February 1991, unconfirmed reports indicated that a draft UN plan called for a temporary partition of the Salvadoran countryside into FMLN and army areas, with about 8,000 UN troops supervising the demarcation line.

Finally, on 27 April 1991, government and FMLN negotiators reached agreement in Mexico City on constitutional reforms which, amongst wide-ranging reforms to bolster an independent judiciary and the electoral process, explicitly subordinated the Salvadoran military to presidential control, stripped them of security functions, and enabled the National Assembly by majority vote to rescind a presidential directive to use the military to enforce order in a declared emergency. However, the agreement was conditional on a ceasefire, which continued to elude negotiators. In late June 1991, with the UN peace process again stalled, President Bush released a part of previously withheld military aid to the Cristiani Government, citing FMLN intransigence as the reason. According to US State Department figures, since 1987, the United States has authorized US \$440.5 million in military aid to El Salvador, and US \$1.5 billion in economic aid.

In mid-summer 1991, therefore, the continuing obstacles to a ceasefire agreement in El Salvador appeared to be the FMLN demand that the army recognize its control over territory during a ceasefire, and the future of the army itself.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

In his speech to the General Assembly on 26 September 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark referred to "the successful conclusion of the democratic process" in

---

<sup>1</sup>Report of the Secretary-General, *Central America: Efforts Towards Peace*, UN Security Council S/22494, 16 April 1991.

Nicaragua, and noted that "the UN's unique experience and expertise in peacekeeping has been invaluable."<sup>2</sup> On 7 December 1990, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced that the 89 Rotary Wing Aviation Unit (89 RWAU) and a number of Canadian Forces observers would be brought home from Central America. Canadian participation in ONUCA involved 173 personnel, as well as eight medium and light helicopters of 89 RWAU. The observers were stationed in all five Central American countries, with 89 RWAU based at Tegucigalpa, Honduras. In commenting on the withdrawal, Defence Minister Bill McKnight commented: "The easing of tensions in Central America since ONUCA's arrival proves how effective UN peacekeeping operations can be."<sup>3</sup>

Following the demobilization of the Contra forces in mid-1990, the United Nations reassessed the requirements for ONUCA, and concluded that in circumstances of reduced tension it would be possible (and less expensive) to contract a civilian helicopter company for air transport. About thirty Canadian personnel remain with ONUCA, which may play a role in both El Salvador and Guatemala, should the peace negotiations in those countries reach a successful conclusion.

In regard to El Salvador, in November 1990, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark responded to the increase in military activity by placing primary responsibility on the FMLN:

This offensive action by the FMLN is a backward step and is not conducive to efforts towards national reconciliation in El Salvador. A year ago, many Salvadorans were killed, injured or orphaned during the FMLN's November offensive. These recent attacks have already claimed lives, and will only add to the suffering of the Salvadoran people. We urge both the FMLN and the Government...to continue the pursuit of a negotiated settlement.<sup>4</sup>

In the same statement, Clark referred to the murder of the Jesuit priests, declaring it "unacceptable that the perpetrators of this inhuman act have not yet been brought to justice."<sup>5</sup>

In March 1991, Canada dispatched eight official observers to serve with the OAS group monitoring municipal and legislative elections in El Salvador. The group reported relatively minor technical flaws in the election, which was boycotted by the FMLN.

---

<sup>2</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Speech to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, 90/55, 26 September 1990.

<sup>3</sup>Department of National Defence. "Repatriation of Canadian Forces Air Resources and Observers from Central America," *News Release*, 75/90, 7 December 1990.

<sup>4</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Clark expresses deep concern about FMLN offensive in El Salvador," *News Release*, no. 273, 23 November 1990.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

On 1 May 1991, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall expressed strong support for the constitutional package agreed to by the Cristiani Government and the FMLN in Mexico City and subsequently passed by the legislative assembly, and went on to note with satisfaction that the parties had renewed their commitment to allow both an independent Salvadoran Commission to investigate human rights violations and a United Nations human rights observer mission (ONUSAL) to operate in El Salvador.<sup>6</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 19 November 1990, commenting on a non-governmental organization (NGO) recommendation that Canada provide more technical resources for UN election monitoring, NDP member Ray Skelly observed in Committee:

It seems to me that the Canadian government in the monitoring process has given credibility to a government in conducting elections that really do not assist democracy in that country. My recollection is that virtually each one, although they found some minor technical problems with it, has given a clean bill of health to each election in El Salvador. Yet what in fact they have done is given credibility to a government that is run by armed forces.<sup>7</sup>

On 13 March 1991, NDP critic Svend Robinson raised the issue of the El Salvador elections, which he said, "according to OAS observers from Canada and elsewhere were marked by intimidation, threats and fraud." He continued:

In view of the latest allegations...will the minister assure the House that he will voice Canada's serious concern to the El Salvadoran authorities about this attempt to steal the apparent victory of the democratic opposition in these already very seriously flawed elections?<sup>8</sup>

Acting for the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in his reply, Minister for International Trade John Crosbie noted that the Canadian observers would report formally through the OAS, but that the government would hear their views informally on their return from El Salvador. "When we receive these reports from our observers, we will then make a considered opinion on this matter."<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Welcomes Progress on Peace in El Salvador," *News Release*, no. 104, 1 May 1991.

<sup>7</sup>Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 73, 19 November 1990: 23.

<sup>8</sup>*Commons Debates*. 12 March 1991: 18402-3.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

Reviewing US policy and aid to El Salvador, Robinson then asked:

Will the Prime Minister today, in his meeting with US President George Bush, urge President Bush to stop funding this bloody military regime which has been responsible for over 70,000 deaths?<sup>10</sup>

In his reply, Crosbie referred to the continuing peace negotiations, and commented: "With respect to American policy in the area, that is for the United States government to decide." His continuing response indicated that the issue was not on the agenda for the Bush-Mulroney meeting.<sup>11</sup>

On 12 April 1991, Robinson posed the following written question in the House of Commons:

Did the Canadian government send an RCMP Officer and a staff member of the Canadian Embassy in Costa Rica to conduct a technical review of the Salvadoran police investigation into the assassination of the six Jesuits and two women at the University of Central America at some time in the last two years and, if so, what was the content of any reports submitted to the Canadian government from this delegation.<sup>12</sup>

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark submitted the following written response:

In a statement at the OAS November 30, 1989, the Canadian Permanent Observer stated that Canada would consider any request from the authorities of El Salvador to help in the investigation of the assassination of the six Jesuit priests and their employees. At the request of the Salvadoran government, the Canadian Ambassador, accompanied by the RCMP Liaison Officer and another officer of the embassy in San Jose accredited to El Salvador, visited San Salvador from January 4-6, 1990 for meetings with the government, the Church and the University of Central America. The Embassy officials later met British, Spanish and American officials, as well as the Salvadoran Special Investigative Unit and two criminal investigators from Scotland Yard. They concluded with the assessment that the investigation, to that point, was proceeding in a serious and professional manner. The Salvadoran government made no specific request for assistance, and, since the investigation soon moved from the forensic to the judicial phase, it did not lend itself to Canadian technical intervention. No recommendation for further action was submitted to the RCMP.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>*Commons Debates*. 12 April 1991: 19458-59.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

# RECENT LITERATURE

- Bendana, Alejandro. "Conflict Resolution in Central America: the Nicaraguan Experience," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 22, no. 2, June 1991.
- Grenier, Yvon. "Understanding the FMLN: A Glossary of Five Words," *Conflict Quarterly* 11, no. 2, Spring 1991.
- Klepak, H.P. *Security Considerations and Verification of a Central American Arms Control Regime*. Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers No. 5. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, 1990.
- Latin American Working Group. *Canada and the Central American Peace Process: Selected Documents*. Toronto, September 1990.
- Needler, M.C. "El Salvador: The Military and Politics," *Armed Forces and Society* 17, no. 4, Summer 1991.
- U.S. General Accounting Office. *Central America: Humanitarian Assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance*. Report to Congressional Committees. Washington D.C.: GPO, November 1990.
- U.S. General Accounting Office. *El Salvador: Flow of U.S. Military Aid*. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee of Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate. Washington D.C.: GPO, March 1991.

# FURTHER READING

- Mujal-Leon, Eusebio M. *European Socialism and the Conflict in Central America*. The Washington Papers 138. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989.
- North, Liisa, ed. *Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada*. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990.



## 21. CONFLICT IN THE SOVIET UNION<sup>1</sup>

### BACKGROUND

The policies of glasnost, perestroika and greater democracy, advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev since he came to power in 1985, have made it possible for the fifteen republics which make up the Soviet Union to take steps towards greater independence. During 1990-1991, earlier moves towards independence by the Baltic republics were followed by Georgia and Moldova and in 1991, Gorbachev used military force in the Baltic republics for the first time, ending a policy of peaceful negotiation.

All fifteen of the Soviet republics have declared some form of sovereignty or independence. The moves towards complete independence taken by the three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have been given the most international attention, perhaps due to their relatively recent experiences with independent statehood. Canadian comment has focussed more on the situation in the Baltic republics than on other areas and consequently, this section reflects that emphasis.

The three Baltic republics were formerly part of the Russian Empire and emerged from World War I as independent states. As part of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, these countries were annexed and incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940. Each republic, although linked to the others by common histories, is linguistically and ethnically discrete and varies greatly in urban/rural mix.

Estonia was the first of the three to move towards independence, declaring sovereignty on 16 November 1989. This declaration was followed a year later, on 12 November 1989, by a declaration that the 1940 vote to join the Soviet Union was illegal because it occurred under military coercion. The invalidity of the 1940 vote and acceptance of the 1938 constitution were to be used as a basis for negotiating a new relationship with the Soviet Union. On 8 May 1990, the sovereign and independent Republic of Estonia was declared, using its 1938 constitution as a base.

Lithuania took a much stronger first step. After multi-party elections in February 1990, on 11 March 1990, the Lithuanian Parliament announced the formation of the Lithuanian Republic, declared the 1940 vote illegal and reinstated the 1938 constitution. In contrast to Estonia, Lithuania's declaration of the invalidity of the 1940 vote was equated with an assertion that Lithuania had never been part of the USSR and was, therefore, not now part of the USSR.

---

<sup>1</sup>This entry covers events in the Soviet Union relating to the struggle of certain republics to move toward independence. *The Guide* was going to press in August, prior to the failed coup attempt in mid-August and subsequent events relating to the independence of the Baltic republics. Consequently, this entry does not reflect those changes.

When Lithuania refused to rescind its declaration in compliance with a demand from Gorbachev, an economic embargo against the republic was put in place. This embargo placed a tremendous strain on the Lithuanian population and economy. On 16 June, the Lithuanian cabinet proposed that a moratorium be placed on the 11 March declaration to allow for negotiations with the Soviet Union. This was passed by the Parliament on 29 June 1990.

The third Baltic republic, Latvia, declared independence on 4 May 1990, but has taken a gradual approach overall and has been willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union. (For an in-depth examination of the moves to independence by the Baltic republics, see Chapter 29 in the 1990 edition of *The Guide*.)

The declarations of sovereignty and independence have in some areas sparked actions by minority groups who fear discrimination by republic governments. Moldava (previously Moldavia) declared itself sovereign on 24 June 1990. Moldava was annexed from Romania in 1940 and the majority of its population are ethnic Romanian. However, approximately 150,000 Christian Turks, known as Gagauz, live in a small area within the republic. They fled to Moldava in the 1830s in order to avoid religious persecution in Turkey.

In response to the Moldava declaration of sovereignty, the Gagauz declared themselves independent in August 1990. In late October, the Gagauz planned to hold elections for a new government. However, thousands of Moldavan "volunteers" armed with clubs and other weapons began travelling to the Gagauz region on 25 October, in an effort to stop the elections. The Moldavans surrounded the area and set up roadblocks and the Gagauz prepared to fight. On 26 October, the Moldavan parliament declared a state of emergency, abolishing the Gagauz governing council, banning public meetings, and restricting travel. Both Gagauz and Moldava officials requested help from Moscow and Soviet Interior Ministry troops were sent to the area to oversee and permit the withdrawal of the Moldavans from the Gagauz region.

On 24 November, after two years of promises, Gorbachev unveiled a draft version of his proposal for a new union treaty. The new plan would create the Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics, replacing "socialist" with "sovereign." It proposed a Federation Council which would include the President and Vice-President of the Soviet Union and the heads of all of the republics. The central government would maintain control over defence, borders, foreign policy and foreign economic policy as well as control over gold and diamond resources. The treaty was immediately rejected by Lithuania because it did not recognize the republic as a separate state. Latvia and Estonia also refused to discuss the treaty. On 17 December, in the face of increasing criticism of the draft, Gorbachev proposed that there be a nation-wide referendum on the treaty to allow citizens to express their opinion.

The new year opened with a marked change in the policy and actions taken by the Soviet government. On 2 January, Lithuania announced that it was withdrawing its offer to suspend its March 1990 declaration of independence due to the failure of the two sides to agree to begin negotiations on Lithuania's status. The two sides had held talks in October with a view to preparing for negotiations within weeks. However, with the appearance of Gorbachev's new draft union treaty in November, the Soviet government announced that there would be no negotiations with republics on the nature of their status until after the union treaty was signed.

On 7 January, the Soviet Defence Ministry announced it would send divisions of paratroopers into seven republics -- the three Baltics, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine -- in order to assist local authorities in picking up men who had been conscripted into the Soviet army but had not reported for duty. Large numbers of men drafted to the army from the Baltic republics did not report. For example, in Latvia, of 4,000 drafted last fall, only 1,000 reported for duty. The move heightened tensions in the republics, especially in the Baltic republics which had made repeated requests for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in the area. Contributing to the tension, on 27 November, the Soviet Defence Minister announced that Soviet troops had been given the authority to use force in order to defend themselves and government institutions if threatened.

On 8 January, approximately 5,000 pro-Soviet demonstrators (primarily Russian and Polish minorities) surrounded the Lithuanian parliament building protesting against proposed price rises. The demonstrators began smashing windows and were forced back by police. The police were soon joined by thousands of nationalist Lithuanians responding to a call for support from President Landsbergis. Protests and the stand off between the two groups continued for a second day. At the same time Soviet troops surrounded the parliament buildings and the television station. On 10 January, Gorbachev sent a message to the Lithuanian government warning that it was violating the USSR Constitution and the Constitution of Soviet Lithuania. The latter had been declared void with Lithuania's declaration of independence and Gorbachev demanded, as he had done many times, that it be reinstated.

The next day, 11 January 1991, Soviet troops in the capital city Vilnius took over the headquarters of the Lithuanian Defence Council and seized the Lithuanian printing house. At the printing house, a Soviet colonel responded to being doused with a water hose by shooting back at the building, wounding a security guard in the process. Seven civilians were injured that day. Overnight on 12 January, the army continued to raid various buildings including police, telephone and railway offices.

On 13 January, Soviet forces stormed the Vilnius Radio and Television tower using tanks and machine guns to force their way through unarmed civilians who had surrounded the station. Thirteen people were killed in the incident and 230 were injured. Thousands of citizens set up barricades around the Lithuanian parliament buildings preparing for any effort by Soviet troops to take the building.

Although a National Salvation Committee did not actively take control of Lithuania, it imposed a curfew and banned public gatherings on behalf of the Soviet Government. January 14 and 15 were declared national days of mourning. The actions by the Soviet Union received widespread condemnation internationally.

On 20 January, 100,000 people in Moscow participated in a protest against the crackdown. On the same day, Soviet troops attacked an Interior Ministry building in Riga, the capital of Latvia, killing four civilians. The attack came after a number of earlier incidents involving Soviet army raids on public buildings in the city.

There were further incidents in Lithuania, but at the end of the month, apparently in response to international pressure, Gorbachev announced that all excess Soviet troops were being withdrawn from the republic. On 9 February 1991, Lithuania held a national referendum in which 90.47 percent of the voters supported Lithuanian independence.

Other republics also took strong steps towards complete independence. In Georgia, on 30 January 1991, the Georgian parliament approved the establishment of its own armed forces and voted to abolish the Communist system of local government and to close a number of state farms. During February and March, unrest in the republic of Georgia between the Ossetian minority and Georgian nationalists (which had prompted the intervention of Soviet troops in December) continued. On 31 March, 89.5 percent of voters in a referendum supported the idea of an independent Georgia. On 1 April, the Soviet legislature authorized a state of emergency and sent troops to Georgia to end a siege in the South Ossetia area. On 9 April, the second anniversary of the killing of nineteen civilian protestors by Soviet troops in Georgia, the Georgian parliament unanimously agreed to declare Georgia independent.

Continuing an effort to maintain control of rebellious areas, in May, Soviet troops occupied Nagorno-Karabakhskaya, an area in Azerbaijan inhabited by Armenians. The Soviet government maintained that the villages were being used as bases for illegal paramilitary groups and that the Soviet troops were enforcing a July 1990 presidential decree requiring that illegal groups be disarmed.

During this entire period, President Gorbachev continued in his efforts to develop a new union treaty and his campaign for a favourable vote on the upcoming national referendum. Just prior to the referendum, on 9 March 1991, a new version of the draft treaty was published. The proposed treaty would establish a federative democratic state based on the voluntary union of equal republics. Local authority was broadened but the central government would still maintain control over areas such as defence and state security. As the original treaty does, the draft treaty accepted that republics had the right to secede but did not include specific procedures for secession.

The referendum took place on 17 March 1991. Voters were asked: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?" Of the 136 million who voted, 79 percent supported the idea of a renewed federation. Six republics -- the three Baltic republics, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia -- boycotted the referendum.

On 24 April, talks between Gorbachev and the nine republics that had agreed to negotiate (Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia and Turkmenia) resulted in a joint statement on a future path for action on a new union treaty. The statement acknowledged that a new union must be one between "sovereign states." In exchange for this acknowledgement, the nine republics agreed to maintain law and order and to work within the existing system until a new system was established. The statement recognized the right of the six republics that did not participate in the negotiations to make an independent decision about whether to sign the new treaty. However, signatories to the treaty would form a single economic bloc, to the exclusion of the others. Within six months of the signing of the new treaty, a new constitution would be ready, to be followed by elections to the new official bodies including -- for the first time -- a direct election of the Soviet President by one-man-one-vote suffrage. The treaty was finalized and opened for signature on 24 July 1991.

#### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has never recognized the 1940 annexation of the Baltic States and recognizes their *de jure* independence.

Speaking to a conference on Canadian-Soviet relations, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark discussed the problems faced by the Soviet Union and Canada's support for Soviet reform. Clark noted that the strength of the Canada-Soviet relationship depended on the success of reform. However,

Canada is not a fair-weather friend of the Soviet Union. We support reform unreservedly and unambiguously.... This is a window of opportunity.... We must support reform because reform is right. We must support a new order there because it affects a new order elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at a Conference on Canadian-Soviet Relations at the Government Conference Centre," *Statement*, no. 90/68, 28 November 1990: 4.

When Soviet troops moved into seven republics to enforce conscription, Mr. Clark issued a statement expressing concern about the situation, stating that Canadian concerns had been "forcefully" conveyed to the Soviet Ambassador and that Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had given Mr. Clark and Prime Minister Mulroney assurances that there would be no crackdown in the Baltic states.<sup>3</sup>

Canadian-Soviet relations cooled considerably after the use of military force in Lithuania and Latvia in January. Both Mr. Clark and Prime Minister Mulroney condemned the use of violence in Lithuania. Mr. Clark issued a statement in which he outlined the comments he had made to the Soviet Ambassador. Mr. Clark said that he had indicated that Canada deplored the use of force against a democratically elected government, that the Soviet Union must abide by its commitments under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and that any further use of force would be detrimental to Canadian-Soviet relations.<sup>4</sup>

A news release from the Office of the Prime Minister indicated that the Prime Minister had written President Gorbachev to "express the abhorrence of all Canadians at the unwarranted violence" used in Lithuania.<sup>5</sup>

The Prime Minister appealed for Mr. Gorbachev to show restraint and avoid further bloodshed. He urged the Soviet President to seek solutions consistent with the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the legitimate aspirations of Lithuania and the other Baltic States.... The Prime Minister advised that Canada was reviewing its offers of technical assistance and new lines of credit for the purchase of foodstuffs.<sup>6</sup>

Similar condemnations were issued in response to the violence in Latvia on 20 January.<sup>7</sup>

In a speech during an emergency debate on the situation in the Baltics in the House of Commons, Mr. Clark announced that the government had decided to suspend further action on an earlier offer of technical assistance to the Soviet Union and a \$150 million line of credit. Mr. Clark indicated that Canada was prepared to help the Baltic states in what ever way was possible, within a context that supported the reform process begun in the Soviet Union. He indicated that Canada was

---

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Expresses Concern about Soviet Troop Movements," *News Release*, no. 4, 8 January 1991.

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Condemns Soviet Actions in Lithuania," *News Release*, no. 9, 11 January 1991.

<sup>5</sup>Office of the Prime Minister. "Prime Minister Condemns Soviet Violence Against Lithuania," *Release*, 13 January 1991.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Strongly Condemns Violence in Latvia," *News Release*, no. 17, 21 January 1991.

considering establishing a Baltic Centre in Canada, as has already been established in Sweden, and in response to requests from the Baltic states, Canada was facilitating the shipment of medical supplies. Mr. Clark encouraged groups in Canada who might have materials of use to consider how they could be gathered and made available in order to be sent to the region.

Mr. Clark emphasized throughout his speech the strong support Canada gave to the Baltic states and the deep disapproval it felt about the use of force.

Bilaterally we are looking at concrete ways that Canada can support the Baltic States through increased contacts and direct assistance.... I am prepared to look at any other ways that are practical. There are limits upon what we can do given our obligations in the family of nations and given the importance of our continuing relations with the Soviet Union, ...I can say, that while I am aware of those limits, it is my intention...to push those limits as far as is humanly possible.<sup>8</sup>

The Lithuanian referendum on independence in February was observed by Canadian Embassy officers and the results were welcomed by Secretary of State Clark.<sup>9</sup> Canada has made an effort to ensure that at least one diplomat is present in the Baltic region at any given time. This policy drew a complaint from Moscow about the diplomatic presence, especially in relation to the Lithuanian referendum, prompting a Soviet foreign ministry official to accuse Canada of interference in Soviet internal affairs.<sup>10</sup>

During July 1991, while attending the G7 summit in London, Prime Minister Mulroney announced that Canada would free up the technical aid and line of credit that it had suspended in January.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The situation in the Baltic states prompted many statements of support for the states by a number of MPs throughout the year.<sup>11</sup> MPs also tabled a number of petitions relating to the situation,

---

<sup>8</sup>*Commons Debates*. 21 January 1991: 17533.

<sup>9</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Welcomes Lithuanian Poll Results," *News Release*, no. 33, 10 February 1991.

<sup>10</sup>P. Koring. "Clark rejects Soviet protest," *Globe and Mail*, 21 February 1991: A7.

<sup>11</sup>See: *Commons Debates*. 6 December 1990: 16373. *Commons Debates*. 18 December 1990: 16894. *Commons Debates*. 16 January 1991: 17106. *Commons Debates*. 21 January 1991: 17491. *Commons Debates*. 5 March 1991: 17970. *Commons Debates*. 29 May 1991: 717 (relating to Armenia).

*inter alia* calling on the Canadian government to recognize the governments of the three states and to call on the Soviet Union to withdraw its military forces from the area.<sup>12</sup>

On 15 January 1991, the House of Commons unanimously adopted a motion put forward by then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark which condemned the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania and supported "the right of the Baltic peoples to determine their own future."<sup>13</sup>

Many questions were raised about Canadian responses and policy in the wake of the military actions in Lithuania and Latvia. MPs suggested that Mr. Clark call in the Soviet Ambassador and advocated using the UN Commission on Human Rights and the CSCE processes.<sup>14</sup> Mr. Clark indicated Canada's willingness to consider initiating such processes but also cautioned that the UN procedures would be subject to the Soviet veto and that the important thing was to try to find a way which would influence the Soviet leadership.<sup>15</sup>

On 21 January 1991, the House of Commons held an emergency debate on the crisis in the Baltics. Liberal member Jesse Flis outlined the requests that the parliamentary group on the Baltics had received from the Canadian Baltic communities for action by Canada. These included the imposition of sanctions on the Soviet Union, diplomatic recognition of Lithuania, a Canadian resolution in the UN condemning the Soviet aggression, and an emergency debate in the House of Commons.<sup>16</sup>

MP Alex Kindy noted that there were similar moves towards independence and struggles with the Soviet government occurring in other parts of the Soviet Union and advocated granting diplomatic recognition to the Lithuanian government.<sup>17</sup>

All of the MPs who spoke took the opportunity to express their support for the Baltic republics and condemn the Soviet crackdown. A number of the speakers described visits they had made to the Soviet Union and to the Baltic republics and drew connections to other events around the world such

---

<sup>12</sup>*Commons Debates*, 21 January 1991: 17504. *Commons Debates*, 13 March 1991: 18403. *Commons Debates*, 26 March 1991: 18996. *Commons Debates*, 27 March 1991: 19085. *Commons Debates*, 23 May 1991: 440. *Commons Debates*, 12 June 1991: 1542. *Commons Debates*, 14 June 1991: 1747. *Commons Debates*, 19 June 1991: 2099.

<sup>13</sup>*Commons Debates*, 15 January 1991: 16983-4.

<sup>14</sup>*Commons Debates*, 21 January 1991: 17495, 17497, 17501.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*: 17526.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*: 17528-9.

as the Persian Gulf crisis, the Kurds and other human rights situations. Some MPs also read from letters received from their constituents expressing concern about the situation in the Baltics.<sup>18</sup>

On 5 March 1991, MP Bill Blaikie called attention to the recently completed referenda in the Baltic states and called on Canada to make it clear to the Soviet Union that until the Soviet government dealt adequately with the issue, Canada would raise the Baltic question at every opportunity presented in international fora.<sup>19</sup>

Liberal MP Jesse Flis, NDP member Dave Stubich and PC member Pauline Browes all belong to a group of MPs known as the Canadian Parliamentary Group for the Baltic Peoples. The three MPs visited the Baltic states in March 1991 to express their support for Baltic independence.<sup>20</sup> Upon their return, MP Jesse Flis rose in the House and advocated that Canada promote a special international conference on the Baltics in an effort to help move the stalemated negotiations in the Soviet Union forward.

The objective would be to bring interested parties together...where objective criteria and the rules of international law would be used to determine the legal status of the annexation of 1940 and to set...the terms of reference for further negotiations...<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup>For the full emergency debate, see: *Commons Debates*. 21 January 1991: 17524-17556.

<sup>19</sup>*Commons Debates*. 5 March 1991: 18014.

<sup>20</sup>"Canadian MPs in Moscow back Baltic Independence," *The Gazette*, 19 March 1991: A10.

<sup>21</sup>*Commons Debates*. 22 March 1991: 18867.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Lesage, Michel. "La crise du pouvoir et les libertés en URSS," *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, no. 653 March 1991.
- Lieven, Dominic. *The Soviet Crisis*. Conflict Studies 241. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991.
- "Lithuanian Violence on Gorbachev's Orders?" *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 43, no. 2 13 February 1991.
- "Moldavia Hit by Three-Way Ethnic Strife," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 42, no. 43 28 November 1990.
- Olcott, Martha Brill. "The Soviet (Dis)Union," *Foreign Policy*, no. 82, Spring 1991: 118-136.
- Roeder, Philip G. "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," *World Politics* 43, no. 2, January 1991: 196-232.
- "Soviet Union: Restless Republics," *Canada and the World* 56, no. 7, 1991: 4-5.
- Waever, Ole. *Culture and Identity in the Baltic Sea Region*. Arbejdspapirer Working Papers 18/1990 Copenhagen: Center for Peace and Conflict Research, 1990.

FURTHER READING

- "Baltic Republics," *The Guide 1990*. Ottawa: CIIPS, 1990: 393-407.
- Miljan, Toivo. "Perestroika in the Baltic Republics," *Behind the Headlines* 47, no. 3, Spring 1990.
- Radvanyi, Jean. "Pays baltes: le prix de l'indépendance," *Politique internationale*, no. 48, Summer 1990: 57-71.
- Tarpas, Jan Arveds. *Impatient for Freedom? The Baltic Struggle for Independence*. London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1990.

*BACKGROUND*

Since February 1986, when Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier fled the country, Haiti has been struggling to develop a democratic society, its first since Haiti gained independence in 1804. In February 1987, a new constitution for Haiti was approved which provided for presidential elections to take place on 29 November 1987. These elections were cancelled because of widespread violence and the deaths of thirty people. The balloting was postponed to 17 January 1988. Although the elections were characterized by violence and a large percentage of voters boycotted the polling, Leslie Manigat was declared the winner and was sworn in on 7 February, the anniversary of the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship.

However, the new government was short-lived and, on 20 June 1988, Manigat was overthrown in a military coup led by Lt.-General Namphy who promptly suspended the new constitution. Three months later, there was a second military coup, this time led by Brig.-General Avril. However, Avril was unable to control ongoing violence and opposition to his rule and, in March 1990, he resigned. In his place, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a Supreme Court justice was appointed, along with a Council of State, as provided in the 1987 constitution. This was in effect the first civilian government for Haiti.

In June, Pascal-Trouillot appealed to the United Nations (UN) for assistance in preparing for and monitoring their planned elections. The UN granted the request. A potential problem arose when in July, a former interior minister under Duvalier, Roger Lafontant, returned to Haiti. In October, he declared that he would run for President. However, the Haitian constitution prohibits anyone who had "zealously" supported the Duvalier regime from holding public office for ten years, and on 6 November, the candidacy of Lafontant was refused by the Provisional Electoral Council.

The elections went ahead as planned on 16 December 1990, under the observation of several hundred UN and Organization of American States (OAS) observers. The UN observers were part of the United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Haiti (ONUVEH) established by UN Resolution 45/2 in response to the Haitian request for assistance.<sup>1</sup>

The elections were won by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a popular Roman Catholic priest who had worked in the slums of Port-au-Prince. The Provisional Electoral Council formally declared Aristide the winner on 23 December. The elections went smoothly and there was a large percentage of voter turn out. The announcement of Aristide's victory generated large celebrations in Haiti. Internationally, the success of the democratic process, after so long a wait, was applauded.

---

<sup>1</sup>UN Resolution 45/2, 10 October 1990. Adopted without a vote.

However, having been shut out of the elections, Roger Lafontant predicted that Aristide would not be permitted to assume the Presidency. On 7 January, Lafontant made good his threat and seized control of the Presidential Palace, forcing interim President Pascal-Trouillot to announce her resignation and declaring himself President. The coup was short-lived, however. Thousands of Haitians took to the streets in protest and Army Chief of Staff, General Hérard Abraham denounced the coup. Troops loyal to the constitution stormed the Palace, arrested Lafontant and freed Pascal-Trouillot.

Aristide was inaugurated on 7 February 1991. Run-off elections were held on 20 January for seats in the National Assembly where no clear majority had established a victor on the first ballot.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada has firmly supported Haiti's efforts to establish a democratic government and administer free elections. On 21 September 1990, the Minister for External Relations, Monique Landry announced that Canada would contribute \$1 million to the Haitian election process.<sup>2</sup>

Ten Canadians from the Canadian Armed Forces went to Haiti as part of the UN Observer mission, as security experts.<sup>3</sup> They assisted the Haitian authorities in establishing a security plan for the elections and in monitoring security on the day. Ten Canadians were also part of the OAS observer mission. They included Pierre-F. Coté, the director-general of elections in Quebec, who acted as personal representative for the Secretary-General of the OAS and coordinator of the OAS mission. In October, during the voter registration period, fifteen Canadians acted as observers.

On 18 December 1990, the day after the elections, Canada's then Minister for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

I join all Canadians in congratulating the Haitian people, as well as the interim government and the Provisional Electoral Council on the orderly way in which this election day passed.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>M. Tison. "Un million \$ du Canada pour les elections en Haïti," *Le Soleil*, 22 September 1990: 28.

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canadians Join UN Election Monitoring Team in Haiti," *News Release*, no. 252, 2 November 1990.

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Congratulates Haiti," *News Release*, no. 288, 18 December 1990.

Ms. Landry, the Minister for External Relations, announced that Canada would begin discussions with Haiti about restoring bilateral Canadian aid to the country.<sup>5</sup> Canadian aid was cut off in September 1988.

Prime Minister Mulroney transmitted a congratulatory message to President-elect Aristide, stating:

We hope your Government can now swiftly create conditions conducive to implementing an economic and social development program that respects the fundamental rights of your people.... You may rest assured that Canada will continue supporting Haitian efforts to build a just, modern and open society.<sup>6</sup>

On 7 January 1991, immediately after the Lafontant coup had been reversed, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark and the Minister for External Relations Monique Landry, issued a joint statement welcoming the reversal of the coup and the release of the interim President. Mr. Clark stated:

Canada has fully supported the process of democratization in Haiti, and welcomed the first free and orderly elections in Haiti's history....<sup>7</sup>

Ms. Landry noted that the Canadian Government was encouraged by the support for democracy demonstrated by the Haitian armed forces and said, "[w]e hope that the long cycle of repression and despair which has marked Haiti's history may at long last be over."<sup>8</sup>

Ms. Landry led an all-party Canadian delegation which attended the inauguration of Jean-Bertrand Aristide on 7 February 1991.<sup>9</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Progressive Conservative member Nicole Roy-Arcelin, rose in the House of Commons on 19 December 1990 to express support for the election in Haiti, and the victory of Aristide. She stated:

---

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Government of Canada. Office of the Prime Minister. *Release*, 24 December 1990.

<sup>7</sup>Department of External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 3, 7 January 1991.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Department of External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 30, 6 February 1991.

After electing Jean Bertrand Aristide, ...this country will be able to make great strides towards democracy and justice. That is why I want to ask my government not only to increase material aid to this country but also to promote economic and political relations with [the] newly-elected government...<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup>*Commons Debates*. 19 December 1990: 16935.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Alaux, Jean-Pierre. "Hopes Rekindled for Haitian Democracy," *Le Monde Diplomatique*. January 1991, reprinted in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 20 January 1991: 15.
- Gold, Herbert. *Best Nightmare on Earth: A Life in Haiti*. New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1991.
- Moïse, Claude. "Haiti's Long Unhappy Road to Democracy," *Peace and Security* 5, no. 4, Winter 1990/91: 10-11.

## FURTHER READING

- Abbott, Elizabeth. *Haiti: the Duvaliers and their Legacy*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988.
- Bellegarde-Smith, Patrick. *Haiti: the Breached Citadel*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
- English, E. Philip. *Canadian Development Assistance to Haiti: an Independent Study*. Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1984.
- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. *Haiti, State against Nation: the Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989.



### 23. HORN OF AFRICA: ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, THE SUDAN

#### *BACKGROUND*

For Ethiopia and Somalia, 1991 marked the first change in government in many years, bringing to a climax what have been lengthy and costly internal wars for both countries. For Sudan, virtually alone in its support of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, its internal problems, backing of Iraq and refusal to allow aid agencies to deliver food have exacerbated a food crisis of immense proportions.

In Ethiopia, three main rebel groups have been leading the civil war. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) has been fighting since 1961. Eritrea was under Italian colonial rule from 1889 until 1941 when it was taken over and administered by Britain. In contrast, Ethiopia was only under Italian colonial rule from 1935 to 1941. The two areas, therefore, developed very distinct identities up until World War II. In December 1950, UN Resolution 390A decided that Eritrea would be an autonomous territory, federated with Ethiopia. The British administration officially ended in 1952. However, in 1961, capping a long effort to take more control of Eritrea, Ethiopia simply annexed the area. The Eritrean people have been fighting the Ethiopian government for independence ever since. Eritrea provides Ethiopia with valuable access to the Red Sea, without which Ethiopia would be a landlocked country.

Two other rebel groups have been fighting since the mid-1970s. The Tigray People's Liberation Front is based in the province of Tigray and, prior to 1990, was staunchly Marxist in its ideology. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) is based in the south and east. Other groups also exist. While the TPLF and OLF have also espoused a desire for autonomy, their primary goal has been to topple the dictatorship of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. This goal was achieved in May 1991.

A variety of factors contributed to this outcome. The new superpower relationship meant a changed situation for the Ethiopian government. The Soviet Union ended its military aid to the country, and the US agreed in January 1991 to act as a mediator for peace talks between the government and the rebel governments. While the peace talks were being held in London, rebel groups achieved some important military gains. A loose coalition of the three main rebel groups under the title, Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) also contributed to their strength.

By April 1991, only one sea port remained in government hands and rebels were advancing towards the capital, Addis Ababa. Many countries, including Canada, advised their citizens to leave the country. On 21 May 1991, Colonel Mengistu, ruler of Ethiopia since 1977 when he killed his predecessor, left the country for Zimbabwe leaving Vice-President Lieutenant General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan and Prime Minister Tesfaye Dinka in charge. Upon Mengistu's departure, the Prime Minister contacted the US embassy to ask the US to request a ceasefire from the rebels who were then

within fifty miles of Addis Ababa. The rebels refused a ceasefire but did agree to permit the evacuation of thousands of Ethiopian Jews to Israel in a massive airlift operation.

In the final week of May, the rebels took control of Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, and Assab, the last port to remain in government hands. Successful rebel advances toward the capital occurred simultaneously with a round of peace talks in London. On 27 May, the acting President told the army to give up. Urged on by the US who sought to reduce chances of looting and rampaging, the rebel forces took full control of the capital the next day. The EPDRF formed a provisional government and stated its willingness to discuss the formation of a broader coalition and to hold elections within nine to twelve months. While agreeing to cooperate with the provisional government, the Eritrean rebels announced that they would form their own provisional government in Eritrea, pending a UN-sponsored referendum on Eritrean independence.

From 1 to 5 July, a conference involving all rebel troops was held in Addis Ababa. The aim of the conference was to work out election procedures for a Constituent Assembly which would then write a constitution. It was agreed that the question of Eritrean independence would not be dealt with at the conference. The TPLF has agreed to a UN referendum on Eritrean independence and the Eritrean leaders have agreed to wait for up to two years to hold the referendum in order to give the country time to stabilize. Famine continues to be a problem for Ethiopia and much-needed UN aid has been unable to be transported into the country because of the ongoing fighting. It is hoped that the end to fighting will open the way for aid to reach Ethiopian citizens.

### *Somalia*

Somalia was created out of two colonies, British and Italian, and achieved independence in 1960. Until this year, Somalia was ruled by President Mohammed Syad Barre who declared himself President for life in 1969. Full-scale civil war broke out in Somalia in 1988 after Somalia and Ethiopia signed a peace treaty re-establishing diplomatic relations, ending a ten-year conflict and providing for the withdrawal of troops from border areas. Three main rebel groups have fought the civil war: the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).

In August 1990, the three groups agreed to cooperate in order to overthrow the Barre regime. After a month of fighting within the capital, Mogadishu, on 28 January, the USC rebels took over the city and established a provisional government. Barre and his family were reported to have fled to the south and would possibly go on to Kenya. The provisional government, led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed promised free elections and called for a conference of national reconciliation to discuss

the country's future. However, the other rebel factions have refused to recognize the provisional government. As of April, the conference had been postponed indefinitely and fighting between rebel groups continued in various parts of the country, especially in the south where SPM forces were reported to be heading north towards Mogadishu.

In contrast to the situation in Ethiopia, neither superpower has offered help or been requested to help. But as is the case in Ethiopia, much of Somalia's population is in need of aid, and by 1990, it was estimated that some 400,000 refugees had fled to Ethiopia. The war in Somalia has been particularly brutal and wide-scale human rights abuses and random killings by both the rebels and the military have meant that many aid agencies have pulled their workers out of Somalia.

### *Sudan*

From 1899 to 1955, Sudan was administered by a Governor-General on behalf of Britain and Egypt. In spite of a democratic beginning, the differences between the Muslim Arabs in the north and the Christian and animist groups in the south, were too significant to support a successful transition. In 1958, the Army took over the government, dissolved the House of Representatives and suspended the constitution.

Since 1955, Sudan has been experiencing a civil war between the Muslim Arab north and the largely Christian south. Peace talks initiated in 1988 and early 1989 resulted in an agreement in March 1989. However, on 30 June 1989, the Sudanese army staged a coup, toppling Prime Minister Sadik el Mahdi in favour of Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) based in the south has continued to wage war against the government.

The ongoing war has contributed to famine and the displacement of civilians on a massive scale. In June 1990, CIDA estimated that 7,685,000 people in Sudan were threatened with famine. In southern Sudan, 250,000 people died of hunger and disease in 1988. International efforts to provide relief to the population have been caught in the crossfire between the two sides. The Sudanese government has refused to allow aid to be transported to areas where it is needed, and in September, the Sudanese armed forces bombed relief distribution centres in the south. Amnesty International has charged the Sudan government with genocide by starvation. The UN-sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan continues a tenuous effort to get aid to the area, but, of the estimated US \$12.8 million thought needed by the UN for basic programmes, only \$2.1 million had been received by November 1990.

*CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada is a major contributor of aid to the Horn of Africa region. On 20 August 1990, Canada made a further contribution of \$400,000 to support an airlift of emergency food supplies to Ethiopia. Since 1981, Canada has provided a total of \$470 million in aid to Ethiopia, \$36.6 million in this year alone.<sup>1</sup> In April 1990, Canada established a set of principles for humanitarian relief efforts. In 1990-1991, Canadian Government Food Aid to the Sudan totalled \$15 million. \$11,344 million in food aid has been approved for 1991-1992.

In his speech to the United Nations, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

...in the Horn of Africa, the cycle of conflict, poverty and starvation continues. While we can take pride in the way the UN and its agencies provided food to those in need, only a lasting and political solution will end the terrible curse of famine in that region.<sup>2</sup>

On 10 May 1991, the Minister for External Relations, Monique Landry welcomed the planned peace talks between the Ethiopian government and the rebel groups, noting that Canada has actively promoted this outcome. Ms. Landry stated that "Canada considers these talks crucial because the cycle of underdevelopment and famine cannot be broken without an end to the civil conflict."<sup>3</sup> Canada was active in international efforts to negotiate the re-opening of the port of Massawa in January and February 1991.

After President Mengistu left the country, but prior to the full takeover by the rebels, the Canadian government called for an immediate ceasefire and for progress at the peace talks in London. In a release from the Department of External Affairs, it was pointed out that the rebels had required that there be a change in government in order for the peace talks to be successful.

Canada hopes that the departure of former President Mengistu Haile Mariam and the readiness of the present Ethiopian government to work towards a transitional government will create the conditions for successful peace talks between the Government of Ethiopia and the rebel groups.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Minister for External Relations and International Development. "Canada Welcomes Ethiopian Peace Talks," *News Release*, no. 115, 10 May 1991.

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, no. 90/13, 26 September 1990: 3.

<sup>3</sup>"Canada Welcomes Ethiopian Peace Talks," *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada calls for Meaningful Talks in Ethiopia," *News Release*, no. 124, 23 May 1991.

The Minister for External Relations called on the rebel groups to re-open the "southern line" which had been closed because of fighting, to allow aid supplies to begin flowing again.<sup>5</sup>

A Canadian Press report in the *Globe and Mail* revealed that Canada had encouraged a member of Ethiopia's government to consider replacing President Mengistu in order to make way for democratic transition.<sup>6</sup> The information came from Mr. Kasa Kabebe who had been a member of President Mengistu's government and had taken part in the talks. Mr. Kasa left Ethiopia for Israel during the airlift of Ethiopian Jews.

Canada, in cooperation with the US, helped facilitate President Mengistu's departure to Zimbabwe by using its close relationship with the Zimbabwean government to ask and encourage it to accept the leader.<sup>7</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

In December, NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin noted that Oxfam Canada estimated that \$1.75 million in further aid was needed for Ethiopia and asked the Government whether they would commit that amount to Ethiopia. Then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, responded that a special three-party group of Members of Parliament would be going to Ethiopia and the Government would consider their recommendations when they returned.<sup>8</sup>

Ms. McLaughlin pursued the question and asked whether the Government would consider sending surplus Canadian grain to Ethiopia. The Minister for External Relations, Monique Landry responded. She pointed to the re-opening of the port of Massawa as a positive step forward which would allow supplies to enter the country and said:

We will also go on cooperating...with the international community and the Canadian NGOs through which most of our food aid reaches the Ethiopian people, to provide as much assistance as possible to the Ethiopians.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Warren Caragata. "Ottawa sought ouster of Mengistu," *Globe and Mail*. 30 May 1991: A8.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>*Commons Debates*. 19 December 1990: 16941-16942.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.: 16942.

Ms. McLaughlin continued to pursue the point:

My question is simple: Will the government give these [wheat] surpluses to the people who are now starving in Africa?<sup>10</sup>

In reply, Ms. Landry stated:

...to provide assistance and food to distressed people in Ethiopia the donor countries have to coordinate their efforts to make sure that food assistance does get to the people....We have assistance budgets and, ...we are prepared to buy the food and ship it to Ethiopia...the ongoing war often made it impossible for us to reach the people involved.... Our efforts have been successful in the case of the re-opening of the Massawa harbour. This amounts to a major victory for the international community, ...<sup>11</sup>

A parliamentary delegation went to Sudan and Ethiopia in January 1991 to investigate the food crisis and the prospects for peace in the region with a view to recommending appropriate Canadian responses. The delegation was led by David MacDonald (PC) and also involved Ross Reid (PC), Christine Stewart (Liberal), Stan Hovdebo (NDP) and Betty Plewes from the Canadian Council for International Cooperation. The delegation travelled within Ethiopia and Sudan, and interviewed officials and representatives of non-governmental organisations in both countries.

The delegation's report stated that "it is difficult to know what to recommend for the Sudan."<sup>12</sup> They noted that at least seven million people were considered to be at risk from famine and that there was a shortfall of at least 1.2 million tonnes of food. The report recommended that Canada take the lead within the donor group in order to explore ways of dealing with the situation. In addition:

There is real fear in many areas that the Sudanese government is willing to let is people starve. In addition, reports of the repeated violations of basic human rights and the number of people who have been detained or imprisoned without due process raise fundamental questions about national sovereignty and the responsibility of the international community. Canada should examine reports of the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Africa Watch on human rights violations and be prepared to raise these issues, including the denial of food, in the February meetings of the UN Commission on Human Rights and in other appropriate fora.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>*Report of the Parliamentary Delegation to Ethiopia and Sudan*. Ottawa, January 1991: 4.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

On Ethiopia, the report noted that Canada has given support to the four supply routes in Ethiopia and said that there was a need to establish a system of data collection, monitoring and famine prevention, since the UN cannot carry out these functions without the permission of the government. More particularly, the group called on Canada to play a role in facilitating the peace process by engaging in dialogue with all of the parties to the conflict in Ethiopia. This requires a change in policy or a clarification of existing policies. The jurisdictional division between External Affairs and CIDA on peace issues needs to be reviewed.<sup>14</sup>

Overall, the delegation concluded that Canada needs to develop a broad policy framework and evaluation procedures. As part of this process, Canada should seek to redefine humanitarian assistance to include famine prevention. Also, Canadian officials should be encouraged to engage in regular high-level discussions with parties to a conflict. To facilitate the policy process, the delegation recommends that an informal roundtable be established which brings together people working on the Horn of Africa with Canadian officials, non-governmental organisations and specialized institutions.

On 27 May 1991, Liberal member Sheila Finestone made a statement in the House of Commons applauding the successful airlift of Ethiopian Jews by Israel.

The importance of this undertaking at this time in the history of Israel, while coping with high unemployment and the integration of an overwhelming Russian immigration, is of particular importance.<sup>15</sup>

NDP member Svend Robinson made a statement calling for support for the right of Eritrea to define its own future. Mr. Robinson supported the right of the Eritrean people to have a free, fair and open referendum on their future and stated:

...obtaining a permanent solution to the problems of this region will require a peaceful settlement of the status of Eritrea that respects the wishes of the majority of the Eritrean people. I therefore urge the Canadian government to follow the example of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and other countries in upholding the right of the Eritrean people to define their own future.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.: 9.

<sup>15</sup>*Commons Debates*, 27 May 1991: 598.

<sup>16</sup>*Commons Debates*, 14 June 1991: 1733.

RECENT LITERATURE

Bechtold, Peter K. "More Turbulence in Sudan: A New Politics This Time?" *The Middle East Journal* 44, no. 4, Autumn 1990: 579-595.

Harbeson, John W. "The Horn of Africa: From Chaos, Political Renewal?" *Current History*, May 1991: 221-224.

Henze, Paul B. "Three Decades of Arms for the Horn of Africa: A Statistical Analysis," *Conflict* 10, no. 2, 1989: 135-172.

Olsen, Gorm Rye. "Domestic and International Causes of Instability in the Horn of Africa, with Special Emphasis on Ethiopia," *Cooperation and Conflict* 26, no. 1, 1991: 21-32.

FURTHER READING

Cliffe, Lionel. "Forging a Nation: The Eritrean Experience," *Third World Quarterly* 11, no. 4, October 1989: 131-147.

Delancey, Mark W. *Somalia*. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1988.

Harbeson, John W. *The Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State*. Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1988.

Helin, William H. et al. "Dossier: The Horn of Africa," *Refugees*, no. 72, February 1990: 19-37.

Holt, P.M. and M.W. Daly. *The History of Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present*. Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1979.

Laitin, David D. and Samatar, Said S. *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1987.

Sherman, Richard. *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980.

Woodward, Peter. *War -- or peace -- in north-east Africa?* London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1989.

### *BACKGROUND*

India and Pakistan were formed in 1947 when British colonial rule over the area ended. Since 1947, the two countries have fought over the area of Kashmir, a struggle that has included two full-scale wars. India controls two-thirds of the Kashmir area which consists of two states, Kashmir and Jammu. Pakistan controls one-third of the area, which is known as Azad (free) Kashmir. Pakistan believes that it should have been given control over the whole Kashmir area because the majority of its population is Muslim. Pakistan is a Muslim country and the majority of the population in India is Hindu. Kashmir is the only state in India which has a majority Muslim population, but there are some 100 million Muslims living in other parts of India.

After the first war in 1947-1948, a UN military observer group (UNMOGIP) was established to supervise the "line of control" through the disputed area. Canada has participated in this UN operation since it began in 1949.

During the mid-1980s, tensions between the two countries flared, resulting in a number of skirmishes along the border area in the Himalayan mountain region. In 1989, India and Pakistan discussed the possibility of withdrawing their troops from the Siachen glacier area to create a demilitarized zone. No final agreement was reached, however. During August 1990, tensions again flared up in this area. Pakistan claimed that on 12 August 1990, India used artillery and mortar fire in an attack on Pakistani positions in the Kel sector. India denied the attack, which came one day after the second round of talks on easing tensions between the two sides was completed. Later in August, India was reported to have sent twenty tanks and a number of troops to the frontier to bolster its positions in response to the Pakistani use of heavy artillery in the Kupwara area.

Within the Indian state of Kashmir, ten people were killed on 13 August when people celebrating Pakistan's independence day clashed with security forces. On 3 September, India's Parliament voted to extend direct federal rule over Kashmir. Direct federal rule in the state was instituted in early 1990 when the Indian government dissolved the state government.

Tensions between the two countries are also fuelled by the possibility that one or both could deploy nuclear weapons within a short period of time. The possibility that Pakistan may be developing nuclear weapons has been an issue of concern to the US for some time. Under US law, Pakistan may not receive US aid unless the President provides Congress with certification of the absence of nuclear devices. This certification was not given when it was required in October 1990, and as a result Pakistan will not receive an estimated \$564 million in US aid during 1991. In addition, the programme of military equipment cooperation between the US and Pakistan has been interrupted.

In June 1991, Pakistan called on the US, the Soviet Union and China to act as mediators with Pakistan and India in discussions on making South Asia nuclear-free. The US responded positively to the proposal. However, India rejected the proposal, maintaining its position against such regional pacts and calling instead for a nuclear-free world.

Both India and Pakistan have experienced a tumultuous year internally in 1990-1991. On 6 August 1990, Pakistan's President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and asked the leader of the Opposition, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to form a government. Prime Minister Bhutto was elected in 1988 after Pakistan's military leader, General Zia, was killed in a plane crash. She was the first woman to lead a Muslim government and represented the first democratically elected government in Pakistan after eleven years of military rule. Her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was deposed in a military coup in 1977 and was hanged in 1979. The dismissal of the Bhutto Government was justified on the basis of charges of corruption and loss of public faith. Elections were called for 24 October.

Three days before the election, a Pakistani court upheld the dismissal of the Bhutto Government. The court judgement outlined nine areas where it said that the Bhutto Government had not been working within the constitution and concurred with the need for elections. On 23 October, Benazir Bhutto led tens of thousands of supporters in a 136 kilometre protest march from Faisalabad to Lahore. In spite of this tremendous show of popular support, Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was defeated in the elections on 24 October. The PPP also lost in the provincial elections on 27 October. On 24 October, the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) won 105 of 206 seats while the PPP won only 45, down from the 93 they had won in the 1988 election. The IDA was also victorious in the provincial elections winning 208 of 234 seats. On 6 November 1990, Nawaz Sharif became the new Prime Minister of Pakistan.

In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) withdrew its support from the coalition government led by prime Minister V.P. Singh, prompting a parliamentary crisis for the Singh government which needed the support of the BJP in order to maintain its coalition government. The BJP withdrew its support after the arrest of its leader Lal Krishnan Advani and large numbers of his supporters. Advani was ordered arrested by Prime Minister Singh in an effort to halt the BJP's plans to build a Hindu temple on a site of a Muslim mosque. The BJP, a Hindu revivalist party, has gained tremendously in popularity since it took up the issue of the Mosque site. The Babri Masjid mosque was built in 1528. However, Hindus believe that it is the birthplace of the god Rama. The BJP has supported and encouraged a drive to tear down the mosque.

Astrologists determined that 9:44 a.m. on 30 October 1990 was an appropriate date for the destruction of the Mosque. On that day, approximately 15,000 Hindu pilgrims stormed the mosque

in an effort to tear it down. In the resulting confrontation, security forces opened fire on the crowd and used tear gas in an effort to stop the push to the mosque. The incident prompted further clashes around the country and 170 people were reported to have died in the first eight days after the crisis.

In the wake of the crisis at the mosque and the withdrawal of BJP support, sixty-eight members of Prime Minister Singh's own party, the Janata Dal, formed their own faction of the Janata Dal party. On 7 November, Prime Minister Singh lost a vote of confidence in the Indian Parliament and resigned. His resignation and the split in the Janata Dal party meant that the Congress (I) Party led by Rajiv Gandhi was in a position to determine the new government. The Congress (I) Party chose to support Chandra Shekhar and the party that had splintered from the original Janata Dal. On 21 November, Chandra Shekhar was named Prime Minister of India. The new government was short-lived however, and in early March 1991, Chandra Shekhar resigned. Elections were planned for May.

Indian national elections were disrupted when, on 22 May 1991, the leader of the Congress (I) Party, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated, reportedly by a supporter of Tamil activists seeking a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. The Congress (I) Party chose Narasimha Rao as its new leader. The elections continued on 12 and 15 June 1991.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

On 31 July 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark expressed concern about the developments in Kashmir, in particular the implementation of the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act to an area twenty kilometres wide along the Line of Control. The Act gives police above a certain level authority to shoot citizens violating a ban on assembly, or engaging in a breach of public order. While recognizing the need for civil stability, Mr. Clark encouraged Pakistan and India to pursue peaceful measures to resolve their difficulties.

Canada has consistently urged India and Pakistan to exercise moderation and restraint on the issue of Kashmir to avoid the risk of miscalculation or accident that could lead to a military clash.<sup>1</sup>

A Canadian observer was present to monitor the tribunal hearings on the question of the dismissal of the Bhutto Government in Pakistan. The Honourable Ronald Atkey, an expert on

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Concerned About Developments in Kashmir," *News Release*, no. 160, 31 July 1990.

constitutional law, went to Pakistan in late October to observe the process.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Atkey, along with three other Canadian observers, was also present during the Pakistani elections. The other three Canadians were MP Allan Koury of Quebec, MP Charles-Eugene Marin, also of Quebec and Jess Flis, an MP from Ontario. The Canadian observers went to Pakistan after a request from the Pakistani government.

The Canadian Government reacted with shock and regret to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall rose in the House of Commons and stated:

I express the profound hope of the Prime Minister and of this government that this event will not be allowed to interfere with the democratic process at this very sensitive time during this very important election to India and to those of us who have an interest in democracy and the development of democracy in India. I know I speak for all Canadians in deploring this senseless violence and in extending condolences to the bereaved family.<sup>3</sup>

Barbara McDougall attended the funeral of Rajiv Gandhi on behalf of the Canadian government.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Opposition party members also spoke of the assassination in the House of Commons. Liberal External Affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy, NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin and Bloc Québécois member Jean Lapierre all joined the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs in expressing their sympathy with the Gandhi family and India.<sup>4</sup>

Progressive Conservative member Doug Fee stated that the Gandhi assassination should serve as a reminder to Canadians that they should be grateful for their society.

Our hearts and prayers go out to the people of India, and especially the family of Mr. Gandhi. At the same time we should offer a prayer of thanks for the privilege of living in Canada and serving in a tolerant, open, caring society where violence is not acceptable as a means to achieve political ends.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Honourable Ronald G. Atkey to Observe Pakistan Tribunals," *News Release*, no. 242, 22 October 1990.

<sup>3</sup>*Commons Debates*. 21 May 1991: 342.

<sup>4</sup>*Commons Debates*. 21 May 1991: 342-343.

<sup>5</sup>*Commons Debates*. 22 May, 1991: 375.

Liberal member Shirley Maheu brought to the attention of the House of Commons, the anniversary of the storming of the Gold Temple in Amritsar.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>*Commons Debates*, 12 June 1991: 1523.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. "Indian Naval Buildup and Southeast Asian Security: a Pakistani View," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 13, no. 1, June 1991: 86-102.
- Ganguly, Sumit. "Avoiding war in Kashmir," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 5, Winter 1990-1991: 57-73.
- . "Deterrence failure revisited: the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 4, December 1990: 77-93.
- Harrison, Selig S. "Showdown in Kashmir," *Peace and Security* 5, no. 3, Autumn 1990:8-9.
- Naidu, G.V.C. "The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 13, no. 1, June 1991:72-85.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. "Pakistan-India relations in the Eighties," *Regional Studies* 8, no. 3, Summer 1990: 3-31.

FURTHER READING

- Cohen, Stephen Philip, ed. *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
- Seth, S.P. "The Indo-Pak Nuclear Duet and the United States," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 7, July 1988: 711-728.
- Wirsing, Robert G. "The Siachen Glacier Dispute-II: The Domestic Political Dimension," *Strategic Studies* 11, no. 3, Spring 1988: 83-97.
- . "The Siachen Glacier Dispute-III: The Strategic Dimension," *Strategic Studies* 12, no. 1, Fall 1988: 38-54.

CROSS REFERENCES

Non-Proliferation Treaty

## 25. ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

### *BACKGROUND*

While the intifada continued and entered its fourth year, events in Israel and the Occupied Territories during 1990-1991 were dominated by events at Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the Persian Gulf War and diplomatic efforts to establish an agreement to convene a Middle East peace conference.

Temple Mount, a holy place for both Muslims and Jews, was the site of a confrontation between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli police on 8 October 1990, resulting in seventeen Palestinian deaths. Temple Mount is the site of the Al Aksa mosque, the holiest shrine for Islam after Mecca and Medina. According to Islam, this is where Mohammed flew to heaven on his winged horse. It is also the location of two holy sites for Judaism, the first and second temples of Solomon and Herod.

Differing accounts of the events were given after the incident. Reports from various investigations into the incident outline the following sequence of events. The Supreme Islamic Council called on supporters to go to the Al Aksa mosque after hearing reports that the Temple Mount Faithful, a small Jewish group which advocates tearing down the mosque and replacing it with a Jewish temple, would try to lay a cornerstone at the mosque. The Temple Mount Faithful have proclaimed their intent to do this during the Jewish holiday of Succoth for eight consecutive years, but have been blocked by Israeli authorities. Palestinians carried rocks and sticks with them to the compound in order to defend the mosque.

At the same time, Jewish worshippers had gathered below the mosque compound, at the Western Wall to celebrate the Succoth. At some point, the Palestinians began throwing rocks over the wall onto the Jewish worshippers. According to Palestinians, they did not begin throwing rocks until after the police began storming the compound. The Israeli police maintain that the Palestinians began three concurrent assaults on the Jewish worshippers before they began shooting. In the event, after using tear gas and rubber bullets the Israeli police forced their way into the compound and opened fire on the Palestinians with live ammunition. Seventeen Palestinians were killed and approximately one hundred and forty wounded. Police also arrested approximately one hundred Palestinians.

The incident received widespread international condemnation. The next day, on 9 October, the US asked the United Nations (UN) Security Council to consider a resolution which would condemn Israel's excessive use of force and support a mission by the Secretary-General to investigate. The US effort to get a Security Council resolution was linked to its need to preserve support from Arab nations for the coalition against Iraq. After considerable diplomatic effort, a resolution was developed which condemned the acts of violence committed by Israeli security forces, called on Israel to abide by its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and requested that the

Secretary-General send a mission to the region and submit a report to the Security Council before the end of October. Resolution 672 was passed on 12 October. The US vote in favour of the resolution was a marked departure from its past practice of vetoing Security Council resolutions that criticized Israel.

The Israeli government appointed its own commission to investigate the incident on 10 October. On 14 October, the Israeli cabinet denounced the UN resolution and stated that it would not accept a UN investigating team. Later that day, the cabinet decided to increase Jewish settlements in east Jerusalem, a decision which was interpreted as an act of defiance against the US and the UN.

In the two weeks following the Temple Mount incident, Palestinians undertook reprisal attacks against Jews which in turn prompted Jewish reprisals. In one incident, on 21 October, a Palestinian stabbed three Jewish citizens to death. On 23 October, in response to the series of attacks, the Israeli Defence Minister ordered the Occupied Territories sealed. Palestinian residents were banned from entering Israel and those staying in Israel were ordered to return home. Since large numbers of Palestinians work in Israel, this placed a strain on the workers who were unable to go to work and the employers who found themselves without staff.

The next day, on 24 October, the UN Security Council passed a second resolution (Resolution 673) deploring Israel's refusal to cooperate with the UN investigation and requesting that it reconsider its decision. Israel again refused to accept the UN mission. On 26 October, the report of the Israeli commission looking into the incident was released. The report was critical of the lack of preparedness of the police but said that the officers involved in the shooting were blameless and that the use of live ammunition was justified. Affirming reports that had surfaced in the aftermath, the commission confirmed that Jewish worshippers were long out of range of the Palestinian rock throwers before the police opened fire. Israel announced that it would submit a copy of the report to the Security Council. Two days later, on 28 October, Israel began re-admitting Palestinians from the Occupied Territories into Israel although the cabinet toughened restrictions on who could enter.

The Secretary-General's report, concluded without the cooperation of the Israeli government, was submitted to the Security Council on 1 November. *Inter alia*, the report recommended that a meeting of the Fourth Geneva Convention be convened to discuss ways of giving greater protection to the Palestinians.

In the meantime, sporadic incidents of violence between Palestinians and Jews continued. On the weekend of 3 November, Palestinians protesting the prison death of a Palestinian, clashed with Israeli security forces. One hundred and fifty Palestinians were estimated to have been wounded and one Palestinian died in the violence.

At the United Nations, a vote on a Security Council resolution put forward by the non-aligned states, advocating a Middle East peace conference and providing for increased UN protection for Palestinians, was delayed three times to allow negotiations on the wording in order to avoid a US veto. A US veto would have been construed as a blow to the Persian Gulf coalition at a time when the Security Council was voting in favour of the use of force in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, a positive vote on the resolution as it stood would signal declining US support for Israel.

On 14 December, three Israeli workers were killed by Palestinians in an aluminum factory. An Islamic group claimed responsibility for the killings and in response, Israel announced on 16 December, that it was planning to deport four Gaza Strip citizens who are members of the same group. The policy of deportation has long been condemned by the US. In response to the Israeli announcement, the US decided to go ahead and vote in favour of the UN Security Council resolution.

Resolution 681 was passed on 20 December 1990. It deplored the Israeli decision to resume deportations and urged Israel to accept the *de jure* applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to the Occupied Territories. The resolution also called on the high contracting parties to the Convention to ensure that Israel respect its obligations, and asked the Secretary-General to develop his idea of a meeting of the parties to discuss possible action. The Secretary-General was further requested to continue monitoring the situation in the Occupied Territories. The resolution made no mention of a Middle East peace conference, but the president of the Council read a non-binding statement at the time which supported a conference.

On 16 January 1991, the Persian Gulf War began (see Chapter 29). Almost immediately, Iraq began firing SCUD missiles at Israel. In response to US requests and in recognition of the need to keep the Persian Gulf War limited, Israel refrained from responding to the missile attacks. A number of the missiles were intercepted by Patriot missiles and others fell short of their targets. In the end, none of the missiles contained chemical or biological warheads. However, the entire population had been given gas masks, and throughout this period, Israel remained in a situation of high alert. In order to ensure security, on 17 January, Israel imposed a strict curfew on the Occupied Territories easing it for a few hours at a time in different areas to allow for food purchases.

Israel also came under rocket fire at the end of January from Palestinians based in southern Lebanon who said they were acting on behalf of Iraq. Israel responded to the attacks and the two sides exchanged rocket and artillery fire for a few days before the PLO announced on 4 February that it would cease the attacks.

The Persian Gulf crisis prompted renewed and intensified efforts on Middle East peace. As early as September, both the US and the Soviet Union, in discussions with Israel, spoke of the need to develop

a credible peace process. With the end of the war, efforts to put a Middle East peace process in place intensified. On 7 March, US Secretary of State James Baker, began what was to be the first of many trips to the Middle East to discuss a US peace proposal. The US plan was based on a two-track approach which dealt with the disputes between Israel and its neighbours and broader regional questions. The US initiative was supported by the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates), Egypt and Syria.

The Israeli cabinet reaffirmed its support for Prime Minister Shamir's peace plan of May 1989 and on 20 March, emphasizing Israel's commitment to keeping the Golan Heights, Israel's Housing Minister announced that they would seek to double the Jewish population of the Golan Heights. More movement of Jewish settlers into the West Bank during April and an earlier decision to deport four Palestinians continued to make US-Israel discussion difficult. Although there were some moves forward, including an agreement in principle by Israel to attend a regional peace meeting sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union, by the end of April, the US was unable to get agreement on its specific proposals from the two key players, Israel and Syria, and Baker returned from his third tour of the region planning to reassess the situation.

On the eve of Baker's fourth trip to the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) issued a statement in which it outlined its willingness to participate in an international peace conference as an observer (through its Secretary-General) and to participate in any meeting of regional states as individual states. This statement was considered a strong step forward and Baker hoped that it would create momentum for his discussions with Syria and Israel. However, the two states refused the compromise plan offered by Baker and remained adamant on two key issues. Syria wanted the UN to play a key role in any peace conference and felt that the conference should exist as a continuing enterprise in order to keep the process moving. Israel was against any UN role and was only willing to attend the conference as a one time event which would give way immediately to direct talks among the parties.

On 3 June, President Bush sent letters to the Israeli Prime Minister and to the President of Syria outlining a compromise plan and urging flexibility. Bush proposed that a single UN observer be allowed to attend but not be allowed to actively participate. On the question of duration, provision could be made for the conference to reconvene every six months in order to hear progress reports, providing all parties agree to the re-convening. The compromise proposal was rejected by Israel later that week. In spite of this setback, the US continued in its efforts. On 1 July, Bush hinted that unless Syria and Israel were more receptive to ideas, the US might go ahead and issue invitations to a conference, making it clear which states were throwing up obstacles to the process.

In a surprise move, on 14 July, Syria sent a letter of response to the Bush letter accepting the compromise without any additional conditions. This announcement was welcomed as an extremely promising development by the US and was also approved by the Arab states and the PLO. The next day, Israel announced that it would not change its position until it had full details of the Syrian position.

These events occurred as the G7 summit meeting took place in London. The G7 Communique, issued on 16 July, confirmed the summit members' support for the US peace initiative and urged flexibility by all parties. As a confidence-building measure, the G7 advocated that the Arab boycott of companies doing business with Israel be suspended and that Israel agree to suspend its settlements in the Occupied Territories (this measure had been advocated by Baker early on in the process).

On 19 July, Baker met with the Syrian President and confirmed the Syrian commitment to a meeting. The two agreed that the UN observer could take notes and communicate with participants but would not have a role beyond that. Israel announced on 22 July that it would reconsider its position in view of the Syrian shift. On 24 July, after having spoken of the Syrian move as equivalent to the Egyptian shift in position in 1977 which led to a peace accord, Israel announced that it would agree to the conference, on the assumption that its conditions for Palestinian representation would be accepted. Israel wants Palestinian representatives to be from the Occupied Territories and to have no overt connections to the PLO. Having achieved agreement in principle, the question of Palestinian participation was left for later discussion and the US put its high-level process on hold for August.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canadian support for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Arab dispute has always been grounded in a need to base any solution on UN Resolution 242, passed in November 1967, which outlines the principles for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and Resolution 338, passed in October 1973, which calls for a ceasefire and requires states to begin peace negotiations based on Resolution 242, immediately. In a speech to the UN General Assembly, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark reaffirmed Canada's position:

A just and lasting negotiated solution based on the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to self-determination, is more vital than ever.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark to the Forty-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, 26 September 1990: 3.

After the killings at Temple Mount, Mr. Clark issued a statement calling for restraint and expressing "grave reservations" about the degree of force used by Israeli authorities.

Canadians were shocked and horrified by the eruption of violence in Old Jerusalem today....The tragic events of today highlight the urgent need for a resolution to the Palestinian question. The international community must dedicate itself to finding a just and lasting settlement, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Clark's comments were echoed at the UN Security Council by Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier. Ambassador Fortier condemned the recent Israeli demolition of Palestinian housing in the Gaza strip, as well as the killing of an Israeli soldier which had prompted the retaliation.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Clark later welcomed the unanimous Security Council adoption of Resolution 672 dealing with the Temple Mount incident.<sup>4</sup>

When debate on the Palestinian question began in the Security Council in November, Ambassador Fortier, in speaking to the press, spoke of the need to find an adequate way of protecting the Palestinians, noting that the subject "simply cries out for a solution," and that "[t]he ball is in the Security Council's court. We must decide how to ensure protection for the Palestinians in the future."<sup>5</sup>

Secretary of State Clark reiterated these comments as he began a trip to the Middle East for consultations. On 27 November 1990, Clark met with both Israeli and Palestinian leaders. In comments to the press, Clark made clear that there should be no linkage between the Occupied Territories and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. On the other hand, Clark maintained that the question of a Palestinian homeland would need to be dealt with after the Persian Gulf crisis.<sup>6</sup>

Back in Canada, speaking to Parliament about the Persian Gulf crisis, Clark discussed the possibility that the crisis may lead to efforts to resolve other Middle East problems.

We have of late witnessed a pattern of successes within the Security Council in addressing regional issues, not just in the Middle East, but also ...elsewhere. If that pattern continues, ...if we can maintain the strength of the United Nations...then a just

---

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "SSEA Calls for Restraint in Aftermath of Violence in Jerusalem," *News Release*, no. 234, 8 October 1990.

<sup>3</sup>UN Security Council. *Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Forth-Sixth Meeting*. S/PV. 2946, 8 October 1990: 48.

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Welcomes Unanimity of Security Council Decision," *News Release*, no. 238, 13 October 1990.

<sup>5</sup>O. Ward. "UN Debates moves to protect Palestinians," *Toronto Star*, 8 November 1990: A16.

<sup>6</sup>P. Koring. "Issue of Palestinian homeland must be resolved, Clark says," *The Globe and Mail*, 27 November 1990: 9.

lasting and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, which Canada views as necessary and urgent, may at last be possible. This is a matter that can only be addressed, however, separately from the current crisis.<sup>7</sup>

A number of resolutions were adopted by the UN General Assembly in its 45th Session relating to Israel and the Occupied Territories. Resolution 45/73, *United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*, was an omnibus resolution with eleven parts. Canada abstained from parts G and H of the resolution. Part G reaffirmed the inalienable right of displaced inhabitants to return to their homeland and part H dealt with the property rights of Palestinian Arabs. Canada voted against part 45/73 F which dealt with the provision of relief to Palestinian refugees by the UN Relief and Works Agency. Canada voted in favour of all other elements of the resolution. Canada registered a positive vote on all elements of Resolution 45/74,<sup>8</sup> except for part A. Canada abstained from this element of the resolution which condemned a long list of Israeli actions and practices. Canada also voted in favour of Resolution 45/69 which dealt with the intifada and, *inter alia*, called for Israel to abide by the 1949 Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and reaffirmed that the occupation by Israel of Palestinian territory since 1967 in no way changed the status of the territories.

Speaking to the Security Council after the adoption of Resolution 681 on 20 December, Ambassador Fortier supported the statement made by the President of the Security Council on a Middle East peace conference and stated Canada's belief that Resolution 681 would make a significant contribution to the peace process. On behalf of Canada, Ambassador Fortier joined in deploring the recent Israeli deportation decision and said that Canada supports the possible use of the Fourth Geneva Convention and believes that the question must be examined carefully.

Canada believes that the international community has a role to play in protecting the rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories. The resolution responds to this concern by urging the monitoring and observing of the situation, with the help of the United Nations personnel stationed in the region. This should contribute to enhancing the protection of the Palestinians.<sup>9</sup>

On 18 January 1991, after the first missile attack on Israel by Iraq, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote to Prime Minister Shamir:

---

<sup>7</sup>*Commons Debates*. 28 November 1990: 15863.

<sup>8</sup>United Nations General Assembly. *Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories*, Resolution 45/74, 11 December 1990.

<sup>9</sup>United Nations Security Council. *Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventieth Meeting*. S/PV.2970, Part II: 23.

You may be aware that I have strongly condemned Saddam Hussein's missile attack on your country tonight. ...Canada deplores this criminal and unprovoked act.<sup>10</sup>

Canada commended Israel, throughout the war, on its restraint in responding to the missile attacks. Canada also provided \$500,000 in aid to Israel through the Canadian Red Cross, to assist in providing medical supplies, temporary housing and housing repair. Canada also sent 10,000 gas masks to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza region.

In responding to questions after a speech to the Rotary Club, Mr. Clark expressed sympathy with Palestinian frustration with the UN process.

I can understand why Palestinians would accuse the world of acting with a double standard when it is prepared to act as decisively as it has with respect to Iraq and Kuwait and has been unable for so long to deal with Resolution 242...<sup>11</sup>

In a later speech, Clark outlined Canada's position on a possible search for a regional peace plan in the aftermath of the Gulf War:

No regional security plan can expect to succeed unless it is firmly determined to make progress toward a comprehensive, lasting, negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict, including the Palestinian question. Such a negotiated settlement must be based on Resolutions 242 and 338...even before the Gulf War, Canada let it be known that it favoured holding an international conference. ...A properly structured conference with reasonable chances of success could indeed be useful and contribute to the peace process.<sup>12</sup>

The question of Palestinian representation in the peace process and the credibility of the PLO was discussed considerably by Joe Clark. On his arrival in the Middle East at the beginning of a post-war tour of the region, Mr. Clark indicated to reporters that Canada still saw the PLO as an important actor although "its authority has been diminished" by the attitude it took in the war. Clark said that Canadian officials had expressed concern about the PLO stance during the war to PLO officials.<sup>13</sup> These comments prompted speculation about a possible rift in the Government view when Prime Minister Mulroney spoke in the House of Commons on the same day. In response to a question, Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

---

<sup>10</sup>Office of the Prime Minister. *Release*, 18 January 1991.

<sup>11</sup>P. Priegert. "I understand Palestinian frustration with UN: Clark," *The Gazette*, 5 February 1991: 4.

<sup>12</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period," *Statement*, 91/10, 8 February 1991: 6.

<sup>13</sup>P. Watson. "PLO must play role in talks, Clark says," *Toronto Star*, 7 March 1991: A18.

Anyone who has looked at the position of the current leadership of the PLO, particularly in its support of Saddam Hussein, and their cheering of Scud missiles as they rained on Israel, would have to conclude that the PLO and its leader Arafat have been substantially, if not completely, discredited.<sup>14</sup>

Prime Minister Mulroney and Secretary of State Clark insisted that no contradiction existed. In a press interview in Syria, Mr. Clark outlined the problems in dealing with the question of Palestinian representation, noting that the key difficulty was in ensuring that the Palestinians are represented by a group they consider legitimate, which at the same time has the ability to make commitments on behalf of Palestinians that other negotiators can expect to be honoured.<sup>15</sup> Prime Minister Mulroney reiterated his earlier comments about the PLO's credibility in a meeting with US President George Bush in March. Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

Canada has always taken the position that there has to be a solution to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians. And it is up to the Palestinian people to choose their representatives. And its not up to Canada or the United States or, I assume, anyone else to impose choices on them.<sup>16</sup>

On 15 March, Mr. Clark discussed his trip to the Middle East in a statement to the House of Commons. In his discussion, Mr. Clark again returned to the question of Palestinian representation in the peace process. He stated:

...Canada can only agree with the Secretary-General of the United Nations; the Palestinians should be represented by the organizations or representatives they choose. Our distaste for the support for Saddam Hussein by the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization should not disqualify Palestinians from coming to their own conclusions...<sup>17</sup>

Mr. Clark went on to say that he had been encouraged in his meetings with leaders in the Middle East by their desire for a durable peace.

They are however not yet ready to move beyond the liberation of Kuwait to address the age-old problems on which they have been so long divided, except with wariness and with distrust. But move they must.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>*Commons Debates*. 7 March 1991: 18173.

<sup>15</sup>R. Gwyn. "Clark offers deft analysis of PLO crisis," *Toronto Star*, 12 March 1991: A14.

<sup>16</sup>United States Embassy (text of joint Bush-Mulroney press conference in Ottawa). "US Arms Sales to Israel, Saudi Arabia to Continue," *Text*, 91-19, 15 March 1991: 5.

<sup>17</sup>*Commons Debates*. 15 March 1991: 18536.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid*.

Mr. Clark engaged in a more detailed discussion of meetings with Israeli and Palestinian leaders in his presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) on 21 March 1991. Mr. Clark expressed his view that a key to peace was the dual recognition of the legitimate status of Israel as a state and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. He said that in speaking with Prime Minister Shamir and Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy he emphasized Canada's strong friendship with Israel, but also emphasized that a window of opportunity existed for peace that must be seized.

Israel has always demonstrated itself as a moral force, ...I emphasized to the leaders of Israel that the same sort of moral courage must now be demonstrated in the search for peace. ...I encouraged them, as I did the other leaders with whom I met...to envisage action on confidence-building measures that could contribute to an atmosphere conducive to further progress...<sup>19</sup>

One confidence-building measure that Israel could consider was to lift restrictions on the Occupied Territories and re-open the universities, while the Palestinians could give a clear reaffirmation of their recognition of Israel. Mr. Clark also indicated that while Canada supported the idea of an international peace conference on the Middle East, any negotiating forum which might be successful in achieving a solution based on 242 and 338 would be acceptable.

Too often in the past there has been the tendency to expect the other side to make the first move. ...If we permit the region to lock itself into such an inertia in the future, we will be sowing the seeds for future conflict, not future peace. Time is of the essence. I genuinely believe this conflict has opened a window of opportunity, [but]...it can not be held open forever. The next six months -- at most, the next year -- will be a critical time in determining whether the war with Iraq will go down in history as the key that opened a whole new era in the Middle East, or simply one more conflict in a tragic series of conflicts.<sup>20</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

MPs made a variety of statements in the House of Commons, condemning the Israeli actions at Temple Mount and expressing support for the peace process.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup>Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (hereafter SCEAIT). *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 105, 21 March 1991: 26.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*: 27.

<sup>21</sup>*Commons Debates*, 10 October 1990: 13976. *Commons Debates*, 15 October 1990: 14134. *Commons Debates*, 29 October 1990: 14799. *Commons Debates*, 31 October 1990: 14923. *Commons Debates*, 12 March 1991: 18346, 18347. *Commons Debates*, 13 March 1991: 18393.

During the hearing in which Joe Clark gave an account of his trip to the Middle East, NDP member Svend Robinson pushed the question of getting the peace process activated.

I have no reason to believe there is going to be any progress on the Palestinian question. But assuming that time goes by, at what point is our government prepared to say that we must move ahead, ...to ensure that pressure is brought to bear on Israel, ... and also on other states...<sup>22</sup>

Mr. Clark responded that there were no guarantees and indicated that there was a sharp debate in Israel about the best future path to follow. He also said:

You ask when Canada is going to seek more rigorous means to change behaviour in the region. Not immediately, if ever, because I think there is a possibility now for persuasion to work. ...Frankly, I think the role of Canada in this regard is to try to keep lines open as much as we can, with people and groups and countries with whom others will not deal or cannot deal at the moment.<sup>23</sup>

During this hearing, MPs entered into a wide-ranging discussion of issues relating to Middle East peace and the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Some of the issues raised included future Canadian policy, Canadian initiatives and the role of the UN.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup>SCEAIT. *Minutes of Proceedings*, op. cit.: 34.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.: 35-36.

<sup>24</sup>For the full discussion, see: SCEAIT. *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 105, 21 March 1991.

# RECENT LITERATURE

- Antonius, Rachad et Pierre Beaudet, eds. *Le développement en Palestine*. Centre d'études arabes pour le développement (Canada) Inc., Novembre 1990.
- Chazan, Naomi. *Negotiating the Non-Negotiable: Jerusalem in the Framework of an Israeli-Palestinian Settlement*. Occasional Paper no. 7. Cambridge, Mass.: International Security Studies Program. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 1991.
- Cobban, Helena. *The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict*. The Washington Papers 149. Washington D.C.: Praeger with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991.
- Fitzgerald, Garret. *The Israeli-Palestinian Issue*. The Triangle Papers, no. 38. New York: The Trilateral Commission, May 1990.
- Gal-Or, Noemi. "A Chance for an Israeli-Palestinian Rapprochement," *Middle East Focus* 13, no. 2. Summer 1991.
- Indyk, Martin. "Peace without the PLO," *Foreign Policy*, no. 83, Summer 1991: 30-38.
- Matthews, Robert O. and Charles Pentland, eds. *International Journal* 45, no. 9, Summer 1990 (entire issue: Israel and the Arabs since the Intifada).
- Rubin, Barry. "Reshaping the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 3, Summer 1990: 131-146.
- Segal, Jerome M. "The Gulf War and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *World Policy Journal* 8, no. 2. Spring 1991: 351-364.
- US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Developments in the West Bank and Gaza, May 1990*. Hearing, 9 May 1990. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990.

# FURTHER READING

- Aruri, Naseer, ed. *Occupation: Israel over Palestine*. London: Zed Books, 1984.
- Lockman, Zachary and Joel Beinin, eds. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation*. Toronto: Between The Lines, 1989.
- Mendelsohn, Everett. *A Compassionate Peace: A Future for Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East*. Toronto: Collins Publishers, 1989.
- Muslih, Muhammad Y. *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Norton, Augustus Richard and Martin H. Greenberg, eds. *The International Relations of the Palestinian Liberation Organization*. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press/Scholarly Book Services, 1990.
- Peretz, Con. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.
- Taras, David and David H. Goldberg, eds. *The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989.

*CROSS REFERENCES*

The Persian Gulf Crisis  
Middle East Arms Control



## BACKGROUND

Discussions between North and South Korea on joint efforts and possible reunification experienced both progress and setbacks during 1990 and early 1991. Korea has been partitioned into north and south since 1945. An earlier effort at negotiating reunification took place between 1976-1981, when three international conferences were unsuccessful in making any progress on the question.

The discussions between the two sides are the result of an exchange of proposals which began in 1988. On 26 July 1990, after some eighteen months of difficult negotiations, representatives from the two countries signed an agreement which provided for the first ever meetings between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. The agreement called for two sets of meetings, the first in Seoul, the South Korean capital, from 4 to 7 September, and the second in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, from 16 to 19 October 1990.

In the interim, a proposed opening of the border between North and South, at Panmunjom, from 13 to 18 August to allow free travel, did not materialize. Early in July 1990, North Korea had announced that it would open its half of Panmunjom, a city straddling the border, on 15 August, the Korean national celebration of independence from Japan. South Korea had responded positively and a pan-Korean festival had been planned. However, all plans fell through and on 15 and 16 August, there were violent confrontations between students and police in South Korea as students tried to make the trip to Panmunjom.

At the historic meetings in Seoul in September, it was clear that the two sides remained far apart on important issues. However, there was a general air of quiet optimism and cordiality. At the meetings, North Korea elaborated on previous proposals and presented a nine-point plan for military disarmament. The proposal included a call for the complete withdrawal of all US troops stationed in South Korea and an end to the annual joint US-South Korea military exercises. At present, the US maintains 43,000 troops in South Korea, although budgetary restrictions have prompted a US plan to reduce these troops by 10 to 12 percent. These moves would be a prelude to a three to four year period of overall reductions by both North and South resulting in both sides maintaining armed forces of about 100,000. Once arms control measures were in place, North Korea proposed that neutral troops could be deployed in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the border to oversee the process. North Korea also asked that South Korea give up its bid for a separate UN seat, and release three citizens jailed for unauthorized visits to North Korea as confidence-building measures.

In contrast, the South Korean approach was to emphasize non-military matters first. South Korea's Prime Minister called for a joint statement of intent which would, *inter alia*, recognize and

respect the two political systems, open the borders and call for an end to unnecessary international competition between the two. At the end of the two days of talks, the North Korean delegation was received by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo. President Roh proposed a summit meeting with his North Korean counterpart President Kim Il-Sung.

Although there was no final statement issued at the conclusion of the meetings, there was an agreement to meet again, and to establish a special committee to review each others' proposals regarding a seat at the United Nations. South Korea agreed to temporarily suspend its efforts to get its own seat. The question of a UN seat for one or both Koreas has been a long standing issue of concern. Both North and South Korea have observer status at the UN. South Korea has recently actively sought to win its own official seat at the UN. North Korea, however, has strongly opposed this position, claiming that a South Korean seat would formalize and perpetuate the countries' separation.

The general improvement in the state of relations between North and South Korea comes in the context of a changed atmosphere between East and West in the international arena. In particular, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the changes in Soviet foreign policy have left North Korea somewhat isolated in the world. As a result of these changes, both North and South have sought to encourage and develop new international ties. In the South Korean case, it has courted both China and the Soviet Union, previously traditional allies of North Korea, as part of its bid to secure a UN seat. On 30 September 1990, the Soviet Union established formal diplomatic relations with South Korea. In December, the South Korean President visited Moscow and pledged \$3 billion in economic assistance. Also in September, North Korea began discussions with Japan on normalizing relations. On 30 January 1991, Japan formally apologized for its period of colonial rule (1910-1945). However, these discussions stalemated in May over North Korea's refusal to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

The second set of prime ministerial meetings began on 16 October. While these meetings had been preceded by successful exchanges of musicians and athletes, the meetings themselves were less successful than those in September. Neither side made changes of substance in their position, and the mutual retrenchment led to an exchange of accusations about bad faith. A third set of meetings in December, in Seoul, were equally unproductive with the two sides stalemated on the question of a non-aggression pact, the North wanting a pact signed immediately, the South wanting such an agreement to be accompanied by confidence-building measures.

Another set of meetings was planned for February 1991 but these were cancelled by North Korea when it became clear that South Korea planned to proceed with its military exercises with the US. On the plus side, prior to the cancellation, the two sides had agreed to establish unified teams in

table tennis and soccer to compete internationally. In mid-July, North Korea called for the talks on unification to resume, and South Korea accepted the invitation.

On 28 May, in the face of a determined South Korean campaign to seek a UN seat, North Korea announced that it would seek its own UN seat, noting that it could not allow South Korea to be the only official representative of Korea at the UN.

Although North Korea has proposed that the Korean peninsula be declared a nuclear-weapon free zone and has stated that it will refrain from testing, producing, stockpiling or introducing nuclear weapons on its soil, in recent years, the possibility that North Korea may be developing a nuclear weapons capability has become an issue of international concern. South Korea will neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its soil, but it is widely thought that the US maintains some nuclear weapons there. North Korea is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but has refused to open up its facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea has said that it will sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA if the US will remove the threat to North Korea or give a formal guarantee that it will not launch a pre-emptive strike. In June, North Korea began formal discussions with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement but continued to tie its final acceptance of IAEA inspections to removal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea. The US refuses to link the status of its weapons to a commitment North Korea is required to make by virtue of its signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In South Korea, there were large-scale student protests during May and June, involving tens of thousands of students. Riot police have been out in response to the protests and many arrests have been made. The students were protesting the police beating to death of a student protester, and in later demonstrations called for the resignation of President Roh Tae Woo (whose cabinet has been plagued by scandals during 1991) and the withdrawal of US military forces from South Korea.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, visited South Korea for two days in late September. This was the first visit of a Canadian foreign minister since 1975. Mr. Clark held discussions with President Roh Tae Woo and South Korea's Foreign Minister Choi. Discussions focussed on international issues and Mr. Clark commended Korea for its support of the UN sanctions against Iraq.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Mr. Clark Concludes Talks in Korea," *News Release*, no. 208, 20 September 1990.

On 27 December 1990, Canada agreed to sell a second CANDU nuclear reactor to South Korea. Mr. Clark expressed his support for this proposed sale in his September visit.<sup>2</sup>

Canada has expressed concern about North Korea's position on the NPT Treaty. At the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT Treaty held in September 1990 (see Chapter 8), the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason stated:

...the obligation to conclude a...safeguards agreement within 18 months of NPT adherence is clear. All NPT parties should make every effort to respect this obligation. We have a special concern in this regard, however, that North Korea, a party with considerable nuclear activity, has not yet concluded its safeguards agreement. This is a particularly clear example of non-compliance which we hope can be resolved soon.<sup>3</sup>

In 1990, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, proposed that a dialogue on North Pacific security be initiated with a view to developing new consultative institutions which would facilitate increased security cooperation in the region. The Clark proposal envisaged a dialogue including Canada, China, Japan, the Soviet Union, the US and both North and South Korea.

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue during 1990-1991.

---

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations at Geneva. "Statement by Peggy Mason Ambassador for Disarmament to the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, August 24, 1990," Geneva, 24 August 1990: 5.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Borong, Zhou. "The Security Situation of the Korean Peninsula in Prospect," *International Strategic Studies*, no. 1, September 1990.
- Byong-moo, Hwang. "The Evolution of ROK-PRC Relations: Retrospects and Prospects," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 5, no. 1, Winter/Spring 1991: 24-48.
- Jong-chun, Baek. "North Korea's Military Process and the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 4, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1990: 311-343.
- Joo-hong, Nam. "US-ROK Security Relations in the 1990s: A Challenging Partnership," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 4, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1990: 243-255.
- Kwak, Tae-Hwan. "Military Capabilities of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study," *Asian Perspective* 14, no. 1, Spring-Summer 1990: 113-144.
- Mack, Andrew. *Nuclear Issues and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula*. Working Paper no. 96. Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australia National University, 1991.
- Perry, John Curtis. "Dateline North Korea: a Communist Holdout?" *Foreign Policy* 80, Fall 1990: 172-191.
- Plunk, Daryl M. "Recent Changes on the Korean Peninsula and US Policy Toward Pyongyang," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 5, no. 1, Winter/Spring 1991: 1-23.

## FURTHER READING

- Bognanno, Mario F. and Yang, Sung Chul. "Modeling Stalemate: The Case of North-South Korean Reunification Negotiations," *Asian Perspective* 13, no. 1, Spring-Summer 1989: 131-149.
- Bridges, Brian. *Korea and the West*. Chatham House Papers, no. 33. Royal Institute for International Affairs, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.
- Macdonald, Donald Stone. *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society*. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1988.
- . "Security in Northeast Asia: Two Koreas or One?" *Washington Quarterly* 12, no. 4, Autumn 1989: 139-153.
- Shin, Mungsoon, Brian L. Evans, Dae Ryun Chang, eds. *Partners in a Changing World: Korea and Canada in the Pacific Rim*. East and West Studies Series 16. Korea: The Institute of East and West Studies, 1990.

## CROSS REFERENCES

Non-Proliferation Treaty  
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones



*BACKGROUND*

Civil war began in Lebanon on 13 April 1975 when skirmishes between Palestinians and the Phalange, on the heels of clashes between citizens of Sidon and the Lebanese Army, sparked large scale fighting among various political groups which grew into full scale civil war. The war has resulted in many thousands of deaths among Lebanese civilians, led to the division of Beirut into two warring sectors, devastated a prosperous economy, generated large-scale migration and displacement of the population and has left Lebanon the victim of various power battles in the Middle East region.

Lebanon was under French control from 1920 to 1941 when Britain took over the area during World War II. At that time, by British and Free French agreement, Lebanon was made independent. In 1943, the first president was elected and a parliamentary system was established under a "National Pact." Under the covenant, religious sectors are given representation on the basis of their numerical strength. In addition, by tradition, the President has been a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem and the Speaker of the National Assembly a Shia Moslem. Over time the Moslem population has gained in numbers through immigration and a higher birthrate. As a result, discontent among the Moslem population, as well as other religious groups, has developed about what is perceived to be Maronite Christian domination of the political process. A sense of discontent was also generated by regional economic disparities within the country.

The civil war has been complicated by the presence in Lebanon of large number of Palestinian refugees and guerillas. The presence of the Palestinian guerillas has prompted two Israeli invasions of Lebanon, in 1978 and in 1982. Israel left Lebanon in 1985 but kept a strip of territory along the Lebanese border which, along with the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army, it continues to patrol. Israel maintains that it must keep this "security zone" in order to prevent attacks against its borders by guerillas based in southern Lebanon and in further efforts to counteract and pre-empt guerilla activity, Israel has launched a number of air attacks against guerilla targets in southern Lebanon. The war has been further complicated by splits within the Christian and Muslim organisations which have resulted in battles within Lebanon.

In 1990-1991, it appeared that the first real steps towards peace in Lebanon may have been taken. The seeds of this progress were set in October 1989 when Lebanese leaders, under the auspices of the Arab League, agreed to a peace plan which included changing the constitution to redistribute power among the religious groups. The peace plan, known as the Taif Accord, provided for a national unity cabinet including representatives of all groups, the creation of a unified army, and the dismantlement of the various militias in Lebanon. It also provided for the redeployment of Syrian

forces within Lebanon to be followed by an agreement between Lebanon and Syria as to the strength and duration of stay of the Syrian forces.

In spite of agreement from most key parties in Lebanon, implementation of the Accord was thwarted by a faction of the Lebanese Army, led by General Michel Aoun who refused to accept the Accord because it did not call for the complete withdrawal of Syrian forces. General Aoun also rejected the election of Elias Hrawi as President in November 1989. President Hrawi is a Maronite Christian with good relations with Syria.

During July 1990, fighting erupted between the Hizbollah (Party of God) and Amal fighters in the Iqlim al Toffah district. The Hizbollah were attempting to get to Nabatiye, near the Israeli security zone, but were stopped short of their goal after eight days of fighting. The struggle drew in elements of the Fatah, the mainstream group of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yassar Arafat, and was estimated to have involved some 5,000 combatants. One hundred and forty people were said to have been killed.

Fighting within Christian and Palestinian groups continued through August and September. At the end of August, a three month ceasefire which had ended three months of fighting between rival Christian factions over control of East Beirut, ended with mortar and tank battles. From 7 to 9 September, in the Ein Hilwe area, the Fatah group of the PLO fought a battle against a rival Palestinian group led by Abu Nidal, successfully ousting them from their positions. It was estimated that the three days of fighting resulted in seventy-eight deaths.

At the end of August, Lebanese President Hrawi met with Syrian President Assad to discuss Lebanon. The Syrian President pledged to give any assistance necessary to help the Lebanese government implement the Taif Accord and regain control of all of Lebanon. At the end of September, President Hrawi began a new effort to make the Taif Accord possible and instituted a blockade of the area in Christian east Beirut, controlled by General Aoun and his forces. On 10 October, when the blockade failed to oust General Aoun's forces, President Hrawi officially asked the Syrian government for help.

On 13 October, under siege by Lebanese troops supported by Syrian artillery and jet fighters General Aoun called on his army units to obey Lebanese Army commander Emil Lahoud (who was appointed by President Hrawi) and Aoun sought refuge in the French Embassy. Syrian forces bombed the Presidential palace in which Aoun had been hiding and took control of the palace by the next day. Aoun's removal opened the way for the disbanding of all of the militias in Beirut under the terms established in the Taif Accord. On 21 October 1990, Dany Chamoun, a prominent supporter of General Aoun was killed by masked gunmen in his home. His wife and two sons were also killed.

By the end of October the militia groups had all agreed to withdraw from Beirut and to the plan for a unified national army. The Lebanese Cabinet issued an order calling for the withdrawal process to begin on 10 November and end by 19 November. A last minute problem arose when the Christian Lebanese forces led by Geagea refused to leave until the government agreed to hand over their offices in Beirut which had been seized earlier. A compromise was reached and the Christian Lebanese Forces began leaving Beirut on 24 November. By 4 December, Beirut was finally free of militia and bulldozers destroyed the barricades which had formed the "Green Line" dividing west and east Beirut.

At the beginning of May, the process of disarming militias in the rest of the country was underway. The Army moved to deploy troops in locations taken over from the militia, remove roadblocks and re-open the coastal highway. In an apparent step away from the Taif Accord, a meeting between Syrian and Iranian officials at the end of April led to agreement that elements of the Hizbollah militia could remain in an enclave in the eastern Bekka valley. The first hitch in this process came when the PLO announced that it would not disarm its groups in Lebanon. The disarming of the Palestinian groups was thought to be critical to the Lebanese Government's success in regaining control of the country. In response to the PLO announcement, Government officials made it clear that the PLO could no longer exist as a state within a state and could not live outside the law.

On 15 June 1991, with the PLO continuing to be intransigent about disarming, the Lebanese Government sent troops to Sidon to begin the process. On 1 July, fighting between the Army and the PLO broke out. The resulting battle lasted four days and on 4 July, the PLO agreed to dismantle its power base near Israel and ship its heavy arms abroad. The next day, government troops took over the last of the PLO positions and PLO guerillas began turning over their weapons to government forces. During this entire period, Israel continued to launch air attacks against Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon.

In mid-May, Lebanon and Syria negotiated a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination. The treaty establishes joint Lebanese-Syrian government institutions to review Lebanese policy in defence, internal security, economics, foreign policy and social issues. A higher council including the heads of state, speakers of the Parliaments and Prime Ministers will oversee the joint institutions. After seven hours of debate the Lebanese parliament voted in favour of the treaty by a vote of twenty-eight to three. Christian Maronite members who voted against the treaty had not succeeded in eliminating a clause which nullifies any Lebanese laws which are in contradiction with the Treaty's terms. The Treaty was ratified by Lebanon on 27 May 1991.

For some sectors of the Lebanese population, the treaty has generated new fears of Syrian domination within Lebanon. It had been hoped that the Lebanese Government's success in ending

Palestinian guerilla activity in southern Lebanon would generate pressure on Israel to pull out of its security zone. However, Israel remains adamant about staying so long as there are foreign forces in Lebanon.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada has always supported Lebanon's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and has called for the removal of foreign troops, both Israeli and Syrian. Canada has also supported UN Security Council Resolution 425 which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. Canada was a participant in the UN peacekeeping operation established in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in its initial stages and supports the idea of expanding UNIFIL to include monitoring of the southern border.

Through aid administered by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Canada has sought to support organisations such as the Red Cross, working in Lebanon. Canada has also established a special immigration programme which speeds up the immigration process for people with relatives in Canada seeking to leave Lebanon.

In a speech at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), the Associate Minister for Defence, Mary Collins reiterated Canada's position and spoke encouragingly of the hopes for peace. She also stated:

Canada supported the efforts of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab League, and we urged the concerned parties -- especially Syria and the various Lebanese factions -- to join in these efforts. We were also pleased by the success of consultations among Lebanese Members of Parliament in Taif under the auspices of the Tripartite Committee of Arab Heads of State. ....Canada is very encouraged by the great sense of responsibility shown by Lebanese Members of Parliament toward their country, and we continue to encourage all Lebanese to support the legitimate government of President Hrawi.<sup>1</sup>

In speaking at a second meeting organized by CIIPS, the Assistant Under-Secretary for Africa and the Middle East at the Department of External Affairs noted that the encouraging developments in Lebanon had contributed to a shift from vigilant hope about Lebanon to prudent optimism, especially in light of the extension of Presidential authority over greater Beirut. Mr. Perron

---

<sup>1</sup>Minister for External Relations and International Development. "Lebanon: Hope from within, Notes for remarks by the Honourable Mary Collins, Associate Minister of National Defence On behalf of the Honourable Monique Landry, Minister for External Relations and International Development," *Statement*, 27 September 1990: 4.

emphasised Canada's support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and the withdrawal of foreign forces from its territory.

We have used and will continue to use, every opportunity to urge those countries [with troops in Lebanon] to respect Lebanese sovereignty and to avoid complicating the already difficult problems of Lebanon.<sup>2</sup>

Responding to a question about Lebanon during a discussion of the Persian Gulf crisis, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

Regarding Lebanon, I discussed the matter in Israel, in Syria and Iran; I made a particular point of discussing the hostages when I was in Iran....The situation in Lebanon is still very difficult...but there have been improvements over the last few months, and we hope to encourage these improvements.<sup>3</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 24 October 1990, Liberal member Mark Harb requested the unanimous consent of the House to adopt a motion stating:

That this House, in this time of sadness in Lebanon over the death of political leader Dany Chamoun, extends its sincere sympathy to the people of Lebanon and that this House continues to pledge its support for sovereignty, independence and peace in Lebanon.<sup>4</sup>

The motion received unanimous consent. After the resolution passed, representatives of all three parties spoke of their support for the resolution. PC member Bob Corbett who seconded the motion said that it was "...important that we urge all the parties involved in the wrenching turmoil in Lebanon to come to grips with the root cause of their agonies."<sup>5</sup>

In March, Liberal member Paul Martin spoke about how the Persian Gulf crisis had obscured events in Lebanon and said:

---

<sup>2</sup>Marc, Perron, Assistant Under-Secretary for Africa and the Middle East, Department of External Affairs. "Le Liban: Nouveaux espoirs de l'intérieur," *Statement*, 14 December 1990: 5.

<sup>3</sup>Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes and Proceedings*, no. 105, 21 March 1991: 37.

<sup>4</sup>*Commons Debates*, 24 October 1990: 14631.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*: 14633.

...it is unacceptable for the Canadian ambassador to be absent from Beirut. Lebanon is an occupied country. There are flagrant and constant violations of international law. Unfortunately, Canada has been very slow to react and to denounce those responsible.<sup>6</sup>

Liberal member Christine Stewart asked the government to condemn the continuing air raids by Israel against bases in Lebanon, noting that Lebanese civilians and children are killed in such raids.

In view of the very tense and fragile peace that is being sought in the whole of the Middle East, I ask our government to condemn these raids and to call upon the United Nations to intervene to prevent even greater tragedy from occurring.<sup>7</sup>

On 19 June 1991, MP Mark Assad tabled a petition in the House requesting that the Canadian Government re-open its embassy in Beirut as soon as possible.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>*Commons Debates*. 20 March 1991: 18715.

<sup>7</sup>*Commons Debates*. 6 June 1991: 1274.

<sup>8</sup>*Commons Debates*. 19 June 1991: 2097.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Blanc, Paul. "La guerre des autres?" *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1990: 35-48.
- Hanf, Theodor. "Le Liban en perspective comparée," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1990: 49-74.
- International Peace Research Association. *Peacebuilding and Development in Lebanon*. Paris: UNESCO, 1990.
- Nantet, Jacques. "Complexité de la géopolitique libanaise," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1990: 24-34.
- Reick, Andreas. "A Peace plan for Lebanon? Prospects after the Taif Agreement," *Aussenpolitik* 41, no. 3, 1990: 297-309.
- Remond, René. "La survie du Liban," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1990: 9-19.
- Sigler, John. "Conflict in the Middle East." In Albert Legault, John Sigler, eds. *Les conflits dans le monde 1989-1990: Rapport annuel sur les conflits internationaux*. Québec: Centre Québécois de relations internationales, 1990: 93-122.
- Tueni, Ghassan. "Le Liban et l'ONU," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1990: 129-148.

## FURTHER READING

- Barakat, Halim. *Toward a Viable Lebanon*. London: Croom Helm, 1988.
- Brière, C. *Liban: guerres ouvertes 1920-1985*. Paris: Ramsay, 1985.
- Friedman, Thomas L. *From Beirut to Jerusalem*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Girouc, 1989.
- Hagopian, Elaine C. "From Maronite Hegemony to Maronite Militancy: The Creation and Disintegration of Lebanon," *Third World Quarterly* 11, no. 4, October 1989: 101-117.
- Khalaf, Samir. *Lebanon's Predicament*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
- Rabinovich, Itamar. "Paralysis in Lebanon," *Current History* 88, no. 544, February 1990: 73-76, 89-90.
- Sirriyeh, Hussein. *Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict*. Adelphi Papers 243. London: Brassey's for the IISS, Autumn 1989.



*BACKGROUND*

Myanmar, previously known as Burma, gained independence in 1948. Since then it has struggled to establish democratic governments but has primarily been ruled by military dictatorships. At present, Myanmar is under the rule of a military junta, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), led by General Saw Maung. General Maung took power from General Ne Win in September 1988. Once in power, General Saw Maung abolished all state institutions and established the SLORC. The changeover in government came after two months of continuous protests in the capital city of Rangoon and was accompanied by a violent crackdown against the pro-democracy movement, the strength of which had contributed to General Win's downfall. This crackdown resulted in the deaths of more than 1,000 civilians.

The new regime had, however, promised to hold democratic elections when they came to power. These occurred on 27 May 1990. The opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 392 of 485 seats, almost 80 percent of the vote. Only ten members of General Ne Win's party, the National Union Party (NUP) were elected. Although the results were in by the end of May, they were not released until 1 July, the first indication that General Win and the SLORC were not going to forfeit their power easily. The SLORC claims that a parliament cannot meet and it must remain in power until a formal constitution is drawn up.

On 8 August 1990, the second anniversary of protests for democracy, students and monks taking part in a protest in Mandalay were fired upon by police. Four people were killed and several were injured. By September 1990, the SLORC had arrested more NLD members, including the acting leader Kyi Maung, his deputy and four senior party members. The two leaders of the NLD, Tin Oo and Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of Aung San, one of the leaders of Burma's independence movement) have been under house arrest since 20 July 1989. By the end of October, all but four key NLD leaders were imprisoned. The NLD representatives remaining free were forced to sign a state order (Order 1/90) which gives the SLORC the right to continue governing until a constitution is written.

Since then, the junta has continued its crackdown, jailing more political leaders. On 20 December 1990, it took the final step and declared the National League for Democracy illegal. The current experience bears a striking resemblance to past Burmese efforts to establish democracy. General Ne Win, deposed in September 1988, came to power in a military coup in 1962, overthrowing Prime Minister U Nu.

After the August protest by monks and students ended in violence, the Mandalay Monks Association began a boycott of the military authorities, refusing to minister to officials and their

families. By mid-October, this movement had spread across the country. In response, the SLORC began raiding monasteries and arresting monks. As in the case of the NLD, the SLORC's unceasing tactics took their toll and on 20 October, the boycott officially ended.

Groups, such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International, have drawn attention to the human rights abuses being carried out in Myanmar. However, the situation and the continued refusal of the SLORC to accept the results of the May elections have generated little in the way of international condemnation. As part of its campaign of arrests, in September 1990, the SLORC went so far as to enter the West German, British and US embassies to arrest Myanmar nationals working there. This prompted a formal protest to the Myanmar government by the twelve members of the European Community as well as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and the US. As part of the protest, the government representatives informed the SLORC that they did not accept it as the legitimate government of Myanmar.

At the General Assembly meeting of the United Nations in the Fall of 1990, Sweden advocated a UN resolution which would condemn the government of Myanmar for its human rights abuses, express concern about the failure of the government to transfer power and demand the release of all political prisoners. The resolution was also sponsored by the members of the European Community, Norway, Iceland, Australia, Austria, Canada, Poland and Hungary. However, the resolution failed to attract enough support to move ahead. In particular, Third World and Asian countries were reluctant to give the resolution support because they felt it interfered in domestic affairs. In the end, a resolution was adopted without a vote which deferred consideration of the draft resolution until next year's General Assembly meeting.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Panama has brought the failure of the SLORC to respond to the will of the people and its human rights record, to the attention of the Secretary-General. Consequently, the Forty-sixth General Assembly in autumn 1991 will address an item titled "[e]nhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections."

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada supported and welcomed the elections held in May 1990 in Myanmar, calling at the same time for the release of all political prisoners.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>United Nations General Assembly. *Request for the will of the people of Myanmar*, Resolution 45/433, 18 December 1990.

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Welcomes Democratic Elections in Myanmar," *News Release*, no. 124, 14 May 1990.

The continuing refusal of the military government to hand over power, prompted Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark to write to General Saw Maung. In a 13 August 1990 letter to the General, Mr. Clark reiterated Canada's support for the elections, but also made clear that Canada now expects the government to complete the transfer of power to the elected representatives. Clark also called for the release of NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. Progress, or lack of progress, on these issues would affect Canada's relationship with Myanmar. "The course of those developments will have a direct impact on future relations between our two countries."<sup>3</sup>

Canada was one of the foreign governments to protest the Myanmar government's actions in September and early October 1990, and to support the Swedish resolution at the United Nations.

At the beginning of October, on behalf of the Canadian government, the Canadian Ambassador to Myanmar had expressed "grave concern" to the Myanmar government about the failure to transfer power to a parliament. Canada also protested the violation of diplomatic premises (see above). Clark expressed particular concern about the arrests of NLD members, stating:

The interim government and the army must initiate constructive dialogue with the National League for Democracy, convene the elected national assembly, and release all political prisoners. That dialogue is only possible if the leaders of the National League for Democracy are free.<sup>4</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

The anniversary of the May 1990 elections prompted comment from two members of Parliament. NDP member Dan Heap noted the anniversary and stated:

Nevertheless, Canada continues to recognize this unlawful and violent military regime. Petro-Canada, of which the Canadian government is the sole shareholder, has a contract to develop oil in Burma for the enrichment of the military. I call on our government to condemn publicly this military attack on parliamentary government in Burma, to recognize the lawfully elected government, to withdraw recognition of that military dictatorship and to cause Petro-Canada to abandon its contract with that dictatorship.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Urges Myanmar to Complete Move Toward Democracy," *News Release*, no. 187, 31 August 1990.

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Expresses Concern About Human Rights in Myanmar," *News Release*, no. 229, 5 October 1990.

<sup>5</sup>*Commons Debates*. 27 May 1991: 599.

Four days later, Liberal member Beryl Gaffney echoed Mr. Heap's words, calling on the Canadian government to demand the transfer of power and the release of political prisoners:

The Government of Canada must then bring all its influence to bear at the United Nations so that the rest of the world can also begin to do what is right for the people of Myanmar.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>*Commons Debates*. 31 May 1991: 872.

*RECENT LITERATURE*

Gassi, Renaldo. "Burma still under the thumb of the military," *Le Monde Diplomatique*. January 1991.

*FURTHER READING*

de Silva, K.M., Pensri Duke, Ellen S. Goldberg and Nathan Katz, eds. *Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies: Sri Lanka, Thailand and Burma*. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1988.

Singh, Kumar Badri Narain. *Freedom Struggle in Burma*. New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1989.



## 29. THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Because of the extensive materials relating to Canadian policy in the Gulf crisis, this entry in *The Guide* is sub-divided as follows:

<i>BACKGROUND</i> .....	212
<i>a. Issues surrounding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait</i> .....	212
<i>b. Allied and United Nations response: 2 August to 29 November 1990</i> .....	213
<i>c. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions: 660 to 678</i> .....	216
<i>d. Diplomacy and war: 30 November 1990 to 27 February 1991</i> .....	217
<i>e. The aftermath of war: 1 March to 15 August 1991</i> .....	219
 <i>CURRENT CANADIAN POLICY</i> .....	 222
<i>a. Response to the invasion of Kuwait and dispatch of Canadian Forces</i> .....	222
<i>b. Policy statements on hostages and refugees</i> .....	226
<i>c. United Nations diplomacy</i> .....	227
<i>d. Sanctions</i> .....	231
<i>e. Response to peace proposals in January and February</i> .....	232
<i>f. Proposals for post-war reconstruction and security</i> .....	233
 <i>PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT</i> .....	 236
<i>a. The commitment of Canadian Forces</i> .....	237
<i>b. The efficacy of sanctions</i> .....	237
<i>c. Resolution 678 and Canada's traditional peacekeeping role</i> .....	238
<i>d. Post-hostilities proposals for regional security</i> .....	240

The invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and subsequent events dominated both international and Canadian news for most of the following seven months until the suspension of coalition military activities on 27 February 1991. Thereafter, international attention shifted to the plight of Kurdish refugees, environmental damage, and Iraqi compliance with the terms of the ceasefire. Throughout the summer of 1991, efforts by UN inspectors to examine Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities continued to keep the issue in the forefront of international attention as it became clear that Iraq had systematically developed capabilities aimed at the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles. Canada's major involvement, however, resulted from its position on the Security Council from the outset of the crisis on 2 August to the end of the year, and from its military contribution to the multinational coalition. In the post-hostilities period, Canada made a number of proposals directed to the broader problems of peace and security in the Middle East.

## **BACKGROUND**

### *a. Issues surrounding the invasion of Kuwait*

During the second part of July 1990, relations between Kuwait and neighbouring Iraq deteriorated rapidly. On 18 July, Baghdad Radio broadcast a speech by Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accusing Kuwait of exceeding the production levels set by OPEC, and so driving down the price of oil. Iraq's lost oil revenues were claimed to amount to US \$14 billion. Aziz also accused Kuwait of stealing the equivalent of US \$2.4 billion from Iraq by producing oil from the Iraqi part of the transborder oil fields. By 24 July, an estimated 30,000 Iraqi troops had deployed to the border with Kuwait, although cross-border traffic remained normal and Iraq made no apparent effort to conceal the troop concentration.

On 26 and 27 July, an emergency session of OPEC was called. Despite the efforts of other Arab countries, no progress was made in resolving the crisis, which appeared still to be one relating to oil prices, oil production and lost oil revenues. Iraq's serious shortage of foreign currency in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, and a situation of over-supply in world oil markets, appeared to be the motivating factors in Iraq's aggressive approach to the dispute with Kuwait. Following the OPEC meeting, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt sought to mediate the dispute. Meeting in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, however, on 1 August the Iraqi delegation walked out of the talks, claiming that the Kuwaitis were not negotiating seriously. In addition to the initial claims concerning oil prices and production, it now became clear that Iraq had demanded that Kuwait forgive an estimated US \$10 billion in loans made to Iraq during the eight-year war with Iran. In the meantime, by the end of July, the Iraqi troop concentration on the border had increased to 100,000,

and, subsequently, US intelligence sources indicated that, by 1 August, combat support units had also deployed, providing the first compelling evidence that an attack was imminent.

In the weeks following the invasion and annexation of Kuwait, Iraq cited two more grounds for its action. First, on 8 August, it accused "western colonialism" of creating Kuwait in order to keep Iraq from "acquiring part of its tactical and strategic abilities." Subsequently, on 28 August, Kuwait was declared to be the 19th province of Iraq. Second, on 12 August, Iraq declared that the occupation of Kuwait could not be separated from other "occupations" in the Middle East.

Although the extent of the Iraqi build-up prior to 2 August was detected and reported by US intelligence agencies using satellite and other information sources, the Iraqi invasion on 2 August appeared to take the Bush Administration and other governments, both Arab and western, by surprise. Although conducted against a much smaller Kuwaiti military force, the speed and sophisticated tactics of the Iraqi armoured attack, and the occupation of Kuwait City in a matter of hours, impressed some military analysts as a professional military operation, apparently confirming the Iraqi military prowess which had been battle-hardened in the war with Iran. When Iraqi troops moved south of Kuwait City towards the border with Saudi Arabia, therefore, fears grew that Iraq also intended to invade Saudi Arabia.

*b. Allied and United Nations response: 2 August 1990 to 29 November 1990*

Although US intelligence agencies were fully aware of the Iraqi troop build-up, prior to 2 August, the Bush White House did not develop a definitive view that President Saddam Hussein intended to attack Kuwait. Moreover, in the days prior to 2 August, both King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt had expressed to western governments their conviction that Iraq did not intend to invade Kuwait. When the attack took place at 2:00 a.m. local time, there were no US military units within striking distance of the Iraqi forces and the initial response of the White House was one of surprise. Urgent requests from Kuwait for military assistance could not be met. The first US response, therefore, was to unilaterally freeze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States, and to focus on the situation in Saudi Arabia.

On the same day, 2 August, the UN Security Council met and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Thereafter, the US efforts to coordinate the international response to the Iraqi attack moved along two parallel tracks: the first was to create an alliance of Arab and western states intended to deter an attack on Saudi Arabia; the second was to seek United Nations support for policies intended to bring about the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait in accordance with the UN resolution of 2 August.

On 3 August, fourteen members of the Arab League, including Egypt and Syria, voted to condemn the Iraqi invasion. On the same day, in a move widely seen as confirming Gorbachev's desire to avoid confrontational foreign policies with the United States, the Soviet Union, which had been the principal military supplier of Iraq and its leading great power supporter, joined the United States in condemning the invasion. Meeting in Moscow, US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze jointly condemned the "brutal" invasion of Kuwait, and the Soviet Union announced an arms embargo against Iraq.

After initial hesitation, on 7 August, Saudi Arabia, faced with intelligence evidence that strong Iraqi forces had moved south of Kuwait City to take up positions on the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, expressed its wish "for the participation of fraternal Arab forces and other friendly forces" in the defence of Saudi Arabia. US fighter squadrons began to move to Saudi Arabia within forty-eight hours of this decision, while British and US naval forces had already begun to converge on the Persian Gulf. Insofar as the defence of Saudi Arabia required the positioning of land forces, the Saudi decision made possible large-scale US troop deployments on Saudi territory. Initial US estimates indicated that it would be necessary to move up to 200,000 troops to ensure the defence of Saudi Arabia against a determined Iraqi attack. On 10 August, twelve out of twenty-one Arab League members, including Egypt and Syria, agreed to send troops to assist in the defence of Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the defence of Saudi Arabia, and following a second UN resolution on 6 August imposing economic sanctions on Iraq, allied naval forces moving to the Gulf were also called upon to monitor compliance with the sanctions policy. With the mounting of a naval blockade, therefore, Iraq's relations with two of its overland neighbours, Iran and Jordan, became crucial to the effectiveness of the sanctions approach. On 15 August, and despite three years of unfinished negotiations under UN auspices to reach a peace agreement with Iran, Iraq accepted Iranian peace terms in order to stabilize the security situation on its eastern border. Although Jordan initially undertook to respect United Nations resolutions on sanctions, strategically and economically Jordan was severely affected both by UN sanctions, and by the stream of refugees which began to cross into Jordan. Making frequent complaints that the United Nations and the western countries were not providing adequate economic support to help deal with the refugees and the economic consequences of sanctions, King Hussein adopted an ambivalent position during the crisis, seeking to emphasize the search for a peaceful solution, declining to condemn Saddam Hussein in unambiguous terms, and emphasizing the enormous cost that Jordan would incur in the event of a war. The large Palestinian population of Jordan was overwhelmingly supportive of Iraq.

Between 7 August and the US mid-term Congressional elections on 6 November 1990, both Iraq and the US-led multinational coalition forces arrayed against it built up massive military forces in the Gulf region. In aggregate, the multinational forces constituted over 360,000 troops, 1,800 tanks,

and over 1,300 aircraft. The United States was much the largest provider. It had positioned nearly 240,000 troops, over 1,000 main battle tanks, nearly 700 aircraft, and 55 ships, including three aircraft carrier battle groups, a heavy battleship equipped with cruise missiles, and a number of nuclear attack submarines. The United Kingdom had contributed two armoured brigades totalling 15,000 troops with 200 tanks, 200 aircraft and 12 ships. France had provided 13,000 troops, 75 aircraft and 14 ships including an aircraft carrier. Other western countries, including Canada, provided ships, combat aircraft, and support units including medical teams. Syria deployed 50,000 troops and over 270 tanks along its border with Iraq, while making a commitment to send 19,000 troops to Saudi Arabia, and, amongst other contributions, Egypt promised to deploy 20,000 troops in Saudi Arabia.

For its part, Iraq responded by mobilizing increasing numbers of troops and increasing its forces in Kuwait and along the Saudi border. The total Iraq military forces in 1990 were estimated to comprise more than 1 million troops, over 5,500 tanks, of which a limited number were the most modern Soviet T-72 main battle tanks, and over 600 combat aircraft. Of these totals, by the end of October, Iraq was estimated to have deployed in Kuwait 430,000 troops, 3,500 tanks, 2,500 armoured combat vehicles, 1,700 artillery pieces, and a large number of aircraft, dispersed bases for which were located both in Kuwait and Iraq. In a further measure intended to deter an allied attack on its key installations, in mid-August, Iraq began rounding up westerners in Kuwait to use as hostages. An unspecified number of these hostages were held at key military and civil installations in Kuwait and Iraq as a "human shield." Following numerous official and unofficial representations, however, Saddam Hussein abandoned this policy, and announced that all western hostages would be freed by 25 December 1990. The hostage issue prompted the first statements by western governments that under international law Saddam Hussein would be held criminally responsible for these actions.

Two days after the mid-term congressional elections, on 8 November 1990, President Bush ordered a major reinforcement of US forces in the Gulf from 200,000 to 500,000. When completed, this reinforcement gave the Bush Administration the option to use its forces in an offensive mode, and so prepared the way for the offensive operations in February 1991. Subsequent analyses and accounts of White House decision-making suggest that the military plan for a large-scale bombing campaign against Iraq some time in January, to be followed by a ground offensive, was approved by the White House in late October 1990.

*c. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions: 660 to 678*

Between 2 August and 27 November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted twelve resolutions relating to the war in the Gulf.<sup>1</sup> These Resolutions began with 660, which, following the sequence of steps outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, condemned the invasion of Kuwait, demanded that Iraq withdraw, and called upon the two parties to begin intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences. On 6 August, again invoking Chapter VII, the Security Council decided to impose mandatory sanctions against Iraq, and called upon all states, including non-members, "to act strictly in accordance with the present resolution." The Council also struck a Committee, consisting of all members of the Council, to examine reports on the progress of the sanctions, and to oversee the actions taken by states in implementing the Resolution. The actual monitoring of the situation regarding the imposition of sanctions, therefore, was left to the individual states, members of the United Nations.

Of the ten further resolutions, seven dealt with issues which arose in the course of the dispute. These involved, for example, the status of the nationals of third countries in Iraq and Kuwait, the status of diplomatic missions in Kuwait, rejection of the annexation of Kuwait, and the attempts by Iraq to destroy the records of civil administration in Kuwait. Two additional resolutions dealt with sanctions, while the last one, Resolution 678, opened the way to the use of force rather than sanctions to bring about Iraqi compliance with Resolution 660.

Further to Resolution 661, on 25 August the Security Council returned to the implementation of sanctions in Resolution 665. Noting the failure of Iraq to comply with Security Council resolutions, and particularly the attempts by Iraq to use Iraqi flag vessels for the export of oil, Resolution 665 called upon states deploying naval forces in the area "to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary...to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping." Those states deploying naval forces, therefore, acting under the authority of the Security Council, were entitled to use appropriate force to implement the sanctions.

Tightening the sanctions noose still further, in Resolution 670 on 25 September 1990, the Security Council confirmed that sanctions applied to all means of transport, including aircraft. Resolution 670 reminded states that aircraft bound for Iraq should not be allowed to take-off from or overfly their territory, and decided that each state should "take all necessary measures" to ensure that aircraft registered in its territory or flown by operators resident in its territory complied with

---

<sup>1</sup>These Resolutions are summarized in FACTS AND FIGURES.

Security Council decisions. Resolution 670, therefore, implied that aircraft violating the sanctions might be shot down by states implementing the sanctions decisions.

In Resolution 678, which was passed on 29 November by a vote of 12 to 2, with Cuba and Yemen voting against and China abstaining, the Security Council authorized the use of force against Iraq. Following a Soviet proposal, Resolution 678 determined first that Iraq should be allowed "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will," to comply with Security Council resolutions. After 15 January 1991, however, it authorized "Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait" to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

Resolution 678 broke new ground in the crisis in several ways. First, it left enforcement, if it became necessary, to those states which undertook the responsibility by virtue of cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, and it therefore entitled the US-led multinational coalition to act under the authority of the Security Council, but not as a United Nations force. Second, by imposing a 15 January deadline on Iraqi compliance with Security Council decisions, it created, *de facto*, a deadline for judgements about the merits of sanctions alone in bringing about Iraqi compliance with Resolution 660. Third, the objectives of the Security Council *vis-à-vis* Iraq and the Gulf region were, in principle, significantly broadened by the granting of authority to use all necessary means "to restore international peace and security in the area."

#### *d. Diplomacy and war: 30 November 1990 to 27 February 1991*

Between 27 November and 15 January both preparations for war and efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis intensified. On 30 November, President Bush offered to hold direct talks with Iraq to go "the extra mile for peace." After many false starts, bilateral talks between James Baker and Tariq Aziz were finally held in Geneva on 9 January 1991. In the meantime, on 10 December, Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid initiated an Arab mediation effort which foundered on 16 December when the Saudis refused to meet with the Algerian President. On 4 January, Aziz declined an invitation by the European Community (EC) foreign ministers to a meeting in Luxembourg. Following the failure of the Baker-Aziz meeting in Geneva on 9 January, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar flew to Baghdad on 10 January, but returned empty-handed three days later. On 14 January, France made last-minute peace proposals, exploring earlier French meetings with Saddam Hussein which suggested that Hussein might be willing to make concessions if the occupation of Kuwait were linked to the Palestinian problem. This last-ditch effort was blocked, and on 15 January, the Secretary-General made a final but despairing appeal to Iraq to avoid war. United States aircraft began the attack on Baghdad during the evening of 16 January 1991.

The offensive against Iraq fell into two clearly distinct phases. From 16 January to 24 February, multinational aircraft sought first to obtain air superiority through the destruction of Iraqi airfields, aircraft, and command and control systems. As these objectives were achieved, the air attack turned increasingly to the destruction of Iraqi ground forces, in particular its heavy armour, artillery and armoured personnel carriers. At the same time, selective strikes were launched against Iraq's suspected nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities, and against its SCUD missile bases. As frequently threatened in the weeks preceding 17 January, Iraq replied with missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia. Israel sustained direct hits in urban areas, but, under considerable pressure from the United States, chose not to retaliate. Iraq failed, therefore, in its attempt to turn the conflict into an Arab-Israeli one, or, at least, to force the Arab members out of the multinational coalition.

As the allied air campaign entered its fourth week, pressures grew at the United Nations to find the grounds for a ceasefire. In mid-February, the Security Council began a series of private meetings to explore various proposals for a ceasefire. Following Iraqi statements which suggested strongly conditioned acceptance of Resolution 660; the Soviet Union began intensive discussions with Aziz which culminated on 18 February, when the Soviets revealed a six-point peace plan calling for unconditional acceptance of Resolution 660, and Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to begin one day after a ceasefire, with a pull-out from Kuwait City to be completed in four days and total withdrawal from Kuwait within twenty-one days. Other Security Council resolutions would then lose force on the ground that the reasons for them had been removed. On 21 February, the Soviet Union indicated that the Iraqis had agreed to unconditional acceptance of Resolution 660 on the basis of this approach.

Also on 18 February, however, the United States on behalf of the Coalition gave an ultimatum to Iraq to begin large-scale withdrawal from Kuwait by noon on 23 February, and to complete it within one week. The United States pledged that coalition forces would not attack retreating Iraqi troops. Thereafter, the United States and other western countries, including Canada, expressed reservations about the Soviet plan, particularly its apparent willingness to drop other Security Council decisions concerning war reparations and restitution to the Government of Kuwait. Moreover, the United States in particular, citing the reference in Resolution 678 to the restoration of peace and security in the area, indicated its reluctance to reach a ceasefire which left the Iraqi army intact. As the Security Council continued to meet in closed session, efforts to reconcile these positions continued, but with time running out in the face of the impending US deadline. On Saturday afternoon of 23 February, Secretary-General de Cuellar made an appeal to the Council to continue to seek a solution, noting that "openings towards a cessation of the conflict have been clearly revealed during the past two days."

Despite continuing efforts on 23 February to reconcile the different approaches, no agreement was reached. On 24 February, under the command of US General Norman Schwarzkopf, the

multinational forces began a massive ground attack. Employing textbook tactics for armoured warfare, Schwarzkopf launched a frontal attack against dug-in Iraqi forces, but saved his heaviest armour for a rapid sweeping movement around the right flank of the Iraqi positions. On 28 February, the multinational forces suspended military operations. The leading elements of these forces were deep inside Iraqi territory, but stopped short of Basra, Iraq's second largest city and staging area for Iraqi military operations in Kuwait, and made no attempt to advance on Baghdad.

Although no definitive figures on the casualty toll were made public after the Iraqi defeat, based on the estimates of various officials of the multinational coalition, Iraqi losses were as follows:

- between 85,000 and 100,000 troops killed or wounded, the majority as a consequence of the bombing campaign;
- 42 Iraqi divisions, averaging 12,000 troops, destroyed or captured;
- 3,700 tanks; 1,857 armoured personnel carriers and 2,140 artillery pieces destroyed;
- 97 aircraft confirmed destroyed, plus 6 helicopters;
- 175,000 prisoners taken.

Multinational coalition losses were estimated as follows:

- 183 killed and about 500 wounded;
- 56 missing in action, plus a small number of prisoners of war;
- 45 allied planes lost, including 9 non-combat losses, together with 14 non-combat US helicopter losses.

In addition, Kuwaiti civilians numbering in the thousands were seized by the Iraqis and deported to Iraq.

#### *e. The aftermath of the war: 1 March to 15 August 1991*

In the two weeks following the suspension of hostilities by the coalition forces, the Security Council faced a series of issues in need of resolution: these included setting the conditions that Iraq would be required to meet prior to the establishment of a formal ceasefire; the terms of the ceasefire itself; the possible establishment of a UN peacekeeping force to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and assist in the stabilization of borders; the lifting of sanctions against Iraq; and humanitarian assistance.

Meeting shortly after the suspension of hostilities, on 2 March the Security Council adopted Resolution 685. The Council decided that, before a formal ceasefire, Iraq should first implement the list of political and military preconditions which had been laid down by President Bush in his announcement suspending military operations. Under the Resolution, Iraq was required to accept in principle its liability for damages resulting from the invasion of Kuwait and return stolen property, cease all hostile or provocative military actions, designate high-level military representatives to discuss practical military issues arising in regard to the ceasefire, and return all detainees, prisoners of war, and the remains of any who had died.

Despite hasty compliance by Iraq with the main provisions of this resolution, thereafter the negotiation of the terms of a ceasefire proved to be complex and controversial. Eventually, on 3 April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687 by a vote of 12-1, with Cuba opposing. Amongst its many provisions, 687 set down a schedule of operations after the ceasefire that included the following:

- the immediate lifting of restrictions on emergency food aid;
- by April 17, the provision by Iraq of a list of chemical and biological weapons and plants, materials that could be used in nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles with a range over 90 miles;
- by 2 May, a fund for war damages to be fed by Iraqi oil revenues;
- by 17 May, a plan for the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction;
- by 1 June, guidelines for implementation of a new arms embargo against Iraq.

In its response on 6 April, Iraq complained bitterly against the stern provisions of Resolution 687 and the alleged infringement of Iraqi sovereignty, but concluded: "Iraq finds itself before one alternative: to accept the resolution." Immediately thereafter, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a plan for the deployment of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). As subsequently approved by the Security Council on 12 April, UNIKOM comprised 1,440 armed and unarmed military personnel to be deployed in the area of the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized border zone extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait. UNIKOM functions were to deter violation of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone, to observe any hostile or potentially hostile behaviour from either side, and to support UN efforts to provide humanitarian relief to the thousands of displaced people and refugees in the area of operations. Although the area was generally barren, making surveillance relatively easy, UNIKOM faced two immediate hazards: the risk of military incidents as coalition forces withdrew from the line of contact with remnants of the Iraqi army, and the danger from unexploded ordnance and mines in the area. As subsequently agreed by the Security Council, UNIKOM drew personnel from thirty-four countries, including Canada, but without

representation from the Arab states. In a possibly precedent-setting move, all five permanent members of the Security Council were represented in the force.

In the same week, on 5 April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which was also extraordinary in that it marked the first time that the Security Council has held internal state security actions to be a threat to international peace and security. In the wake of the defeat of its armies in Kuwait, the government of Saddam Hussein faced insurgencies from both the majority Shi'ite Muslims in southern Iraq, and the minority Kurdish population. As the remaining elements of the Republican Guard began to crush the rebellions, an estimated 300,000 refugees began fleeing across the border to Iran, and as many as 600,000 Kurds began crossing into Turkey. Brushing off Iraqi claims that the situation was an internal matter, the Security Council condemned the "repression of the Iraqi civilian population" and insisted that humanitarian organizations be allowed immediate access to all those in need of assistance.

In the following weeks, the plight of the Kurdish refugees became a critical problem for the western countries, first in terms of humanitarian relief as attempts were made to provide food and shelter to hundreds of thousands of Kurds fleeing into the mountainous border area of Turkey in harsh winter conditions. Faced then with the task of resettlement, and despite earlier statements by President Bush that the United States did not wish to become involved in a civil war in Iraq, on the initiative of the EC the western governments decided to move troops into northern Iraq in order to establish a safe haven for returning Kurdish families. Despite efforts to replace allied forces with UN guards, Kurdish apprehensions and concerns about the actions of the Iraqi military made it difficult thereafter for US and other allied forces to fully withdraw from northern Iraq.

In further fulfillment of the settlement laid down by Resolution 687, which stipulated a 120-day timetable for Iraq to destroy its weapons, Iraq was required to reveal to UN inspectors all details concerning the development and stockpiling of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. In apparent compliance, on 18 April, Iraq submitted lists of such weapons to the United Nations and to the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). Amongst other things, Iraq declared possession of 52 ballistic missiles, 30 chemical warheads, 1,481 artillery shells and bombs containing chemical weapons, and large supplies of various poison gases. The US State Department immediately labelled the disclosures "short on reality." Shortly afterwards, IAEA officials, though not revealing the contents of the Iraqi letter, expressed scepticism about the information provided.

These fears proved to be well-grounded when, in mid-May, IAEA inspection teams began investigating Iraqi nuclear facilities on the principle, established under the ceasefire agreement, that the inspection teams would have complete freedom of movement in Iraq. On 3 June, an Iraqi nuclear scientist defected to United States forces in Iraq. Subsequently, US officials stated that he had

described eight primary sites for nuclear research and development, only three of which had been destroyed by allied bombing, and four of which were unknown to allied intelligence. Following these revelations, on 22 June, an IAEA team arrived in Iraq for a second inspection, but were denied access to military bases suspected of harbouring nuclear facilities. Following further meetings of the Security Council and indirect threats from the United States to resume bombing of key facilities, Iraq agreed at the end of June to allow unrestricted inspections.

Based on these further inspections, in its report on 3 July, the second IAEA inspection team concluded that Iraq "had been pursuing an undeclared uranium enrichment programme using the electromagnetic isotope separation technique." This technique, which utilizes devices called calutrons to separate Uranium 235 from Uranium 238, had been developed by the United States in World War II but abandoned as ineffective. The revelation indicated that Iraq was in violation of its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Of broader consequence, it had been able to develop an enrichment programme outside the standard IAEA nuclear safeguards programme, thus indicating a major loophole in the NPT safeguards regime. Two further IAEA inspection teams visited Iraq in July and August, with a further team due at the end of the summer to investigate the possibility that Iraq had developed high explosive triggers for nuclear weapons. Three UN teams were scheduled in August to further investigate Iraq's biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Prior to their formal report, in mid-August, UN inspectors revealed that they had located supplies of anthrax sufficient to kill or incapacitate over areas of thousands of square kilometres. The Security Council and the IAEA continued to receive these inspection reports in the late summer of 1991.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

##### *a. Response to the invasion of Kuwait and dispatch of Canadian Forces*

On 2 August, the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark denounced the Iraqi military attack, which he described as "a totally unacceptable aggression," and indicated that, as a member of the Security Council, Canada was seeking an immediate meeting of the Council "to ensure a clear and effective international response to the Iraqi aggression." At the United Nations, Canadian ambassador Yves Fortier repeated this condemnation to the Security Council, and commented:

The draft resolution now before us is in complete accordance with the position already adopted by the government of Canada. For this reason, Canada has agreed to

co-sponsor this resolution, and we hope that it will enjoy the full support of all members of the Council.<sup>2</sup>

Following consultations with "its friends and allies" and "a lengthy discussion" between Prime Minister Mulroney and President Bush, on 4 August Clark indicated that "the Government had earlier today decided on further steps to reinforce Canada's condemnation of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait." These measures included:

- an embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait;
- placing Iraq on the Area Control List under the Export and Import Permits Act which allowed Canadian exports to Iraq to be controlled;
- suspension of the Canada-Iraq Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Co-operation, and termination of Most Favoured Nation Treatment, which meant that Iraqi imports to Canada would face higher tariffs;
- the suspension of all trade and business promotion by the Government of Canada;
- suspension of the Canada-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding on Academic, Cultural and Sports relations.<sup>3</sup>

Several days later, at a press conference on 7 August, Prime Minister Mulroney indicated that Canada would offer military help if the NATO Council, which was about to hold a special meeting in Brussels, decided that it was necessary. At the Brussels meeting, the NATO Council agreed to harmonize allied policies, but did not issue a call for the dispatch of military forces. Mulroney was also reported as saying at the 7 August press conference that neither Saudi Arabia nor the United States had made a specific request for Canadian military assistance. On 8 August, responding to Security Council Resolution 661 imposing mandatory sanctions, Clark announced the imposition of sanctions against Iraq. All imports from and exports to Iraq and Kuwait were prohibited, a ban was imposed on export credits, and the Canadian assets of Iraq and Kuwait were frozen.<sup>4</sup> On the same day, Clark called upon Iraq "to permit the departure from Iraq and Kuwait of all Canadians who wish to leave."<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Text of Remarks by Ambassador Yves Fortier to the United Nations Security Council on the Iraq Invasion of Kuwait," 2 August 1990.

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Announces Further Measures Against Iraq," *News Release*, no. 166, 4 August 1990.

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Mr. Clark Announces Regulations on Sanctions Against Iraq," *News Release*, no. 170, 8 August 1990.

<sup>5</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Comments on Situation of Canadians in Iraq and the Gulf," *News Release*, no. 172; *Toronto Star*, 9 August 1990.

On 10 August, with Parliament in recess, Mulroney announced at a nationally broadcast press conference that Canada would send three warships to the Persian Gulf. Describing Saddam Hussein as a "criminal of historic significance," he was reported as commenting: "If a clear warning is not sent to Iraq now, it will only be emboldened to find new victims."<sup>6</sup> However, the Prime Minister was careful to avoid identifying the tasks which the ships would perform in the Gulf, which was to be revealed only when they were in the theatre of operations. Technically, this permitted the Government to avoid the recall of Parliament, which, under the National Defence Act, must review a decision to place Canadian military personnel on active duty within ten days of the passing of the order-in-council. Parliament was not scheduled to resume sitting until 24 September. It also temporarily avoided an emerging debate in the Security Council, where some members of the Council, among whom were reported to be France, the Soviet Union and Canada, believed that while naval vessels were required to observe and monitor the application of sanctions, it was premature for individual states to choose to mount a blockade against Iraq.

On 14 September, still with Parliament adjourned, the Cabinet announced its decision to send a CF-18 squadron (eighteen) with approximately 450 support personnel from their base in Germany to the Gulf. The number of CF-18s was increased to twenty-four prior to hostilities in January. Former Defence Minister Bill McKnight subsequently described the mission of the Canadian forces in the Gulf:

Under Security Council resolution 665 our maritime forces are authorized to use such measures as may be necessary to halt all inward and outward shipping to ensure that sanctions are not being violated. The CF-18s will provide long-range defence air cover in the operating area of the Canadian task group and will be part of an integrated multinational air defence network in the gulf area. Together with those defensive resources of other countries, our CF-18s will investigate unidentified or hostile aircraft and ships that could be capable of attacking the Canadian task group or other allied ships. They will also investigate any unknown radar contacts and take appropriate action to protect the men and women on Canadian ships.<sup>7</sup>

On 1 October, it was announced that the fighter aircraft would be based in Qatar, where they would provide air cover for the Canadian ships then assuming patrol responsibilities at the southern end of the Persian Gulf. In their patrol area, the trio of Canadian naval vessels were within range of Iraqi aircraft firing air-to-surface missiles, although such attacks would have required the Iraqi pilots to have first penetrated the defensive screen provided by a US carrier battle group and other naval forces deployed to the north of the Canadian task force.

---

<sup>6</sup>Cited in: "Canada ends tradition sends warships to Gulf," *Toronto Star*, 11 August 1990: 1.

<sup>7</sup>*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13259.

As the multinational naval force assembled in the Gulf, the coordination of naval forces became the responsibility of the US Navy as the largest national component. The Gulf was divided into several geographic sectors, each with a designated coordinator. Overall coordination of the air space over the sea was allocated to the Commander of the US Naval Forces Central, and of the overland air space to the Commander, US Central Air Force. The CF-18s flying combat air patrol over the Gulf received flight direction control from specialized US Navy ships, and reacted to directions from US Navy air controllers. The Canadian forces in the Gulf, however, remained under Canadian command and control for the duration of their operational mission.

The Canadian ships, equipped with night-capable Sea King helicopters and forward-looking infra-red radar, proved exceptionally well-suited for the task of intercepting vessels in the Gulf. By December, they were intercepting an average of twenty ships each day, representing more than 20 percent of all intercepts by the allied naval forces.<sup>8</sup> This ratio rose to above 25 percent by mid-January.

On 16 January, with hostilities imminent, the Department of National Defence announced that preparations were underway to deploy 1 Canadian Field Hospital from CFB Petawawa to Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. In making the announcement, then Defence Minister Bill McKnight commented:

The deployment of the field hospital is made in response to a request from British authorities, and it allows Canada to make a vital contribution to the medical treatment facilities in the Persian Gulf. The decision to provide the medical facility also enables the multinational forces to meet the demands of the Geneva Convention for the treatment of Prisoners of War.<sup>9</sup>

After hostilities commenced, the Canadian Naval Task Group Commander became coordinator of the multinational Combat Logistic Force. With much of the combatant fleet deployed in the central Gulf area, allied supply ships and escort vessels were held in a protective area in the south, moving north with escorts to resupply combatants and then returning to safer waters. The Combat Logistic Force numbered approximately twenty-four ships from ten countries. The Canadian Commander assumed responsibility for scheduling all logistic force activities on behalf of the battle commander, and for the escort and protection of supply vessels.<sup>10</sup>

On 17 January, McKnight indicated that the CF-18s would continue to conduct combat air patrols as their primary task. However, he indicated that they would be available to tactical commanders for

---

<sup>8</sup>Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf*, 21 December 1990.

<sup>9</sup>Department of National Defence. "DND to Deploy Field Hospital to the Persian Gulf," *News Release*, no. 03/91, 16 January 1991.

<sup>10</sup>Department of National Defence. "Canada Controls Combat Logistic Force in the Gulf," *News Release*, no. 05/91, 28 January 1991.

sweep and escort missions to protect bombers and ground attack aircraft over Kuwait and Iraq. On 20 February 1991, McKnight announced that the CF-18s would undertake air-to-ground attack missions against military targets inside Kuwait and Iraq in addition to continuing combat air patrols over the Gulf. Asserting that the change was fully consistent with Resolution 678, McKnight commented:

Unless and until Saddam Hussein complies fully with UN resolutions, Canada will work with Coalition forces in the campaign to expel his forces from Kuwait.... The more we weaken Hussein's army from the air both before and during a ground battle, the fewer will be the casualties suffered by the Coalition forces, and the sooner we can end this war and restore the peace.<sup>11</sup>

*b. Policy statements on hostages and refugees*

In mid-August, concerns mounted about the plight of Canadians stranded in Kuwait and Iraq. More than 500 Canadians had been contacted in Kuwait, and about 200 were reported to be in Iraq. On 18 August, Clark noted that

Canada will support any and all UN actions to safeguard the lives and security of foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. Canada has urged a number of non-aligned members of the Security Council to work for early and unanimous adoption of an effective resolution.<sup>12</sup> Resolution 664, which demanded that Iraq "permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries," was passed unanimously on 18 August.

Like other countries, Canada sought to keep open its embassy in Kuwait despite increasing harassment by the Iraqi military. Following the Iraqi decision to allow the departure of foreign women and children, the embassy was able to coordinate the safe departure of these Canadians from Kuwait. Faced with the interruption of water, telephone and other services, and continuing harassment by Iraq, it became increasingly difficult for the Kuwait embassy to function effectively. In mid-September, following the entering of diplomatic premises by Iraqi troops, Security Council Resolution 667, co-sponsored by Canada, again condemned Iraqi behaviour as contrary to international law and sought guarantees of diplomatic immunity. Despite increasing difficulties, operations at the Canadian Embassy continued until 19 October, when Clark announced the provisional suspension but not the official closing of the Embassy. Canada was amongst the last of the

---

<sup>11</sup>Department of National Defence. "CF-18 Air-to-Ground Attack Role Authorized," *News Release*, no. 10/91, 20 February 1991.

<sup>12</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Iraqi Threats to Foreign Nations Unacceptable," *News Release*, no. 176, 18 August 1990.

western countries to suspend diplomatic operations in Kuwait. At that time, it was believed that some twenty Canadians remained in Kuwait.<sup>13</sup>

As large numbers of third country nationals who had been working in Kuwait and Iraq sought to flee across the border to Jordan, the Government of King Hussein struggled to manage a refugee crisis of increasing proportions. On 26 August, Canada provided a grant of \$2.5 million to Jordan to assist with refugees. It soon became apparent, however, that assistance on a much larger scale was required. Prime Minister Mulroney afterwards commented:

We subsequently announced a substantial expansion of that assistance, and approved as well a range of additional measures, altogether amounting to some \$75 million. One of these measures will be the airlifting of displaced people to their home countries and providing special assistance to some of those countries least able to cope with the impact of thousands of returning citizens. Another such measure will be assistance to the countries of the region suffering serious side-effects from the crisis and from sanctions against Iraq, especially Jordan, Turkey and Egypt.<sup>14</sup>

### *c. United Nations diplomacy*

When Parliament resumed on 24 September, both Mulroney and Clark presented overviews of Canadian policy on the United Nations Security Council. Mulroney commented:

The United Nations has emerged from this crisis with new life.... We have seen the United Nations operate I think precisely as its founders would have envisaged and would have hoped.... It has taken, partly at Canada's urging, a careful, determined and step-by-step approach under Chapter 7.... Some have suggested that the enforcement by armed force of international law and of the United Nations' resolutions is somehow contrary to the spirit of multilateralism and Canada's traditions. Nothing could be further from the truth. The willingness of the United Nations to authorize military means to enforce the resolutions it has passed may well presage an important new era for multilateralism, a goal for which generations of Canadians have worked.<sup>15</sup>

Following meetings with James Baker in Washington on 22 September, Clark indicated that Canada had not ruled out sending ground troops to the Gulf, but was quoted as commenting: "We think it would be helpful in maintaining steady pressure [on Iraq] that we do not do everything at once." Amidst reports that Canada was anxious to dissuade the United States from action outside the framework of the United Nations, in his follow-up speech to Mulroney in Parliament on

---

<sup>13</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canadian Embassy in Kuwait Suspends Operations," *News Release*, no. 241, 19 October 1990.

<sup>14</sup>*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13234.

<sup>15</sup>*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13232-33.

24 September, Clark indicated that any such further measures would be taken "in the context of the United Nations," and continued:

We have encouraged our close allies, we have encouraged others, and we have used our influence and our position on the Security Council to ensure that the action that proceeds...is within the mandate of the Security Council and, indeed, that the mandate given by the United Nations expands to take account of the circumstances as they develop in the region. We are working very hard to have United Nations auspices respected.<sup>16</sup>

One day later, on 25 September, Clark attended the Security Council proceedings and co-sponsored Resolution 670 imposing an air embargo on Iraq. While in New York, Clark also counselled restraint, suggesting that there should now be a pause. As he explained later, however, his message was twofold:

I proposed that we allow some time to President Saddam Hussein to reflect on his situation and the will of the international community.... At the same time, I have also made it clear that, if President Hussein does not withdraw from Kuwait in the face of the unprecedented international consensus and under pressure of sanctions, he must understand the willingness of the world to take further action, including military action. Canada is prepared to consider, with its Security Council colleagues, what the next steps might be.<sup>17</sup>

On 5 October, measures were announced to implement the embargo which prohibited the operation of aircraft transporting goods to Iraq and Kuwait, or attempting to land there, and the entry into Canadian ports of Iraqi registered vessels deemed to be carrying goods in violation of Resolution 661.<sup>18</sup>

The emphasis on proceeding step-by-step in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter continued to be a central theme in statements of Government policy throughout Canada's tenure on the Security Council. At the same time, in October and early November Clark made it clear that the Government was willing to countenance the use of force outside the framework of the United Nations. In a presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs on 25 October, Clark commented:

Ambassador Fortier and his team have been tireless in helping draft and helping pass resolutions that are clear and principled, and balanced to ensure they do the job they

---

<sup>16</sup>*Commons Debates*, 24 September 1990: 13246; "Canada won't reject idea of dispatching army troops to the gulf," *Toronto Star*, 22 September 1990: 14.

<sup>17</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Persian Gulf Situation," *News Release*, no. 240, 16 October 1990.

<sup>18</sup>Department of External Affairs. *News Release*, no. 230, 5 October 1990.

are intended to do without the unnecessary tension or debate. Although the front page of the New York Times has suggested that this has sometimes been to argue for greater moderation than desired by others, the degree of unanimity of the major players on the Security Council has been, quite frankly, extraordinary.<sup>19</sup>

Responding to questions in committee and in Parliament on the same day, Clark warned:

It is therefore possible that a veto would make it impossible to act under the auspices of the United Nations. That is why we are now and in fact have been from the outset, negotiating carefully and diligently to find a way that would make it easier for Canada to arrange for a system that would make use of the auspices of the United Nations.

However, Clark added, Canada's opposition to the Iraqi invasion would not be set aside "if China, for instance, were to exercise its veto in the Security Council. That would be irresponsible, and that is not our position."<sup>20</sup> In the following weeks Clark repeated this position in various statements and responses to questions in Parliament.

Some two weeks later, Clark flew to Bermuda to be briefed by James Baker on his most recent round of consultations in Europe and the Middle East. After the meeting, and following a comment by Baker that the US approach was "right in synch with the Canadian government," Clark was asked if Canada would support a resolution supporting the use of force. He replied:

I can't foretell what form a resolution might take, but Canada has always been of the view that you can't send people to the Gulf unless you are prepared to have them carry through with their responsibilities, and that it's better to have them carry through with their responsibilities under the aegis of the United Nations. So, we would be interested in cooperating with that kind of resolution.

Secondly, I said at the UN some -- now weeks ago -- that Canada has not ruled out any options with regard to other actions we might take.... We are contemplating at the moment no change in the nature or the number of Canadians who might be there in a military capacity and I was not requested to consider that today in conversations. But I make the point that we've ruled out no options. If it is the view of the government of Canada that there are other things we can do to make that very remarkable coalition more effective, then we'll take those actions.<sup>21</sup>

Immediately prior to the Security Council debate on Resolution 678, Clark visited the Middle East, meeting at length with both King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt. From the

---

<sup>19</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, at the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on the Gulf Crisis," *Statement*, 90/62, 25 October 1990: 4.

<sup>20</sup>*Commons Debates*. 25 October 1990: 14693.

<sup>21</sup>United States Embassy. "Baker Says US, Canada Agree on Strategy in the Gulf," *Text*, 90-104, 14 November 1990.

onset of the crisis King Hussein's support of Iraq produced strong statements of disapproval from the Bush Administration. As the only western leader to visit Jordan between the invasion of Kuwait and the end of hostilities, Clark spoke in glowing terms of the role that King Hussein had played in the region, and was quoted as saying that the King "has been a constructive and courageous leader in this region for decades."<sup>22</sup> On his return, he commented:

There may be the elements of a peaceful resolution of this crisis. I was more encouraged than I thought I might be by the conversations I had in the Middle East. I was encouraged by the determination of people ranging from Israeli leaders, to King Hussein, to the Palestinians to look for ways in which this experience may lead to constructive responses to other issues. So we hope that there will be means found to resolve this crisis.<sup>23</sup>

Clark gave no indication, however, what the elements of a peaceful resolution might be. In referring to the Palestinian problem he noted that "one of the consequences of the current Gulf crisis could be a new sense of urgency about solving other problems facing that troubled region," but at the same time he specifically rejected the Iraqi claim that the issues were linked, noting that the Palestinian issue could only be addressed "separate from the present issue."<sup>24</sup>

In his speech to Parliament supporting Resolution 678, Prime Minister Mulroney again emphasized the degree to which Canada had sought to dissuade the United States from unilateral action. Possibly freed from a concern to respect the privacy of Security Council negotiations by an earlier article in the *New York Times* which had revealed differences between the US position and that of some of its allies, including Canada, Mulroney commented:

In the many discussions I have had with President Bush on this subject, I have consistently counselled both restraint in securing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the need to work at all times within the authority of the United Nations Charter.

Indeed...an important disagreement took place in respect of an interpretation of Article 51 where Canada, through our distinguished ambassador Yves Fortier, led the fight in the Security Council to insist that the suggestion by the United States that any concept of unilateral action at that point in time must be resisted and that the solidarity that this had engendered at the United Nations must be respected.

I believe that that action taken by the Government of Canada...resulted in the solidarity we know today. It was consistent with the finest traditions of Canadian diplomacy.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup>*Globe and Mail*, 26 November 1990: 7.

<sup>23</sup>*Commons Debates*, 28 November 1990: 15863.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup>*Commons Debates*, 29 November 1990: 15960.

*d. Sanctions*

In the same speech, Mulroney also indicated the Government's scepticism that sanctions alone would force Iraq out of Kuwait. Noting a "remarkable consensus" amongst world leaders that a peaceful solution was desirable, Mulroney continued:

However, we have also found that a very strong consensus exists to the effect that if peaceful means do not work, recourse would have to be added to other necessary means. While the UN sanctions are undoubtedly being felt by the Iraqi and Kuwaiti people, we have found no widespread confidence that they are sufficient to bring about the desired result: namely, to persuade President Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait.<sup>26</sup>

In the face of opposition demands for factual information on the efficacy of sanctions, on 30 November, Clark responded by noting his difficulty in sharing confidential information, which he later referred to again as "highly sensitive" information, but commented:

There is no evidence that in the next several months there will be any impact upon the decision makers in Iraq. If we were to rely only on sanctions, the consequence would be that over that period of time we would run the risk of more children dying, we would run the risk of Kuwait being sacked even more than it is now. We would run the terrible risk that in highly volatile region of some mistake being made which could inspire a conflagration that no one in this world wants.<sup>27</sup>

In a letter to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on External Affairs on 28 December, Clark emphasized not the potential for destruction resulting from the time taken to make sanctions effective, but the insensitivity of the Iraqi leadership to the hardship imposed. He wrote:

...the civil sectors of the economy are being affected more severely than the privileged military; rationing continues; prices of foodstuffs and consumer goods continue to rise; and more non-essential industries have been forced to reduce or cease production. Most important, the international cooperation in the imposing and policing sanctions is proving very effective, and sanction-breaking remains insignificant...

However, in spite of the fact that these are the most comprehensive and effective sanctions ever applied by the international community, we must recognize that there are no signs whatsoever that they are having their intended impact of persuading the Iraqi government to comply with Security Council resolutions.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>*Commons Debates*. 30 November 1990: 16046.

<sup>28</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Persian Gulf Situation," *News Release*, no. 294, 28 December 1990.

This continued to be the position of the Government on sanctions as the "pause for peace" called for in Resolution 678 began to run out and the deadline of 15 January loomed closer. In mid-January, however, Clark appeared less confident about the policing of sanctions, and both he and Mulroney expressed concern that the time required for sanctions to be effective might allow Iraq to perfect instruments of mass destruction. Replying to a question in the House on 16 January, for example, Clark commented:

...the most comprehensive set of sanctions ever devised in human history...are allowing now the passage into Iraq of chemical additives, lubricants, water purification chemicals, spare parts and other things that can be used to build the war machine.... Time...is allowing Saddam Hussein to devise new means of environmental warfare, to perfect his capacity to conduct chemical warfare, and to perfect his capacity to conduct biological warfare.<sup>29</sup>

*e. Response to peace proposals in January and February*

In the final flurry of efforts to avert hostilities, and following the failure of the Geneva talks between James Baker and Tariq Aziz, on 9 January 1991, Clark flew to New York carrying a letter to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar which restated the Canadian views on an acceptable settlement. The precondition was Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The letter then proposed, *inter alia*

- an international guarantee for all borders in the Gulf area;
- the initiation of a process to settle Iraq's differences with Kuwait, bilaterally or by mutually agreed reference;
- the creation of a peacekeeping force as part of a broader security system for the region;
- a follow-on process to address other issues in the Middle East.<sup>30</sup>

During the air campaign against Iraq, the Government rejected unconditionally all proposals for a pause, noting that the first step towards peace must be the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. In supporting the beginning of the ground campaign, Mulroney rejected the final Soviet efforts to develop a peace proposal with Iraq. On 23 February, the Office of the Prime Minister issued the following comment:

---

<sup>29</sup>*Commons Debates*. 16 January 1991: 17117.

<sup>30</sup>The Mulroney letter to the Secretary-General was tabled in the House of Commons, 15 January 1991; Clark summarized and commented on its contents in his presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings*, no. 79, 21 January 1991: 7.

The Soviet-Iraqi proposal made yesterday fell unacceptably short of the objective of providing for complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Despite the characterization of the Soviet-Iraqi proposal as being unconditional acceptance of UN resolution 660, it, in fact, posed conditions that were unacceptable.

The substantial difference in the time frame between the Soviet-Iraqi proposal and the Coalition position would have allowed Saddam Hussein to repatriate his huge arsenal of tanks and artillery from Kuwait, thus making it impossible to restate peace and security to the area, as called for by UN resolution 678. (The Soviet-Iraqi proposal would have allowed 21 days for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces while the Coalition proposal called for seven days.) Other key conditions included in the Iraqi proposal sought immunity from reparations for the wanton damage caused by Iraq to its neighbours (Security Council Resolution 674), and from the question of violations of the Geneva Conventions (Security Council Resolution 670). Finally, nowhere in the Soviet-Iraqi proposal would Saddam Hussein have been obliged to renounce his claim over Kuwait as called for in Security Council Resolution 662. The Soviet-Iraqi proposal was thus inconsistent both with the objectives of a series of UN resolutions and with some of the most basic principles of international law.<sup>31</sup>

#### *f. Proposals for post-war reconstruction and security*

On 8 February 1991, in a speech by Clark and news releases, the Government revealed a package of proposals for post hostilities activities in the Middle East. In summary these were based on four "guiding principles," viz:

- no compromise on Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait;
- the governments and peoples of the region must support any peace proposals;
- the United Nations must be an integral part of the solution; and
- regional security must address all related issues -- political, economic, military and humanitarian.

On the basis of these principles, the central elements of the package were:

*Humanitarian Assistance.* The Government undertook to provide assistance to the direct victims of the war, especially the migrant workers, Iraqis and Kuwaitis, and to support the leadership of the UN Disaster Relief Organization and the High Commission for Refugees.

*Peacekeeping.* Canada undertook to participate in a peacekeeping mission to oversee the disengagement and repatriation of forces, and to maintain peace and order "while longer term security arrangements are made."

---

<sup>31</sup>Office of the Prime Minister, "Statement on the Beginning of the Ground Campaign to Expel Iraqi Forces from Kuwait," *Press Release*, 23 February 1991.

*The Arab-Israeli Dispute.* Noting the urgency of this issue, and its continued support for Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the package suggested that a comprehensive negotiated settlement "could include the convening of a properly structured conference" to facilitate the settlement of disputes between the parties.

*Economic Development.* The proposal suggested a regional Marshall Plan, financed in substantial measure from regional resources.

*Arms Proliferation.* Canada proposed that "the United Nations convene a Global Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction in order to mobilize political will and energize efforts to produce results on a short term basis."<sup>32</sup>

Prime Minister Mulroney further elaborated on these proposals on 12 February. While support was apparently received from the Secretary-General and the Nordic states, in the first instance there was a less than enthusiastic response from the United States and the United Kingdom. Reacting to this in a speech in London, England on 20 February, Clark offered an emphatic defence of the Government's proposals and a sharp critique of the arms transfer policies of the great powers:

...I believe it is imperative that the world declare that there be no Middle East arms bazaar. Ninety-five per cent of the weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein came from the five permanent members of the Security Council, the same Council which has had to respond to Saddam Hussein's aggression. During the Iran-Iraq war, 28 countries supplied both sides of the conflict, a situation which we must now see either as greed run rampant or as a short-sighted attempt to manipulate a region where control is impossible and where alliances can shift with remarkable speed. Our men and women now face the weapons the Coalition provided Iraq.<sup>33</sup>

In regard to the proposal for a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Clark reacted vigorously to criticism from allied capitals:

It will be greeted with cynicism by officials in some capitals in the West, particularly on the part of nuclear weapons states. But I don't believe their political leaders can be

---

<sup>32</sup>Government of Canada. "Government of Canada Unveils Post-Hostilities Proposals," *News Release*, no. 31, 8 February 1991; Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period in the Gulf," *Statement* 91/10, 8 February 1991; Department of External Affairs. "Post-Hostilities Activities," *Backgrounder*, 8 February 1991.

<sup>33</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, Delivered at the Royal Institute for International Affairs," *Statement* 91/12, 20 February 1991: 8. Similarly frank comments were made by Prime Minister Mulroney in a joint press conference with President Bush in Ottawa on 13 March. See chapter 1, ARMS TRANSFERS.

cynical. Their publics won't allow it. Public opinion is outraged by what we have learned about the history of arms sales to Iraq.<sup>34</sup>

In the second week of March, Clark visited a number of countries in the Middle East, including a return trip to Jordan, it was believed that Canada might have a particular role to play in easing the strains between Jordan and the United States as a consequence of Jordan's partial support for Iraq. In his report on the trip, which began with discussions with the Secretary-General, Clark stated:

[The Secretary-General] urged us to try to heal some of the wounds of this crisis by helping leaders with whom Canada has close ties -- such as King Hussein of Jordan. He was concerned about the Palestinians whose leadership had been so criticized, but whose rights represent a continuing challenge to the reputation for fairness and effectiveness of the United Nations. Indeed, this issue dominated many of my subsequent discussions.<sup>35</sup>

Clark offered no new proposals, but reiterated the Government's desire to play a constructive role in the solution of broader Middle East problems.

Following the adoption of Resolution 687 on 3 April 1991, attention shifted first to the plight of the Kurdish refugees, and then to the implementation of the inspection provisions in Resolution 678. With regard to the refugees, in addition to the \$77 million allocated in August 1990, the bulk of which had gone to Jordan and Egypt, on 5 April, an additional \$3.3 million was allocated for assistance to the Kurds. On 9 and 10 April, additional relief funds were allocated, bringing the total to \$8 million and making Canada one of the largest donors. On 15 April, the Department of National Defence began relief flights from Germany to Turkey and Iran, and from Incirlik in Turkey to Diyarbakir and other bases in southern Turkey. On 15 April, the decision was also taken to deploy Canadian medical personnel based in Germany to the Turkey-Iraq border to provide humanitarian aid to refugees.

On 9 April, in response to questions in the Parliament, Clark indicated that Canada would support the EC proposal for an enclave in Northern Iraq under UN protection despite doubts with respect to jurisdiction. In the event that the EC proposal was not acceptable, Clark also indicated that Canada would propose a plan to establish a UN presence in northern Iraq with a two-fold

---

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.: 9.

<sup>35</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Notes for a Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs in the House of Commons on his Visit to the Middle East," *Statement* 91/16, 15 March 1991.

responsibility: to coordinate relief aid, and to act in an ombudsman role, "which would be able to guarantee, as best the world can, that undertakings with respect to amnesty are being honoured."<sup>36</sup>

Despite fears that Canadian support of the Coalition would detract from its ability to participate in peacekeeping operations, on 16 April the Government announced that, at the request of the Secretary-General, it would participate in the United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). Out of a total force of 1,400, Canada provided a contingent of 300 engineers, whose principal task was the removal of mines and unexploded bombs that would impede peacekeeping in the area.<sup>37</sup>

Canada provided three inspectors for UN teams conducting on-site inspections of Iraqi chemical weapons facilities. Joining in the general concern that the lists of biological, chemical and nuclear weapon facilities provided by Iraq in fulfillment of Resolution 687 were incomplete, on 9 July 1991, Mulroney echoed US threats to resume bombing of selected targets in Iraq if Saddam Hussein failed to comply with the terms of the ceasefire. The Prime Minister declared that the West would be justified in using further military force if Saddam Hussein were to pose a further nuclear threat to Israel or Iraq's Arab neighbours. In mid-August, as UN and IAEA inspection teams continued to uncover details of Iraq's biological, chemical and nuclear weapon programmes, the sanctions against Iraq remained in force.

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

Parliament was not in session in August 1990, when Canada responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by sending naval forces to join the multilateral forces gathering in the Persian Gulf. A full debate on the Government's policy took place after Parliament resumed on 24 September. A second debate in the House began prior to the Security Council adoption of Resolution 678 in late November. Parliament resumed sitting on 15 January 1991 and another full debate took place on the eve of hostilities. The Gulf was a major topic during question time until the end of March 1991, and it was the subject of a number of joint sessions of the defence and external affairs committees of the House. Three parliamentarians, Lloyd Axworthy, Svend Robinson and Robert Corbett, travelled to Iraq in November 1990 in an attempt to secure the release of almost fifty Canadians being held hostage as part of Iraq's "human shield" tactic. They were denied a meeting with Saddam Hussein, but obtained the release of five hostages.

---

<sup>36</sup>Government of Canada. *News Release*, 15 April 1991; *Commons Debates*. 9 April 1991: 19226.

<sup>37</sup>Government of Canada. "Canadian Forces join United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)," *News Release*, 16 April 1991.

On a number of occasions both opposition parties strongly condemned the invasion of Kuwait and the failure of Iraq to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. While opposition comment was both extensive and varied, criticism of the government tended to focus on certain key issues, viz:

- the decision to send forces without consulting Parliament;
- the efficacy of sanctions;
- the authorization of "all necessary means" in Resolution 678 and the perceived departure from Canada's peacekeeping tradition; and
- post-hostilities proposals concerning regional security.

*a. The commitment of Canadian Forces*

Before the reconvening of Parliament, Liberal external affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy and NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin both criticized the Government for not recalling Parliament before sending ships to the Persian Gulf. When the debate on the crisis began on 24 September, Axworthy noted the Prime Minister's statement that the crisis was an historic event, and continued:

If that is the case, if it was so significant, so crucial and so vital, then why was Parliament kept in silence for seven weeks?... When it comes down to vital issues of international obligation, of war and peace, of sending Canadian troops overseas, to deny this Parliament the opportunity to be heard or to represent the Canadian people, to have the question posed, is a dereliction of duty by the government...<sup>38</sup>

McLaughlin commented:

I am pleased to see the House finally has a chance to discuss the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq which took place a little over seven weeks ago. Let me make myself clear: the government has shown a flagrant disregard for Parliamentary democracy and Canadian parliamentary tradition by failing to call back Parliament.<sup>39</sup>

*b. The efficacy of sanctions*

On 28 November, on the eve of Resolution 678, Acting Liberal leader Herb Gray commented:

---

<sup>38</sup>*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13236.

<sup>39</sup>*Commons Debates*. 24 September 1990: 13241.

[The Government] does not appear to be sufficiently interested in determining first whether the United Nations approved sanctions have been working. It does not appear to be sufficiently interested in finding a constructive and peaceful solution.... Maybe the government is reluctant to let us in on the facts about sanctions because there is evidence that the sanctions are working.<sup>40</sup>

Recounting the unprecedented strength and rigour of the effort to enforce sanctions, Gray continued:

...the Security Council has imposed near airtight sanctions against Iraq. UN member countries are enforcing these sanctions with the help of a broad-based multinational force. At this time we are not convinced that sanctions have failed. On the contrary, as I have said, experts are pointing to increasing evidence of their success.<sup>41</sup>

Noting the number of experts who argued that sanctions would take time to work, NDP critic John Brewin expressed similar views about the Government's failure to give sanctions an opportunity to work:

It is a tragedy that the minister and the leaders of the international community have not been prepared to take the additional time necessary to understand that the continued isolation of Saddam Hussein will, in the long run, produce the results that are necessary. Turning him into a martyr to international exterior power will itself be a problem,...but beyond that the minister completely discounts the impact of war in that region.... All of the evidence is that sanctions, if given time, will work. Sanctions undercut prematurely, as the UN resolution proposes to do, will in fact move us to war much faster.<sup>42</sup>

Noting the disparity between Clark's letter of 28 December to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and his statement in the House on 16 January, prior to the air attack on 17 January, both opposition parties renewed their argument that sanctions could be effective without the resort to force, and their request to the government for detailed information on the efficacy of sanctions. When hostilities commenced on 17 January, this issue continued to mark a fundamental difference between the policies of both opposition parties and that of the government.

*c. Resolution 678 and Canada's traditional peacekeeping role*

On a number of occasions opposition spokesmen argued that the multinational force could not be construed as a United Nations force and would not operate under the UN flag. Associated with this

---

<sup>40</sup>*Commons Debates*. 28 November 1990: 15866-67.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup>*Commons Debates*. 28 November 1990: 15870-71.

argument, it was also argued that Canada would deprive itself of its traditional ability to act in a peacekeeping capacity by engaging in hostilities. On 15 January, for example, Liberal Lloyd Axworthy commented:

But if there are hostilities, when the judgement comes what is the role of Canada? Should we sort of march into the barricades waving the flag, not the UN flag but whatever flag it happens to be?... The contribution we can make in a military sense is minuscule. We have got good airplanes. We have wonderful armed services personnel, but in the over-all weight our contribution is small. It is small at least when we weigh it against the contribution we can make in the political, diplomatic sense. Wars have to come to an end. Ceasefires have to be negotiated, truces have to be honoured, peacekeeping has to take place, bridges have to be built, reconstruction has to occur, and that is the peculiar Canadian talent. That is the kind of capacity we have nurtured and built up over the years. That is what Canadians want to support. For us to become a combatant, for us to be on the frontlines, will destroy and eliminate the ability of Canada to play that kind of role.<sup>43</sup>

On 22 January, several days after the onset of the air campaign, NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin explained some of the reasons for the NDP decision to vote against a House motion reaffirming support for the United Nations. McLaughlin commented:

We have consistently opposed Canada's participation in this war because we do not believe that economic sanctions and diplomatic measures were given a full chance. We do believe that the January 15 deadline was an artificial one; one that gave a momentum towards war, instead of a real pause for peace...the United Nations should not be authorizing member countries to go to war. Let us remember that these are not forces which are under the United Nations flag... Canada can make a more valuable contribution than simply as a participant in the military force. In dealing with this issue...we are confronted with three options: the options of supporting and the strengthening of economic sanctions; of renewing and continuing diplomatic efforts; or with war. Every option contained risks. The options of sanctions and diplomacy have the risks that come with time. The option of war contains the risk of loss of human life as well as economic, political and environmental disaster. One set of risks must be weighed against the other set of risks when making these decisions. We weighed these options and we decided that the tragic consequences of war were too high not to give diplomacy and economic sanctions a chance.

As well as being involved in the offensive aspects of this war, we have lost so much of our credibility to participate and provide an effective role in the mediation and peacekeeping aspects...we believe Canada can play a useful and constructive role. We will not be a participant in the war, but a true maker of peace.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup>*Commons Debates*. 15 January 1990: 17033.

<sup>44</sup>*Commons Debates*. 22 January 1991: 17564-66.

*d. Post-hostilities proposals for regional security*

The Government's proposals to control arms transfers, and the March tour of the Middle East by then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark generally elicited support and approval from opposition critics. Liberal Fred Mifflin offered a series of possible initiatives for reconstruction and security in the Middle East, commenting:

The current scramble for reconstruction contracts in Kuwait has not yet been matched by a serious commitment to provide comprehensive aid to the countries of the region hardest hit by the war.<sup>45</sup>

The Liberals proposed a six-point programme to address reconstruction, in which it was argued that the central role should be played by the United Nations and its specialized agencies, peacekeeping and border monitoring, confidence and security building measures, and arms control.

Mifflin concluded:

...the Liberal caucus...is convinced that if the United Nations is to emerge as a leading player in the management of international peace and security, it must be vigorous in promoting its role as an active participant in both the short and long term peace process in the Middle East.... We should therefore encourage the long-term changes the United Nations requires to become the agent of choice of the world community to lead the process of constructing and maintaining this new world order.<sup>46</sup>

NDP member David Barrett focussed on the consequences of entering into alliances with leaders such as President Assad, and on the need to restore relations with Jordan. While generally supportive of the post-hostilities policies of the Government, he concluded:

...I believe that there will be a harvest of damage done to the western nations by the war, based on propaganda that we are not in control of.... We have placed ourselves, through this experience, in the position of being lumped in with the rest of the western nations and of being viewed, frankly, as attempting to impose western hegemony on the region.... I hope that every effort is made by this government...to set a distinct and separate pattern defining Canada.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup>*Commons Debates*, 15 March 1991: 18538.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*: 18540.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*: 18543.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Bonnefous, Marc. "Golfe 1991: essai d'interprétations," *Défense nationale*, May 1991: 59-66.
- Cox, David. "Canada, the United Nations and the Gulf Crisis," *Queen's Quarterly* 98, no. 1, Spring 1991.
- Heller, Mark, et al. "State Breaking, Nation Building," *Peace and Security* 6, no. 2, Summer 1991: 2-6.
- Moulin, Max-Pierre. "Réflexions sur le conflit du Golfe: durcissement, mobilité, camouflage," *Défense nationale*, May 1991: 75-88.
- Paris, Henri and Claude Dagiral. "L'Universalité des théâtres d'opérations, une leçon de la guerre du Golfe," *Défense nationale*, May 1991: 67-74.
- Sifry, Micah L. and Christopher Cerf, eds. *The Gulf War Reader*. New York: Times Books, 1991.
- Stein, Janice. "Crisis in the Gulf: Could it have been Prevented and Can it be Managed?" *Queen's Quarterly* 97, no. 4, Winter 1990.

## FURTHER READING

- Gittings, John, ed. *Beyond the Gulf War*. Canadian Institute for International Relations, 1991.
- Smolansky, O.M. and B.M. Smolansky. *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*. Duke University Press, 1991.
- UN Document S/22535 (a 145 page report assessing the damage inflicted on Kuwait's infrastructure by Iraq).

## CROSS REFERENCES

Arms Transfers  
 Israel and the Occupied Territories  
 Middle East Arms Control  
 United Nations and Peacekeeping



*BACKGROUND*

During 1990-1991, substantial progress on the dismantlement of the system of apartheid in South Africa occurred in tandem with an increase in violence and killings between rival black factions in the townships. The string of remarkable changes and events occurring in South Africa this year culminated in July with the first ANC National Conference inside South Africa in 30 years, the announcement that the US would lift sanctions against South Africa and the revelation that the Inkatha movement, one of the main protagonists in the ongoing battles in the townships, had been secretly funded by the South African security forces.

Since President F.W. De Klerk came to power in August 1989, he has followed a policy which moved South Africa away from legislative apartheid. On 7 August 1990, after the second set of negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the de Klerk government (the first were held in May 1990), the ANC announced that it had agreed to suspend its thirty-year old guerilla campaign. In exchange, the government had agreed to review and repeal security legislation, to release some categories of political prisoners and to facilitate the return of political exiles by April 1991. This agreement, a major achievement for South Africa, opened the way for negotiations to begin on developing a new constitution.

These achievements soon took a back burner to efforts to end violence in the townships around Johannesburg. Clashes between supporters of the Zulu-based Inkatha movement, led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and supporters of the ANC had flared throughout 1990 particularly in and around the city of Pietermaritzburg in Natal. However, by mid-August the battles had taken on a new degree of seriousness and permanence. During the week of 12 to 18 August, 178 people were killed, and by 23 August the death toll had exceeded 500. During this period, there was increasing pressure on the leaders of the two rival groups to meet to try to reach an agreement which might end the fighting.

It was not until 20 September that the ANC issued an invitation to Inkatha leader Buthelezi to meet. However, the invitation was extended to Buthelezi in his capacity as Chief Minister of KwaZulu, the Zulu homeland, rather than as head of Inkatha. At issue was recognition of Inkatha as an equal actor in the black anti-apartheid movement. The ANC has been reluctant to give Inkatha such stature. Buthelezi welcomed the invitation but responded that he would only attend in his capacity as head of Inkatha. On 22 October, the ANC finally agreed to extend an invitation to Buthelezi as head of Inkatha.

On 23 September, President de Klerk arrived in Washington to begin talks with US President Bush, the first such talks between US and South African leaders since 1945. President Bush praised

the progress achieved by de Klerk as "irreversible" and indicated that the US would consider lifting sanctions if more progress were made. Specifically, President Bush referred to the need to meet four of five conditions established by the US Congress in its Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. The Act requires South Africa to free political prisoners, legalize political parties, end the state of emergency, dismantle the Group Areas Act and enter into good faith negotiations for a new constitution. On 25 September, de Klerk told a US audience that he is willing to accept the idea of "one man one vote" in a new constitutional situation as long as there is adequate protection of minorities. He reiterated this willingness during a visit to the Netherlands in October. The Separate Amenities Act which segregated public facilities according to race was formally repealed on 15 October 1990. Parliament had voted to repeal the Act in June 1990 but its official implementation did not come into effect until 15 October in order to allow communities to prepare for the transition.

On 29 January, the long awaited meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi finally took place in Durban. At the end of the day, the two leaders issued a joint statement which called on their supporters to stop attacks in the townships and to promote peace. It was not clear, however, whether the joint statement would be successful in ending the fighting.

Three days later, on 1 February, in a speech marking the opening of a new session of Parliament, President de Klerk announced that the National Party would introduce legislation to repeal the acts that controlled land ownership, keeping most land in the hands of the white population. The acts to be repealed included the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1966 and the Black Communities Act of 1984. In a surprise announcement, President de Klerk stated that his party would also introduce legislation to repeal the Population Registration Act which classifies South Africans into racial groups. Previously, de Klerk's position had been that this act could only be dealt with in the context of a new constitution. However, special transitional measures would be introduced to allow old and new structures to be in place simultaneously.

On 12 February 1991, Mandela and de Klerk met in an effort to move negotiations forward again. As part of a clarification of the ANC's earlier agreement to suspend its guerilla war, the ANC agreed to stop infiltrating and training guerillas in South Africa and not to create any new underground military structures. In return, the government recognized the ANC's right to engage in protests without intimidation or violence and agreed to speed the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles.

On 12 March, draft legislation which would repeal the land laws was tabled in Parliament in the form of five draft laws. Although the legislation would make it possible for South Africans to live where they chose it did not provide for any reparations for an estimated 3.5 million blacks who had been forcibly evicted from their land and moved to homelands. For this reason, the legislation was

criticized by the ANC. The Conservative Party, which had walked out during de Klerk's speech to Parliament, was also opposed to the legislation but because it was opposed to changing the laws.

In spite of repeated calls for restraint by Mandela and Buthelezi, and a second meeting between Buthelezi and Mandela on 30 March, resulting in a new peace plan, violence continued to escalate in the townships. It was estimated that 1,200 people had died in township fighting since August 1990. On 5 April, the ANC announced that unless the government undertook measures to end the violence by 9 May, the ANC would refuse to participate in further talks on the constitution.

Violence intensified at the end of April and on 6 May, blaming the ANC for the fighting, Inkatha threatened to send 100,000 fighters in to Soweto if the ANC did not stop the fighting within seven days. On 7 and 8 May, President de Klerk held separate meetings with Buthelezi and Mandela in an effort to breach the impasse. The Zulu, supporters of Inkatha, have a tradition of carrying spears and clubs. The ANC maintained that these weapons were contributing to the fighting in the townships and wanted the carrying of weapons in public to be banned. On 9 May, de Klerk announced that there would be a ban on the carrying of traditional weapons, with the exception of spears, in areas of unrest.

President de Klerk also attempted to meet two other ANC conditions and announced that single sex workers' hostels (one of the flashpoints for violence) would be phased out and that a commission to investigate misconduct complaints about the behaviour of the security forces would be established. However, these changes did not meet all of the ANC demands and on 18 May, the ANC announced that it would not participate in discussions relating to the constitution until all of its demands for an end to the fighting had been met.

At the beginning of July, the ANC held a national conference in Durban, the first such national conference held inside South Africa. Nelson Mandela was elected as President of the ANC, replacing Oliver Tambo. In a shift from its past emphasis, the conference also supported negotiations as the way forward. In closing the conference, Nelson Mandela said that the ANC had "...reaffirmed the premise that negotiation is a terrain of struggle leading to our central objective, the transfer of power to the people."

Since autumn 1990, accusations that government security forces were doing little to stop township violence and were in some instances encouraging it, were accompanied by accusations that a "third force" was instigating the fighting in the townships. On 19 July, top secret documents made available to the press revealed that the South African security forces had secretly given money to the Inkatha organization to help give it an edge over its rival, the ANC. The revelations called into question the credibility of the de Klerk government, especially after the depth of involvement of

government officials was revealed. Similarly, Chief Buthelezi's credibility as a leader has also been called into question. It is not clear how and to what degree this latest development, after so much positive progress on removing the apartheid system, will affect the situation in South Africa and its international standing.

### *International Sanctions*

Progress in removing the legislative framework of apartheid prompted a reconsideration of sanctions by the international community. On 15 December, the European Community (EC) voted to lift its ban on new investment in South Africa. The move came after a letter from Nelson Mandela to the EC, asking them to postpone consideration of repealing sanctions until after the ANC had reconsidered their position. On 15 April, building on its earlier decision to allow new investment in South Africa, the EC agreed to lift a ban on imports of gold coins, iron and steel from South Africa. However, this decision has not yet taken effect as its implementation was blocked by the Danish Parliament.

The Commonwealth Committee on South Africa, chaired by Canada's former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, decided on 16 February to continue full sanctions pending concrete steps toward removing apartheid. The Committee agreed to review the sanctions situation after 30 April providing that South Africa met five conditions: the release of remaining political prisoners; allowing exiles to return home; repeal repressive provisions of security legislation; and repeal the Group Areas, Population Registration and Land Acts. It was also decided that trade, investment and financial sanctions should remain in place until a multiparty constitutional reform process made progress and that the arms embargo should remain in force until a new constitution is in place.

The Commonwealth also agreed to de-link the sports embargo from its general consideration of sanctions and agreed to permit competition between Commonwealth and South African athletes. On 27 March, the International Olympic Committee re-admitted South Africa to the Olympic games subject to its compliance with conditions established by the Committee. South Africa had been banned from the Olympic Games since 1970.

The South African Parliament passed legislation repealing the land laws on 5 June 1991. On 17 June 1991, the Parliament voted to repeal the Population Registration Act, removing the final legislative pillar of apartheid and leaving only the constitution to be changed in order to end the formal system of apartheid. In recognition of these actions, on 10 July 1991, President Bush announced that South Africa had met all five of the conditions established in the CAAA and that consequently, US sanctions against South Africa should be lifted.

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has been a very active participant in the international debate on South Africa. The Secretary of State for External Affairs acts as the Chairman of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers of South Africa, and Canada has been a strong advocate of sanctions and an end to apartheid in international fora such as the United Nations.

On 7 August 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark welcomed the announcement of an agreement between the ANC and President de Klerk. In particular, Clark welcomed the ANC's suspension of guerilla warfare, noting that Canada had encouraged Mandela to end the armed struggle when he visited Canada in June 1990. In addition, Mr. Clark re-stated Canada's willingness to help with the resettlement of exiles and political prisoners, and with the process of negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Clark also welcomed the formal repeal of the Separate Amenities Act on 15 October 1990, calling on the South African government to ensure that the effects of this change would not be counteracted by municipal legislation.

The South African government's public commitment to end apartheid should be accompanied by vigorous action to ensure that all citizens of South Africa are given full access, as a basic right, to public facilities throughout the country.<sup>2</sup>

The day after President de Klerk's announcement to Parliament of plans to introduce legislation to revoke the land laws and Population Registration Act, Prime Minister Mulroney indicated that he had phoned President de Klerk to congratulate him on the announcement. Prime Minister Mulroney told reporters:

[President de Klerk] has demonstrated great courage and determination in dealing with an extraordinarily difficult problem.... They are really at the beginning of the road, but he has clearly placed South Africa along what appears to be an irreversible course.<sup>3</sup>

On 10 February 1991, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark issued a statement commemorating the first anniversary of the release of Nelson Mandela, noting the "momentous steps" that

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Mr. Clark Welcomes Breakthrough on Negotiations in South Africa," *News Release*, no. 168, 7 August 1990.

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Hails repeal of Separate Amenities Act in South Africa," *News Release*, no. 239, 15 October 1990.

<sup>3</sup>T. Harper. "End near for Pretoria Sanctions, PM hints," *Toronto Star*, 2 February 1991: 1.

had been taken by South Africa since that time. Mr. Clark also stated that he hoped that formal negotiations would begin shortly and that political prisoners would soon be released.<sup>4</sup>

As chairman of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CFMSA), Mr. Clark outlined the rationale for the Committee's February decision to maintain sanctions, to the House of Commons. Clark spoke of the profound changes occurring in South Africa and said that the CFMSA had decided that they would "...only reward actual changes which dismantle the system of apartheid." To this end the CFMSA had decided to take a "programmed management approach" where the strongest sanctions would be kept until apartheid was abolished and the lesser sanctions would be lifted in response to "tangible proof of a determination to end apartheid irreversibly."<sup>5</sup> Consequently the Committee had decided to meet again at a later date to assess progress on the first five criteria for change (see above for detail). In discussing the Committee's decisions, Clark stated:

Just as many South Africans show remarkable responsibility in facing their new challenges, so must the world community weigh and apply our influence with great care. The moral imperative remains: to end apartheid. Now, with change in the air, the question of how we contribute to that goal becomes more complex.<sup>6</sup>

On the specific question of developing a new constitution, the CFMSA agreed to provide constitutional expertise and funding to contribute to the process. As its contribution, Clark announced that Canada would provide \$1.8 million in 1990-1991 and \$2.3 million in 1991-1992. A further \$5.8 million would go to assist the return of exiles and political prisoners.<sup>7</sup>

In a speech to the Commonwealth Working Group on Human Resource Development for a post-Apartheid South Africa, Joe Clark spoke again of the progress that had been made to date, but also sounded a note of caution.

For blacks in the townships, ...apartheid is still alive and well. They are still pushed around by the security forces and by an indifferent or antagonistic white bureaucracy. They are still denied access to hospitals and schools.... And now they fear that the international community is beginning to forget them.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Marks First Anniversary of Nelson Mandela's Release, *News Release*, no. 32, 10 February 1991.

<sup>5</sup>*Commons Debates*. 28 February 1991: 17791.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, to the Ottawa Meeting of the Commonwealth Working Group on Human Resource Development for a post-apartheid South Africa," *Statement*, 91/19, 17 April 1991: 2.

The effects of apartheid, such as illiteracy, poverty and violence will take years to overcome and Clark noted that:

We must increasingly look to the future, beyond the launch of formal negotiations to the creation of an apartheid-free society. This is the prize for which the struggle has been waged. I have been struck, in my discussions with other foreign leaders, by the priority they all accord to supporting the long-term development needs of South Africa.<sup>9</sup>

For its part, Canada has been involved in a variety of programmes aimed at dealing with social questions. In 1985, Canada established the Canadian Education Programme for South Africa which includes scholarships, small-scale initiatives in areas such as adult education, labour education and a scholarship and training programme in Canada. Canada also supports community development projects in South Africa. In addition, Canada established the Dialogue Fund, administered by the Canadian embassy in South Africa, which encourages the negotiation process and other interactions among various groups in the community. In 1990-1991, the Dialogue Fund was valued at \$2.3 million.

In outlining Canada's programmes, Mr. Clark summarized:

We are engaged in this work across a broad front, and we intend to stay with this issue for the long haul: applying our funding, experience, pressure, and support to bring about an end to apartheid.<sup>10</sup>

On 16 May, the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, Joe Clark's successor, issued a statement expressing concern about the escalation of violence in the townships and the possible consequences for the ongoing negotiations, urging all parties to continue negotiations on the constitution in good faith.<sup>11</sup> In June, Mrs. McDougall issued a statement commending the South African government for its actions in repealing the legislation relating to land laws and the Population Registration Act.

This is a breakthrough for South Africa. Canada congratulates the South African Parliament, and the Government of President de Klerk, for taking this major step towards political reconciliation in South Africa. We also pay tribute to the thousands of South Africans who struggled for so long to bring about an end to apartheid. The abolition of this abhorrent legislation is their victory.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.: 3.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.: 5.

<sup>11</sup>Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Profoundly Concerned About Escalation of Violence in South Africa," *News Release*, no. 116, 16 May 1991.

<sup>12</sup>Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Commends Repeal of Pillars of Apartheid," *News Release*, no. 143, 17 June 1991.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

After the EC's decision to lift its ban on new investment in South Africa, NDP member Svend Robinson sought assurances from the Government that Canada would maintain its ban on investment and its policy of sanctions. The Minister for External Relations, Monique Landry replied that Canada was "determined to maintain our present policy" until the next meeting of the Commonwealth Committee.<sup>13</sup>

In response to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark's statement to the House after the Commonwealth Committee's meeting, Liberal member Lloyd Axworthy and NDP member Svend Robinson commended Mr. Clark's role in the process. In addition, both members called attention to the contribution made by Canadian churches and non-governmental organizations to progress. In supporting the changes made by the de Klerk government and the decisions of the Commonwealth Committee, Lloyd Axworthy sounded a note of caution.

Time is running out. We know that there must be a constitutional meeting by 1991 and I believe the mandate of the de Klerk government begins to run out by 1994.... How do we, in fact, maintain the constant pressure of having applied sanctions over the years and at the same time provide encouragement?<sup>14</sup>

Mr. Axworthy went on to recommend that the Government undertake a review of Canada's policy to date and the possible future steps that might be taken to support the reforms that are underway, under the auspices of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT). He also stated that the changes in South Africa should not lead Canada to forget the difficulties experienced by the front-line states.<sup>15</sup>

NDP member Svend Robinson pointed to the many elements of the apartheid system that remained to be changed and urged Canada not to give up its sanctions policy too early. In particular, he noted that there were more political trials in 1990 than in 1989, and that housing, education, literacy, unemployment and health issues must also all be addressed.

...the per capita spending on social services in the last year, in 1990, was five times more for whites than it was for blacks in South Africa.... As well, South Africa's strict security legislation must be revoked, particularly the Internal Security Act which provides for detention without trial and the banning of public gatherings. Most

---

<sup>13</sup>*Commons Debates*. 17 December 1990: 16820.

<sup>14</sup>*Commons Debates*. 28 February 1991: 17793.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

important, existing sanctions must continue until blacks are guaranteed full democratic rights in the South African Constitution;...<sup>16</sup>

SCEAIT discussed the question of reforms in South Africa. On 26 March 1991, it heard from Ronald MacLean, the Canadian Ambassador to South Africa who was accompanied by Lucie Edwards, the Chairperson of the Southern Africa Task Force at External Affairs.

Ambassador MacLean gave a lengthy summary of the situation in South Africa, outlining the prospects for future change, the rationale behind the de Klerk policies, and the areas which still need further work. Ambassador MacLean noted that the use (or abuse) of the security forces in South Africa was unchanged and that while policy changes were occurring, change had not filtered down to the day-to-day life of blacks in the townships. There was considerable hope to be found in the de Klerk policies, the negotiations on the constitution and in the willingness of the white society to accept change. However, a very difficult problem in the future would be dealing with the large number of poorly educated blacks and their high expectations for a new system.<sup>17</sup>

Much of the Committee discussion focussed on the current situation in South Africa, the prospect that the changes might be derailed, and how Canadian policy on sanctions might best be applied as change occurs. Committee members also discussed the possible post-apartheid problems with Ambassador MacLean and how they might best be addressed by Canada.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*: 17795.

<sup>17</sup>For Mr. MacLean's remarks and the ensuing discussion see: Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, no. 107, 26 March 1991.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*

RECENT LITERATURE

- Anderson, Catherine. *All Shades of Truth. Reviewing the Road to Democracy in South Africa*. Toronto: The Mackenzie Institute, 1990.
- CUSO. "Canada's South Africa policy: Does it live up to the rhetoric? An interview with Linda Freeman," *Journal*, July 1990: 15-17.
- Davies, Robert. *Key Issues in Reconstructing South-southern African Economic Relations after Apartheid*. Southern African Perspectives Working Paper no. 2. University of the Western Cape: Centre for Southern African Studies, 1990.
- Freeman, Linda. *Le Canada et l'Afrique du Sud 1990*. Montreal: Le Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe, 1990.
- Godfrey, Stephen. *Economic Sanctions and South Africa*. Background Paper no. 33. Ottawa: CIIPS, August 1990.
- US General Accounting Office. *Economic Sanctions. Effect of Selected Measures on South Africa and Namibia*. Washington D.C.: GPO, April 1990.
- Zartman, I. William. "Negotiation and the South African Conflict," *SAIS Review*, Winter-Spring 1991: 113-132.

FURTHER READING

- Anglin, Douglas G. *Canada and South Africa: Challenge and Response*. Ottawa: Carleton University, 1986.
- Berger, Peter L. and Bobby Godsell, eds. *A Future South Africa: Visions, Strategies and Realities*. Capetown, South Africa: Human & Rousseau and Tafelburg, 1988.
- Landgren, Signe. *Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry*. New York: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1989.
- Minter, William. "South Africa: Straight Talk on Sanctions," *Foreign Policy*, no. 65, Winter 1986-1987: 43-63.
- Munton, Don and Timothy M. Shaw. "Apartheid and Canadian Public Opinion," *International Perspectives*, September/October 1987: 9-12.
- Oxfam Canada. *South Africa Watch*, 1990-1991 issues.
- SAR Collective. *Southern Africa Report*, 1990-1991 issues (five issues per year).
- Sevry, Jean. "Afrique du Sud: l'Apartheid en crise," *Problèmes politiques et sociaux*, no. 559, May 1987: 1-40.

### 31. SOUTHERN AFRICA: ANGOLA, NAMIBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE

#### BACKGROUND

Three countries in Southern Africa -- Angola, Namibia and Mozambique -- have, after years of post-colonial civil war, sought to achieve peace in their country and work towards multiparty democracy. This process has been considerably aided by the new warmth in the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union which has led both sides to rethink their involvement in various regional conflicts and encourage peace negotiations. Improvements have also been linked to the movement toward ending the apartheid system in South Africa, a system which had fed instability and deliberate destabilization in neighbouring countries. Although the three countries have all begun this process, they are at three very different stages in finding their way to peaceful democratic societies.

Namibia was declared independent in March 1990, having made the transition to multiparty democracy through UN-monitored elections in November 1989. From 1884 to 1920, Namibia was a German colony. With the German defeat in World War I, Namibia, then known as South-West Africa, was placed under South African administration by the League of Nations. After World War II, no new agreement was concluded between the UN and South Africa, leaving the territory in South African hands by default. In 1950, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the territory was still under an international mandate and required South Africa to submit the area to General Assembly supervision and file regular reports.

The UN changed the territory's name to Namibia in 1968, and in 1971, the International Court of Justice ruled again on the question, stating that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal. In the meantime, in 1966, the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which was formed in 1958, began a guerilla war against South Africa in an effort to gain independence.

In 1978, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 435 which outlined a plan for Namibian independence, including a ceasefire and elections under UN supervision. It was not until 22 December 1988, however, that the plan was realized when Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed an agreement calling for its implementation. Official implementation of Resolution 435 began on 1 April 1989. In February, the UN authorized the deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a 4,650 strong UN peacekeeping force, 1,000 civilian election monitors and 500 police officers. Although the process was nearly derailed by violence and accusations of torture and intimidation on both sides, in the end, the elections to the Constituent Assembly were successfully carried out in November 1989 with SWAPO winning forty-one of seventy-two seats. On 9 February 1990, a new constitution was approved by the Assembly and Namibia achieved full official independence on 21 March 1990. (For more details see *The Guide 1990*.) Namibia has become a

member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and has begun to establish formal diplomatic relations with a large number of countries.

The December 1988 agreements, which contributed to progress in Namibia, also affected Angola. Angola achieved independence from Portugal in 1975. Since then, Angola has been ruled by the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which took power after independence. The MPLA has been challenged ever since it took power by the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The fifteen-year civil war has taken its toll on Angola which has the highest percentage of limbless citizens in the world and whose resource-rich (including oil) economy has been devastated by the war.

Since 1975, the Soviet Union has supported the MPLA government with \$500 million in military aid. This has been supplemented by large numbers of Cuban advisors whose presence was as high as 50,000 soldiers at a given time. South Africa and the US have supported UNITA, with US support coming in the form of approximately \$50 million in arms each year.

The December 1988 peace accords signed by Angola, Cuba, Namibia and South Africa brought an end to South African assistance for UNITA and provided for the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola. The withdrawal has been monitored by a UN peacekeeping force (UNAVEM). These changes opened the way for peace talks. The first round, brokered by Zaire, established a ceasefire which broke down in June 1989. A second attempt was begun in April 1990, this time under Portuguese auspices. The slow process was given a boost in September 1990 when the US and Soviet Union agreed to act as mediators. The process was also aided by shifts in the MPLA government attitude. In July 1990, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos announced that the MPLA would accept the principle of multiparty democracy.

The negotiations resulted in a set of Peace Accords for Angola which were signed in Estoril, Portugal, on 1 May 1991. The accords called for a de facto ceasefire to begin on 15 May 1991, the date of the final formal acceptance of the accords by the two party leaders, with the formal ceasefire beginning officially on 1 June. A unified armed force of 50,000 including members of UNITA and MPLA forces is to be established. A United Nations force (an expanded version of UNAVEM which was established to monitor the Cuban withdrawal) will monitor the ceasefire and a political military commission involving UNITA, the MPLA and three mediators -- the US, the Soviet Union and Portugal -- will oversee the transition process and aid in preparations for elections and unified armed forces. Elections are planned for autumn 1992. The Accords were formally initialled by the leaders of the Angolan government and UNITA, in the presence of the UN Secretary-General, in Lisbon on 31 May 1991.

To date, the ceasefire has held successfully and preparations for elections are underway. All Cuban soldiers had been withdrawn by the end of May, five weeks ahead of schedule.

In contrast, although the Mozambique government has agreed to move towards multiparty democracy, talks between the government and rebel soldiers have not succeeded in ending the conflict and the situation for Mozambique's population continues to worsen due to lack of food, proper medical care and other basic services. Of a population of 16 million, estimates of internal refugees, a large percentage of whom cannot be reached by aid, range from two to five million. One million refugees are thought to have left the country. Large numbers are now suffering from famine while international aid is decreasing. In April 1991, only 37 percent of emergency food aid pledged by the West had arrived.

After Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won control of the nation. An opposition group known as RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana - also known as MNR) was formed by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization in 1977. These two groups have continued a bloody military struggle since then.

After the end of white-minority rule in Rhodesia in 1982, South African Military Intelligence took over the support and training of RENAMO guerillas. This assistance was formally ended by the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa, signed in 1984. However, reports have suggested that South African elements continued to supply RENAMO unofficially, in spite of denials from the South African government.

Talks aimed at ending the civil war began in July 1989. Also in 1989, the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO government abandoned Marxism in favour of an economy based on liberalized trade. At the same time, the government announced that it would draft a new constitution for the country which would be based on a multiparty democratic system. The new constitution was developed during 1990 and became official on 30 November 1990.

On 1 December 1990, the peace negotiators in Rome announced that they had agreed on a limited ceasefire which would restrict Zimbabwean troops to two narrow transportation corridors. RENAMO agreed to cease military operations within those corridors. This ceasefire is monitored by a multinational commission. All Zimbabwean troops had been withdrawn to the corridors by 28 December, ahead of the 5 January deadline. However, attacks and violence have continued in the rest of the country. The sixth round of peace talks began on 2 May in Rome. Significant differences remain between the two sides.

### CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada was a strong supporter of the transition process which brought Namibia to independence. Canada contributed a total of 301 personnel to the UNTAG team, including RCMP officers, election monitors and military personnel (see *The Guide* 1990).

In a speech to the United Nations, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

We take great pride in the UN's role in assisting Namibia make its transition to independence, an effort which was truly global, involving 109 members of this organization.<sup>19</sup>

Canada, along with the rest of the United Nations General Assembly supported a resolution calling for international economic assistance for Angola to aid in economic rehabilitation. The resolution was adopted without a vote.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which noted with deep concern the situation in Mozambique and called for all states to provide and expand help.<sup>21</sup>

### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on these issues during the 1990-1991 sessions.

---

<sup>19</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the 45th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," *Statement*, no. 90/55, 26 September 1990: 2.

<sup>20</sup>*International Assistance for the Economic Rehabilitation of Angola*. UNGA Resolution 45/233, 21 December 1990.

<sup>21</sup>*Assistance to Mozambique*, UNGA Resolution 45/227, 21 December 1990. Adopted without a vote.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Grundy, Kenneth W. "Namibia's First Year of Independence," *Current History*, May 1991: 213-216, 226-227.
- Jaster, Robert S. *The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-Western Africa*. Adelphi Papers 253. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Brassey's, Autumn 1990.
- Knight, Virginia Curtin. "Mozambique's Search for Stability," *Current History*, May 1991: 217-220, 226.
- Njanana, Rhoda. "Namibia Since Independence," *South Africa News Features*. Harare, Zimbabwe: South Africa Research and Documentation Centre, 1990.
- Simon, David. *Independent Namibia One Year On*. London Research Institute for Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Conflict Studies 239, March 1991.

FURTHER READING

- Anyang'nyong'o, Peter, ed. *Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa*. London: Zed Press, 1987.
- Dreyer, Ronald. *Namibia and Angola: The Search for Independence and Regional Security (1966-1988)*. Occasional Paper, no. 3. Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 1988.
- Kitchen, Helen, ed. *Angola, Mozambique and the West*. New York: Praeger for Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1987.
- Letrilliart, Philippe. "Les décolonisations portugaises de 1975: histoire d'un échec," *Défense nationale*, February 1988: 117-129.
- O'Meara, Dan. *Destabilization of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, 1980-1987*. Background Paper, no. 20. Ottawa: CIIPS, June 1988.
- Somerville, Keith. *Angola: Politics, Economics and Society*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986.
- Wood, Brian, ed. *Namibia 1884-1984: Readings on Namibia's History and Society*. London/Lusaka: NSC in Cooperation with the UN Institute for Namibia, 1988.



*BACKGROUND*

The state of Yugoslavia is a product of the first world war. It was first formed in 1918 when Serbia and Bosnia (which had historically been under Turkish rule) joined with Slovenia and Croatia, which had been part of Austria-Hungary, to create the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. It was thought that a union of this sort would protect the small states from foreign domination. The Kingdom was ruled by King Alexander Karageorgevic who initially promised a union of the groups which would enhance and ensure their integrity. However, in 1928, the King abrogated the Constitution and ruled the country as a dictatorship. In 1929, King Alexander changed the name of the country to Yugoslavia which means South Slav State. The King, a Serb, carried out policies which subsumed and ignored the interests of the Slovenes and Croats. He was assassinated in 1934 and his brother Prince Paul took over.

Yugoslavia was invaded by the Germans in 1941. After Yugoslavia's liberation in 1944, Tito's Communist government came to power and in the initial post-war years many thousands of anti-Communist Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were killed. Under Tito's leadership, Yugoslavia followed an independent Communist line which resulted in the country's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948.

The union, enforced under various dictatorships since 1918, began to come apart after Tito's death in 1980, and the shift to greater freedom and democracy seen throughout Eastern Europe in recent years has made it possible for various republics in Yugoslavia to take steps towards independence. As presently constituted, Yugoslavia is composed of six republics and two nominally autonomous provinces. The six republics are Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A number of distinct ethnic groups are distributed among the six republics, including Albanians, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins. Comprising 40 percent of the total population, Serbs are the largest ethnic group in the country. Croats make up 19.8 percent, and Slovenes 7.8 percent (according to the 1981 census). There is a large crossover between Croatia and Serbia with some 600,000 Serbs living in the Croatian republic of 4.6 million.

The two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, are essentially outgrowths of Serbia. In 1990, Serbia suspended Kosovo's assembly and has been running the province directly. Nine of ten citizens in Kosovo are ethnic Albanian, but the Serbs claim that the province is the original Serbian homeland. The disparities in cultures, language and histories among the ethnic groups have been exacerbated by economic developments that resulted in Slovenia and Croatia being more economically advanced than the other republics.

In order to deal with the different republics, a system of collective presidency was established whereby representatives from the six republics and two provinces rule collectively and the presidency itself rotates among the eight representatives with each representative acting as president for one year.

On 9 December 1990, the republic of Serbia elected Slobodan Milosevic as its president. Milosevic leads the Serbian Socialist Party, previously the Communist Party, which maintained power over the past three years by building on and encouraging Serbian nationalism. The Serbian Socialist Party has been the only previously Communist Party to win an election in Yugoslavia.

As part of their move towards increased independence, Croatia and Slovenia took charge of republican defence forces. On 9 January 1991, the Collective State Presidency (CSP) ordered that all unauthorized armed units should surrender their arms to the Yugoslav Army (JNA) within ten days. It was not precisely clear what the CSP considered to be unauthorized units, but in Croatia and Slovenia, it was thought that the Government intended to disband the republican defence forces. On 19 January, with both the JNA and Croatian and Slovene forces on high alert, the deadline was extended by forty-eight hours. The crisis was averted when the CSP and Croatian leaders met and reached agreement on the demobilization (not disbanding) of Croatia's special forces.

On 25 January 1991, Macedonia adopted a declaration of sovereignty. On 20 February, following a December referendum in which Slovene citizens voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence, the Slovenian Parliament passed a resolution which called for the disassociation of Slovenia from Yugoslavia. One day later, on 21 February 1991, the Croatian assembly approved a similar resolution. In January, Croatia and Slovenia agreed to a mutual defence pact under which, if armed intervention occurs in one republic, the other republic will immediately declare full independence.

The declaration of Croatian independence sparked action from Serbs living in the republic. On 28 February 1991, the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina declared itself separate from Croatia. In the following two days, attempts by Serbian police reservists to take formal control of the town of Pakrac led to violence when Croatia sent in riot police. The Yugoslav army was brought in to re-establish order.

Talks on the future constitutional make-up of Yugoslavia were scheduled throughout this time period. However, there is a fundamental difference in the approach of Serbia which seeks a strong central government and the other republics which advocate a looser federation of independent republics.

Within Serbia, on 9 March, an anti-communist demonstration calling for an end to Communist control of the media in Serbia and for the resignation of the Milosevic Government, drew an estimated 100,000 protestors in defiance of a ban on such demonstrations established two days earlier.

The demonstration was put down by the Army and riot police, resulting in ninety injuries and the death of one policeman and one student. The leader of the protest, Vuk Draskovic was arrested. Further protests led to the release of Draskovic. As a further concession to the protestors, the head of the state-run television station resigned, along with the Minister of the Interior.

On 15 March, in what appeared to be a concerted effort to force the intervention of the armed forces, the President of the CSP, Borisav Jovic, the Serbian representative, resigned. He announced that his resignation was due to the failure of the CSP to support his call for a state of emergency. His resignation was followed by resignations from the Montenegro and Vojvodina representatives. In a further effort to subvert the process the Kosovo representative was forced out of the CSP, leaving only four of eight representatives, paralyzing the CSP, which needs a quorum of five to make decisions.

The next day, the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic announced that the Serbian republic would no longer accept the decisions of the CSP and mobilized Serbian defence forces on the pretext of potential disorder in the province of Kosovo. Forces in Croatia and Slovenia were also mobilized and the country appeared on the brink of civil war. It was widely speculated that these actions were an attempt by Serbia to prompt the intervention of the army. As the country waited, there was no word from the armed forces, fuelling speculation that there was a split in the command. However, on 19 March 1991, in a somewhat ambiguous statement, the armed forces announced that it would not intervene in political affairs but neither would it allow intranational armed clashes to develop anywhere in the country. The crisis past, the Serbian Parliament asked Jovic to rescind his resignation. His return to the CSP was accompanied by the reinstatement of the other members.

Early in May, the CSP held an emergency meeting to deal with the ongoing violence between Croats and Serbs in Croatia. After an initial deadlock, on 9 May, the CSP agreed to give the Army sweeping powers, prohibited the movement of armed civilian units and called for Serbs and Croats to hand over their weapons. A new crisis occurred in the following week, when the three Serbian representatives on the CSP blocked the annual transition of the Presidency. Stipe Mesic, the Croatian representative was to be the next President and would have been Yugoslavia's first non-Communist President. However, Montenegro abstained from the vote on the Presidency in protest of the Federal Assembly's failure to ratify the nomination of three new members of the CSP. In conjunction with the three Serbian negative votes, this meant that Mesic failed to get a majority of five votes.

An emergency meeting of the Federal Assembly ratified the nomination of three new representatives in an effort to clear the way for the Montenegro vote. However, the CSP again failed to ratify Mesic's nomination who along with the Slovene and Macedonian representatives walked out of the meeting.

On 19 May, a referendum in Croatia resulted in an overwhelming vote for sovereignty and independence. Many Serbs boycotted the voting. With a declaration of Croatian independence on 29 May and an upcoming declaration by Slovenia planned for 26 June, Yugoslavia was once again on the brink of civil war. On 27 June, the Yugoslav army began attacks on the Slovene militia in an effort to remove them from border posts Slovenia had established on its border with Austria and Croatia. It is estimated that one hundred people died in the first day of fighting and it was later revealed that the army had acted without the approval of the CSP.

On 28 June, a mutually agreed halt to violence was established allowing for a mediation team from the European Community (EC) to negotiate a ceasefire. The ceasefire, agreed to on 29 June, allowed for Mesic to finally be instated as President and required Croatia and Slovenia to postpone further moves to independence for three months. As well, all army and militia would return to their barracks. Although the situation did not deteriorate again into full-scale battles, sporadic clashes continued to occur.

The violence in Yugoslavia was the subject of the first meetings of the new Conflict Prevention Centre at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE passed a resolution calling for an immediate end to the hostilities. This followed a 20 June resolution by CSCE ministers which supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and urged a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

On 8 July, a more substantive agreement between the Yugoslav government and Slovenia, mediated by the EC representatives, was achieved. It included the terms of the initial ceasefire, the release of prisoners, limiting the army to a designated zone, as well as a compromise on the border posts in which Slovenia maintained control but acted in conformity with federal regulations and deposited customs revenue in an account shared with the federal government. Under the plan, observers from the EC would go to Yugoslavia to monitor the ceasefire.

Although the agreement with Slovenia did not resolve the core problems, it has brought the situation under control. The same has not been the case for Croatia where violence between Serbs and Croats continues. Repeated attempts by EC and CSCE negotiating teams have brokered a number of short-lived ceasefires. In August, violence in Serbia and Croatia continued to escalate, edging just short of full-scale civil war.

## CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Canada has urged Yugoslavia to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis and has been supportive of the actions and resolutions taken by the CSCE. Prime Minister Mulroney stated that the unity of Yugoslavia was very important to the stability of Central Europe.<sup>1</sup>

On 27 June, the first day of fighting in Slovenia, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall issued a statement urging a peaceful resolution.

Canada subscribed to the June 20 statement of CSCE ministers, which supported the unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, based on economic reforms and the full application of human rights, including minority rights.<sup>2</sup>

Two days later, Canada welcomed the achievement of the ceasefire. In issuing a statement to this effect, Mrs. McDougall noted that thousands of Canadians had expressed concern about the situation and she urged all Canadians to support efforts to resolve the crisis. In addition, she stated:

Above all, what is needed at this time is peaceful dialogue among the parties involved.... We fully support efforts to organize an emergency meeting to address this issue under the auspices of the [CSCE].<sup>3</sup>

On 3 July, Mrs. McDougall issued a further statement, reaffirming Canada's support for the CSCE process and the CSCE statement issued that day.<sup>4</sup>

## PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 23 May 1991, Liberal member Albina Guarnieri called the attention of the House to the moves of Croatia and Slovenia towards independence and called on the government

---

<sup>1</sup>T. Harper. "Unity question dampens PM's Balkan Policy," *Toronto Star*, 4 July 1991: A3.

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "McDougall States Canada's Views on the Current Situation in Yugoslavia," *News Release*, no. 150, 27 June 1991.

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Welcomes Ceasefire in Yugoslavia," *News Release*, no. 153, 29 June 1991.

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Underlines Support for CSCE Position on Yugoslavia," *News Release*, no. 155, 3 July 1991.

...to respect the democratic wishes of the people who live in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia and to be prepared to recognize whatever form of government they choose.<sup>5</sup>

---


<sup>5</sup>*Commons Debates*. 23 May 1991: 471.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Feron, Bernard. "Yugoslavia -- The Still-born Nation," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 31 March 1991: 6.
- Gagnon, V.P. "Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 3, Summer 1991: 17-35.
- Lendvan, Paul, "Yugoslavia without Yugoslavans: The Roots of the Crisis," *International Affairs* 67, no. 2, 1991: 251-261.
- Lévy, Luc, ed. *Yugoslavie: la fédération menacée*. Problèmes politiques et sociaux, no. 645, December 1990: 3-62.
- Petkovic, Ranko. "Will Yugoslavia Survive?" *Review of International Affairs* 42, 20 February 1991.
- Romet, Sabrina P. "The Breakup of Yugoslavia," *Global Affairs* 6, no. 2, Spring 1991: 93-110.
- Rusinow, Dennison, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 83, Summer 1991: 143-159.

## FURTHER READING

- Biberaj, Elez. *Yugoslavia: A Continuing Crisis?* London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1989.
- Denitch, Bogdan Denis. *Limits and Possibilities: The Crisis of Yugoslav Socialism and State Socialist Systems*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
- Dordevic, Dimitrije. *The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914-1918*. Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1980.



#### *BACKGROUND*

The roots of the conflict in the Western Sahara, as in most cases of conflict in Africa, are in the effects of European colonialism. The area now known as the Western Sahara lies on the north Atlantic coast of Africa and borders with Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. In the late 1880s, Spain set up missions on three coastal areas in the region and laid claim to the area. Between 1900 and 1904, France and Spain determined the borders between the West Sahara area and the French controlled area of French West Africa, part of which is now known as Mauritania. In 1912, the two countries divided up a neighbouring area into French Morocco and Spanish Morocco.

After Moroccan independence in 1956, Spain ceded some parts of the territory it held to the new Moroccan state. However, Spain continued to hold the Western Sahara which it made into a Spanish province in January 1958, although Morocco made it known that it felt that it had a claim on the area. In 1957, irregular Moroccan forces had made an attempt to take the area militarily but they were pushed back by Spanish forces.

During the 1960s, general pressure for decolonisation began at the United Nations. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, on 14 December 1960, which called for decolonization, was accompanied by a list of territories which should be decolonized, including the Western Sahara. In 1963, discussions on Western Sahara began at the UN's decolonisation committee. By 1967, Spain had publicly accepted the idea of a referendum which would allow the local population to voice an opinion on their future. A UN resolution in December 1968 invited Spain to hold such a referendum and to consult with interested parties. Although it did not have a territorial claim to the area, Algeria announced that it was an interested party.

Consultations and better relations between Spain, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco characterised the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1972, Morocco and Algeria signed an agreement settling a border dispute between them. As part of its side of the deal, Algeria agreed not to oppose Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara. In 1974, Morocco and Mauritania concluded a secret agreement in which the two states agreed to partition the Western Sahara after Spain had withdrawn. Also in 1974, responding to Moroccan pressure, a UN resolution was passed calling for an International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion on the Western Sahara question and urging Spain to postpone a referendum until after such an opinion was concluded.

Pressure from within Western Sahara came from a rebel group known as the Polisario, an acronym for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sakiet al-Hamra and Rio de Oro, which was formed in 1973.

The Polisario claim to be the representative of the local Sahrawi people. They have been supported primarily by Algeria, and since 1973 have fought for the independence of Western Sahara.

On 16 October 1975, the ICJ released its opinion on Western Sahara. The Court concluded that while some legal ties between Morocco and Western Sahara and Mauritania and Western Sahara did exist, these did not translate into sovereignty over the area. Most important, it reaffirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. Morocco interpreted this judgement as clear support for its position and King Hassan announced that he would lead a peaceful Green March of thousands of Moroccans to Western Sahara to claim their territory. The Green March, with some 350,000 marchers, crossed into Western Sahara on 6 November and stopped just short of Spanish military positions. It was announced that a breakthrough had been made in negotiations between Spain and Morocco and the marchers returned home. A potentially dangerous confrontation was averted.

Negotiations between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania did result in an agreement a week later in which Spain agreed to withdraw from Western Sahara, and Morocco and Mauritania would set up a joint administration. This agreement set the stage for the conflict that was to follow. In February 1976, the Spanish withdrawal from Western Sahara was complete. On 26 February, the Moroccan parliament voted to integrate Western Sahara into Morocco and Mauritania and the two countries began to establish administrations in the area. On 27 February, the Polisario announced the creation of Western Sahara as an independent state, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and a full-fledged conflict with Morocco and Mauritania began.

The war exhausted Mauritania which was also experiencing significant economic and political difficulties internally. In August 1979, Mauritania signed a peace treaty with the Polisario in Algiers renouncing its claims to Western Sahara. In the meantime, Algeria continued to be a player in the situation. During the ICJ hearings, Algeria had reneged on its agreement not to oppose Morocco's claim and had spoken in favour of Western Sahara independence and the right of the Sahrawi to self-determination. Algeria was the Polisario's strongest supporter and worked actively at the UN and in the Organization for African Unity (OAU) to generate support for self-determination and independence.

When Mauritania gave up its claim to Western Sahara, Morocco annexed the Mauritanian part of Western Sahara. However, Morocco found itself increasingly isolated. There had been little support for the Moroccan-Mauritania takeover initially, and there was considerably less support for the latest Moroccan annexation. In spite of increasing pressure at the UN and especially at the OAU, Morocco continued to hold Western Sahara and battle the Polisario until 1988.

On 30 August 1988, Morocco and the Polisario agreed in principle to a peace proposal put forward by the UN Secretary-General and a special envoy of the Chairman of the OAU. The peace

plan called for a ceasefire and a reduction in Moroccan troops to be followed by a UN-sponsored referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would be able to choose between independence and joining Morocco. In September 1988, the UN Security Council asked the Secretary-General to work out the details of a plan. On 22 April 1991, the Secretary-General submitted the plan to the Security Council and the Security Council gave formal approval to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) on 29 April. The peacekeeping force will involve approximately 2,295 civilian, security and military personnel from a number of countries and will last forty-two weeks.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada will contribute 740 troops to the peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara and a Canadian, Brigadier-General Armand Roy has been appointed to head the entire UN force. This will be Canada's largest contribution to a peacekeeping force since its contribution to the Cyprus operation in 1974.<sup>1</sup> In announcing Brigadier-General Roy's appointment as head of the military component of MINURSO, the Minister for National Defence noted:

The participation of Brigadier-General Roy in this operation will contribute directly to the easing of tensions in the Western Sahara and help assure the necessary conditions for a free and fair referendum.<sup>2</sup>

### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

There was no parliamentary comment on this issue.

---

<sup>1</sup>Government of Canada. "Canada Contributes Largest Peacekeeping Force Since 1974 to UN Operations in the Western Sahara," *News Release*, 18 July 1991.

<sup>2</sup>Department of National Defence. "Appointment to Force Commander United Nations Mission in Western Sahara," *News Release*, 29/91, 27 June 1991.

RECENT LITERATURE

Brûlé, Rychard. "Western Sahara," *Peace & Security* 6, no. 3, Autumn 1991: 15.

Coulon, Jocelyn. "Du golf d'Oka aux sables du Sahara," *Le Devoir*, 17 July 1991, p. 9.

Porteus, Tom. "Polisario's Weak Hand," *Middle East International*, 28 June 1991:14.

FURTHER READING

Barbier, Maurice. *Le conflit du Sahara occidental*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1982.

Damis, John. *Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

---. "Morocco and the Western Sahara," *Current History* 89, no. 546, April 1990: 165-168, 184.

Hodges, Tony. *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War*. Westport, Conn.: L. Hill, 1983.

Lawless, Richard and Laila Monahan, eds. *War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Conflict*. London: Pinter, 1987.

Price, David Lynn. *The Western Sahara*. The Washington Papers 63. London: SAGE for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1979.

Thompson, Virginia and Richard Adloff. *The Western Saharans*. Totowa, New Jersey: Croom Helm, 1980.

## SECTION IV -- INSTITUTIONS

### 34. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

#### BACKGROUND

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began on 3 July 1973 in Helsinki. It involves thirty-four countries, including Canada and the US. The CSCE gave European countries not involved in NATO or the Warsaw Pact an opportunity to discuss security questions, and all participating states an opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues. States have generally operated within three main groups at the CSCE: Western states (NATO members), Eastern states (Warsaw Pact members), and the Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA). However, reflecting a membership which transcended the European military alliances, the CSCE has become a vital forum for the discussion of the future in Europe in response to the dramatic changes occurring in Eastern Europe.

The first CSCE meetings, held in Helsinki, resulted in the *Helsinki Final Act*, on 1 August 1975. The Final Act contained provisions in the three issue areas or "baskets" dealt with by the CSCE: security questions; cooperation on economic issues, the environment and science and technology; and cooperation on humanitarian and other fields.

Three review meetings have been held.<sup>1</sup> Both the second and third meetings established a mandate for talks on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), the first set resulting in the Stockholm Document, the second leading to the Vienna Document (see section on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures for further details).

There have also been achievements in other areas. For example, the Helsinki Final Act included a set of agreed principles to guide relations between states. Principle VII dealt with the importance of human rights and provided a base from which the West could work to demand and encourage more respect for basic human rights and freedoms by states in the East, especially the Soviet Union.

For a number of years, the CSCE was considered to be secondary in importance to the alliance-to-alliance negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce the vast numbers of conventional forces deployed along the central front. However, with the changes that have occurred in Europe in the past few years, this attitude has changed significantly. The unification of Germany

---

<sup>1</sup>The first review took place in Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978. The second review was held in Madrid from November 1980 to September 1983, and the third review occurred in Vienna from November 1986 to January 1989.

on 3 October 1990, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact<sup>2</sup> and the signing of a treaty reducing conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) all put a new emphasis on the need for a strong European institution which could provide a forum for cooperation. The CSCE, as an institution which deals with more than simply military questions, and which includes most European states as well as the US and Canada, has thus taken on new importance.

During 1989 and 1990, CSCE members worked to conclude a document on CSBMs to be ready for signing at the CSCE summit in November 1991. Similarly, the CFE Treaty was concluded in order to be ready for the summit. The CSCE summit meeting, involving the leaders of the then thirty-four member states,<sup>3</sup> took place in Paris from 19 to 21 November 1990. Two other important documents were signed at the summit. Members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact signed the Joint Declaration of the Twenty-Two which proclaimed that the twenty-two states would refrain from the threat or use of force against one another and reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations.

The thirty-four members of the CSCE also signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. This Charter is intended to provide a framework for future European relations. *Inter alia*, the Charter establishes a Council and a Secretariat for the CSCE. The Foreign Ministers of the participants will form the Council which will meet at least once each year. The Council will be supported by a committee of senior officials. The Secretariat will be based in Prague and will administer the CSCE. An Office of Free Elections was also established. It will be based in Warsaw, and work to facilitate contacts and exchanges of information on elections and strive to foster free elections in general.

The Charter also establishes a Conflict Prevention Centre to be based in Vienna. The Centre will work to reduce the risk of conflict in Europe. Its functions will include assistance in implementing CSBMs and possibly the development of dispute resolution procedures. At the first meeting of the CSCE's Council of Ministers, agreement was reached on a new mechanism for bringing forward issues relating to peace and security in Europe. If initial efforts to clarify a situation with the state or states involved fail, the state raising the problem may submit all relevant information to the CSCE within forty-eight hours. If the question remains unresolved, the state raising the problem has the right to call for an emergency meeting, providing it has the support of twelve other members. Although this new mechanism is considered a breakthrough in international relations, providing the first formal mechanism to deal with external and

---

<sup>2</sup>On 25 February 1991, Warsaw Pact members agreed to end the military side of the alliance as of March 1991. The possibility of continuing political cooperation would be decided at a later date.

<sup>3</sup>The unification of Germany brought the member total to thirty-four from thirty-five. Albania was granted membership in the CSCE in June 1991.

internal state problems, it does not include an ability to impose recommendations or solutions. All such decisions continue to require unanimous consent from CSCE members.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada has been a strong supporter of the CSCE since its inception. This support has its roots in the years prior to the beginning of the CSCE when Canada played an active role in the negotiations leading to its development. Canadian involvement reflected a desire to ensure that Canada would be included in the new institution, thus further institutionalizing the link between Europe and North America.

Current strong Canadian support for the CSCE process continues to reflect both a Canadian belief in the value of the CSCE and a desire to ensure ongoing Canadian connections to Europe at a time when Europe and the CSCE are undergoing significant changes. In a speech on 26 May 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark spoke of a need for Canada to focus its efforts on transforming institutions such as the CSCE and made a number of proposals for changes in the CSCE structure.<sup>4</sup> Some of these proposals for a stronger institutional framework for the CSCE have been incorporated in the new structures established in the Charter of Europe.

At a meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in New York, prior to the 1990 CSCE summit, Joe Clark reiterated Canada's support for the CSCE as "the drawing board of the new European architecture"<sup>5</sup> and emphasized the need to ensure that the new CSCE structure was one which was flexible and could grow.

Clark outlined five areas which he said should guide the deliberations on the CSCE. First, the need for strong political direction and leadership; second, the CSCE should have "...a truly democratic and representative face."<sup>6</sup> To this end, Canada supports moves towards an Assembly of Europe. Third, there should be a centre for the prevention and resolution of conflict. Fourth, the CFE agreement should be completed in time for the summit. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Canada, Clark stated that the summit must:

---

<sup>4</sup>External Affairs. "Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Humber College, Lakeshore Campus on Canada and the New Europe," *Statements and Speeches*, 90/9, 26 May 1990.

<sup>5</sup>External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation Meeting of Foreign Ministers," *Statement*, 90/57, 2 October 1990.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*: 2.

...reinforce and consecrate the trans-Atlantic and pan-European role of the CSCE.... In all its actions and decisions, the Paris Summit should reflect the compelling image and reality of a European order which bridges the Atlantic, a Europe which is a concept rather than just a continent.<sup>7</sup>

Prime Minister Mulroney was present at the CSCE summit and signed the Charter for a New Europe and the Declaration of the Twenty-Two on behalf of Canada. In a speech given to the CSCE summit on 19 November 1990, Mulroney linked the success of the CSCE to the new possibility for using the full potential of the United Nations (UN).

History records that the United Nations does not work well if [Europe] is deadlocked. And this region will not have peace if the nations of the world are united only in name. Our task here, therefore, is to strengthen regional cooperation for its own sake and to create conditions in which the United Nations can succeed, a goal that has been frustrated too often in the past by the very tensions we are burying here today.<sup>8</sup>

Mulroney spoke of Canadian support for the new framework established in the Charter, and stated:

Canada also supports the call for a parliamentary forum where elected representatives...can come together and cooperate on issues of concern to us all. Canadian parliamentarians will participate actively in establishing the mandate and machinery of such a parliamentary assembly.<sup>9</sup>

Canada has also strongly supported the reunification of Germany, one of the significant results of the changes in Europe in the past few years. On 3 October 1990, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark stated:

Few events in recent history hold more significance and hope for Europe and its partners. For the first time in decades our common goal within the Alliance of achieving a Europe united in peace and freedom is now within reach. We are pleased that this goal has been achieved peacefully, in consultation with all interested parties.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.: 3.

<sup>8</sup>Office of the Prime Minister. "Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, CSCE Summit Paris," *Statement*, 19 November 1990: 3.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.: 2.

<sup>10</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canada Welcomes German Unity, October 3, 1990," *News Release* no. 222, 2 October 1990.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 8 November 1990, just prior to the CSCE summit, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Patrick Boyer introduced a motion in the House of Commons calling on the House to:

...express its support for the CSCE as a key pan-European and trans-Atlantic forum within which a new cooperative security framework can be built through the maintenance and development of its comprehensive approach to security, political, economic, environmental and human dimension issues, and strengthened by the development of the structure of the CSCE process, including by the creation of a CSCE parliamentary assembly.<sup>11</sup>

Each of the three parties announced their support for the motion. Representatives of all three parties pointed to the history of the CSCE and the remarkable changes that had occurred in Europe recently, emphasising the need for an institutional framework which could encourage stability during current and future changes.<sup>12</sup>

All of the speakers supported the CSCE process and the idea of a parliamentary assembly. Special emphasis was placed on the role the CSCE plays in cementing the North American-European link. The idea of a parliamentary assembly was given strong support as a method of maintaining peace and security and especially as a way of cementing North American links to Europe.

In supporting the parliamentary assembly idea, Howard Crosby, the Parliamentary Secretary to President of the Treasury Board, pointed out that this idea, and the question of whether such an organization should include only European parliamentarians, will be considered at the Interparliamentary Conference on European Cooperation and Security in July 1991. He emphasized that it will not be in Canada's interests to allow North America to be excluded from such an institution and therefore Canada should make sure that it makes its case strongly at the meeting.<sup>13</sup>

Some speakers raised questions or suggestions relating to the CSCE. Liberal member Jesse Flis suggested that there be a public dialogue on the CSCE, as there was prior to the Madrid review conference.<sup>14</sup> A number of speakers pointed to the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, warning that the possibility of destabilization remained, and suggesting that Canada should ensure

---

<sup>11</sup>*Commons Debates*. 8 November 1990: 15296.

<sup>12</sup>For the full debate see: *Ibid.*: 15296-15316.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*: 15308.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*: 15302.

that the CSCE be as strong as possible in order to help deal with this possibility and to ensure continued growth in interstate relations in Europe and North America. Liberal member Jim Karygiannis pointed out that as a result of the attention given to Eastern Europe, the important and difficult problems of Cyprus, a CSCE member, were being forgotten.<sup>15</sup>

NDP member John Brewin suggested that while the CSCE should be strengthened and supported, the time had come to end the Canadian and US military presence in Europe, shifting the money spent on the Canadian contribution to other needs, such as the deficit or childcare. Mr. Brewin maintained that Canada should remain an active participant in establishing the framework in Europe, but he suggested that NATO should be wound down and that to that end, Canada should end its participation in the alliance. He stated:

It is in Canada's interests...that we end Canadian and American military participation in Europe and that we leave to Europeans the responsibility of specific security concerns...<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.: 15315-15316.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.: 15312.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Dean, Jonathan, Stanley R. Sloan, Madeleine Albright and Jenonne Walker. "The Paris Summit: Beginning a New European Security System," *Arms Control Today* 20, no. 10, December 1990: 3-7.
- Department of External Affairs. "Canada's Goal for the CSCE Summit," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 14, Fall 1990: 22.
- Department of External Affairs. "CSCE Summit Results in Charter of Paris for a New Europe," *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 10-11.
- Ghebaldi, Victor-Yves. "The CSCE in the post Cold-War Europe," *NATO Review* 39, no. 2, April 1991: 8-11.
- Goodby, James E. "A New European Concert: Settling Disputes in CSCE," *Arms Control Today*, Jan/Feb 1991: 3-6.
- Holst, Johan J. "Institutionalizing the CSCE Process: Considerations, Options and Constraints," *NUPI*, September 1990.
- Lucas, Michael R. "Get used to saying 'CSCE'," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1990: 32-34.
- Rotfeld, Adam D. *Changes in the European Security System*, Occasional Papers no. 16. Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1990.

## FURTHER REFERENCES

- Department of External Affairs. "Joint Declaration of 22 Signed," (text of the declaration) *Disarmament Bulletin*, no. 15, Winter 1990/91: 11.
- Flanagan, Steven J., and Fen O. Hampson. *Securing Europe's Future*. London: Croom Helm, 1986.
- Spencer, Robert, ed. *Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1984.
- United Nations. *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*. UN Document A/45/859, 12 December 1990.

## CROSS REFERENCES

Arms Transfers  
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures  
Conventional Forces in Europe  
Yugoslavia



*BACKGROUND*

In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of the idea of establishing a regional institution for consultation and cooperation in the North Pacific. In contrast to some other regions of the world, and especially in contrast with the improved climate for security and cooperation in Europe, North Pacific countries rely almost entirely on bilateral interactions in their relationships with regional neighbours. This is in part due to the vast distances that separate countries, the disparity in geographic size of countries and the lack of an historical tradition of dealing with problems as a region.

Some institutions do exist in the Pacific region. In the South Pacific, the South Pacific Forum was established in 1971. Australia, New Zealand and thirteen island states are members of the Forum which holds annual, private meetings. One of its most significant accomplishments has been the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) treaty which bans the stationing, testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons within the South Pacific. The Treaty entered into force in 1986 (see Chapter 10 on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones).

Four institutions are devoted to Pacific economic cooperation: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation. On the security front, Australia, New Zealand and the US form the ANZUS alliance which has been in place since 1951. Similar in nature to the NATO commitment, the three agree that an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all, but even this limited alliance has been strained in recent years. Finally, the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN provides a forum for discussion of a variety of issues of concern, ranging from economic to security to domestic issues. While it is neither a full-fledged security arrangement nor one for economic integration, ASEAN has helped build much better relations among its members, and some coordinated approaches to other countries. At a meeting in July, ASEAN moved beyond its traditional discussions and began to consider the possible formation of a new trading bloc and a new forum for dealing with regional military and security questions.

Relationships in the North Pacific were greatly influenced by the Cold War. The new warmth in the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union has given impetus and optimism to ideas for creating a North Pacific forum. Most of the proposals for a new forum aim toward the development of arms control, with confidence-building measures as a beginning. Some proposals have used the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a model for the North Pacific and advocated a similar forum which would establish an administrative base and give states the opportunity to consult on a variety of issues.

Australia was an early advocate of a CSCE-type structure to cover the whole Pacific region. Soviet President Gorbachev has also advocated similar institutional initiatives. The Soviet Union has also made a number of proposals for arms control and confidence-building measures in the Pacific. In September 1988, Gorbachev proposed that nuclear and naval arms in the Pacific region be frozen at current levels and that measures be aimed at reducing the possibility of confrontation in the Japanese Sea. The US has not given its support to any proposals for new institutions in the North Pacific. It has been reluctant to respond to such initiatives, as well as arms control initiatives, because it fears such measures will adversely affect its military presence in the Pacific, and potentially disrupt other delicate relationships (such as those with Japan, South Korea, and the Soviet Union) without necessarily enhancing security to any a major degree.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada is very much affected by its position in the North Pacific. A large percentage of immigrants to Canada come from North Pacific nations. Canadians fought in the Korean war and played an important role in the control commissions established for Indo-China. In addition, Canada maintains strong economic ties with a number of North Pacific nations. Canadian airspace and waters can be directly affected by continuing heavy US and Soviet military activity in the region.

Canada, as a Pacific nation, has been an active participant in recent efforts of developing institutions in the North Pacific. As Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark was particularly active in advocating and initiating discussions on this question. His initiative has been taken up by his successor Barbara McDougall.

Prior to and during a visit to Japan in July 1990, Joe Clark proposed that consideration be given to ways of developing a stronger sense of community in the North Pacific. He indicated that while the thaw in East-West relations made stronger cooperation possible, the opportunity should be seized to diminish the likelihood of regional disputes. Mr. Clark proposed that a dialogue on security cooperation be initiated among states bordering the North Pacific. These include Canada, China, Japan, North and South Korea, the Soviet Union and the US.

...there has not been a structure of security co-operation, of traditional military Alliances, of regional political institutions to mirror the European experience. I suggest it is time to consider security or political institutions in the Pacific.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at a Luncheon Hosted by the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan," *Statement*, 90/41, 24 July 1990: 3.

The proposal was not given immediate support by Japan, preoccupied with its longstanding boundary dispute with the Soviet Union, and with the strong Soviet military presence remaining in the area. US reticence toward multilateral efforts in the region remains, and there is still a general uncertainty as to how fruitful these approaches may prove.

From 4 to 7 October 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark hosted a meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers in Alberta. The meetings included discussion of increased cooperation between Canada and ASEAN at the political and economic level. One outcome of the meeting was the signing of a \$9.1 million training project agreement and four new development projects funded by CIDA.<sup>2</sup>

At a meeting of experts and government representatives on the North Pacific in April 1991, Joe Clark reiterated the need for new methods of consultation and cooperation in the Pacific and carefully pressed his 1990 proposals.

When I turn to the North Pacific, I cannot help but feel concern at the tenuous threads of communication and the sporadic nature of dialogue among the countries of the area. My concern deepens when I view these weaknesses in the light of the very significant challenges to security and stability we in the North Pacific face.<sup>3</sup>

In speaking of ways to address potential causes of insecurity, Mr. Clark suggested that security must be broadly defined and therefore efforts to develop mechanisms for common security must be multi-dimensional. In outlining the Canadian concept, he emphasized that what he was proposing did not seek to replace existing mechanisms, to interfere in bilateral issues or to superimpose institutions which had worked in other contexts (such as the CSCE). Mr. Clark reiterated Canada's strong support for economic institutions such as APEC, PECC, and the PBEC and said that Canada was seeking to encourage the development of "the habit of dialogue."<sup>4</sup>

We see a co-operative security dialogue as a regional or sub-regional multilateral exercise that brings together a relatively small number of countries that share geography and have common interests. We have focused our initiative on the North Pacific with this in mind.... There is no intention on our part to force bilateral problems or arrangements onto multilateral agendas or to prescribe for specific problems some multilateral formula or forum. My contention is, though, that some

---

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Canadian Ministers Announce New Development Assistance Agreement with ASEAN," *News Release*, no. 225, 5 October 1990.

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Colloquium on North Pacific Co-operative Dialogue in Victoria, British Columbia," *Statement*, no. 91/17, 6 April 1991: 2.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*: 4.

level of co-operation and dialogue at the multilateral level can help create an atmosphere in which bilateral issues can be more readily, but still bilaterally, resolved.<sup>5</sup>

This government interest has contributed towards stimulating and underwriting a scholars dialogue on these issues to be carried out over a two-year period, with active participation by specialists from across Canada, all the North Pacific countries, and some others.

In the course of Prime Minister Mulroney's official visits to Hong Kong and Japan in May 1991, a range of issues of Pacific cooperation and security were raised and it is expected that these issues will also be part of the agenda of the blue-ribbon Canada-Japan Forum 2000 established by the two prime ministers to study the bilateral relationship and report in 1992.

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

There was no parliamentary comment on the Government's North Pacific dialogue initiative. However, MP Warren Allmand and MP Maurice Tremblay both called the attention of the House of Commons to the problems faced by Tibet.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.: 5, 8.

<sup>6</sup>*Commons Debates*, 12 March 1991: 18344. *Commons Debates*, 14 March 1991: 18456.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Alagappa, Muthiah et al. "Security Concerns in the South-East Asian and Pacific Regions," *Disarmament* 13, no. 2, 1990: 59-90.
- Findlay, Trevor. *Asia/Pacific CSBMs: A Prospectus*. Peace Research Centre Working Paper no. 90. Canberra: Australian National University Research School of Pacific Studies, 1991.
- Goodby, James E. "The New World Order in Northeast Asia," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 3, no. 1, Summer 1991: 11-20.
- Hara, Kimmie. "Kuriles Quandary The Soviet/Japanese Territorial Dispute," *Pacific Research* 4, no. 2, May 1991: 3-5.
- Langmore, John. MP. *Increasing Security in the East Asia-Pacific Region*. Peace Research Centre Working Paper no. 95. Canberra: Australian National University Research School of Pacific Studies, 1991.
- Mack, Andrew. "Asia/Pacific Common Security," *Pacific Research* 4, no. 2, May 1991: 8.
- - -. *Reassurance Versus Deterrence Strategies for the Asia/Pacific Region*. Working Paper no. 103. Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, February 1991.
- Polomka, Peter. "Towards a 'Pacific House'," *Survival* 33, no. 2, March/April 1991: 173-182.
- Stubbs, Richard. "Canada's Relations with Malaysia: Picking Partners in ASEAN," *Pacific Affairs* 63, no. 3, Fall 1990: 351-365.
- Woods, Lawrence T. "Le Canada: un partenaire pour le Pacifique désintéressé ou réticent?" *Études internationales* 21, no. 4, December 1990: 855-862.

## FURTHER READING

- Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. *In Search of Peace: Confidence-Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific*. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1988.
- Findlay, Trevor. *Confidence-Building Measures for the Asia/Pacific*. Peace Research Centre Working Paper, no. 55. Canberra: Australian National University Research School of Pacific Studies, 1988.
- Mack, Andrew and Paul Keal, eds. *Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988.



## 36. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)

### *BACKGROUND*

The Organization of American States (OAS) was formed in 1948 at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota, Colombia. The OAS was preceded by the International Bureau of American Republics or the Pan American Union, which was established in 1890. The organization's charter provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes, common action against aggression, the promotion of representative democracy, economic, social and cultural development and calls for efforts to limit the spread of conventional weapons in the region. The Charter also prohibits direct or indirect intervention in the affairs of any state and prohibits the use of economic or political coercive measures by any state. At present, there are thirty-four member states of the OAS.

The OAS structure includes a number of administrative bodies. The Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs meets to discuss matters of urgency, usually relating to conflict or potential conflict. The OAS General Assembly meets annually and when it is not in session, the Permanent Council operates. In addition, there is an Inter-American Economic and Social Council, a Council for Education, Science and Technology and an Inter-American Judicial Committee. There is also an Inter-American Court of Human Rights and an Inter-American Defence Board.

In spite of the wide-ranging provisions in the OAS Charter, over time the organization has not lived up to its potential. It has been criticized for being a forum for US hegemony, or for military dictatorships or both. When it appears that US interests in the region cannot be served by the OAS, the US has chosen to act unilaterally. In recent years, the OAS has been unable to deal effectively with important problems such as the conflict in Central America, and the dispute settlement provisions have had little use. The establishment of the Contadora Group of five Central American states which eventually devised a regional solution to the Central American conflict is evidence of this.

However, moves towards democracy in some countries and the positive changes in the Central American situation have generated some hopes of changes in regional cooperation. There has also been a movement among member states to modify the organization to make it more responsive and useful through reform of the Charter.

Canada officially joined the OAS in January 1990, finally moving from observer status to membership. Canada is one of the last states in the Americas to join the OAS. In the post-World War II period, Canadian foreign relations were effectively concentrated on European relations and

the East-West nature of the international area. However, in the last two decades, Canadian interest in its own hemisphere has increased substantially. In announcing Canada's decision to join the OAS, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney noted that Canadian interests were directly engaged in the Americas and that Canada would no longer "stand apart."<sup>1</sup>

In February 1990, Canada put forward a number of proposals for changes at the OAS. These included the creation of a Secretariat, regular summit meetings of Heads of Government, expanding links between parliaments, creating a Unit for Democratic Development, creating a unit to conduct impartial investigations of electoral or judicial irregularities, and a Commission for Sustainable Development. Canada also announced that it would seek to bring Cuba back into the hemispheric family.

#### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Canada's proposal for a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy was adopted unanimously by the OAS General Assembly in June 1990. On 27 March 1991, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark issued a report on Canada's first year in the OAS. The report pointed to the agreement on the Unit as an important achievement for Canada. It also noted that Canada had been elected to the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, had joined the Inter-American Commission on Women and had created the Canada-Latin America Forum which would address mutual interests.<sup>2</sup>

Joe Clark's successor, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall attended Canada's second OAS General Assembly meeting in June 1991 in Santiago, Chile. In announcing her plans to attend the meeting Barbara McDougall stated:

Canada places great importance on our relations with our OAS partners. Membership in the OAS is a key element of the Canadian Strategy for Latin America. We come to this Assembly strongly committed to working together on issues of common concern.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Office of the Prime Minister. "Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders, San Jose, Costa Rica," 27 October 1989: 5.

<sup>2</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Clark Reports on Canada's First Year in the OAS," *News Release*, no. 79, 27 March 1991.

<sup>3</sup>Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Attends 22nd General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Chile," *News Release*, no. 126, 28 May 1991.

In her speech to the General Assembly, Mrs. McDougall reiterated Canada's commitment to the OAS.

In joining the OAS we share a commitment to strengthening and consolidating democracy and human rights. We seek a more secure and peaceful hemisphere without the threat of conflict. We are working toward a hemisphere that is at home with its environment and freed from the scourge of drugs.<sup>4</sup>

Mrs. McDougall spoke of the tremendous change occurring throughout the world and noted that it was essential for the OAS to use the opportunity to consolidate democracy in the region, saying that Canada would do whatever was necessary to assist in getting the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy established as soon as possible.

On the question of regional security, Mrs. McDougall proposed that the General Assembly adopt a resolution condemning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms and establish a working group to study regional proliferation.

In response to the Canadian proposal, the OAS initiated a discussion of problems relating to arms proliferation and the final communique of the Assembly recognized the need to limit regional arms proliferation. Mrs. McDougall said that:

In addressing this problem, OAS Foreign Ministers are sending an important political signal to all regions of the world about our commitment to contributing to international peace and security in the post-Cold War era.<sup>5</sup>

#### *PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT*

There was no comment on the OAS in the House of Commons this year. However, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) held hearings on the situations in El Salvador and Guatemala. At the hearings, Liberal member Jesse Flis asked non-governmental organization representatives about Canada's role in the OAS, noting that progress on human rights issues seemed to progress faster at the CSCE than at the OAS.

---

<sup>4</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Meeting of the OAS General Assembly," 91/7, 3 June 1991: 2.

<sup>5</sup>Department of External Affairs. "McDougall Says OAS Stronger at Dealing with Key Issues," *News Release*, no. 134, 4 June 1991.

Is there anything we can learn from the CSCE process that might help speed up correcting some of these violations and bringing the countries to task a little earlier? Is there anything we have tried through OAS?... Is there anything through OAS that you can say has improved for El Salvador and Guatemala because of our membership?<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade. *Minutes and Proceedings* no. 73, 19 November 1990: 21.

RECENT LITERATURE

- Bloomfield, Richard J. and Abraham F. Lowenthal. "The Inter-American Institutions in a Time of Change," *International Journal* 45, no. 4, Autumn 1990.
- Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives (CAPA). *Report Card on Canada's First Year on the OAS*. Toronto: CAPA, 1991.
- Department of External Affairs. *Canada's First Year in the Organization of American States: Implementing the Strategy for Latin America*. Ottawa, 27 March 1991.
- Peres, Carlos Andres. "OAS Opportunities," *Foreign Policy*, no. 8, Fall 1990: 52-55.

FURTHER READING

- Han, Henry H. *Problems and Prospects of the Organization of American States: Perceptions of the Member States' Leaders*. New York: Peter Lang, 1987.
- OAS. *OAS and the Evolution of the Inter-American System*. OAS: Department of Public Information, 1986.
- Scheman, L. Ronald. *The Inter-American Dilemma: The Search for Inter-American Cooperation at the Centennial of the Inter-American System*. New York: Praeger, 1988.
- Stoetzer, A.C. *The Organization of American States: An Introduction*. New York: Praeger, 1965.



## 37. THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING

### *BACKGROUND*

In the last several years, there has been a variety of proposals aimed at strengthening the structure and processes of the United Nations. Some have come from the Secretary-General. For example, in his 1986 Annual Report, Perez de Cuellar suggested that a war-risk reduction centre be established under the auspices of the United Nations to provide early warning of potential conflict situations. In September 1988, the Soviet Union put forward a series of reforms aimed at enhancing the role of the United Nations in collective security, including proposals to hold periodic meetings of the Security Council at the foreign minister level, and giving greater support to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The Soviet Union has also called for the revival of the Military Staff Committee and suggested that it assist the Council in the strategic direction of peacekeeping operations. In his 1989 Annual Report, the Secretary-General proposed regular, high-level meetings of the Security Council to review situations of potential and actual conflict.

The resurgence of peacekeeping operations and the expectation that the United Nations will be required to conduct more operations, including ones relating to intra-, as well as inter-state conflict, have focussed attention on the need to strengthen peacekeeping procedures, as well as the capabilities of the Office of the Secretary-General. In turn, the renewed interest in peacekeeping has led experienced diplomats and commentators into a discussion of the broader activities of the United Nations and its potential as the central organization in an international system of cooperation. Such discussions have tended to emphasize the many areas of responsibility of the United Nations, which range widely from early warning of potential conflicts, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking to the promotion and codification of human rights, and development cooperation. This range of activities has led to calls for greater coordination of UN activities, and to suggestions that the United Nations is uniquely placed to provide leadership in building a system which former Canadian Secretary of State Joe Clark has called "cooperative security."

This discussion, which has centred on the potential of the United Nations to lead and coordinate multilateral approaches to international issues, has occurred in a year when negotiations have begun to seek agreement on the next Secretary-General. Attention has also been directed, therefore, to the human resources and requirements of the United Nations. Two distinguished former UN civil servants, Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, have proposed a fundamental reform of the Office of the Secretary-General. They advocate the appointment of several deputy Secretaries-General with functional responsibilities for peace and security, economic and social issues, and administration and management. The streamlined senior echelon would be joined by the heads of the key UN

agencies to form an "international cabinet for an energetic, coordinated approach to global problems."<sup>1</sup> The position of Secretary-General would be filled on the basis of extensive search procedures designed to replace the existing parochial approach to choosing the Secretary-General. While it is evident that no such process will be in place for the selection of the next Secretary-General, these proposals have drawn attention to the importance of the position of Secretary-General, and to the critical decision to be made in autumn 1991 in choosing a replacement for Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar.

### *CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION*

Most Canadian statements have focussed on peacekeeping. Canada has responded positively and enthusiastically to the progress made in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1990, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark commented:

Canada believes that more can be done to ensure that the UN's unique capacity to provide peacekeeping forces for regional conflicts remains effective and efficient. I am pleased that Canada was able to help breathe new life into the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which has now provided the UN with new proposals to improve present peacekeeping activities and to plan for new ventures. However, more work and even greater commitment will be needed to ensure that the UN is provided with the capacity and the resources to mount varied, speedy and successful peacekeeping operations...

In particular, Canada would support a United Nations effort to secure a clearer indication from all member countries of the forces and equipment they could make available in future UN peacekeeping operations. We believe that effort could include an inventory of civilian resources. This might include police forces, communications and logistic personnel and election experts and observers which could be used not only to keep the peace but to prepare for peace.<sup>2</sup>

In its recommendations to the General Assembly in December 1990, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations proposed to concentrate its future work on a short list of items aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. It also invited member states to provide further observations on its recommendations and future work. Canada responded to this invitation on 15 April 1991, endorsing the approach of the Special Committee and encouraging the Secretariat

---

<sup>1</sup>Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers. *A World Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations*. Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1990: 40.

<sup>2</sup>Secretary of State for External Affairs. "Speech to the 45th Session of the General Assembly," [hereafter Speech to the General Assembly] *Statement*, 90/55, 26 September 1990.

to continue its efforts towards rationalizing the procedures of peacekeeping operations.<sup>3</sup> The Canadian response emphasized the importance of the move towards the better management of peacekeeping operations. In this respect it noted, *inter alia*, the work of the Secretary-General towards development of a model agreement between the UN and member states contributing personnel to peacekeeping forces, the importance of the forthcoming reports on the Namibia operation (UNTAG), and the factual report of the Secretariat describing the responsibilities, functions and structures of the various elements within the Secretariat dealing with peacekeeping operations.

This emphasis on consolidating practical approaches to the question of streamlining and rationalizing the Secretariat management of peacekeeping operations was also reflected in Canadian responses on financing peacekeeping operations. In this regard, the specific focus of Canadian diplomatic activity was the financing of the peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Throughout its tenure on the Security Council, Canada sought an agreement to change the financing of UNFICYP, which is based on the troop contributing countries paying for their own forces while the United Nations costs, which constitute about 30 percent of the annual UNFICYP costs of around \$100 million, are paid on the basis of voluntary assessments. On 14 December 1990, Canada sought a vote in the Security Council on a resolution to place the UN portion of UNFICYP costs on the basis of a mandatory assessment paid by all member states, and therefore in line with the standard practice in other peacekeeping missions. For different reasons, the Soviet Union, the United States and France were critical of this resolution, which was supported by all the troop-contributing states. Canada agreed to a delay in the vote for one week in order to allow further consultations.

On 21 December 1990, still faced with resistance from permanent members of the Council, the Canadian delegation agreed to a further amendment to the resolution. Ambassador Yves Fortier commented:

...we have continued our efforts to convince certain permanent members of this Council -- members that have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security -- that the time has come to solve the financial crisis of UNFICYP. We have attempted to convince these members that they, as well as other States Members of the United Nations...were duty-bound to shoulder their fair share of the financing burden.

Regrettably, we were not successful, and the spectre of a veto was hanging over the Council Chamber. In these circumstances, and with a view to advancing the interests of all the peacekeeping States, we amended our draft resolution still further (S/21988/Rev.1) so that the Security Council would undertake to examine alternative means of financing UNFICYP in the next six months, but with the understanding that

---

<sup>3</sup>Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. "Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, Addendum to the Report of the Secretary General." A/AC.121/38/Add.1, 26 April 1991.

if no alternatives to assessed contributions could be found in that time the Council would agree to finance UNFICYP using assessed contributions from 15 June 1991.<sup>4</sup>

Since Canada left the Council some ten days after this outcome, it was not in a position to directly press for a further resolution in June 1991. The "understanding" of 21 December, however, did not hold. On 14 June 1991, the Council requested the Secretary-General to consult those involved and report back by 1 October, at which time the Council would decide how to place UNFICYP on a sound financial basis. In the meantime, for the six-month period ending 15 June 1991, voluntary assessments yielded only US \$3.2 million against a budget of US \$15.4 million, bringing the total UNFICYP arrears to over US \$178 million.

In its response of 15 April 1991 to the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Canada proposed continuing discussions on the standardization of financial agreements between the UN and member states, as well as the development of the Working Capital Fund. Indirectly, it also renewed its criticism of those states which have failed to pay their assessed share of peacekeeping costs. Noting that "Canada's position on the question of funding peacekeeping operations is well known," the response continued:

The recent increase in the scale and number of peacekeeping operations has highlighted the need for adequate financial reserves to cover start-up costs. Thought should be given to practical means for increasing the Working Capital Fund without placing an unfair and inequitable burden on those Member States which traditionally pay their assessed contributions in full and on time...<sup>5</sup>

While the greater part of the Canadian response to the recommendations of the Special Committee focussed on practical ways to improve peacekeeping operations, certain proposals also looked ahead to broader questions. Specifically, the response also emphasized the value of informal consultations amongst states contributing to peacekeeping operations, and suggested a partial agenda for such informal discussions:

For our part, we would like to see discussion on, for example: the current situation regarding status of forces agreements between missions and host States; creation of a register of national, regional and international seminars, symposia, etc., related to peacekeeping; creation of a register of national and regional training programmes; and possible use of that informal forum for the conduct of briefings on current and potential operations.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>S/PV.2971, 21 December 1990.

<sup>5</sup>A/AC.121/38/Add.1: 3.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.: 5.

On the broader issue of expanding the scope of peacekeeping, the Canadian response commented:

The time has come to have a full and open discussion on the possible expansion of traditional, "after the fact" peacekeeping to a more proactive role in the prevention of conflict. Recent world developments have demonstrated possible scenarios where prior deployment of peacekeeping elements may have prevented the outbreak of conflict. Some thinking has been done in this area already ranging from the dispatch of a good offices mission of the Secretary-General through to full-scale deployment of armed troops. The Special Committee should continue to exchange views on this question.<sup>7</sup>

Although the Canadian Government did not express specific views on proposals such as those aimed at reforming the Secretariat or revitalizing the Military Staff Committee, in various statements the potential to expand the role of the United Nations was noted and supported. In a speech to the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, for example, Joe Clark commented: "Peacekeeping in the future must anticipate as well as react. It must deal with the causes of conflict and not just their symptoms. It must build peace and not simply keep it."<sup>8</sup>

On the point that the United Nations might play an expanded role in promoting a stable social order, in his September speech to the General Assembly Clark also pointed to Canada's efforts to promote democratic institutions and practices through the CSCE, the OAS and the Commonwealth. He continued:

Canada believes that there is a further role for this Organization [the United Nations] in encouraging democratic development. Through supporting the co-operation of the various regional organizations in exchanging information and improving co-ordination, and through encouraging member states in their many recent efforts to strengthen democracy, this Assembly can act as a catalyst in reinforcing both democracy and security.<sup>9</sup>

#### PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

Most Parliamentary comment focussed on specific peacekeeping operations and is noted accordingly. On the broader questions of the United Nations role, on 21 and 22 May 1991, Parliamentarians for Global Action sponsored a meeting in Ottawa to develop a new approach to peacekeeping. The Canadian Chairman of the group, Warren Allmand, commented in Parliament:

---

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.: 4.

<sup>8</sup>Department of External Affairs. "Peacekeeping and Foreign Policy," *Statement*, 90/65, 8 November 1990.

<sup>9</sup>Speech to the General Assembly.

During the recent Iraq-Kuwait war there was much talk about a new world order. The war also taught us that the existing approach to peacekeeping was no longer adequate. It is mostly ad hoc, reactive, slow and underfinanced. In the case of the Iraq war, the force was overwhelmingly American and not under UN command.

What is needed is an early warning process that will provide for preventive peacekeeping. Under such a process there would be standing UN peacekeeping forces stationed in the different regions of the world which would be sent to trouble spots to deter and repel aggression such as that of Iraq against Kuwait.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup>*Commons Debates*. 22 May 1991: 3.

## RECENT LITERATURE

- Cox, David, ed. *The Use of Force by the Security Council for Enforcement and Deterrent Purposes: A Conference Report*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, December 1990.
- Delvoie, L.A. "Canada and Peacekeeping: A New Era?," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20, no. 2, Autumn 1990.
- Goedenker, Leon. "Thinking About the United Nations System," The Academic Council of the United Nations System, *Reports and Papers*, 1990-4.
- Kozyrev, Andrei and Gennadi Gatilov. "The UN Peace-making System: Problems and Prospects," *International Affairs*, no. 12, 1990.
- North-South Roundtable. "Strengthening the United Nations for the 1990s," *Society for International Development*, April 1991.
- The Stanley Foundation. *The United Nations: Structure and Leadership for a New Era*. 22nd UN Issues Conference. Muscatine, Iowa: 1991.
- Urquhart, Brian and Erskine Childers. *A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations*. Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1990.

## FURTHER READING

- Liu, F.T. *United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations*. Occasional Papers on Peacekeeping no. 4. New York: International Peace Academy, 1990.
- Petrofsky, Vladimir F. "Multifaceted Co-operation: A Post Confrontational Perspective for the United Nations," *Disarmament* 13, no. 2, 1990.
- "United Nations Peacekeeping" (entire issue) *Survival* 32, no. 3, May/June 1990.

## CROSS REFERENCES

Cambodia  
 Central America  
 Haiti  
 The Persian Gulf Crisis  
 Southern Africa  
 Western Sahara



## SECTION V -- FACTS AND FIGURES

### 1. CANADA AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The following provides a summary of the resolutions on arms control, disarmament and international security at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that were voted on during the 45th Session of the Assembly. Many of the titles of the resolutions provide some indication of their nature. One or two sentences explaining, in more detail, the contents of resolutions which were opposed by Canada or where Canada registered an abstaining vote are provided. For more detail on given issue areas, see the appropriate chapter in *The Guide*.

Four draft decisions were adopted by the First Committee. All the decisions were supported by Canada. They are:

International arms transfers  
 Naval armaments and disarmament  
 Conventional disarmament on a regional scale  
 Information on arms control and disarmament agreements

<i>Resolution # and Lead Sponsor</i>	<i>Resolutions Supported by Canada</i>	<i>Vote (Yes/No/Abstain)</i>
45/8 (Costa Rica)	Tenth Anniversary of the University for Peace	Consensus
45/14 (Mongolia)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of People to Peace	Consensus
45/48 (Mexico)	Implementation of GA Resolution 44/104 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco	141-0-3
45/51 (Australia)*	Urgent Need for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	140-2-6
45/52 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
45/53 (Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia	114-3-28

---

\*Resolutions co-sponsored by Canada.

45/54 (Bulgaria/ Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective int'l arrangements to assure non- nuclear-weapon states against the threat of use of nuclear weapons	145-0-3
45/55A (Egypt)*	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	149-0-1
45/55B (Argentina)	Confidence-building measures in outer space	149-0-1
45/56A (Sierra Leone)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	145-0-4
45/57A (Poland/ Canada)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
45/57B (Austria)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
45/57C (Australia)*	Chemical and biological weapons; measures to uphold authority of Geneva Protocol	Consensus
45/58A (Yugoslavia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
45/58C (China)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
45/58D (China)	Nuclear disarmament	Consensus
45/58E (Sweden)	Comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons	Consensus
45/58F (Germany)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Consensus
45/58G (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
45/58H (UK)*	Bilateral arms negotiations	99-0-50
45/58I (France)*	Confidence- and security- building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
45/58J (Hungary)	Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities	141-1-11
45/58K (Sierra Leone)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	144-0-9

45/58L (Canada)	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	146-1-6
45/58M (Belgium)*	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
45/58O (USSR)	Defensive security concepts and policies	148-0-5
45/58P (Pakistan)	Regional disarmament	142-0-10
45/59A (Nigeria)	UN disarmament fellowship training and advisory services program	Consensus
45/59C (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	Consensus
45/59E (Brazil)	UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus
45/61 (Germany)*	Science and technology for disarmament	Consensus
45/62A (Nigeria)	Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade	Consensus
45/62B (Indonesia)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
45/62F (Germany)*	Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures	Consensus
45/64 (Sweden)	Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	Consensus
45/65 (Canada)	Study on the role of the UN in the field of verification	Consensus
45/66 (Egypt)*	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	Consensus

45/79 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus
45/81 (Poland)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	Consensus

*Resolutions Opposed by Canada*

45/59B (India)	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	125-17-10
----------------	---	-----------

This resolution requested the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on an international convention which would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Canada was joined by other NATO countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand in voting against. Warsaw Pact members such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, along with Israel and Japan were among the abstainers.

45/59D (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	126-14-12
-----------------	---------------------	-----------

Resolution 45/59D calls on the US and the Soviet Union to agree to an immediate freeze on their nuclear arms, including a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapons purposes. It also called on all nuclear weapon states to agree, by a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear arms freeze. As well as Canada, other NATO countries, Japan and Israel voted against the resolution.

45/62C (Yugoslavia)	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war	132-12-9
---------------------	--	----------

This resolution requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish ad hoc committees on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war to analyze how progress can be made on these two issues. Again, other NATO countries joined Canada in registering negative votes.

*Resolutions on which Canada Abstained*

45/49 (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	127-3-17
----------------	---	----------

This resolution notes that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban as part of the Conference of Disarmament has occurred without a negotiating mandate. The resolution appeals to the Conference on Disarmament to promote the re-establishment of the committee in 1991 with a multilateral negotiating mandate for a nuclear test ban. France, the UK and the US voted against the resolution, Canada was joined by other European countries, China, Israel and Japan in abstaining.

45/50 (Mexico)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning nuclear tests in the Atmosphere, Outer space and under water	116-2-8
----------------	---	---------

This resolution anticipated the PTBT amendment conference planned for January (see Chapter 9). It recommended that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts towards a comprehensive ban continue under the auspices of the conference until a comprehensive ban is achieved. It also recommended that a working group be established by the Amendment conference to study the organization, institutional mechanisms and legal aspects of a comprehensive ban.

45/56B (Sierra Leone)	Nuclear Capability of South Africa	118-4-27
--------------------------	---------------------------------------	----------

This lengthy resolution, *inter alia*, welcomes the Secretary-General's report on South Africa's ballistic missile capability, reaffirms that the acquisition of nuclear capability by South Africa constitutes a grave danger to international peace and security, calls on all states to end military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and demands that South Africa submit its nuclear installations to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Association.

45/58B (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	131-0-22
---------------------	-------------------------------------	----------

Resolution 45/58B welcomes progress on strategic arms reduction. It notes that the key prevention of war is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and calls on the US and the Soviet Union to exert every effort to sign the START treaty by the end of 1990, as part of a larger effort to eliminate nuclear weapons. NATO and other European countries, abstained from the resolution.

45/58N (Sweden)	Charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment	138-3-12
-----------------	--	----------

In this resolution, the Secretary-General is asked to carry out a study of how potential resources allocated to military efforts could be used to protect the environment.

45/60 (India)	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	133-3-16
---------------	--	----------

Resolution 45/60 requests that the Secretary-General continue to follow this issue, in the wake of a Secretary-General's report on the question.

45/62D (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	128-8-16
---------------------	---	----------

This resolution, *inter alia*, notes the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and calls on the Conference on Disarmament to strengthen its work, urging it to give negotiating mandates to ad hoc committees on all agenda items.

45/62E (Mexico)	Comprehensive programme of disarmament	123-6-22
-----------------	--	----------

This recommends that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament be re-established by the CD. A number of European countries also abstained, and six NATO members voted against the resolution.

45/63 (Jordan)

Israeli nuclear armament

98-2-50

This resolution condemns Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa. It also expresses concern about information on Israel's continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and reaffirms that Israel should place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities.

45/77 (Yugoslavia)

Implementation of the  
Declaration of the Indian  
Ocean as a Zone of Peace

128-4-17

This resolution notes successful progress in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, and requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold two preparatory sessions during 1991 to complete preparatory work for a conference on the Indian Ocean planned in 1992. Canada was joined by other NATO countries in abstaining. France, Japan, the UK and the US voted against.

45/80 (Yugoslavia)

Review of the  
implementation of the  
Declaration on the Strengthening  
of International Security

123-1-29

This resolution reaffirms the validity of the Declaration in question. The resolution also reaffirms the responsibility of the UN on dismantling apartheid and reaffirms that democratization of international relations is necessary. Further, the resolution invites states to submit their views on implementing the Declaration.



## 2. CANADA AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

During Canada's last six months at the Security Council, from 1 August 1990 to 31 December 1990, Security Council debates and resolutions focussed on the crisis in the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf resolutions are summarized in a separate section (see UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF). Canada voted in favour of all the Persian Gulf resolutions. In this time period, the Security Council also passed the following resolutions:

S/RES/672, 12 October 1990. Re: incidents in Jerusalem on 8 October 1990, condemns violence of the Israeli security forces, requests the Secretary-General to send a mission to the region;

S/RES/673, 24 October 1990. Re: deplores Israeli decision to refuse entry to a Secretary-General mission and asks Israel to reconsider its decision;

S/RES/676, 28 November 1990. Re: extension of Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group for two months;

S/RES/681, 20 December 1990. Re: requests the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Red Cross, to further develop the idea of a meeting of the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, requests that the Secretary-General monitor the situation of Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation.

Canada voted in favour of all the above resolutions.



### 3. THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Personnel<sup>2</sup>

Regular Forces	86,614
Primary Reserve	30,326
Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructors List	41,864
Civilian Strength	<u>38,360</u>
	197,164

<i>Command</i> <sup>3</sup>	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>Reserves</i>	<i>Civilians</i>	<i>Total</i>
Maritime	10,317	4,212	7,150	21,679
Mobile	18,900	25,750 <sup>4</sup>	6,500	51,150
Air	19,114	1,472	5,741	26,327
Communications	3,500	2,100	550	6,150
Canadian Forces Europe	8,000	--	4,400	--
Northern	--	--	--	90

<sup>1</sup>Sources: Public Affairs, National Defence Headquarters; Department of National Defence. *Defence 90*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991.

<sup>2</sup>Public Affairs. Department of National Defence, July 1991.

<sup>3</sup>Not all commands are listed; totals do not correspond to personnel strength listed above.

<sup>4</sup>Of which 23,300 are militia, and 2,450 are supplementary Ready Reserve.

### *3. The Canadian Armed Forces*

#### *2. Functional and Regional Commands*

<i>Command</i>	<i>Headquarters</i>
Maritime	Halifax, Nova Scotia
Mobile	St. Hubert, Quebec
Air	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Canadian Forces Europe	Lahr, Germany
Canadian Forces Communication Command	Ottawa, Ontario
Canadian Forces Training System	Trenton, Ontario
Northern Region	Yellowknife, NW Territories

#### *3. Canadian Naval Forces*

- 3 Patrol Submarines (Oberon)
- 18 Destroyers
- 3 Operational Support Vessels
- 1 Tanker
- 2 Research Vessels
- 12 Patrol Vessels and Training Ships
- 5 Gate Vessels
- 14 Reserve Tenders
- 14 Tugs
- 70 Auxiliaries and Yard Craft
- 2 Mine Countermeasures Vessels (MCMAs)

4. *Canadian Land Forces*

(includes major equipment assigned  
to Mobile Command and Canadian Forces in Europe)

*Tanks and armoured vehicles*

- 107 Leopard C-1 Tanks
- 157 Lynx Armoured Fighting Vehicles -- Reconnaissance
- 195 Cougar Armoured Fighting Vehicles
- 799 M-113 Armoured Personnel Carriers
- 256 Grizzly Armoured Personnel Carriers

*Artillery*

- 41 Model 44 (L-5) Howitzer (pack 105 mm)
- 163 towed Howitzer (105 mm)
- 74 M-109 Self-Propelled Howitzer (155 mm)

*Anti-tank Weapons*

- 376 Carl Gustav Recoilless Rifles (84 mm)
- 134 TOW Anti-tank Guided Weapons

*Air Defence*

- 54 L-40/60 Guns (40 mm)
- 78 Blowpipe Surface-to-air Missiles
- 20 Twin Guns (35 mm)

### *3. The Canadian Armed Forces*

#### *5. Air Forces - Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe<sup>5</sup>* (includes major equipment assigned to Air Command and Canadian Forces Europe)

##### *Aircraft*

- 27 CF-5 Freedom Fighters
- 126 CF-18D F/A-18A/B Hornets
- 16 CC-144 Challengers -- Electronic Countermeasures
- 18 CP-140 Aurora -- Maritime Reconnaissance

##### *Transport Aircraft*

- 32 CC-130E/H/MT Hercules
- 5 CC-137 Boeing 707
- 7 CC-109 Cosmopolitan
- 7 CC-138 Twin Otter
- 10 CC-115 Buffalo
- 60 CT-133 Silver Star
- 146 CT-114 Tutor
- 19 CT-134/134 A Musketeer
- 6 CC-142 Dash 8

##### *Helicopters*

- 34 CH-124 Sea King -- Anti-Submarine Warfare
- 64 CH-136 Kiowa -- Observation
- 44 CH-135 Twin Huey -- Transport
- 14 CH-113/A Labrador/Voyageur -- Search and Rescue
- 9 CH-118 Iroquois -- Search and Rescue
- 14 CH-139 Bell 206 -- Training

INFORMATION CORRECT AS OF JULY 1991

---

<sup>5</sup>Includes storage, instructional, and repair.

#### 4. CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1948 TO PRESENT

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Maximum Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Current Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Total UN Troop Contribution</i>
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria	1948-	22	79	298
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Kashmir	1949-1979	27	Yes <sup>1</sup>	102-39
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK) <sup>2</sup>	Korea	1950-1954	8,000	-	
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) <sup>2</sup>	Korea	1953-	2	1	
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Cambodia Laos Vietnam	1954-1974	133	-	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	Egypt	1956-1967	1,007	-	6,373-3,378
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-1959	77	-	591-375

<sup>1</sup>Airlift of Group, twice annually (Rawalpindi-Srinagar)

<sup>2</sup>UN operations in Korea, 1950-1953, and the subsequent United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), 1954 to the present, fall outside the current definition of peacekeeping as used in this *Guide*.

4. Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to Present

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Maximum Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Current Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Total UN Troop Contribution</i>
Organisation des Nations-Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Congo (Zaire)	1960-1964	421	-	19,828
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	West New Guinea	1962-1963	13	-	15,761
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Yemen	1963-1964	36	-	189-25
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	575	6,411-2,345
Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Dominican Republic	1965-1966	1	-	3
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	India/Pakistan border	1965-1966	112	-	96-78
Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968-1969	2	-	
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 2)	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-1979	1,145	-	6,973-4,031
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	South Vietnam	1973-	278	-	
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel/Syria (Golan)	1974-	227	227	1,450

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Maximum Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Current Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Total UN Troop Contribution</i>
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	1978-	17	-	7,000-5,773
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Egypt/ Israel	1982-(1986)	140	25	2,700
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	Afghanistan/ Pakistan	1988-1990	5	-	50-40
United Nations Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Iran/Iraq	1988-	540	-	408-955
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Namibia	1989-1990	301	-	4,650
Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) <sup>3</sup>	Pakistan	1989-	14	-	70
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	Central America	1989-	173	24	380

<sup>3</sup>The Mine Awareness and Clearance Training Plan (MACTP) for the training of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 1989, is a humanitarian relief assistance programme. The Canadian contribution to the MACTP ended in July 1990.

#### 4. Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948 to Present

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Maximum Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Current Troop Contribution</i>	<i>Total UN Troop Contribution</i>
Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) <sup>4</sup>	Afghanistan/ Pakistan	1990-	1	1	10
United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	Iraq/ Kuwait demilitarized zone	1991-	301	301	1,400
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Western Sahara	1991-	740	- <sup>5</sup>	1,700
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)	Angola	1991-	15	1	600
United Nations Office in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	El Salvador	1991-	1	1	15

<sup>4</sup>Following the termination of UNGOMAP's mandate on 15 March 1990, the UN Secretary-General established OSGAP which includes a small Military Planning Unit to assist the Secretary-General's Representative in his efforts to bring about a political settlement. It is, however, not considered a peacekeeping mission by definition.

<sup>5</sup>Canadian troops will begin deployment to Western Sahara in late 1991. Canadian Brig. General Armand Roy was appointed as the commander of the UN operation.

Source: National Defence, Canada.

## 5. CANADIAN TREATY OBLIGATIONS<sup>1</sup>

### *The Geneva Protocol of 1925*

(Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)

Signed by Canada: 17 June 1925 (Geneva).

Ratified: 6 May 1930.

For Canada the following reservation applies:

The Protocol is binding only as regards states which have both signed and ratified or acceded to it. The Protocol will cease to be binding in regard to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

### *United Nations Charter*

Signed: 26 June 1945.

Ratified: 9 November 1945.

Entered into force for Canada: 9 November 1945.

### *North Atlantic Treaty*

Signed: 4 April 1949, Washington, D.C.

Ratified: 3 May 1949.

Entered into force: 24 August 1949.

### *Partial Test Ban Treaty*

(Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Limited Test Ban Treaty.). Signed by the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom on 5 August 1963 in Moscow.

Signed: 8 August 1963.

Ratified: 28 January 1964.

Entered into force: 10 October 1963.

---

<sup>1</sup> In the arms control, disarmament and defence fields.  
Information Correct effective 23 May 1991.  
Source: External Affairs and International Trade Canada. Legal Affairs Bureau, Treaty section.

## *5. Canadian Treaty Obligations*

### *Outer Space Treaty*

(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.)

Signed: 27 January 1967.

Ratified: 10 October 1967.

Entered into force: 10 October 1967.

### *Non-Proliferation Treaty*

Prohibits non-nuclear weapon signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon signatories from giving nuclear weapons or their technology to non-nuclear weapon states. Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 12 June 1968. Signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968. Canada also has a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by the NPT.

Signed: 23 July 1968.

Ratified: 8 January 1969.

Entered into force for Canada: 5 March 1970.

### *Seabed Arms Control Treaty*

(Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.) Approved by the United Nations General Assembly 7 December 1970.

Signed: 11 February 1971.

Ratified: 17 May 1972.

Entered into force: 18 May 1972.

### *Biological Weapons Convention*

(Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.)

Signed: 10 April 1972, London, Moscow, Washington.

Ratified: 18 September 1972.

Entered into force for Canada: 26 March 1975.

### *ENMOD Convention*

(Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.)

Signed: 18 May 1977, Geneva.

Ratified: 11 June 1981.

Entered into force: 5 October 1978.

Entered into force for Canada: 11 June 1981

*Inhumane Weapons Convention*

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.)

Signed: 10 April 1981.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

*Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident*

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: 19 January 1990.

Entered into force for Canada: 18 February 1990.

*Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency*

Signed: 26 September 1986, Vienna.

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

*Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material*

(Intended to ensure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic storage and transport.)

Signed: 22 September 1980.

Ratified: 21 March 1986.

Entered into force for Canada: 8 February 1987.

*The Antarctic Treaty*

(Guarantees the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and prohibits any activities of a military nature, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material.)

Done at Washington: 1 December 1959.

Entered into force: 23 June 1961.

Acceded: 4 May 1988.

Entered into force for Canada: 4 May 1988.

*Charter of the Organization of American States as amended*

Signed: 30 April 1948, Bogota.

Signed by Canada: 13 November 1989.

Ratified: 8 January 1990.

Entered into force for Canada: 8 January 1990.

*Exchange of Notes Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning renewal of the Agreement affecting the organization and the operation of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)*

Exchange of Notes: 30 April 1991.

Entered into Force: 12 May 1991.

## 5. Canadian Treaty Obligations

*Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. Protocol I with Annexes, Protocol II*

Signed: 8 June 1977, Geneva.

Signed by Canada: 8 June 1977 (Protocol I)

12 December 1977 (Protocol II)

Ratified: 20 November 1990.

Entered into Force for Canada: 20 May 1991.

*Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe with Protocols*

(Provides for reductions in conventional forces in Europe.)

Signed: 19 November 1990, Paris

Ratified: not yet ratified by Canada.

Not yet entered into force.

**6. TREATY ON REDUCING CONVENTIONAL FORCES  
IN EUROPE: NATO AND WARSAW PACT CURRENT  
HOLDINGS AND REQUIRED REDUCTIONS<sup>1</sup>**

	<i>CFE Limits</i>	<i>NATO</i>	<i>ex-GDR<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>CANADA</i>	<i>WTO<sup>3</sup></i>
<i>Tanks</i>	20,000	24,325	2,274	77	31,713
<i>ACVs</i>	30,000	34,230	5,817	277	41,832
<i>Artillery</i>	20,000	20,443	2,140	38	24,754
<i>Aircraft</i>	6,800	5,708	392	45	8,368
<i>Helicopters</i>	2,000	1,719	51	12	1,662

<sup>1</sup>Based on final data exchanged by the parties to the Treaty in February 1991. For more information see: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. "Revised Data Summarized," ViennaFAX 2, no. 5, 28 May 1991: 1-5.

<sup>2</sup>East German equipment holdings are counted as part of NATO holdings. They are included in a separate category here to give some indication of the NATO holdings just prior to the unification of Germany (3 October 1990) and the signing of the CFE Treaty (19 November 1990.)

<sup>3</sup>The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) no longer exists. However, the states that were formerly allied together under the WTO are treated as a group for the purposes of the reductions required by the CFE Treaty.



## 7. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT AND THE EMERGENCIES ACT

### *The National Defence Act*

#### *Section 31*

The Governor in Council may place the Canadian forces, or any component, ...thereof...on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so

- (a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or
- (b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada.

#### *Section 32*

If Parliament is not meeting at the time forces are placed on active service:

...a proclamation shall be issued for the meeting of Parliament within ten days...

### *Part XI, Aid to the Civil Power*

An attorney general of a province may request the aid of the armed forces in instances when:

...a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with...occurs or is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered likely to occur.

*The Emergencies Act, 1988 (replaces the War Measures Act)*

3. For the purposes of this Act, a "national emergency" is an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that:
  - (a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or
  - (b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.

## 8. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE

### UNITED STATES<sup>1</sup>

	<i>Launchers</i>	<i>Warheads</i>	<i>Yield<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>Total Warheads</i>
<i>ICBMs</i>				
Minuteman II	450	1	1.200	450
Minuteman III				
MK-12	200	3	0.170	600
MK-12A	300	3	0.335	900
MX	50	10	0.300	500
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,000</b>			<b>2,450</b>
<i>SLBMs</i>				
Poseidon C-3	176	10	0.050	1,760
Trident I C-4	384	8	0.100	3,072
Trident II D-5	48	8	0.475	384
<b>Total</b>	<b>608</b>			<b>5,216</b>
<i>BOMBERS<sup>3</sup></i>				
B-1B	90	SRAM	0.170	1,100
B-52G/H	154	ALCM	0.05-0.150	1,600
FB-111A	24	Bombs	0.500	1,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>268</b>			<b>4,300</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,876</b>			<b>11,966</b>
<b>START LIMIT</b>	<b>1,600</b>			<b>6,000<sup>4</sup></b>

<sup>1</sup>Source: R.S. Norris, W. Arkin. "US Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1990," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 1, January/February 1991: 48.

<sup>2</sup>In megatonnes.

<sup>3</sup>All bombers carry a mix of weapon systems. The B-52 is the only bomber to carry ALCMs.

<sup>4</sup>This limit does not apply directly to the totals. See Chapter 12 for explanation of sub-limits.

SOVIET UNION<sup>5</sup>

	Launchers	Warheads	Yield <sup>6</sup>	Total Warheads
<hr/>				
<i>ICBMs</i>				
SS-11				
M2	100	1	1.100	100
M3	210	3	0.350	210 <sup>7</sup>
SS-13 M2	30	1	0.750	30
SS-17 M3	50	4	0.750	200
SS-18 M4/5/6	308	10	0.550	3,080
SS-19 M3	250	6	0.550	1,500
SS-24 M1/2	86	10	0.550	860
SS-25	300	1	0.550	300
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,334</b>			<b>6,280</b>
 <i>SLBMs</i>				
SS-N-6 M3	176	2 <sup>8</sup>	1.000	176
SS-N-8 M1/2	286	1	1.500	286
SS-N-17	12	1	1.000	12
SS-N-18 M1/3	224	7	0.500	1,568
SS-N-20	120	10	0.200	1,200
SS-N-23	96	4	0.100	384
<b>Total</b>	<b>914</b>			<b>3,626</b>

<sup>5</sup>Source: R.S. Norris, W. Arkin. "Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1990," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 47, no. 2, March 1991: 49.

<sup>6</sup>In megatonnes.

<sup>7</sup>The SS-11 M3 carries a multiple re-entry vehicle which is counted as one warhead.

<sup>8</sup>The SS-N-6 carries a multiple re-entry vehicle which is counted as one warhead.

	<i>Launchers</i>	<i>Warheads</i>	<i>Yield<sup>9</sup></i>	<i>Total Warheads</i>
<hr/>				
<i>BOMBERS</i>				
Tu-142 Bear H	85	8 ALCM/Bombs <sup>10</sup>	0.250 <sup>11</sup>	680
Tu-160 Blackjack	21	6 ALCM, 8 SRAM/Bombs		294
<b>Total</b>	<b>106</b>			<b>974</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,354</b>			<b>10,880</b>
START Limit	1,600			6,000 <sup>12</sup>

*Acronyms*

ICBM	Intercontinental ballistic missile
SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
ALCM	Air-launched cruise missile
SRAM	Short-range attack missile

---

<sup>9</sup>In megatonnes.

<sup>10</sup>As in the US case, bombers carry a mix of weapon systems.

<sup>11</sup>Estimate of total yield.

<sup>12</sup>This limit does not apply directly to the totals. See Chapter 12 for explanation of sub-limits.



## 9. SUMMARY OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF

### *Resolution 660, 2 August 1990*

Determined that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait constituted a breach of international peace and security, condemned the invasion, demanded an unconditional and immediate Iraqi withdrawal to the positions its forces occupied on 1 August and calls on Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations to resolve their differences.

### *Resolution 661, 6 August 1990*

Noting the right of states to self-defence and the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter which outline the Security Council's options for actions, it was determined that Iraq had failed to comply with Resolution 660. As a result, mandatory economic sanctions are imposed. States are prohibited from importing goods from Iraq or Kuwait and from exporting goods to the two countries. Medical supplies and foodstuffs for humanitarian purposes are excepted. A Committee to monitor progress and compliance with the sanctions is established.

### *Resolution 662, 9 August 1990*

Demands an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal and declares the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait null and void, calling on all states to refrain from any recognition of the annexation.

### *Resolution 664, 18 August 1990*

Demands the release of nationals of third countries from Iraq and Kuwait and that Iraq take no further action to jeopardize their safety.

### *Resolution 665, 25 August 1990*

Calls on states cooperating with Kuwait, by deploying maritime forces to the area to monitor the sanctions, to use measures commensurate with the circumstances to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes.

### *Resolution 666, 13 September 1990*

Requests the Secretary-General to seek information about the sources and availability of food in Kuwait and Iraq. If there are circumstances in which there is an urgent need to supply foodstuffs, the Secretary-General should inform the Council. The Secretary-General should also use his good offices to facilitate delivery and distribution of foodstuffs.

### *Resolution 667, 16 September 1990*

Strongly condemns Iraqi acts against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait and the abduction of foreign nationals from diplomatic premises and demands the immediate release of all foreign nationals.

### *Resolution 669, 24 September 1990*

Entrusts the Committee established to monitor sanctions with the task of examining requests from states for assistance because of hardships experienced due to the sanctions.

*Resolution 670, 25 September 1990*

Establishes regulations relating to aircraft leaving or entering Kuwait or Iraq. States are required to deny permission to aircraft taking off from their territory if the aircraft is carrying cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait. Such aircraft must also be denied permission to overfly state territory unless the aircraft lands at a designated airfield to be inspected. The sanctions committee is to be notified of flights carrying food and medical supplies. States are also asked to detain any ships of Iraqi registry that have been used in violation of Resolution 661 which enter their ports, or deny them entrance to their ports, except in an emergency.

*Resolution 674, 29 October 1990*

Part A of the resolution demands that Iraq stop taking third-state nationals hostage and stop mistreating Kuwaiti nationals. The resolution reminds Iraq of its obligations under international law in this regard and demands that Iraq facilitate the immediate departure of third-state nationals and provide the nationals and Kuwaiti nationals access to food, water and basic services. Part B of the resolution reposes the Security Council's trust in the Secretary-General to use his good offices to pursue a peaceful solution to the crisis.

*Resolution 677, 28 November 1990*

Condemns Iraqi efforts to alter the demographic composition of Kuwait and its destruction of Kuwaiti civil records. The resolution mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of an official Kuwaiti register of the population and to establish rules of access for the register.

*Resolution 678, 29 November 1990*

Authorizes states cooperating with Kuwait to use all necessary means to implement Resolution 660 and subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace and security, if Iraq fails to comply with the resolutions by 15 January 1991. States are required to provide support for actions undertaken and to keep the Security Council regularly informed.

*Resolution 687, 3 April 1991*

In this resolution the Security Council, *inter alia*:

- decides that upon agreement by Iraq to the provisions of the resolution, an official ceasefire is in effect;
- guarantees the inviolability of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait;
- requests that the Secretary-General submit a plan for the deployment of a UN observer unit to monitor the demilitarized zone along the border;
- decides that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction and removal of all its chemical and biological weapons and agents and related components, all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, under international supervision;
- creates a special commission to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's chemical, biological and missile capabilities, Iraq will yield all such material to the special commission;

- demands that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-usable material, or any subsystems or components relating to nuclear weapons;
- demands that Iraq will submit, within fifteen days, a declaration of all chemical, biological, missile sites, as well as the locations, amounts and types of items relating to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-usable material;
- decides that the International Atomic Energy Agency will carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities;
- decides that sanctions regarding sales and financial transactions relating to foodstuffs and materials for essential civilian needs no longer apply, pending notification to the sanctions committee or their approval.

















